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Abstract 
 
The difficulties faced by the United Kingdom in realising its stabilisation objectives in the War in 
Afghanistan (2001-2014) have precipitated a change in rhetorical approach by successive British 
Governments, from one based on liberal normative principles to one that emphasises traditional, 
rationalist precepts of ‘national security interests’. This transformation of ‘narrative’ is identified in 
this work as chronologically analogous with the institutionalisation of ‘strategic communication’ 
practices and doctrine emanating from the defence establishment of the British state. In this work, I 
argue that changes in narrative approach and the emergence of strategic communication can be 
understood as a consequence of an overburdened British state attempting to free itself from a 
‘transnational dilemma’ (King 2010): that is, to find a means of appealing coherently and succinctly 
to the benefits of participation in collective security whilst avoiding threatening the viability of 
collective security membership by acknowledging its costs. This transnational dilemma has been 
exacerbated by intra-state competition over the material and ideational aspects of British strategy in 
Helmand, and is traceable by close empirical analysis of three competing ‘policy narratives’ for 
Afghanistan: stabilisation, counter-narcotics, and counter-terrorism, respectively. Intra-state 
competition can, in turn, be conceptualised as the result of embedded inter-state relationships of 
political obligation and military cooperation referred to by Edmunds (2010) as the 
‘transnationalisation’ of defence policy. UK policy in Afghanistan has been guided by transnational 
issues, specifically the maintenance of NATO as a collective security apparatus and of the ‘special 
relationship’ with the United States, through which Britain secures and projects its national interest. 
I argue that the UK’s grand strategic commitment to transnationalisation underscores an 
‘unstatable’ ultimate policy of meeting the expectations of the United States and NATO, and that the 
development of various policies and narratives for Afghanistan can be understood primarily in such 
terms. In Afghanistan, transnationalisation and the concordant pursuit of satisfying American and 
NATO expectations has come at the cost of a significant divestment of strategic autonomy, which 
has uprooted traditional, nationally-based concepts of strategy and policy to the transnational level 
and resulted in a strategic vacuum wherein intra-state competition has flourished. This, I argue, has 
compromised the ability for Britain to link policy to operations (to ‘do’ strategy)d in Afghanistan, a 
point which can be empirically measured by reference to the discordant and contradictory aspects of 
aforementioned policy narratives, which have been rooted in the institutional interests of various 
elements of the state. Strategic communication has arisen out of this situation as a means for the 
state to overcome the transnational dilemma by promoting a unified ‘strategic narrative’ for 
Afghanistan that has reconfigured the narrative for the conflict to one that emphasises the conflict 
not in terms of collective security but in ‘national’ terms. This work concludes by arguing that, in 
sidestepping rather than confronting the core dilemmas of British strategy, the emergence of 
strategic communication can be seen as posing as many problems as solutions for the UK state.  
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CHAPTER 1: STRATEGY, COMMUNICATION, AND 
‘STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION’  
5 
 
 
 
At the time of completion of writing (April 2015), Britain’s war in Afghanistan has 
come to an end. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the world has witnessed 
thirteen years of intervention, making the conflict one of the longest in the modern histories 
of all of its participants. Alongside the United States and the United Kingdom, the conflict 
has involved a coalition of forty-eight other states within and without the UN-mandated 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which in turn ran alongside the US-led 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) tasked with decimating or destroying international 
terrorist networks and stabilising the country. As the conflict wore on, strategies and 
operational approaches have moved from narrow counter-terrorist missions to ‘population-
centric’ counterinsurgency operations, and have spread beyond the frontiers of Afghanistan 
into neighbouring Pakistan. The war has proven costly for many of these contributors, with 
over 3,000 coalition deaths between them. For the UK, Afghanistan has resulted in 453 
troop deaths and over 2,000 wounded in action and, according to one estimate by the Royal 
United Services Institute, has come at a material cost of around £20 billion (Wright 2014: 
online). Statistics are scarce regarding the number of dead insurgents, but is thought to be 
in the tens of thousands (Dawi 2014: online). Similar figures must be considered likely in 
relation to Afghan and Pakistani civilians and security forces. 
Given the magnitude of the intervention and the depth of British involvement, it is 
natural that questions about the efficacy of the mission have become commonplace as the 
war draws to a conclusion. What effect has intervention had, and to what extent has it been 
successful? Of course, any answer to such questions must be prefaced by the simple fact 
that history is still being written on the fate of the country and its state, and whether the 
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state will be able to maintain or expand its security writ over the country rests largely on its 
ability to consolidate its own authority and reach settlements with competing power bases 
in the country. Additionally, any answer regarding what has been achieved in Afghanistan 
depends almost entirely upon how one understands the purpose of the mission and, from 
that, how one measures ‘success’. Increasingly, political leaders of states involved in 
Afghanistan have employed ‘narratives’ that have claimed that the mission has been 
successful, and have done so by emphasising the baseline successes of preventing Afghan-
centric international terrorism and the building up of the Afghan National Security Forces 
(ANSF) as a means of continuing such efforts in anticipation of ISAF’s departure at the end of 
2014. Indeed, by this preferred metric, one may observe considerable achievements. At a 
minimal level, intervention in Afghanistan has realised its immediate goals: first and 
foremost, al Qaeda have been largely dismantled or at least pushed out of Afghanistan, and 
the ability of Islamist extremist groups to plan and/or carry out terrorist attacks from the 
country have been largely mitigated for the time being. Secondly, the Taliban have been 
removed from power and, whatever the threat they pose to the current Afghan state now 
and after 2014, it is unlikely that they will ever recover (as currently constituted) the power 
they held over large parts of Afghanistan as they did prior to September 2001. This is so in 
no small part due to a third achievement of fostering the  improvement of the capabilities of 
the ANSF, which ISAF has trained and which has taken over responsibility for Afghan security 
in time for ISAF’s drawdown. 
These accomplishments are somewhat muted, however, when one considers that the 
first two were achieved within months of the beginning of the intervention in October 2001. 
Indeed, the majority of the history of the international community’s involvement in the war 
in Afghanistan is a story of efforts not directly related to counter-terrorism. Rather, ISAF has 
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been primarily concerned with ‘stabilising’ the Afghan state and assisting it in securing and 
buttressing its authority over its territory. To present the ‘end-game’ of Afghanistan in 
purely security terms, as is now the wont of statesmen and women across the coalition, is to 
provide a highly revised and reductive account of the campaign but, crucially, also an 
instrumental one that to some extent justifies the costs of intervention. The problem with 
such narratives is that, in order to portray the Afghan mission as ultimately successful, they 
omit large parts of the history of the conflict. ISAF’s mission was far broader than the 
narrow national security retrospectives many officials now focus upon, so much so that the 
stabilisation mission in Afghanistan expanded over time to include commitments to 
practically every conceivable area of state jurisdiction, from the sustainability of its security 
forces to the development of a myriad of governance capabilities. Such efforts have, in 
effect, constituted ISAF’s strategy for Afghanistan, and on this basis there are significant 
grounds to question the claims of success made by Government officials.  
Despite (or, as I will argue, reflective of) the revisionist narratives of today, delivering 
stabilising effects has been a fundamental strategic problem for the UK over the last decade, 
and is one that calls into question the viability of the operating model. Ultimately, Britain 
and ISAF’s strategies for Afghanistan have always been dependent on the ability of the 
Afghan state to resolve its own internal problems, leading to a general strategic dilemma 
regarding the suitability of stabilisation, specifically of relating the use of military force to 
achieve what was, in essence, a political objective. At the same time, there appear few 
options available to states in their efforts to prevent terrorist attacks other than stabilisation 
(Paris 2010:340). However one assesses the merit of ISAF’s presence in Afghanistan, it 
should be clear that the strategic methodology by which it sought to facilitate the 
stabilisation of Afghanistan holds significant flaws. For the UK in particular, experiences of 
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Afghan stabilisation have precipitated a crisis of confidence in its ability to devise strategy to 
meet the demands of an increasingly unpredictable world. The difficulties Britain and its 
partners have faced in stabilising Afghanistan have manifested themselves in discursive 
terms – what state officials say – in a way that downplays much of the norm-based content 
of the stabilisation agenda. This work is about understanding this revisionism as a 
consequence of the difficulties of strategy in the contemporary era; specifically, how 
communication has been shaped by strategic dilemmas.  
This introductory chapter provides context to this issue by inquiring how these 
problems of strategy came about. It argues that the root problem for the UK lies in the 
institutional and normative conditions in which stabilisation and state-building models have 
been inculcated; specifically, a divestment of strategy above the national level and a limiting 
of strategic possibilities to liberal normative options because of the way collective security 
mechanisms work. This has led to a conceptual blurring of ideas of interests and values and 
of ‘collective’ and ‘national’ which, I argue, has fundamentally affected British strategy in 
Afghanistan by confounding the terms of reference by which strategists do their work. A 
traditional, linear understanding of strategy begins at the identity and interests of an actor 
or set of actors and proceeds from this starting point to devise policies, from which 
strategies, operations and tactics are made. Under circumstances where the actors or 
interests are not easily divisible, strategy can become confused and unclear and, what is 
more, cannot be easily articulated. It is in this context that so-called ‘strategic 
communication’ (SC) institutional processes and practices have emerged as a discursive 
means of ‘plugging the gap’ in strategic thinking. It is this instrumental use of 
communications that makes it ostensibly strategic. In the chapters that follow, I will argue 
that SC can be understood as a response by the UK state to the problems of collective 
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security strategy in Afghanistan typified by ‘transnational dilemmas’. I then apply this 
concept to the various policies pursued by the UK in Afghanistan. 
 
The State of British Strategy  
The UK has in recent years undergone a period of self-reflection and recrimination 
concerning its apparent lack of strategic capability. Criticism of Britain’s strategic acumen 
has coincided with an expansion of UK activities in Afghanistan since 2006 and the 
emergence of subsequent operational shortcomings. Indeed, one may quite reasonably 
deduce that, given the centrality of Afghanistan to British defence interests over the last 
decade and a half, it is the war in Afghanistan that has served as the crucible for the British 
state’s realisation of its strategic limitations. This view is borne out by reference to 
chronological comparison of Britain’s struggles in Afghanistan with the prevalence of critical 
reports from within the UK’s political establishment regarding Government’s approach to 
the conflict, as well as with scholarly articles in recent years that have questioned the 
viability of the UK’s strategic posture (Strachan 2005, 2006, 2008). In February 2007, Field 
Marshal Sir Peter Inge voiced his concern that Britain had ‘lost the ability to think 
strategically’ (Betz & Cormack 2009:320). This sentiment was echoed by then-Chief of the 
Defence Staff Jock Stirrup in December 2009, when he declared that Britain had ‘lost an 
institutionalised capacity for, and culture of, strategic thought’ and offered the advice that 
‘[a]ll we do at the tactical and operational level needs to be rooted in good strategic soil, 
and therefore in our national interest’ (Stirrup 2009: online). In October 2010, the House of 
Commons Public Administration Select Committee released its review of Britain’s strategic 
capabilities, titled ‘Who Does UK Strategy?’, which opined that Britain has ‘simply fallen out 
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of the habit’ of all things strategic (PASC 2010:3). In that report, the Committee drew upon 
the testimony of Sir Robert Fry, who argued that Britain had  
‘[fallen] out of the habit of Grand Strategy, and I think that is what happened 
to us in the second part of the 20th century. Also larger strategies that were 
extra-national—so NATO, the cold war—took over and really took the place of 
any Grand Strategy’ (2010:14). 
Both Stirrup and Fry’s remarks contained within them an intimation that Britain’s 
difficulties with strategic thought were – at least in part – the result of the interests 
supporting them not being sufficiently ‘national’, seemingly as a consequence of a 
divestment of strategic responsibility from the national to the transnational level, and, in 
Fry’s case in particular, a concomitant hardwiring of collective security logic over and above 
any semblance of a distinctively ‘national’ strategy. Furthermore, for Fry the atrophying of 
British strategic autonomy is nothing new; rather, it has been a multi-generational process 
spanning at least the last half century and most of the history of NATO. This point raises an 
important question, however: if Britain has been operating under such logic for so long, why 
is it that this alleged divestment of strategic authority to the transnational level has only 
recently produced an awareness of a fundamental ‘loss of capacity’ for strategy? Why now? 
The institutional makeup of British defence policy is clearly important in deducing ‘who 
makes UK strategy’, but it does not provide one with an answer as to what animates the 
strategic process at the level of organising concepts.  
Providing such an answer therefore requires an analysis of what is conceptually 
different about contemporary strategic circumstances in relation to those of the Cold War, 
which is of course the emphasis placed on combatting non-state terrorism as an 
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international security issue of the highest order. Along these lines, the most enduring 
strategic dilemma for the UK in the twenty-first century has been determining the best 
response to international terrorism. For illustrative purposes, it is worth considering the 
UK’s responses to this question in terms of a rough binary between liberal and illiberal 
approaches. The first approach, in line with liberal peace theory, is to extrapolate that failed 
states breed terrorism, and that the problem of terrorism is foundationally the result of 
political and economic illiberalism (Doyle 1986, O’Neal et al 1996). From this premise, it 
becomes incumbent to posit that the long-term solution to terrorism is political and 
economic reform (generally in the guise of liberalisation and democratisation), and 
therefore to develop policies and strategies that focus on underlying issues – that is, to treat 
terrorism as a symptom of a broader diagnosis of socio-economic illness stemming from 
weak governance and underdevelopment. The second approach to global security is 
combine comparatively straightforward counter-terrorist activity, typically consisting of air 
strikes and limited covert operations in conjunction with the development and maintenance 
of indigenous security apparatuses and forms of state governance (West 2011, Gentile 
2011a, 2011b, King 2010a, McCrisken 2011). These positions typically give greater credence 
to the utility of military force than those of the stabilisation and human security schools. 
Articulations of this kind have grown in frequency amongst commentators and state officials 
in recent years, and similar sentiments can be observed in the revisionist explanations of 
politicians who have increasingly framed the Afghan campaign in more sparse counter-
terrorist language. Indeed, this work will make the revised character of this approach quite 
clear, since the emergence of a more limited counter-terrorist retrospective for Afghanistan 
can be traced as taking place in conjunction with the gradual disappearance of liberal 
normative explanations.  
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Understanding these two perspectives in binary terms is useful in this work because 
British strategy for Afghanistan (and the way in which strategy has been communicated) has 
gradually but (so I will argue) decisively moved from the first approach to the second 
between 2001 and 2014. We may see this movement as an attempt by the British state to 
simultaneously extricate itself from less successful aspects of liberal state-building in 
Afghanistan and to maintain – and possibly strengthen – its domestic argument for staying 
in Afghanistan and, by consequence, staying true to its obligations to the collective security 
framework of NATO. The story of Afghanistan, simply put, is that British strategy – grounded 
as it is in collective security frameworks and bounded by liberal normative precepts – has 
become confounded by the state’s attempts to meet the challenges of international 
terrorism by over-rationalisation of the means (stabilisation) by which to do so. This was so 
to the extent that the stabilisation of Afghanistan at points appeared to trump counter-
terrorism aims and this is in part because the collective security mechanism of NATO 
operates on the basis of a common denominator of liberal institutionalism. Stabilisation 
was, in this sense, strategically appealing to NATO members because it reflected their own 
assumptions about how their individual and collective power should be wielded. As both a 
leader and follower of institutional and normative principles, the UK has for much of the last 
two decades locked itself into a line of thinking that declares that the best way to respond 
to the security challenges states face in the contemporary era is through concerted action 
that places its faith in liberalisation and democratisation. More specifically, Britain relies on 
collective security actions coordinated around and constituted by liberal frameworks. What 
is significant about Britain’s defence posture is that it implies a divestment of autonomy to 
the transnational level and, therefore, a significant narrowing of strategic options that has 
extended only to those that accord with liberal principles.  
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Thus, the problematic of strategy expressed by Fry, Stirrup and others within the 
British establishment – that strategy must be grounded in national interests – is one made 
more complicated because British strategy appears to be driven by a mixture of collective 
security interests and liberal interventionist principles. This is so to the extent that terms 
like ‘national’ and ‘interests’ have lost much of their utility as foundational nomenclatural 
units of strategic theorising. This in turn is because Britain’s adherence to strategic thinking 
within the purviews of collective mechanisms and liberal principles has progressively eroded 
ideas of the ‘national’ and ‘interest’ over the last two decades, to the point where they are 
understood by policymakers as indistinguishable from the collective security mechanisms 
and liberal principles through which British strategy is made. As such, a national interest is 
also a collective interest, and vice versa; what is a value is an interest, and vice versa; and so 
on. The terminology of strategy has lost its distinctiveness, and so thinking about strategy 
has become more challenging; and this has occurred because of the socialising aspects of 
collective security membership, which provides the UK with the means by which its 
‘national’ interests can be realised.  
In the next chapter, I make the case for this multi-nationalisation of defence policy in 
Afghanistan as being in fact more akin to what Timothy Edmunds (2010) has dubbed the 
‘transnationalisation’ of defence policy, with the implication that a loss of national 
autonomy over strategic direction has gradually led to a reduction in the ability of British 
policymakers to recognise what ‘national interests’ are and, as a result, the loss of capacity 
for theorising about national strategy described by various officials above. Because British 
national interests – tied up as they are in the promotion of the rule of law and liberal norms 
– are difficult to separate from those of the international community, and because to set 
about separating those interests would be in many ways antithetical to Britain’s interests, it 
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would appear that the options for reconstituting Britain’s interests as nationally-based are 
practically and conceptually limited. The blurring of values with interests and ‘national’ with 
‘international’ indicates that Britain’s ‘interests are not defined well enough to impart a 
meaningful idea of strategy’ (Ritchie 2014:88). This issue of definition is key: if one cannot 
easily define where ‘national’ interests end and ‘transnational’ interests begin, how can one 
hope to devise a distinctively ‘national’ strategy? If strategy exists beyond the level of the 
state, improving strategic capabilities at the level of the state will be a difficult task. Again, 
the issues informing British strategy are complex and multi-faceted. This work does not aim, 
nor is it designed, to provide an account for or a solution to all of these issues. Rather, it 
focuses on why strategy is so difficult (and difficult to articulate) for the UK and how 
strategy for Afghanistan, devised under conditions of collective security, has been 
communicated. More precisely, this work is interested in the historical development and 
performance of ‘strategic communication’ practices by the British state in relation to the 
war in Afghanistan and how these practices can be understood as consequences of the 
shaping effects of collective security on British defence policy. 
 
Introducing Afghanistan 
Although never colonised in the same manner as other central and south Asian 
countries, the modern Afghan state is very much a creation borne out of great power 
rivalry. A land occupied by a number of different ethnic, linguistic and religious groups, it is a 
country whose borders were defined by, and whose sense of national identity was forged in 
response to western great power competition (Rubin 2006:177; Barfield 2010:1). Its 
geopolitical position – landlocked, mountainous, and surrounded by past great powers and 
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present regional rivals – lends Afghanistan a dual role of geographic obscurity and great 
strategic significance, and has as such frequently been treated as little more than a buffer 
state between empires and a proxy of local powers. Its shared historical border with Russia 
and British India made it an object of imperial intrigue and, by consequence, has been 
subject to five European military interventions in the last 175 years. The first three 
interventions of these occurred during the era of ‘the Great Game’ in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, in which Britain and Russia (latterly the Soviet Union) competed 
for influence and control over Afghan politics in order to protect their respective imperial 
holdings in India and central Asia. The fourth and fifth interventions, ranging from the late 
1970s to the present day, similarly involved attempts by Soviets and then by an American-
led international coalition to remove political leaders acting against their interests and to 
protect their favoured candidates. The unifying feature of all these conflicts was the idea of 
Afghanistan as the site of potential threats to the interests and security of more powerful 
states. 
Britain’s legacy in Afghanistan in particular set the tone for the country’s historical 
pattern of conflict and political contestation, fuelling both the intermittent emergence of 
Afghan national consciousness and a fractious political lineage that saw thirteen amirs in 
just eighty years. Interventions by the Empire during the Great Game set the conditions for 
the assassination of ostensibly national leaders by their compatriots (Shah Shuja Durrani in 
the First war) or their exile by the British (Shere Ali Khan and Ayub Khan in the Second). 
Despite the British achieving their aim of protecting India in the second and third conflicts 
by maintaining Afghanistan as either a pro-British buffer state or as a neutral party, the 
Afghan narrative tends to emphasise successes such as the massacre of British forces 
retreating from Kabul to Jalalabad in 1842, the defeat of British and Indian forces at 
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Maiwand in 1880, and the gaining of sovereignty in foreign affairs in 1919. Soviet 
intervention in the late 1970s and 1980s further buttressed this identity of resistance, and 
the failure and ultimate overthrow of the Communist-backed Najibullah government, as 
well as the collapse of the Soviet Union shortly after their drawdown from Afghanistan, led 
to a sense amongst the victorious mujahidin of the country as the ‘graveyard of empires’ 
(Bearden 2001).  
Afghanistan’s modern history should thus be seen as inextricably linked to the ebbs 
and flows of great power politics. Each intervention exacerbated extant internal power 
struggles between rival elite individuals and groups vying for nominal control over the 
country. Foreign intervention in Afghanistan was met on each occasion with fierce 
resistance from tribal militias coalesced around religion; as has been remarked upon by one 
historian of the country, the threat of external domination has been one of the few means 
of uniting its disparate population around the concept of an Afghan ‘nation’, and in most 
cases this shared sense of identity cohered around religion, not nationalism (Barfield 
2010:133,242). Indeed, the presence of intervening powers and the development of the 
Afghan state may be seen as mutually supporting: whilst most Afghan leaders throughout 
the last two centuries have asserted their sovereignty over the country, the reality has in 
most circumstances been one of competing tribal chiefs and/or ‘warlords’ rather than a 
single dominant leader (Goodhand 2004:156). Where leaders have managed to cohere the 
disparate tribal and ethnic groupings of the country under one banner – most notably under 
the regime of Dost Mohamed Khan (1826-1839, 1845-1863) – this was due in large part to 
their diplomatic abilities of compromise and co-optation with Afghanistan’s regional power-
brokers (Barfield 2010:134). In other cases, such as that of the reign of Abdurrahman (1880-
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1901), power was maintained by an unflinching ‘internal imperialism’ and the use of 
punitive force against rebellious factions (Saikal 2012:37-39).  
The challenges of maintaining and projecting centralised power in Afghanistan allow 
us to see the relationship of its leaders with world or regional powers in the last two 
centuries as one of mutual exploitation. Throughout the Great Game and the Cold War, 
whilst the British/Americans and Russians/Soviets would use threats and bribes (and 
occasionally force) to compel Afghan rulers to comply with their geopolitical needs, Afghan 
rulers themselves often deftly manipulated those powers to maintain and extend their own 
power (Barfield 2010:206). The pattern followed by Afghan leaders from the nineteenth 
century to the present day is remarkably similar in the respect that most have relied upon a 
rentierist economic model, seeking external aid in order to sustain the cost of security and 
administration (Rubin 1992). As Barfield has stated, the plan of modern rulers was ‘to warm 
Afghanistan with the heat generated by the great power conflicts without getting drawn 
into them directly’ (2010:206). Abdurrahman, for example, used British subsidies to fund his 
military campaigns against rebellious factions; the Musahiban rulers of the mid-twentieth 
century used American capital to develop its nascent economic infrastructure and Soviet 
finance to bolster its armed forces; and, following the overthrow of the last royal leader of 
Afghanistan, Mohamed Daoud, in 1978, the quasi-communist leadership of Babrak Karmal, 
Hafizullah Amin, Nur Muhammad Taraki, and Mohammad Najibullah during the late 1970s 
and 1980s relied in the main on Soviet money and military assistance in its ultimately failed 
attempt to implement socialist policies and put down the American, Saudi and Pakistani-
backed mujahidin (Barfield 2010:153; Giustozzi 2009:32).  
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These trends continued into the post-Cold War period in respect to both the Taliban 
movement (essentially directed and funded by Pakistan), the Northern Alliance (funded 
largely by former Soviet central Asian states) and the regime of Hamid Karzai (maintained in 
economic and military terms by the American-led, NATO-operated International Security 
Assistance Force and the wider international community) (Saikal 2012:221-231). In the 
former cases, occurring in the main in the period of civil war between 1992 and 2001, 
rentierism was limited to the maintenance of proxy parties and the continuation of conflict. 
By contrast, the ISAF mission bore similarities with the Soviet-backed socialist regimes of the 
1980s, insofar as it focused huge amounts of capital and military resources on stabilisation 
and state-building efforts (Braithwaite 2011:146-168). Both intervening parties made the 
error of ignoring Afghanistan’s political history and focused their efforts on bolstering the 
authority of a centralised state, both promoted policies that were deemed ‘universal’ in 
their application and were, unsurprisingly given such hubris, vulnerable to accusations by 
Afghan opposition to being alien and imperialistic ideologies, and both expended enormous 
amounts of blood and treasure in order to sustain the regimes they supported.  
 
Situating UK Strategy and Communication on Afghanistan 
The UK’s struggle to locate a coherent strategy for Afghanistan should, therefore, be 
seen firstly in the light of the historical problematic of Afghan state-building. This is 
important in narrative terms because difficulties of defining strategy imply similar 
challenges in explaining strategy. As with its efforts to ‘think’ strategically, Britain’s ability to 
explain the strategy(ies) for the war in Afghanistan have been frequently criticised by 
various commentators. For example, in scholar David Betz’s view ‘[t]he most strategically 
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debilitating aspect of the Afghan campaign has always been the incoherence of the 
mission’s purpose… the question ‘‘why are we in Afghanistan?’’ has never really been 
settled in public consciousness’ (2011:615). Former officer Frank Ledwidge has voiced 
similar concerns at the lack of coherent communication on Afghan strategy, which he, like 
Betz, saw as the result of a lack of strategy to connect communications to. For him, 
communicating a message of ‘constant, steady, positive movement forward’ in Afghanistan 
has been the response to an ‘absence of credible measures to counter the tactics of the 
Taliban’ (2011:86). These writers have argued that strategy has been lacking, and that 
communication has at times sought to fill the void where strategy should be. Such concerns 
were highlighted by the House of Commons Defence Committee as far back as July 2007 in a 
report criticising the state of government communications on the purpose of Britain’s role in 
Afghanistan. The Committee drew upon the testimony of academic Gilbert Greenall, who 
noted the existence of four different strands of policy emanating from Government – 
counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, stabilisation and democratisation – and concluded by 
arguing that this had ‘confused’ the British public as to the purpose of the Afghan mission 
and, as a result, hindered public support (Defence Committee 2007a:41,Ev91). In its 
response to the report in October 2007, the Brown Government stressed that it did 
‘recognise the importance of a greater understanding on the part of the British public about 
why it is crucial to get Afghanistan right’ and the ‘need to explain what we are trying to 
achieve’ (Defence Committee 2007b:11). In other words, what was expressed by both 
Government and its critics was the idea that the degree to which strategy is communicated 
has a strategic aspect of its own: being unable to articulate clearly why a state is pursuing a 
certain policy and how activities undertaken to a given end contribute to its realisation can 
be detrimental to strategy.  
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The effectiveness of state communications on Afghanistan has been measured. UK 
opinion polls during the period in which the Committee’s report was published bear out 
public uncertainty about the conflict, with support for the conflict averaging between 30 to 
40 percent between 2006 and 2007; a majority (75 and 65 percent, respectively) of those 
polled in August 2007 thought that the conflict was not being won and that British troops 
should be brought home from Afghanistan (Kriner and Wilson 2010:13-14, YouGov 2007). 
More significantly for the purposes of communicating ‘why we are in Afghanistan’ are the 
results of an ICM/BBC poll carried out in September 2006, which revealed a lack of clarity 
amongst those polled of the reasons for the Helmand campaign. Of 1,011 respondents, 63 
percent thought that British forces were there ‘to help the Afghan government fight the 
Taliban’, 71 percent thought they were there ‘as part of the international fight against Al 
Qaeda terrorists’, and 46 percent thought the main purpose of deployment was ‘to help 
stop the flow of drugs grown in Afghanistan’. Another ten percent stated that they ‘don’t 
know why the troops have been sent there’ (ICM/BBC 2006:2). A similar poll – asking the 
same question – was conducted in July of 2009, with similar results. Of 1,000 respondents, 
80 and 78 percent understood the conflict as helping the Afghan government fight the 
Taliban and as part of the fight against Al Qaeda. Interestingly, although by this point a 
relatively un-emphasised aspect of the campaign, 58 percent of those polled stated that 
they viewed counter-narcotics as a main reason for British operations (ICM/Guardian/BBC 
2009:4). Such poll data indicates the possibility of mixed messaging on the purpose of the 
Afghan campaign. Indeed, much of this work’s empirical findings (chapters 4 – 7) 
demonstrate that inconsistency of messaging has been a major issue for the UK in 
Afghanistan, fluctuating between the three themes offered by the ICM/BBC poll: 
Afghanistan has been described as a stabilisation mission, a counter-terrorism mission, and 
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a counter-narcotics mission. While some scholars have sought to establish British 
communications on Afghanistan as relatively consistent over time (at least in comparison 
with some of its allies in continental Europe) (see Ringsmose and Borgesen 2011), that 
perspective is not borne out by this analysis. On the contrary, this work argues that until at 
least late 2008, British communication efforts on Afghanistan were highly fractured and 
inconsistent. 
If the explanatory capabilities of communication on Afghanistan are contingent upon 
the coherence of strategy for Afghanistan, making sense of the problems of communication 
evidently encountered by the British state therefore requires some contextualisation of the 
strategic issues faced. There are several possible explanations worth considering. In the 
following section these are placed into two broad themes of Afghan domestic politics and 
the politics of the international community.  These themes should be understood as inter-
related as a crisis of liberal interventionism and can as indicative (and constitutive) of the 
difficulties of contemporary state-building strategy. Indeed, in recent years scholarship on 
state-building has taken an increasingly downbeat tone. Previously, scholarship had been 
largely optimistic and prescriptive regarding state-building in Afghanistan and elsewhere, 
and is well-encapsulated by reference to Fearon and Laitin’s (2004) and Krasner’s (2004) 
respective concepts of ‘neo-trusteeship’ and ‘shared sovereignty’ where, as the names 
imply, the international community acts as a senior partner or beneficiary to a newly 
constituted administration as a means of addressing the problems of failed states. Their 
works advocated such concepts for human and national security reasons and was situated in 
a time where, so Krasner contended, ‘American leaders simply cannot ignore humanitarian 
crises’ (2004:96). Whilst occasional assessments of the difficulties of stabilising Afghanistan 
persist in downplaying the notion that liberal ideas themselves were the core impediment 
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to a feasible state-building strategy in Afghanistan (see Fukuyama 2006), events have since 
transpired to dampen and possibly even discredit the prospects of Afghan state-building in 
academia and in the wider public, to the extent that some have posited the emergence of a 
‘post-liberal peace’ – where state-building actors have a ‘contradictory desire to intervene 
but also to avoid political responsibility’ as an alternative to the shortcomings of practices 
based upon a ‘depoliticized and reified understanding’ of the state formation (Chandler 
2010:55, Goodhand and Sedra 2013:242). Scholarship now is often centred on narratives 
that note the internal contradictions of state-building theory and highlight the hubris of 
liberal state-building in practice, arguing it operates on a Kantian footing that stresses the 
universal applicability of the western state model and that ignores the local and particular, 
and as such helped create nominally liberal security states that exacerbated violent tensions 
within the countries they sought to stabilise (Paris 2009, Richmond 2010). These scholars 
share a view that the state-building project in Afghanistan was one of creating a legitimate, 
pro-western and ostensibly democratic central authority on the assumption that such 
concepts were universally applicable.  As such, so the argument goes, the international 
community massively underestimated the difficulties of state-building and greatly 
overstretched themselves in the commitments made to Afghanistan, and that they did so 
because ‘strategies’ for Afghanistan rested on assumptions of the universal applicability of 
liberal state-building.  
A corollary of the universalist approach was that the international community from 
the start (meaning from the Bonn Conference of late 2001) fundamentally misunderstood 
the nature of an Afghan society deeply ravaged by decades of conflict, and failed to foresee 
the malign effects state-building ventures would have on the country. Specifically, the Bonn 
Conference, which set out the parameters of the post-invasion Afghan state, implemented a 
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centralised state system onto a state whose experience of such was limited, and where the 
success of such a system in extending its authority beyond the major cities was predicated 
on coercion and the use of force. As noted in the previous section, however, this has rarely 
been a credible option for Afghan rulers or their international backers, and was even less so 
under the self-imposed restrictions of liberal war-fighting and state-building. Rather, re-
creating a centralised state required Afghan and international actors to enter into the same 
methods of co-optation and compromise as those of the past; as Amin Saikal argued, in 
necessitating these kind of measures – as opposed to implementing a looser, federal system 
of governance – the centralisation of the Afghan state ‘paved the way for a reconstitution of 
a ruling order based on tribal elements and ‘strongmen’’ (2012:222, 226). This produced 
something of a paradox for state-builders, as the creation of a strong, central state capable 
of implementing liberal policies across Afghanistan came at the cost of entering into 
alliances with ‘warlords’ known for their illiberal and coercive political approaches and illicit 
economic activities (Maley 2006:22-23).  
Another unintended but unavoidable consequence of centralised state-building 
identified by scholars is the re-constitution of the rentier state in Afghanistan (Rubin 1992, 
2006; Suhrke 2013:271). Post-Bonn, Afghanistan returned to its historical norm of 
maintaining the state via the extraction of external security and development rents, without 
which it would almost certainly implode due to the ruinous state of its economy and 
taxation system. For William Maley (2013:258), this new rentierism differed from previous 
patronage systems at the state level insofar as it was fuelled by an unprecedented influx of 
capital and resources into the country. This had the effect of introducing regulated systems 
of ‘neopatrimonalism’, where ‘departments were to be distributed as rewards to the various 
factions that took part in the [Bonn] conference, and there had to be enough rewards to go 
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around’. In other words, the structure of the post-invasion Afghan state was, to a great 
extent, defined not by the demands of good governance, the needs of the country or the 
demands of post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction – the purposes for which the 
centralised model was chosen to promote – but rather by the first-order need to avoid the 
derailment of the centralised state by co-opting regional power brokers. Because of the 
imperative of shoring up a nascent state by securing support from potential competitors, 
the gulf between the ends of liberal state-building and the patrimonial, illiberal means 
required to facilitate its functioning can therefore be seen to a certain extent as inevitable. 
A major issue, however, was that the patrimonial linkages created by the state for its 
regional proxies was not comprehensive, as it did not extend to the Taliban’s Pashtun 
heartland and, as such, fuelled resentment and alienation as much as they placated and co-
opted extra-state power brokers (Starr 2006:117). Key players in the Northern Alliance – the 
primarily Tajik opposition to the Taliban – received prestigious posts within the state, whilst 
the predominantly Pashtun Taliban were themselves excluded from such arrangements. 
Because those rewarded by the state tended to be given ministerial or governorial roles in 
cities, the conflict dynamic tended to reflect an urban – rural divide similar to that of the 
Soviet occupation (Maley 2013:264). Along this reading, the neo-Taliban insurgency was in 
many ways a product of the political miscalculations and deficiencies of post-invasion state-
building activities. Given this starting point, such a view concludes that the strategic 
problems encountered by the international community in Afghanistan were, to a large 
degree, problems created by (or at the very least exacerbated by) the state-builders 
themselves. They misread Afghan politics in a way that reflected their own philosophical 
assumptions about the state and society.  
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As these assumptions stemmed from the institutional makeup of those that held 
them, understanding this misreading requires an assessment of the politics of the 
international community. Strategy in Afghanistan suffered because the coalition effort, 
comprised of multiple national actors and the United Nations, rarely took on the form of a 
unified effort. Part of the reason for this was a divergence of opinion between actors as to 
the ultimate purpose – counter-terrorism or state-building – of the intervention. In the first 
years of the Afghan campaign, the United States’ Bush Administration remained staunchly 
opposed to what it called ‘nation building’ and opted instead to pursue a policy of capture-
or-kill missions against suspected terrorists. For the United Nations and most of the United 
States’ European NATO allies, however, state-building was considered a necessary element 
of any counter-terrorist strategy (Saikal 2012:226). This difference of opinion was manifest 
from the start by the creation of two parallel missions – the US-led, counter-terrorism-
focused Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the stabilisation missions of the European 
Union, United Nations (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)) and 
NATO (International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)) – engaged in seemingly incompatible 
aims of military prosecution and peace building (Suhrke 2013:272). Opinion on the impact of 
this dual approach varies. Some scholars have noted, along lines similar to those critiquing 
the state-building efforts of the international community that the approach taken by the 
UN, EU and ISAF was too ambitious, naïve and unrealistic, and therefore bound to fall short 
of their liberal political and economic goals (see, for example, Betz 2011, Rynning 2012, 
Ledwidge 2013). They advocated in varying degrees the necessity of paring down the 
international community’s state-building efforts to core, security-centric capacity building 
within the Afghan National Security Forces. Others, such as Giustozzi, argue to the contrary: 
that it was the insufficiencies of state-building approaches vis-à-vis OEF’s counter-terrorist 
26 
 
approach that led to subsequent failures in UN and ISAF efforts; specifically, that a 
disproportionate focus on counter-terrorism missions meant that opportunities of peace-
building were irreparably compromised (2009:303-304). 
Within the NATO alliance, similar problems emerged relating to different political 
perspectives about the purpose of the Afghan mission and its ultimate referent object – 
whether it was primarily about the interests of the coalition member states or concerned in 
the main with Afghanistan itself – and, from that, the methods to be employed in pursuit of 
one or another objective. This was not merely a debate bounded by strategic necessity, 
however; rather, such debates stemmed as much from institutional disagreements over 
who would or could do what in Afghanistan, which in turn arose from the differences in 
political constitutions and cultural attitudes towards counterinsurgency and counter-
terrorism. These ‘national caveats’ or ‘red cards’ of participation created significant 
problems for NATO in Afghanistan, both political, in terms of the relations between states 
and the abiding sense amongst some that others were ‘free-riding’ on the collective security 
system and, and strategic and operational, in the sense that command-and-control 
capabilities and cohesion between forces were limited by the engagement restrictions 
placed on certain armed forces (Saideman and Auerswald 2012:67-69). Indeed, the 
disproportionate burden placed on combat-oriented states like the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and several new member states in Eastern Europe led to political 
statements denouncing Europe’s perceived transgressors of collective security participation; 
former US Defence Secretary Robert Gates argued, for example, that NATO had effectively 
become a ‘two-tier alliance’ ‘between members who specialize in ‘soft’ humanitarian, 
development, peacekeeping and talking tasks and those conducting the ‘hard’ combat 
missions -- between those willing and able to pay the price and bear the burdens of alliance 
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commitments, and those who enjoy the benefits of NATO membership… but don’t want to 
share the risks and the costs’ (US Department of Defense 2011: online). 
Sten Rynning’s recent book on NATO’s performance in Afghanistan argues that this 
division of labour – between combat- and non-combat-oriented states and, operationally, 
between OEF and ISAF – was not a consequence of strategic deficiency but rather a 
precondition of NATO strategy: in order for the United States to be able to shift resources to 
Iraq in 2003, it required greater European participation in Afghanistan. The Germans, whilst 
willing to lead on ISAF operations, were neither politically willing nor constitutionally able  
to take on counter-terrorism operations in the country, just as the United States was, under 
the first years of the Bush Administration, unwilling to commit itself to large-scale ‘nation-
building’ efforts (Rynning 2012:95-97). A lack of strategic unity was the natural consequence 
of a structural compromise that produced two distinct strategic authorities that were, in 
many ways, competing with one another. Along similar lines to the political arrangements 
between the Afghan state and its regional proxies, the NATO alliance structure can be seen 
(and evidently is seen by officials such as Gates) as patrimonial: states participated on the 
basis of fulfilling their own interests and along operational lines that were complementary 
to those interests, for the purposes of securing an alliance structure that accommodated all 
participants ahead of the imperative of creating a coherent strategy for stabilising 
Afghanistan. As with the neopatrimonialism of the Karzai regime NATO’s efforts would be 
dictated by the limitations imposed upon it by circumstance.  
 Thus, in the cases of Afghanistan’s and the international community’s internal 
political dynamics, strategy was confined by the structure of the Afghan state and society, 
the structure of the international community and NATO, and the interplay between those 
structures. The implication here is that the agency required for the possibility of a workable 
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strategy may have been illusory from the start: as Suhrke has argued, ‘the Afghan context 
was not simply very difficult, requiring exceptional qualities of statecraft on both Afghan 
and international sides; even a more coherent strategy would have been circumscribed by 
the inherent tensions generated by the massive intervention itself’ (2013:272). While she 
referred in the main to the problems of Afghan politics, the same clearly applies to NATO 
and the wider international community. This work is concerned with how the structural 
limitations of Afghan politics and the internal dynamics of collective security alliance on the 
strategic agency of the United Kingdom – as a key member of the international community – 
played out in Afghanistan, and specifically how the British state sought to explain the 
strategic challenges it encountered and the political objectives it pursued in the conflict. 
Understanding Britain’s communication efforts for Afghanistan requires a synthesis of these 
two approaches, one that addresses Britain’s role in Afghanistan and its role as a member of 
the international community involved in state-building. Britain’s strategic – and 
communicative - shortcomings in Afghanistan were not merely the result of the difficulties 
of operating in that country, nor are they reducible to the politics of the international 
community alone. Rather, this work accounts for British communicative efforts in 
Afghanistan as arising out of the difficulties of both these elements: as a state 
communicative response to the contradictions of participation in Afghanistan via collective 
security. 
 
Thesis and Structure   
This work views the role of Afghan and ISAF/NATO politics as crucial in determining 
the British approach to explaining its strategy for the Afghan conflict. Britain’s difficulties in 
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explaining its purpose in Afghanistan is intimately wound up in its role there within a 
collective security apparatus. As such, if communication about strategy is naturally 
dependent upon the substance of the strategy itself (its ‘explainability’), it is worth 
considering the difficulty in communicating the purpose of British involvement in 
Afghanistan as a consequence of a cognitive shift away from a traditional continuum of 
state activity of interests, policies, and strategies and toward a multi-national or inter-state 
continuum, wherein one may locate a significant divestment and blurring of ‘national 
interests’ to the transnational level. This in turn may be understood as being a result of an 
adherence to the internationalist assumptions implicit within the liberal norms that bind 
Western collective security mechanisms together. Anthony King has described this 
communicative difficulty in conceptual terms as a ‘transnational dilemma’ wherein mid-level 
states such as the United Kingdom have found it difficult to articulate to the British public 
the purpose of collective security missions like that in Afghanistan in collective security 
terms (2010b:388). King encapsulates the dilemma thusly:  
‘States are now increasingly interdependent and can increasingly defend 
themselves only by cooperating with other polities; individual security and 
defence is dependent upon the generation of collective security. 
Consequently, since the end of the Cold War, states have been driven to 
contribute to military expeditions which do not seem to be in the direct 
national interest but from which they cannot exempt themselves for fear 
of being excluded from access to critical shared security goods’ 
(2010b:388). 
Directness of interest is pivotal in understanding the transnational dilemma. Collective 
security arrangements naturally militate against ‘direct’ effects, since interests and threats 
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are (ideally) joint and several between all members. Indeed, this principle is enshrined in 
Article V of the NATO Charter, a point referenced by NATO in response to the 9/11 attacks. 
There is, therefore, an institutionally built-in predisposition within NATO to accepting the 
principle of indirectness; in a very real sense, it is its defining precept. Explaining collective 
security accurately requires some account of the inherent ‘indirectness’ of such frameworks, 
but to do so risks a level of abstraction perhaps unamenable to everyday political discourse. 
This is the quid pro quo of alliance membership described by King. The dilemma is a 
communicative one at root, and is one that confounds easy explanation. What Britain’s 
rhetorical response to the hardships of Afghanistan demonstrates is that the UK has largely 
sought to avoid this dilemma in both its liberal institutionalist (stabilisation-centric) and 
realist (counter-terrorist) articulations of its Afghan policy. In the first instance, it sought to 
claim that national interests were subsumed within and inseparable from collective 
interests. In the second instance, it argued that collective interests were subsumed within – 
but subordinate to – the national interest. Although, as we shall see, these two approaches 
are in many ways incompatible with one another, they do share a common feature of 
seeking to avoid at all cost the notion that collective and national interests can at times be 
quite separate.  Even though a mutual and reciprocal acceptance of the principle of 
indirectness of interest is quite obviously a key element in the maintenance of any 
permanent collective mechanism it is, in times of hardship and strain, paradoxically also a 
truth that apparently (for the UK, at least) must never be spoken, lest the tenuous nature of 
inter-state diplomacy be revealed and the strategic calculus of collective action (that is, the 
sharing of costs and benefits) therein exposed to question. 
Avoidance of articulating the difference between two sets of interest – ‘national’ and 
‘collective’ – should be understood more generally as an aversion on the part of 
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Governments to revealing the relatively frail ties that bind states together within collective 
security mechanisms to the prevarications of public opinion. This is so particularly during 
periods where the activities pursued by such mechanisms do not appear to be providing 
sufficient collective goods to its constituent members, or where those goods appear to be 
outweighed or otherwise mitigated by the associated costs. Such aversion suggests that 
states are (a) aware of the importance of public opinion and the need to shield certain 
diplomatic arrangements from the dangers of debate in the public weal, and (b) that some 
diplomatic arrangements – particularly those that cut to the heart of supposed ‘national’ 
interests (in this case, the maintenance of collective security apparatuses) are possibly 
considered too important to be subjected to such debate. A view expressed in this work is 
that Afghanistan has tested this arrangement because it has been so difficult a campaign. 
This, incidentally, is why Afghanistan is also the ideal case study of investigating national 
strategy under collective security: it is the quintessential liberal institutionalist conflict of 
this century.  
It is within this context that ‘strategic communication’ (SC) doctrine has arisen within 
the UK defence establishment as a potential corrective to the communication excesses 
wrought by the state’s avoidance of the transnational dilemma. SC as a process came into 
being for the purposes of streamlining dispersed, institutionally-aligned messaging on 
Afghanistan within a more concentrated rubric of ‘nation-centric’ defence interests, thereby 
reducing the potential for mixed messaging (referred to by strategic communicators as 
‘information fratricide’) and facilitating the establishment of a single, coherent narrative for 
the conflict. At the conceptual level, SC is dubbed ‘strategic’ because it is held to possess an 
instrumental quality to it, a point borne out by the definition provided by the Ministry of 
Defence (MOD) in its Joint Doctrine Note 1.12, which states that SC’s utility is in ‘[a]dvancing 
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national interests by using all means of Defence communication to influence the attitudes 
and behaviours of people’ (DCDC 2012:3-1). In this specific context, SC processes and 
practices have been largely successful; as this work will show, instances of defining the 
purpose of British involvement in Afghanistan as anything other than a vital ‘national 
security interest’ concerned with preventing acts of terrorism in the United Kingdom 
drastically diminished following the introduction of SC in late 2008 and early 2009. Public 
support for the Afghan mission actually increased after 2009, possibly as a result of more 
focused messaging (Kriner and Wilson 2010). Most importantly, through implementation of 
SC doctrine, UK communication efforts can truly be seen as ‘strategic’ in the respect that it 
has seemingly ‘solved’ the transnational dilemma: state communication is now reflexive, or 
self-consciously aware, of the confusing nature of ‘indirect threats’, the institutional 
ambiguity within state bureaucracies that indirectness can foster,  and the negative effects 
of mixed messaging, and as such its communication efforts are now oriented around 
preventing such confusion by focusing on greater coordination of what can be said and on 
avoiding what cannot – i.e., that which emphasises the indirect and contingent nature of 
collective security.  
The perspective offered in this dissertation represents a departure from the growing 
literature on strategic communication. Typically, these works are prescriptive in nature – 
they focus on the potential utility of SC and assume it to offer solutions to some of the 
strategic issues states like Britain face (Helmus, Paul and Glenn 2007, Tatham 2008, Mackay 
and Tatham 2009, Cornish, Lindley-French and Yorke 2011, DCDC 2012). They tend to 
assume that SC is capable of adding significant value to understandings of contemporary 
strategy because they claim that much of the landscape of war is now discursively oriented. 
Much of this literature bases its assumptions on the ‘Smithian’ school of thought that 
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asserts the diminishing ‘utility of force’ and the increasing importance of communication 
vis-à-vis physical, or ‘kinetic’ effects in winning ‘hearts and minds’ – both domestic and in-
theatre – to achieving success in stabilisation operations (Smith 2006). In a few specific 
cases, SC and ‘narratives’ more generally have been presented along such lines as not only a 
solution to the difficulties of traversing the transnational dilemma, but also as having the 
potential to re-define the nature of counter-insurgency operations and effectively lead 
strategy (Roenfeldt 2011, Simpson 2012). This work is critical of such assumptions. 
Whatever the merits of their approaches, it is my contention that they arrive at such 
conclusions because they do not bother to problematize strategic communication. They 
tend to focus on theoretical principles of SC or empirical case studies of its effects at the 
operational level of war and extrapolate the strategic significance of communication 
therefrom. They do not adequately analyse SC as a specific, empirically isolatable historical 
and social phenomenon, and as a result fail to make the connection between the 
problematic of British strategy and SC as a consequence of the communication issues 
associated with the transnational dilemma. Indeed, despite a great deal of scholarship on 
the state of British strategy and the utility of strategic communication, there has thus far 
been little work that analyses the linkages between them.  
This work seeks to make headway in this respect by conceiving of SC as both a 
consequence of and response to communication issues arising from the transnational 
dilemma and the transnationalisation of British defence policy more generally. This chapter 
has outlined the strategic issues faced by British policymakers and how prevailing 
institutional and normative orthodoxies contribute to the complexities of statecraft for mid-
level powers like the UK. I have argued that the strategic challenge of the last fifteen years 
has been that of terrorism and failed states, and have introduced the idea (to be further 
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explored in the next chapter) that the institutional and normative responses to these 
challenges has produced a scenario where states belonging to the collective security 
apparatus of NATO – the UK being the object of study in this case – have been socialised 
within that system in a way that has caused them to internalise collective security 
institutional interests and norms, a phenomena best described as the transnationalisation of 
defence policy (Edmunds 2010). This has in turn facilitated the conditions for transnational 
dilemmas to emerge and mixed messaging to ensue, often as a consequence of intra-state 
rivalries caused by a lack of autonomy in policy and precipitated by a concordant loss of 
strategic direction. States within ISAF and state departments and institutions within the UK 
have tended to pursue their own organisational aims; the latter as a means of contributing 
to Britain’s ‘comprehensive approach’ to fulfilling its transnational obligations in 
Afghanistan. The result for the UK has been the emergence of several policies or strategies – 
counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, and stabilisation, namely – that reflected the 
institutional dynamics and interests from which they were created. As both a consequence 
of and response to this scenario, strategic communication doctrine and processes can be 
seen as an object of inquiry that illuminates how the British state has responded in narrative 
terms to contemporary strategic challenges. The transnational dilemma as defined by King 
should be understood as that which makes strategy difficult to articulate; SC, in its attempt 
to simplify the complexities of strategy, can therefore be seen as a response to the 
transnational dilemma. This work is, therefore, animated by the following questions: how 
has the transnational dilemma affected British strategy in Afghanistan, and how has it both 
necessitated and complicated SC efforts for the war in Afghanistan?  
In order to justify my answer to these questions, it is necessary to set out the 
parameters for research. In the main, this means determining the relationship between 
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transnationalised defence policy and transnational dilemmas, and between transnational 
dilemmas and strategic communication practices. Naturally, defining each of these terms is 
a prerequisite to this end. In this introductory chapter, I have provided definitions for and 
outlined the relationship between the latter two terms. In the next chapter of this work, I 
give similar treatment to Edmunds’ transnationalisation thesis and make a more detailed 
case for viewing Britain’s defence policy and strategy in Afghanistan as being subject to 
processes of transnationalisation. I do so by reference to existing literature on the subject 
and by way of a brief comparative assessment of the UK’s participation in the War in 
Afghanistan with that of the Second Afghan War of 1878-1881. I then relate the theoretical 
and empirical lessons from these analyses to a brief summary of the political effects of 
transnationalised policy on the UK state’s institutional dynamics in Afghanistan, thereby 
providing an appropriate grounding for my analysis of empirical evidence in Chapters 4 to 7. 
These chapters detail the evolution of three distinct yet interconnected ‘strategic narratives’ 
– those of stabilisation, counter-narcotics, and counter-terrorism, respectively – employed 
by the UK to justify and explain its strategy(ies) in Afghanistan. These narratives 
demonstrate how British strategies – and the communication of those strategies – have 
struggled against both the direct and indirect effects of transnationalised defence policy, 
specifically the pressure placed on the UK by the United States to perform, and a 
concomitant tension within the British state to meet the requirements of such demands. 
These pressures have produced contradictions in strategy by causing the UK to pursue 
incompatible aims and, as a result, have exacerbated conflicts of interest between those 
tasked in delivering strategy. Such factors have exposed the difficulties of maintaining a 
consistent and coherent ‘meta-narrative’ for Afghanistan when its component parts (the 
three ‘strategic narratives’ of stabilisation, counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism) have 
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frequently failed to mutually support one another. This problematic has precipitated the 
need for SC doctrine and process within the British state. The findings of the empirical 
chapters of this work support the idea of SC as a direct response to the transnational 
dilemma. In the concluding chapter of this work, I discuss the implications of connections 
between British SC and its collective security membership for the future of UK strategy. 
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CHAPTER 2: TRANSNATIONALISATION, 
TRANSNATIONAL DILEMMAS, AND STRATEGIC 
COMMUNICATION  
 
 
In the first chapter of this work, the central theme of ‘transnationalisation’ of defence 
policy has been contextualised within literature on the UK’s strategic capabilities and 
shortcomings. This chapter builds on the first by making the theoretical and empirical case 
for the ‘transnationalisation’ of British policy and strategy, which posits that the UK’s 
capacity to formulate grand strategy is largely dependent upon issues of normative and 
material dependency centred on collective security frameworks and Britain’s ‘special 
relationship’ with the United States. Because of this, I argue in this chapter that Britain’s 
national or grand strategy is to a great extent contingent and discretionary: it exists only in 
relation to other national strategies within the confines of an Alliance meta-strategy. This is 
a rather uncontroversial statement given that it is empirically defensible in terms of Britain’s 
military track record, its numerous documents of strategic intent, and its commitment to 
transforming the structure and outlook of its Armed Forces in order to meet the demands of 
collective security cooperation. In operational terms, Britain has taken the leading role in 
supporting the three major American-led interventions of this century – Afghanistan, Iraq 
and Libya, respectively – and has participated in every such intervention since the end of the 
Cold War, with the exceptions of Somalia in the mid-1990s and the aborted intervention in 
Syria in 2013 (Dorman 2008:vii). In terms of politics and diplomacy, Britain orders its identity 
and interests in the world system around these inter-related pillars of collective security and 
the ‘special relationship’, epitomised in recent years by numerous strategic reviews and 
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security strategies and, of course, in rhetorical terms by the former Prime Minister Tony 
Blair’s commitment to stand ‘shoulder to shoulder’ with the United States (Blair 2001a: 
online). From a military and institutional perspective, these commitments have impelled the 
British Armed Forces to undergo a period of ‘transformation’ of its force structure and 
capabilities to one of ‘expeditionary warfare’ in recent years, both as an attempt to emulate 
and coordinate with similar undertakings in the United States (Farrell 2008, Edmunds 2010, 
King 2011). In these ways, it is possible to posit both the dependence of the UK on the 
United States for the maintenance of British defence interests and strategy and, more 
broadly, the significant shaping effects of transnational factors on the composition and 
behaviour of the British state. This way of viewing the recent history of the United 
Kingdom’s defence affairs is reflected in Tim Edmunds’ assertion that Britain is subject to a 
‘transnationalisation’ of its strategic practices (2010:378-382). For Edmunds, these external 
shaping factors are significantly responsible for the tensions and conflicts within the British 
state as its various constituent parts (government departments and the military) come to 
terms with drastic institutional reform. 
In this chapter, I utilise and expand upon Edmunds’ argument as a means of 
substantiating the transnationalisation thesis (as it applies to Britain’s experiences in 
Afghanistan) and explaining the tensions and conflicts within the British state regarding the 
prosecution of that conflict. I situate Edmunds’ work within a wider set of literature on 
military transformation and Britain’s strategic dilemmas (Cornish and Dorman 2009a, 2009b, 
2010, 2011, 2012; Farrell 2008; Farrell and Gordon 2009; King 2010a, 2010b, 2011a, 2011b). 
I argue that transnationalisation of strategic practice is a significant variable that has 
exacerbated intra-state tensions, as the various departments of state have repeatedly come 
into conflict over their respective remits and the overall direction and purpose of the 
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Helmand campaign of 2006-2014. I contend that these institutional conflicts have 
contributed to the production of operational difficulties that exposed serious strategic 
shortcomings whereby each institution had, contrary to the demands of the 
‘Comprehensive Approach’ (the UK’s doctrine for inter-departmental coordination of effort), 
worked according to its own relatively narrow agenda at the expense of overall strategic 
clarity of purpose and operational cohesion. One may discern three separate strands of 
British policy or strategy in Afghanistan, namely those of stabilisation, counter-narcotics and 
counter-terrorism. Each of these strands of policy appears congruent with the interests of 
their respective institutional ‘owners’, namely the DfID, the FCO, the Army, and the MOD. 
The existence of three separate strands of ‘policy narrative’ may be seen, in short, as 
symptomatic of a strategic drift precipitated in no small part by the institutional tensions 
produced by transnationalisation.  
This situation has reflected what King (2010b:388) has referred to as a ‘transnational 
dilemma’, wherein mid-level states such as the United Kingdom have found it difficult to 
articulate to the British public the purpose of collective security missions like that in 
Afghanistan in collective security terms. This dilemma is largely responsible for the 
prevalence of often contradictory or at least mutually unsupportive explanations, 
justifications and categorisations of the nature and significance of British participation in 
Afghanistan. In response to difficulties of explaining the transnational dilemma, the UK state 
has undergone a period of transformation of its communicative capacities. Crucially, these 
capacities have throughout remained geared around dilemma avoidance. For much of the 
Afghan campaign, the result of an avoidance of this dilemma (again – ultimately precipitated 
by the divestment of strategic authority and autonomy from the level of the British state) 
has been the articulation of various explanations and rationales that have sought to frame 
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Britain’s role in Afghanistan as either being a national interest in the sense that such 
interests are inseparable from collective interests, or as a national interest in the sense that 
such interests exist generally happily with, but are superior to collective interests. Although 
seemingly very similar in most cases, nuances exist that distinguish these two approaches. In 
its positing of the inseparability of national and collective interests, the first approach 
sought to link all strategic activities of the British state to a broader coalition effort located 
at the transnational level – that is, all activities were directed to some collective aim for 
which the collective security apparatus itself was the referent object. Coordination of 
activities towards ‘national’ ends was actually coordination towards collective ends. The 
multi-national nature of collective security operations in Afghanistan meant that the mission 
was not ‘nationally’ directed or for the explicit purposes of the UK nation-state. A 
consequence of this was that the strategy was not always administered and directed by 
those at the upper echelons of the British state but rather was delegated to those at the 
departmental level. This resulted in the appearance of an ensuing plethora of 
categorisations of the nature and significance of British participation in Afghanistan that 
roughly reflected the institutional interests of those uttering them. In other words, the 
difficulty of explaining Afghanistan in collective security terms, that is, in terms that tacitly 
or otherwise pay credence to the transnational dynamics informing British defence policy 
led to a scenario wherein agents of the state were given broad interpretive privileges, which 
in turn has often resulted in incompatible messaging and the emergence of multiple 
‘narratives’ for Afghanistan. These narratives reflected in varying ways the ambiguities and 
complexities of collectively conceived strategy and the doctrine of liberal interventionism 
around which it was ordered, focusing and fluctuating on and between any combination of 
‘national’ or ‘international’ ‘interests’ or values’, and thereby justifying whatever 
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institutional interest a given agent may be pursuing in the conflict at a given point in time. In 
this way, the communication efforts surrounding Afghanistan took on a life of their own as 
they competed with one another for narrative primacy within a strategic vacuum. 
The dispersed and discordant nature of state messaging has roughly reflected the 
institutional interests of departments of state as a result of a strategic vacuum at the state 
level. This has been precipitated by the derogation of national direction in terms of 
formulation of policy and implementation of strategy to the transnational level, and can be 
understood therein as the result of agents of various institutions attempting to fill this lack 
of clarity by interpreting the conflict in Afghanistan in ways that best represent their own 
interests. In the first chapter, I contended that ‘strategic communication’ (SC) doctrine has 
arisen within the UK defence establishment as a potential corrective to this dilemma and to 
wider domestic-political issues associated with transnationalisation, and has done so by 
streamlining the dispersed, institutionally-aligned messaging on Afghanistan within a more 
concentrated rubric of defence interests. I conclude this chapter by arguing that SC’s 
corrective function has partially succeeded in achieving these aims by reformulating the 
Afghan mission as one explained as being about British ‘national security interests’, but has 
– rather ironically – come about as the result of intra-state competition over the Afghan 
‘narrative’ and which, in some important respects relating to the buttressing of defence 
interests within the state, supports a view that such tensions prevail: specifically, that SC is 
merely a continuation of these tensions.  
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Transnationalisation 
In order to meet the demands of contemporary security, British defence policy 
depends on the collective mechanism of NATO and, more specifically, on its ‘special 
relationship’ with the United States. A cursory study of the core texts of British defence 
doctrine published in recent years plainly bears out this statement. The 2010 National 
Security Strategy, for example, states that the UK can ‘best pursue [its] interests’ ‘through a 
commitment to collective security via a rules-based international system and our key 
alliances, notably with the United States of America’ (Cabinet 2010:10). 2011’s Joint 
Doctrine Publication 0-01: British Defence Doctrine states quite clearly that Britain is locked 
into collective security since the ‘UK rarely can, or even should, act alone’ (MOD 2011:1-3). 
Similarly, the 2008 National Security Strategy, published under the Brown Government, 
states that the United States is ‘central’ to British national security and that collective 
mechanisms are ‘the most effective way of managing and reducing the threats we face’ 
(Cabinet 2008:7,8). The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) further 
elucidated this foundational aspect of British statecraft by stating in no uncertain terms that 
‘collective security through NATO’ will be the ‘basis for territorial defence of the UK’ 
(2010:13). Taken individually or collectively, the message is quite clear: the primary purpose 
for which the state exists – defence of the realm – is only fully realisable through collective 
security membership. This carries with it the implication that the imperative of optimising 
British power and influence in national policymaking by coupling it with other states has a 
natural consequence of a mutual willingness to divest national autonomy in large part to 
collective security mechanisms. Collective action inevitably requires individual 
compromises; Britain pursues its interests through a collective mechanism, and therefore its 
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interests must be balanced with the interests of others. Simply, the furtherance of UK 
interests is conjoined to those of the United States (and to a far lesser extent that of NATO): 
in placing collective security as vital and inalienable from British security, the UK has put 
itself in a position where it advocates, ostensibly for its own purposes, a ‘transnational’ 
policy agenda, one that articulates the common interests of all members. What the core 
texts noted above demonstrate is that collective action, central as it is to the realisation of 
Britain’s ‘national’ interests, is not simply a statement of intent, but also a statement of 
identity. In meaningful ways, participation in collective security defines the UK’s role in the 
world, for without the apparatus of collective action, its ability to act would be decidedly 
reduced. Belief in that core identity means that Britain must shape and project its own 
national interests within the milieu of collective security, requiring its full political and 
military participation in joint ventures such as that of ISAF in Afghanistan.  
Alongside accepting the United States’ role as ultimate guarantor of UK security, 
Britain’s willingness to participate in American-led coalitions allows it to continue to ‘punch 
above its weight’ in world affairs, and goes some way in justifying its arguably 
disproportionate status as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. 
There are, therefore, substantial strategic advantages to Britain’s transatlantic alignment, 
without which it is doubtful that it could continue to exert significant influence on the 
international system. The trade-off of this relationship, naturally, is that British strategy and 
policy is ultimately contingent upon American strategy and policy, limiting the UK’s strategic 
horizons and rendering much of British foreign and defence policy discretionary and in all 
practical senses subservient to US interests (Freedman 2007, Gray 2008, Porter 2010b:9). 
This dynamic is not necessarily problematic for the UK. While American and British national 
interests are not synonymous, they are, as Colin Gray has noted, ‘close enough’ (2008:15). 
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Both countries rely on the maintenance of the international political and economic order 
they largely created (through the creation of various laws, conventions, and international 
organisations of global governance) in order to best pursue their national interests 
(described by the 2010 National Security Strategy as consisting of ‘freedom, prosperity and 
security’ (2010:10)). For its part, the United States depends to some degree on having 
strong diplomatic and military partners within the institutional architecture of NATO and the 
United Nations, whilst the UK is dependent (for the time being) on the United States for its 
nuclear deterrent and for much of its military and intelligence capabilities (Porter 2014:130). 
Along these lines, a coincidence of British defence and foreign policy with that of the United 
States appears rather natural and fortuitous, even if from an analytical perspective this 
merger produces a transnational ‘securitisation’ effect of the two sets of interests becoming 
‘so interlinked that their [individual] security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or 
resolved apart from one another’ (Buzan and Waever 2003:44). The benefits of the 
closeness of the US-UK special relationship come with obligations, of course; Britain has 
political obligations to the United States to participate in US-led operations, and this has 
produced a concomitant need for Britain to transform its armed forces to meet the 
demands of operational and tactical inter-operability with America’s military (Betz and 
Cormack 2009:324; Farrell 2008). This sense of obligation and the transformation process 
that both informs and supports it serve a specific purpose, so Betz and Cormack have 
argued, of allowing the UK to ‘show willing’ to the United States by wielding its ‘armed 
forces as an instrument of policy’, i.e. as a means of maintaining the special relationship 
(2009:333-334).  
It is out of this milieu of transformation and obligation that Edmunds’ identified the 
transnationalisation of strategic practice and defence policy. For Edmunds, Britain’s 
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commitment to securing its national interests by honouring its political obligations to the 
United States and transforming its military to that end evinces an iterative momentum, 
constituting further those commitments via processes of multinationalisation. What this 
means is that the more capable the military apparatus of the British state, the more its 
political obligations can be fulfilled. Likewise, the more numerous and onerous the political 
obligations on the state, the greater the need for transformation to meet those obligations 
and the greater the strain on the state institutions being transformed (Edmunds 2010:382). 
Along these lines, Edmunds’ analysis corresponds with that of Anthony King, who argues 
that the transnationalisation of national defence policies in Europe stems from the 
institutionalisation of guiding principles of interoperability within states’ respective armed 
forces (King 2011:10). This evolution appears to have received additional impetus in recent 
years as the demands of interoperability have increased as a consequence of economic 
downturn and the tightening of defence budgets (Cornish and Dorman 2012:223). This cycle 
has been evident throughout the Afghan campaign, particularly in terms of the US 
repeatedly requesting British increases in troop contributions (and British acquiescence to 
those requests) to support American-led operations; the dynamic between political 
obligation and military cooperation appears to be self-regulating or internally propelled. In 
cases where British civilian leadership appears to have been reticent about providing such 
support, as was the case with Gordon Brown in 2007, British military leaders responded 
with outrage that the maintenance of UK political obligations to Afghanistan might not be 
accompanied by sufficient military contributions to the collective security effort.  
The obligation-cooperation cycle can be seen more generally in defence procurement. 
This, as Robin Porter has argued, is a material manifestation of Britain’s desire for ever-
improved coordination with the US: the UK buys from US suppliers to maintain its ability to 
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remain relevant to the US in operational terms. In doing so it fulfils its political obligations 
by remaining interoperable, and by participating in operations secures its place in the elite 
circle of claimants of collective security goods (2014:120,128).  The same patterns apply in 
the embedding of intelligence structures between the UK and US: much of the former’s 
intelligence gathering capabilities are now dependent upon US infrastructure (including that 
which is located within the UK’s territories), lending itself to the perspective that Britain is 
obligated to appreciate US provisions and, more controversially, is subject to its policy 
positions being shaped by US influences in ways that ‘may in fact be impeding the 
development of an independent British foreign policy’ (Porter 2014:130). In Porter’s view, 
such institutional linkages quite clearly imply ‘significant derogations of UK sovereignty’ 
(2014:130). This embedding further cements Britain within a transnationalised policy 
arrangement, since the tools through which policy is informed and actioned are increasingly 
collectively pooled and, crucially, not independent (either intellectually or materially) of 
collective (specifically American) interests. By virtue of its iterative nature, the material 
relationships Britain has with other states produces further and repeated pressure on the 
state in terms of political obligation. The unfolding of this process explains why, according to 
Gray, a crucial precept of British defence policy and strategy is that it manages to ‘satisfy US 
expectations of British effort, effectiveness, and loyalty, while being tolerably congruent 
with British national interests’ (2008:15). In material terms – notwithstanding for the 
moment normative commonalities – it has little choice but to do so; indeed, the point here 
is that the instrumental nature of the relationship may ultimately drive adherence to 
normative elements. 
Crucially for the purposes of this work, Edmunds’ argument supports King’s conclusion 
that it was not strategic logic that defined European and UK participation in Afghanistan, but 
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the ‘institutional dynamics’ of interdependency and transnationalisation within NATO (King 
2011:25). Indeed, at the commencement of each major increase of ISAF and British activities 
in Afghanistan – namely, the expansion of ISAF’s writ beyond Kabul in 2003 and the UK’s 
deployment to Helmand in 2006 – one may find the dynamics of collective security 
obligation to be at least as important as theatre-specific strategic considerations (Bird and 
Marshall 2011:154-155). Centrally, it is a contention of this work that it was not primarily 
the direct threat of terrorism in Afghanistan or weapons of mass destruction in Iraq that 
animated British military participation in those conflicts, but rather the direct imperative of 
satisfying American expectations and of contributing to collective security operations in 
general. Since the UK is dependent upon the US for the realisation of its own strategic 
objectives, it is natural that this would be the case, for without satisfying American 
expectations, very little is possible for the UK. Transnational pressures are observable at 
each point of change in Britain’s Afghan strategy, from the original decision to ‘stand 
shoulder to shoulder’ with the United States in 2001, to the expansion of ISAF’s role in 
Afghanistan in 2003 following the Bush Administration’s invasion of Iraq, the deployment of 
British forces in Helmand in 2006 in response to Britain’s foundering campaign in Basra 
province in Iraq, the expansion of British forces and change in operational approach 
following the Obama Administration’s decision to employ ‘population-centric 
counterinsurgency’ operations in Afghanistan in 2009, and finally to the decision made by 
Cameron in concert with Obama in 2011 to begin an accelerated drawdown of personnel in 
the country. Indeed, underscoring all of Britain’s activity in Afghanistan was an important 
document upon which Britain’s involvement in the War on Terror was based – the so-called 
Blair Doctrine of 1999. This doctrine represented a concise and unambiguous advocacy of 
transnational policy, linking as it did the assumptions of ‘liberal peace theory’ with a desire 
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to equate Britain’s national interest with those of the international community (Blair 1999: 
online). Taking this doctrine into account, it is plausible to conceive of Britain’s participation 
in coalition stabilisation efforts as equivalent to the Blair Government putting its principles 
into practice. 
When viewing British planning for Afghanistan along the lines of a core imperative of 
satisfying expectations, the transnationalisation of defence policy in these conflicts can be 
held up as a major factor leading to the overstretch of British military capabilities and as a 
primary cause of Britain’s inability to redress this overstretch due to the constraining effect 
of transnationalisation on policy choices available to the British state (Edmunds 2010:381-
382). In making the case for the centrality of transnationalisation as both dictating and 
limiting UK options for policy and strategy in Afghanistan, it is perhaps useful to consider 
briefly a comparison between the UK’s policy orientation and strategic options in the War in 
Afghanistan with those of the British Empire in the Second Afghan War of 1878-1881. The 
policy origins and strategic debates surrounding these conflicts have much in common, 
despite the obvious differences in technology and operational acumen that a time gap of 
over a century might produce. The Second Afghan War came about as a result of Imperial 
concerns over the stability of Afghanistan in the face of external (Russian) intrigue and the 
potential implications to the security of British India as a result of an unfriendly Afghan 
regime. The policy debate in Westminster focused on the nature of the threat posed by the 
loss of Afghanistan to the Russian sphere of influence in Central Asia and the most 
appropriate strategic posture to take in response. The ruling Conservative Government 
(under the Lord Beaconsfield, Benjamin Disraeli), advocated an aggressive ‘forward’ policy 
which involved setting up a British diplomatic mission in Kabul and the possibility of punitive 
measures against rebellious Afghans. The opposition Liberals, led by the Marquess of 
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Hartington and the figurehead of William Gladstone, promoted instead a ‘rear’ policy – 
known at the time as ‘masterly inactivity’ – which centred on the use of subtle diplomatic 
bargaining guided by adherence to a normative code of non-interference in tribal affairs and 
the increased protection of the Durand Line separating Afghanistan from British India. 
Parallels between these positions and those of the present day are observable: as with the 
forward policy, the stabilisation approach was informed by a perceived need to implant 
international forces to bolster the position of an allied leader, whilst the counter-terrorism 
approach has argued for the avoidance of involvement in the political and social maelstrom 
of Afghanistan in favour of a more limited campaign of containment and suppression of 
insurgent activity within the borders of Afghanistan. 
Again, it is worth restating that such parallels are naturally imprecise given the 
significant differences between the late Victorian period and today. Other variables are 
obviously important in distinguishing the two conflicts; indeed, much has been made of the 
difficulty of devising strategy and effective communication of strategy in an era of 
‘mediatisation’ of conflict and a corollary multiplicity of political voices (Price 2009, Gilboa 
2008, Gowing 2009, Brown 2003, DCDC 2012). Gowing (2009:11,77) describes the 
information environment in which states jostle amongst non-state actors for communicative 
power as an ‘almost infinite, digital landscape’ where ‘information doers’ – meaning 
practically anyone with a camera phone – have contributed to the creation of ‘a media 
spectrum and matrix that has rapidly become far wider, deeper, more multi-dimensional 
and all-pervasive’ than anything previously known. States must be able to respond to crises 
as they happen, but the democratisation of the information environment also requires them 
to respond consistently and without contradiction between audiences. Messaging can be 
undermined by the reporting of countervailing realities, and trust between publics and 
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institutions can be rapidly eroded. However, while the technological differences between 
the twenty-first and nineteenth centuries need no real elaboration, it is crucial to our 
understanding of what is most significant in the differences between these two campaigns 
to recognise that media and political issues presented considerable problems for the state in 
the nineteenth century as well. The domestic press was highly critical of the actions of the 
Conservative Government that led to the deployment of forces into Afghanistan throughout 
1878 and even more so as the campaign drew to a close in 1879-1880. Specifically, it was 
only weeks prior to the announcement of the forward policy by Government (as a response 
to Russian advances in Afghanistan) that Disraeli had declared peace with the Russians at 
the Treaty of Berlin. News of Russian forays into Kabul therefore represented a political 
embarrassment for the Government and gave credence to the argument made by the liberal 
press that the forward policy was ill-thought out and ignorant of previous costly military 
encounters with the Afghans. Indeed, The Times – a stalwart supporter of the Government’s 
policy – paraphrased the feeling of growing discontent amongst the fourth estate as follows: 
‘We have entered with more or less of disguise upon a policy of aggression, 
undefined in its aim, and certain to bring trouble with it whatever way it may 
end. We are now only at the commencement of the difficulties we have 
brought upon ourselves’ (The Times 1878:9). 
During this period political debate in Westminster surrounding the efficacy of the 
forward policy was far more pronounced than any surrounding the War in Afghanistan, with 
clear splits between the main parties over the rightness of the mission. Liberal proponents 
of masterly inactivity warned against the potential for troop overstretch and strategic 
stalemate that would, in their minds, accompany a failure to stabilise Afghanistan through 
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achieving a functional governance structure. In mid-December 1878, Earl Grey outlined this 
view in opining that, 
‘I do not mean to say that the Afghans will be able to drive you out of their 
country by force; no, but the troops you could maintain there would be so 
harassed and worn down by the continual hard work imposed upon them, the 
difficulties of governing the country would be so great, that in the end you 
would find it practically impossible to persevere in the attempt’ (Hansard 
1878). 
By early 1880, a series of high-profile setbacks (such as the assassination of the British 
envoy, Sir Charles Cavagnari, the abdication of the pro-British Afghan Amir, Yakub Khan, and 
the recommencement of hostilities by the Afghans against British positions) led to a 
renewed round of criticism in the Commons. By this point, the debate had centred upon the 
overall aims and objectives of the war, with those opposed to the forward policy arguing 
that there was no certainty in who the British were fighting or why. In February of 1880, 
Liberal Member William Harcourt issued a scathing riposte to the Conservative forward 
policy and its search for a ‘scientific Frontier’, stating: 
‘they wanted a barrier. A barrier against whom? Who was the unknown foe 
against whom we waged these mysterious wars, to baffle whom we attacked 
chieftains who were not our enemies, invaded countries with which we had 
no quarrel, incurred ruinous expenditure, experienced appalling disasters’ 
(Hansard 1880). 
By characterising the forward policy as foolish, naïve, disastrous and immoral, the 
Liberals in Westminster and the liberal press reaped political dividends. The issue of 
morality of the war was seized upon by them in the 1880 General Election, when former 
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Prime Minister William Gladstone made criticism of Conservative foreign policy the 
centrepiece of his famous ‘Midlothian Campaign’, leading ultimately to the toppling of the 
Disraeli Ministry, a return to power for the Liberal Party and a reversion to masterly 
inactivity in Afghanistan.  
Given that dissent against Government’s Afghan policy was at least as intense in the 
nineteenth century as it has been in the twenty-first, and given that such dissent came from 
both political opposition and the media, it is difficult to maintain the position that the 
strategic issues faced by UK messaging from such quarters today is something wholly new or 
fundamental. On the contrary, the costs of intervention in this century can be seen in 
political terms as far less severe: unlike in the past, Governments have not been 
dispossessed of power because of their handling of the conflict. Indeed, the 2010 General 
Election’s televised debates featured no real debate over Afghanistan, save for 
disagreements about operational requirements (BBC 2010:5). In comparison with the 
tumult of the nineteenth century, the current political order in Britain has been remarkably 
unified. Rather, the most considerable difference between the Second Afghan War and the 
recent War in Afghanistan, as far as British strategy is concerned, is in the degree of 
autonomy the state has had in shaping its respective strategies. The Empire was for all 
intents a self-contained and self-reliant unit of power on the world stage; whilst there were 
undoubtedly machinations between it and other Great Powers, and within it, between 
London and its regional administrators, the constraints upon its strategic options were 
limited in comparison with today. On the one hand, autonomy of interests meant that policy 
and strategy could be meaningfully debated by domestic political parties. On the other, the 
state could operate with unity and with relative impunity in its military endeavours and, 
despite the deep moral misgivings many Liberals had with the forward policy, it was not 
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limited by liberal norms of state behaviour as the contemporary state is. As such, where 
diplomacy and peace offerings failed, the Empire could (and frequently did) put down 
threats to its security through pursuit of punitive measures.  
For example, Major General Frederick Roberts, the commander of British forces in 
Afghanistan in 1880, engaged in tactics of ‘butcher and bolt’ raids, property destruction and 
mass exiling of rebel forces to quell the insurgency, and exercised his authority to ‘execute 
rebels who had defied the will of their Amir, broken diplomatic protocol and besmirched 
British prestige’ (Johnson 2012:1-2,22). Such tactics are not entirely dissimilar to those 
proposed by contemporary advocates of a counter-terrorist stratagem in Afghanistan, but 
these are obviously largely untenable today because their use would breach the liberal 
normative basis upon which the collective security apparatus of NATO and ISAF is founded. 
Indeed, such an operational approach is more readily applicable to the US-dominated OEF’s 
‘drone’ policy. Therein lays another comparison: the United States has the resources and 
capabilities to undertake a counter-terrorist posture in Afghanistan because it can act 
independently of its alliance partners; it has relative autonomy in the same manner the 
Empire once did. The Empire’s autonomy of action allowed for a relative independence of 
strategy and policy, and was therefore unaffected by the quid pro quo of alliance dynamics 
and transnationalised policy. As such, they were less prone to transnational dilemmas and a 
concordant perception of the need for strategic communication remedies. They did not 
think about how to communicate strategy; they simply ‘did’ strategy. The constraints of 
alliance dependency today, however, have produced transnationalised effects that have 
curtailed autonomy, divested authority, and contributed to strategic vacuums which have 
allowed for departmental agendas to manifest and conflict in a way that has severely 
affected British strategy in Afghanistan. In this way the communication dilemmas of the 
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contemporary state are as much internally as externally located. Edmunds has outlined 
these tensions in a manner that can be subdivided into two themes: those concerned with 
the future role of the armed forces as a result of the drive toward transformation, and those 
between the various institutions and departments of the British state in response to the 
operational challenges of Afghanistan. 
 
Intra-state Tensions 
The first set of tensions has been described by Edmunds (2010) and Cornish and 
Dorman (2009a) as reflecting a philosophical debate within the defence community and 
academia over the relative merits of two theses that take opposing views regarding the 
force projection consequences of military transformation. The first of these two 
perspectives, Rupert Smith’s ‘war amongst the people’ thesis, posits a diminishing utility of 
conventional military force, the increased importance of counterinsurgency, and the 
centrality of ‘influence’ to military strategy and of ‘hearts and minds’ as the centre of gravity 
in the majority of contemporary ‘low-intensity conflicts’. A real-world consequence of the 
Smithian view was the perceived necessity of prioritising land forces (essentially the Army 
and Royal Marines) over and above the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force (Smith 2006:200). 
The second perspective, accorded in the main to Colin Gray, has been identified by Edmunds 
and Cornish and Dorman as a ‘balanced’ approach to transformation which, whilst 
conceding that there is currently a proclivity of ‘small wars’ and therefore the need to adjust 
operational capabilities to meet the demands such conflicts necessitate, warns against the 
creation of an imbalance between services to such an end, as well as the potential for 
‘presentism’ (focusing on today’s requirements at the expense of those of the unforeseen 
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future) to skew Britain’s medium term capabilities (Gray 2008:17). Various scholars have 
since noted, by way of references to budgetary allocations (and budgetary cuts) and the 
direction of military doctrine, that the Smithian transformation agenda and its main 
proponents has won the debate, and that the ‘wars amongst the people’ thesis – and its 
corresponding emphasis on ‘effects-based’ operations and population-centric methods of 
counterinsurgency – have been internalised by many within the Army as best representing 
its own future (Farrell and Gordon 2009:679-680, Cornish and Dorman 2009a).   
Along these lines, Paul Cornish and Andrew Dorman argued in a series of articles for 
International Affairs between 2009 and 2012 that the British state’s opting for the Smithian 
perspective on transformation has, in its implication that the material improvement of UK 
land warfare capabilities was central to British security interests, resulted in severe inter-
service rivalry due to the prioritisation of ‘expeditionary land warfare’ (and therefore the 
Army) above the Navy and Royal Air Force (2009b:738-739). For them, the reconfiguration 
of service budgets (latterly under conditions of austerity) and the apparent subordination of 
naval and air power to land power has produced an environment of considerable enmity 
between the services, as each seeks to protect its own interests in what the authors have 
dubbed ‘campaign tribalism’ (Cornish and Dorman 2009a, 2009b, 2012:215-217). They 
contend that this development stemmed from a long-standing decay of the relationship 
between policy and strategy emanating from a lack of civilian leadership on defence matters 
and a correlating deference to military leadership. The consequence of this, in their view, 
was that defence reviews were effectively ‘defence-led’ (2009a:54, 2009b:740-741). In 
addition to these institutional issues, the effects of austerity on such review processes have, 
for Cornish and Dorman, also exacerbated tribal behaviour between the services and a 
subsequent non-strategic or even ‘anti-strategic’ battle for pre-eminence (2009b:739). Thus, 
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by reference to the inter-service fallout that transformation has precipitated, we can begin 
to see how the obligation-cooperation cycle implicit in the transnationalisation thesis has 
produced severe implications for the cohesion of the British state. 
The second set of intra-state tensions stems largely from the transformation agenda’s 
role in influencing the internal divisions within the Armed Forces and the policy-strategy 
vacuum and budgetary issues resulting therefrom. Specifically, it relates to civil-military 
relations over resource provision and the balance of authority within the ‘Comprehensive 
Approach’ for Afghanistan between the Army and its civilian partners at DfID and the FCO. 
The often public debates around these issues have not only exposed the fragile working 
relationship within Whitehall (and the challenges of fulfilling the baseline assumptions of 
the CA), they have also laid bare how discord within the British state has contributed to the 
operational and strategic difficulties faced by the British in Helmand. At the broadest level 
of analysis – looking at relations between Government and the Chiefs of Staff – an inference 
can be made that the decision to deploy to Helmand was the crucible upon which civil-
military tensions were most severely tested. It is worth reiterating at this point that the 
motivations of both the civilian and military leadership in 2005-2006 were largely shaped by 
dynamics of transnationalisation: the Blair Government sought to maintain its support for 
the American Bush Administration by taking on a large share of the burden for ISAF’s move 
south in Afghanistan, whilst some in the British military viewed Helmand as an ‘opportunity 
for good soldiering’ that would allow it to begin to extricate itself from its role in southern 
Iraq (Personal Interview, 2013). In this fundamental way, both the civilian and military 
leadership were engaged in a kind of a-strategic (in the traditional sense of the term) 
appraisal of the significance of Helmand to their individual interests within the transnational 
milieu of British foreign and defence policy. 
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Assuming the plausibility of ideas of institutions as self-regarding, one can begin to 
make an assessment of how the overriding priority of living up to transnational obligations 
shaped what would prove to be an unrealistic plan for Helmand. As mentioned in the 
opening chapter, each element of the state involved in Afghanistan had their own 
preconceptions about what the ultimate purpose of the Helmand mission was and the 
correct ordering of methods in pursuing stabilisation. Along these lines, the planning 
process for Helmand was characterised by a former Government official as one of a 
coincidence of civilian and military interests, in which all parties agreed to the feasibility of 
the CA on the nominal basis that their own individual part to play would be given a place 
(Cavanagh 2012:51). Indeed, in an extreme reading, one might conclude that the CA was 
‘comprehensive’ for the institutional reason that it was the only way all viewpoints and 
interests could be accommodated simultaneously, and that for any approach to be viable it 
must incorporate the interests of all concerned parties. In this light, without making any 
sweeping indictment of its strategic practicability (for strategies that satisfy institutional 
interests do not necessarily always fail), the CA can be seen as a totem around which the 
divergent institutional interests of the British state could coalesce. Perhaps inevitably, then, 
when problems emerged almost immediately on the ground in Helmand that necessitated a 
review of the CA and the reordering of operational priorities, the recriminations between 
Government and Army that followed reverted to type of defending individual institutional 
interests at the expense of the state’s overall reputation and, by proxy, public perception of 
the feasibility of the campaign.  
The unravelling of the CA in Helmand in mid-2006 should therefore be seen as the 
catalyst for several years of institutional acrimony. A brief review of these tensions is 
instructive. The opening shots were provided in mid-2006 by the most high-profile actor in 
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the entire affair, namely then-Chief of the General Staff Sir Richard Dannatt, who in October 
gave an interview with the Daily Mail with the intention of ‘stand[ing] up for what is right 
for the Army’ and wherein he criticised the Blair Government for its decision to force the 
Army to fight two wars simultaneously. He would later accuse Government in his 
autobiography of providing assurances to the military during the Helmand planning process 
that expansion in Afghanistan would correspond with a reduction of commitments in Iraq 
and a correction to what he saw as the general underfunding of the Armed Forces (Sands 
2006: online; Hollander 2010:  online; Dannatt 2011:406). Indeed, some evidence supports 
his claim, including former Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon’s view that simultaneous missions 
would be untenable and that reducing forces in Iraq would be necessary for expansion in 
Helmand (Iraq Inquiry 2010a: online). However, John Reid, the Defence Secretary during the 
Helmand planning process and the first months of deployment, refuted Dannatt’s version of 
events at the Iraq Inquiry in February 2010 by providing documentary evidence showing 
that the then-Chief of the Defence Staff, General Michael Walker, had informed him in 
October 2005 that, in his professional view, the Armed Forces were indeed capable of 
performing concurrently in Iraq and Afghanistan (Iraq Inquiry 2010a: online). Along such 
lines, the evidence presented at the Inquiry appears to confirm the view that both sides 
were content with the leveraging of the Armed Forces to fulfil Britain’s collective security 
commitments. Again, this is because doing so apparently fulfilled the interests of both 
senior politicians and military officials. Both Gordon Brown’s (in 2005 Chancellor of the 
Exchequer) and Dannatt’s testimony appeared – perhaps surprisingly given their apparent 
mutual animosity – somewhat congruent in their recollection that they and others involved 
in planning the Helmand deployment were aware that maintaining Britain’s commitments 
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to Iraq would mean that forces would be ‘stretched but not overstretched’ and ‘running hot’ 
(Iraq Inquiry 2010b, 2010c: online).  
Despite the hostility of Dannatt and elements of the conservative press to Blair’s war 
in Iraq, the public breakdown of civil-military relations plumbed new depths under Gordon 
Brown’s premiership. By most accounts, Brown was never held in particularly high regard by 
the military, who saw him as unsympathetic to the demands of the Armed Forces and 
lacking knowledge in defence issues, and his Government in general as more concerned 
with (and more fiscally generous toward) domestic issues such as the National Health 
Service, education and social welfare (Bower 2007:388, Chin 2009:134-137). An example of 
this apparent lack of respect can be found in the reaction of some in the centre-right press 
and the Shadow Defence Minister, Liam Fox, to the appointment of Des Browne to 
Secretary of Defence, who not only was responsible for the financing estimates for 
deployment to Helmand as Chief Secretary to the Treasury under Brown, but also took on 
his role at Defence whilst simultaneously carrying out responsibilities as Minister for 
Scotland (Coughlin 2008b:25; Walker 2007: online). It was in this environment, where the 
Armed Forces perceived a lack of interest or a failure of leadership in issues of defence from 
the Brown Government that, according to Betz and Cormack, the military and MOD took the 
lead on Afghan strategy (2009:327,334).   
Michael J Williams (2011:67) has argued that this state of affairs produced a view 
within the FCO and DfID that the MOD was dominating the CA and was more widely leading 
defence policy in the place of Downing Street. It has subsequently been argued that, as a 
result of both unforeseen challenges on the ground in Helmand and the lack of an ostensibly 
neutral leading role at the prime ministerial level to arbitrate between the institutional 
interests of these departments, institutional ‘turf wars’ developed over jurisdiction and 
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control of Afghan policy and resources (Baumann 2009:13). Although encompassing 
conflicts of interest across the spectrum of diplomatic, military and development agencies 
involved in Helmand, perhaps the best documented and most significant of these turf wars 
was between the Army and MOD, on the one side, and DfID on the other. The conflict 
between them appears to be long-standing (practically from the outset of British 
involvement in Afghanistan) and deep-rooted. To illustrate, in the first year of the Afghan 
intervention then-DfID Secretary Clare Short refused ‘to allow DfID to cooperate with the 
MOD and FCO in developing Phase IV’ stabilisation operations on the basis that, in her own 
words, the advice of DfID on substantive areas of development policy were ‘ignored by 
government, who favoured supporting US counter-terrorism policy’ (Chin 2009:132; Short in 
Sedra 2010:13).  
This initial friction likely set the trend for a paucity of inter-departmental cooperation 
and the inadequate development of the Helmand plan (Chin 2009:132). DfID and the FCO’s 
approach to stabilisation, centred on soft power and development, did not correspond with 
the highly kinetic reality of Helmand in mid-2006, just as 16 Air Assault Brigade and its 
successors’ approach to stabilisation jarred with the CA plan set out by Government, insofar 
as its command opted for dispersal and offensive operations over concentration and 
reconstruction. Faced with a highly kinetic combat environment where all development 
work would be highly dangerous and potentially deleteriously linked to military activity, the 
civilian departments were reticent to work with the military and MOD. In DfID’s view in 
particular, reconstruction and development work was seen as untenable chiefly because 
their remit was ‘post-conflict’ stabilisation (epitomised by the moniker of the inter-
departmental (FCO, DfID and MOD) team established for Helmand, the Post Conflict 
Reconstruction Unit (PCRU)), whereas the situation in Helmand was very much in the 
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‘conflict’ stage of events (Betz and Cormack 2009:326, Jackson 2010:119, Lamb 2006:22). 
According to an article in The Times in mid-2006, DfID’s reluctance to work alongside the 
military in such an environment was given short shrift by the MOD, whose source argued to 
the press that if DfID were unwilling to work under the conditions as they were, their 
funding and resources should be reallocated directly to the MOD (Lamb 2006:22). 
In light of these tensions, one may see the case of the PCRU as a microcosm of the 
departmental turf wars at play in Helmand and as a case study of the gulf between the 
optimistic thinking of the planning process and the harsh realities of implementing the CA, 
both in terms of how it played out on the ground and in terms of how its delivery was 
pursued by self-interested institutions. According to Williams, the advent of the PCRU in 
Helmand was met with hostility and ‘obstructionist’ behaviour from all three departments 
(as well as the British Embassy in Kabul) as representatives from each were ‘worried that the 
PCRU was forming new relationships and would upset their own existing relationships’ in 
Helmand (2011:72). In other words, while the PCRU was the elected means of Government 
and its constituent parts for delivering the CA in Helmand, the inter-departmental turf wars 
brought to the surface by its creation and implementation effectively impeded its ability to 
function properly, suggesting that the CA itself was either unrealistic in formulation or that 
it failed to adequately account for the extent of inter-departmental differences. Another 
possibility, to synthesise these arguments, is that it was unrealistic in part because it 
functioned to fulfil all these interests simultaneously. Whatever the case, from a military 
perspective it was held that this ‘disconnect between the various arms of government has 
undermined faith in the Comprehensive Approach and whether it can be delivered’, leading 
one senior British military commander, then-Brigadier Andrew Mackay, to conclude that the 
CA was ‘seen [by the military] as a Whitehall concept which had no actual impact on the 
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ground in Helmand’ (Farrell 2008:795). The problem the CA raised was that it sought by its 
very definition to subordinate the military role under a wider set of non-military goals 
(Edmunds 2010:390), but in doing so left the military in the position of carrying the greatest 
burden whilst remaining beholden to the demands of civilian agencies that were unwilling 
or unable to carry out their own responsibilities.  
As alluded to earlier, all of these issues stemmed from a divergence of opinion 
between the civilian agencies and the military of the appropriateness of the CA’s core 
assumption of ‘securitising’ development (Duffield 2001). This approach can in turn be 
traced back to Smith’s ‘war amongst the people’ thesis and the centrality of gaining the 
consent of local populations for activities undertaken for (ultimately) the national security 
interests of the United Kingdom and its ISAF partners which were, as has been established, 
grounded in the transnationalisation of policy and strategy in the War on Terror. Whereas 
the military and the MOD (the authors of the CA) could see this approach to development as 
logical and necessary because it reflected their central institutional interest of pursuing 
national security interests, for DfID and the FCO their core objective of reducing poverty was 
relegated to a means to the end of security (Farrell and Gordon 2009:680; Howell 2010: 
online). Transnationalisation is relevant here as one may make the inference, as Clare Short 
did (mentioned earlier in this work), that the securitisation of development in Afghanistan 
was a consequence of the UK’s interest in following an American policy in Afghanistan that 
has been dominated by national security concerns over and above developmental ends. If 
one accepts the provenance of Short’s point of view and the core arguments of King (that 
multinationalisation has led to transnationalisation) and Edmunds (that transnationalisation 
creates or heightens intra-state tensions), it is reasonable to conclude that the conflicts of 
interest hitherto outlined are the by-product of Britain’s participation in collective security 
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frameworks in Afghanistan. From this point of departure, one is in a position to claim that 
much of the operational and strategic challenges of the UK regarding Afghanistan were 
internally located, albeit (crucially) externally precipitated. Moreover, the lack of a unified 
political objective within the British state allows us to account for some of the strategic 
incoherence in Helmand as well as the incompatibility of the institution-specific policies of 
stabilisation, counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism.  
 
The UK’s ‘Transnational Dilemma’ for Afghanistan 
 The existence of multiple incompatible policies for Afghanistan is, therefore, 
established as the result of the intra-state tensions produced from the UK’s transnational 
policy posture and a concomitant lack of strategic direction and autonomy at the national 
level. How these policies unfolded over time (as ‘policy narratives’) can be explained in the 
context of such tensions, with ultimate reference back to Edmunds’ transnationalisation 
argument. The story expounded in the empirical chapters of this work explains how the 
three policy narratives employed by the British state regarding Afghanistan originated from 
a milieu of institutional interests interacting under the constraints of a transnationalised 
policy environment which, because they reflected those interests and not the strategic 
requirements of the Afghan mission, failed to coalesce into a workable whole. As Britain’s 
military (and therefore political) commitments to Afghanistan increased in 2006 with 
deployment to Helmand, the shortcomings of this arrangement – epitomised by the early 
failure of the CA – became obvious. Britain was expending substantial human and material 
resources in an undertaking that did not appear to have any unified purpose, primarily 
because it had multiple purposes depending on whom one asked. According to the 
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transnationalisation thesis, if there was an ultimate purpose for the British state, it would be 
that of supporting American defence policy as a dependent mid-level power, and this 
imperative would therefore have taken strategic precedence over the requirements of 
stabilising Afghanistan, which would amount to a means to an end. The notion that Britain’s 
decision to stand ‘shoulder to shoulder’ with the United States has defined its participation 
in the War on Terror, and the fact that the last two National Security Strategies and the 
2010 SDSR (amongst other documents) have explicitly stated the centrality of the special 
relationship to Britain’s national interests (security-related and otherwise) should make this 
evident enough.  
To be clear, British Governments involved in Afghanistan have laboured under an 
unstated (and politically unstatable) requirement of balancing the demands of ‘satisfy[ing] 
US expectations … with British national interests’ (Gray 2008:17). This has been a difficult 
task because British ‘national interests’ are themselves uncertain, due to the inter-related 
facts that they are  (a) largely shaped by and contingent upon US interests, and (b) a 
composite of the various institutional interests (themselves shaped by the demands of 
transnationalism) within the state itself. Since Britain’s national interest of territorial 
security is, according to its own strategic documents, practically impossible to secure on its 
own in the manner it deems necessary, it is difficult to conceive of defining the national 
interest in isolation of the interest of its security guarantor. Similarly, the notion of a 
national interest (or perhaps more accurately a state interest (raison d’état)) can only be 
understood in practice as the lowest common denominator of the interests of its 
constituent parts, and beyond that there are issues of interpretation to contend with 
regarding how interests are best secured. As the previous discussion has shown, British 
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state institutions in Afghanistan have often interpreted the national interest in conflicting 
ways.  
These issues contribute to a ‘transnational dilemma’ between domestic politics and 
international diplomacy, where interventions are indirectly linked to the interests of the UK 
polity but from which the British state ‘cannot exempt [itself] for fear of being excluded 
from access to critical shared security goods’ (2010:388). What this implies, first and 
foremost, is that transnational realpolitik is at least as much a motivation for the UK’s 
involvement in Afghanistan as concerns about terrorist plots against its territory or overseas 
interests, but also that interests must be made ‘saleable’ to the general public in terms that 
generate popular support. This is, of course, an unstatable reality for any self-regarding 
politician in any liberal democracy (since the implication would be that the lives of British 
soldiers were being sacrificed in the pursuit of maintaining American favour rather than for 
vital and direct security reasons), and therefore encapsulates the communication element 
of the transnational dilemma, where public acknowledgment of the dilemma must be 
avoided at all cost lest it unravel the fabric of Britain’s transnationalised interests and 
policies. Thus King is undoubtedly correct in his contention that states ‘have found it very 
difficult to conceptualize this transnational dilemma or explain it to their publics’ 
(2010b:389), not only because it would be entirely self-defeating (in terms of a national 
interest contingent upon the provision of collective security goods) to do so, but also 
because it would fail to accord with the sensibilities of liberal democratic politics.  
Instead, the solution for Afghanistan has been to simply ignore the transnational 
dilemma almost entirely. British politicians have tended to emphasise one of two positions 
on Afghanistan: the first, running from 2001 until 2007-2008, related to the security of the 
international community at large and the well-being of Afghans and the democratisation of 
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their society. The second, from 2008 to the present day, has emphasised the mission in 
Afghanistan in terms of its relationship to British security interests, increasingly at the 
expense of any humanitarian or international motivations. The fact that ‘national’ security 
reasons were not frequently referenced until this point suggests that they were not of 
paramount importance in Government’s decision to take part in the war in Afghanistan, that 
‘nationally’ orientated foreign and defence policy was not the lens through which security 
issues were conceptualised by Government or, at the very least, that Government felt such 
concerns were not necessary to justify British participation. Indeed, until recently – October 
2008, to be precise – British participation in Afghanistan was rarely framed by any British 
politician, Government minister or otherwise, as being for reasons of ‘national security’ or 
for ‘national interests’. The use of such arguments only became reasonably regular in 
occurrence from late 2008, presumably as a reaction by ministers to the increasing numbers 
of casualties and a corollary increase in media attention on the Helmand campaign.  
Rather, prior to October 2008 (and in a few isolated cases after that date), the 
communications by ministers and state officials regarding Afghanistan tended to follow a 
pattern of deploying rationales for the intervention that reflected their own departmental 
briefs in conjunction with the emphasis on democratisation coming down from the prime 
ministerial level. Indeed, according to Dannatt, the Labour Government had placed an 
embargo on military commanders issuing their own statements (which invariably would 
have reflected the kinetic aspects of the campaign) and instead enforced a ‘pre-ordained 
narrative’ of reconstruction and development (Dannatt 2011:323,354). Dannatt’s assertion 
of narrative scripts can be easily validated: DfID Secretaries such as Hilary Benn and Douglas 
Alexander, for example, would cite improving the lives of Afghan women or the education of 
young girls as a reason for intervening in Afghanistan in a way that placed such efforts on a 
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par with security concerns (Benn 2006, Alexander 2008).  Defence Secretaries such as John 
Reid and Des Browne would emphasise reconstruction and counter-insurgency (with Reid in 
particular fixated on the role of counter-narcotics as compatible with the latter) even when 
those elements of the mission were practically non-existent in comparison with kinetic 
activity. Perhaps most remarkably, Home Office minister Phil Woollas, whose brief related 
to border control, argued in 2009 that Britain’s presence in Afghanistan helped prevent 
mass immigration from that country to the UK (Slack 2009: online). In these cases, the issue 
was not one of the veracity of each claim about the significance of Afghanistan – each issue 
was of importance to some collection of ministers or civil servants and their respective role 
in Government – but rather one of consistency of message, and who controlled the 
message.  
Who controls the message, and indeed whether messages are controlled enough to 
constitute ‘the message’ (as opposed to multiple messages) has real consequences for the 
viability and popular support of a policy and strategy. Along such lines, Betz and Cormack 
(2009:329) have offered an explanation that accounts for many of the consequences of 
institutional turf wars and departmental fragmentation of messaging, pointing to the fallout 
of public spats over equipment shortages, the unpopularity of counter-narcotics efforts, 
increasing troop casualties, the negative association of Afghanistan with Iraq, and a general 
feeling of strategic drift as contributing factors. Indeed, the first two and the last of these 
variables can be related directly back to turf wars stemming from institutional tensions 
associated with the strategic void concomitant with transnationalised policy, while the third 
and fourth factors (the so-called ‘poodleism’ effect) can be indirectly associated with 
Britain’s transnational positioning of foreign and defence policy. The notion that Britain was 
carrying a disproportionate burden in collective security operations characterised by 
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European ‘free riders’ – and by extrapolation that the obligation implicit in Edmunds’ 
transnationalisation thesis was inducing negative consequences for the British state – is 
supported by troop casualty statistics: by 2007, Britain’s military deaths accounted for 40 
percent of the total for all European contributing nations, and by the end of 2011 was 
greater than those of all European nations put together (iCasualties: online).  
The combination of these factors over the first eighteen months of the Helmand 
campaign may be seen as precipitating factors in causing the Brown Government to attempt 
to address its shortcomings in developing a coherent and consistent set of political 
messages for the UK public on Afghanistan. The prevalence of political discussion on the 
inconsistency of messaging on the conflict by late 2007 suggests that the dilemmas that 
Britain’s Afghan policy (and its transnational orientation more broadly) had produced could 
no longer be ignored. Pre-2006, the costs of collective security obligations in Afghanistan 
were minimal and largely overshadowed by events in Iraq. Following the deployment to 
Helmand, however, the dilemma of balancing the costs of participation against the benefits 
became one that was no longer politically tenable or explainable by reference to 
democratisation and counter-narcotics aims. Because mixed messaging was the result of 
‘information fratricide’ between competing Government departments, streamlining 
messaging to avoid public confusion about the purpose of Britain’s presence in Afghanistan 
meant getting to grips with the turf wars between departments of state. It was in this 
context that Government began to adopt a more self-aware and reflexive approach to 
public relations on Afghanistan which would later be referred to as ‘strategic 
communication’, developing doctrine and institutional processes with the aim of prioritising 
a key message that could unify all efforts in the CA and all elements of state. 
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Strategic Communication: a solution to or continuation of the 
transnational dilemma? 
 
The origins of SC as an institutionalised process and appendage of MOD bureaucracy 
can be traced back to early 2009 (see Kirkup 2009: online). This is significant in a 
chronological sense because it coincides with the beginning of the reconfiguration of the 
British narrative for Afghanistan by Labour Defence Secretary John Hutton in October 2008 
along lines that would mirror the MOD’s definition for SC. The contention here is that 
Hutton’s reconfiguration of narrative and the development of SC are institutionally, 
chronologically and thematically linked, suggesting that they were, in fact, two parts of a 
larger development within defence aimed at reconfiguring the Afghan narrative. In his 
maiden speech as Defence Secretary, given to the International Institute for Strategic 
Studies in November 2008, Hutton argued for the significance of Afghanistan in 
predominantly military terms, stating that the successful prosecution of the campaign was a 
‘vital national interest’ and, in the process, coining a new term – ‘national security interest’ 
– to describe the significance of Afghanistan. Interestingly, this term has a way of addressing 
the transnational dilemma without committing too much rhetorical weight to either of its 
constituent elements; its strength was in its subtlety. It stated outright neither the necessity 
of meeting collective security obligations nor the directness of the threat posed by Afghan 
terrorism to the UK mainland; rather, it occupies a medium space that hints at both and, in 
doing so, makes it possible to bridge the national with the transnational without ever 
referencing the substantive meaning of their relationship. It positioned UK policy on 
Afghanistan in a space where it could posit the necessity of collective security operations 
there but without exposing it to the deficiencies associated with collective security, of which 
there were many. Indeed, Hutton’s speeches contained several references to UK displeasure 
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at free riding problems and the damage it was doing to NATO’s credibility (Hutton 2008b). 
More broadly, Hutton’s speech ushered in a post-Blairite framework for defence policy 
rhetoric, placing ideas of ‘the national interest’ and the primacy of ‘national security’ over 
liberal interventionist norms of democratisation and humanitarianism. From November 
2008 onwards, a consensus amongst state officials – Government and Opposition, ministers 
and civil servants alike – would develop (evidenced by their public utterings) that would 
cement Hutton’s reconfiguration.  
It was in this context that MOD SC practices and processes developed. Unlike his 
predecessor Des Browne, Hutton seemed to have had the confidence of the Armed Forces, 
to the extent that, according to Seldon and Lodge (2011:207), he was seen by some in 
Cabinet as the ‘military’s voice’ in Government. This was reflected in a series of interviews 
and public statements in late 2008 and early 2009 in which Hutton sought both to reframe 
the Helmand campaign as one that was centrally a military one, and to downplay the 
developmental and diplomatic aspects of the CA pushed by DfID and the FCO. Specifically, 
Hutton’s emphasis was on the centrality of military force in order to have any prospect of 
securing political settlements or stability for development projects. He repeatedly 
emphasised force where his predecessors were reticent to do so. In this way, Hutton’s 
publicly stated view that military means could be effective in providing the space for a 
resolution to the conflict jarred slightly with those of David Miliband and others at the FCO, 
who spoke frequently of the need for a ‘civilian surge’ and the impossibility of a ‘military 
solution’ to the conflict (Miliband 2008a, 2008b, 2008c). Of course, an institutional 
perspective suggests it is perhaps natural that Hutton would emphasise the military 
dimension of the Afghan conflict given his departmental remit as head of the MOD (not to 
mention the operational requirements of the day of succeeding in ‘clear, hold, build’). 
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However, it is noteworthy that focusing on Afghanistan as a national security issue and 
fundamentally a counter-terrorist mission would have been difficult to substantiate without 
an emphasis on military prosecution on the ground. Indeed, anything less than a ‘national 
security’-informed approach would have suggested the continued prioritisation of 
developmental efforts. Likewise, the statements of Hutton and Fox indicate that the view of 
some in Government and Opposition at this time was that an increased role for military 
force would be a far more difficult sell to the British public if the overall mission remained 
framed as a democratisation mission or concerned primarily with counter-narcotics work. In 
short, Hutton’s reframing of the mission’s purpose fit naturally with an emboldening of 
military rhetoric. 
Press reports in early 2009 confirm that these developments coincided with a 
ratcheting up of institutional effort in SC, with articles noting the Cabinet Office’s opening 
up of positions for strategic communication officers to direct Government messaging efforts 
(Walker 2009:8). The actual theoretical and practical content of SC efforts seems to have 
originated mainly from the MOD, however. In February 2009, James Kirkup of The Telegraph 
appeared to confirm that Hutton’s shift in narrative reflected fears within the MOD about 
the public’s growing perception of transnationalisation of defence policy as animating 
Britain’s motives in Afghanistan; he claimed that ‘the MoD is haunted by the echoes of Iraq, 
and the belief among some voters - and MPs and soldiers, come to that - that Tony Blair 
ultimately sent UK forces into combat to preserve British relations with the US … [t]his 
strategy dictates that any decision to send more British troops must be explained in terms of 
the immediate UK national interest, not esoteric diplomatic considerations: we're not doing 
this to please the guy in the White House, we're doing this to keep you safe’ (Kirkup 2009: 
online). The transition of the Afghan ‘narrative’ from an internationalist, humanitarian and 
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democratisation mission to one concerned almost solely with British national security can 
be seen in this light as a direct response to concerns that the transnational dilemma had 
emerged into public discourse. Indeed, Kirkup’s article represented exactly that; according 
to him, the worst fear of the MOD was the public uncovering of transnationalised defence 
policy and, as a consequence, the popularisation of a conceptualisation of the transnational 
dilemma in public discourse. Awareness of the shaping effect of transnational issues on UK 
policy and strategy would potentially open up state discourses to questions of inter-state 
bargaining and the inherent indirectness of the threat from Afghanistan. Needless to say, 
this is a highly nuanced account to give and is therefore vulnerable to misinterpretation or 
distortion. In any event, the official SC response was to avoid this account altogether, with 
the MOD opting instead to frame British efforts in Afghanistan as directly related to UK 
security without reference to any transnational features. The UK appears to have acted 
alone in this respect: according to an anonymous NATO official, few of the UK’s European 
allies shared Hutton’s conviction that Afghanistan was vital to their own security, 
contending instead that ‘some of them believe the more fighting there is in Afghanistan, the 
less secure they are at home here in Europe’ (Guardian 2009). 
All of these developments appear to have been motivated both directly and indirectly 
by the transnationalisation of defence policy, as an attempt to both pre-empt and remain 
relevant to American strategy for Afghanistan, and to maintain a justification that could 
sustain British public support for transnationalised policy in the face of an upsurge in 
operations and casualties. The shift to the national security ‘narrative’ took place against the 
backdrop of a renewed interest in Afghanistan on the part of the new US President, Barack 
Obama, whose inauguration occurred within days of the first press reports on SC and MOD 
narrative reconfiguration. Indeed, amongst Obama’s first actions as President was a call for 
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America’s European allies to commit more resources to Afghanistan, signalling a likely 
increase in the size and intensity of military efforts there. In 2009 the Brown Government 
would oblige the US by increasing British troop levels to their apex of 9,500; UK forces 
would suffer more than twice as many casualties (108) in 2009 than in 2008 (51). This sharp 
rise in blood price was met with a more concerted SC effort to frame Afghanistan as a 
national security mission  throughout the summer of 2009, with ministers deploying new 
phrases to describe the ostensibly existential significance of the terrorist threat there 
(labelling Afghanistan as the ‘crucible’, ‘axis’, ‘epicentre’ and ‘incubator’ of terror) and an 
associated rise in occurrence of powerful, hypothetical assertions about what would happen 
if Britain and its partners withdrew prematurely from the conflict. At the same time, 
mentions of DfID and FCO counter-narcotics and development work all but disappeared 
from the narrative. Perhaps reflecting British awareness of Obama’s lack of interest in the 
democratisation agenda of his predecessor, the reconfigured Afghan narrative explicitly 
separated security aims from non-security aims such as the empowerment of women and 
the education of girls. This was so to the extent that, by July of 2009, the champion of soft 
power in Government, David Miliband, was found going to great lengths to disassociate 
fighting from development by stating that the UK was ‘not in Afghanistan militarily because 
girls were not allowed to go to school’ (Miliband 2009c: online). 
Thus, the emergence of SC practices on the one hand and political discourses of 
national security interests on the other should be seen as two inter-connected elements 
comprising the British state’s response to the transnational defence dilemma on 
Afghanistan. This historical development has at least two identifiable implications that 
shape the analyses of policy narratives in this work. The first relates specifically to the 
transnational dilemma, and is that one can see SC as largely fulfilling its immediate purpose 
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for Afghanistan, in that it did manage to produce a consistent message based on the 
centrality of national security out of an institutionally delineated morass of contradicting 
aims. This was so even though, as Betz and Cormack (2009:328) have claimed, the 
existential content of the message was not commensurate with the ‘inadequate’ 
commitment of resources by Government to the war effort. SC practices effectively 
reframed the narrative during a difficult period to defend the Afghan mission by appealing 
to raison d’état, thereby providing the state with breathing space to fulfil its collective 
security obligations and maintain its transnational policy posture whilst promoting a more 
culturally acceptable and nationally located rationale for British sacrifices that would, 
incidentally, not be compromised by the free riding of its ISAF allies. In doing so, SC practices 
effectively circumvented the transnational dilemma by couching UK collective security 
obligations in primarily national terms. SC also provided options to the Government by 
allowing it to focus on strategic and operational aspects of the campaign that supported 
(and were supported by) the national security narrative. The less-than-successful 
development and governance work could be downplayed as non-essential to British national 
security, whilst the more practical work of training the ANSF and providing a security 
umbrella for ‘Afghanisation’ could be pointed to as both relatively fruitful and as essential 
for stabilisation and, by proxy, British security needs. As such, the claim to be working 
towards the ‘national interest’ can be seen as having a constitutive force on the ground in 
Afghanistan, insofar as it provided a discursive exit strategy from all elements of the CA that 
were superfluous to the baseline of national security.   
The second implication for the analysis of UK policy narratives on Afghanistan relates 
to the issue of institutional tensions within the British state. SC came at the price of 
marginalising the agendas of DfID and the FCO in favour of the national interest and security 
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approach of the MOD. Curiously, unlike SC practices in the United States which have been 
instituted as a cross-departmental process, British SC doctrine has been formulated within 
the MOD’s think tank, the Developments, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC), 
culminating in the publication of Joint Doctrine Notes 1/11 and 1/12 in 2011 and 2012. This 
has led some commentators to conclude that British SC appears to having something of a 
‘tail wagging the dog’ quality to it, that is, that principles of state-wide SC are defined by the 
defence establishment rather than by Downing Street, Cabinet, or the recently formed 
National Security Council (Cornish, Lindley-French & Yorke 2011:5). Given the rather drastic 
reorientation of the Afghan narrative from one that attempted (perhaps unsuccessfully) to 
accommodate all institutional interests in the CA under an equally comprehensive (if 
somewhat confusing) über-narrative for Afghanistan, it is not unreasonable to posit that the 
location of SC within the MOD allowed defence matters to set the agenda for British efforts 
in Afghanistan from 2009 to 2014.  
Along such lines, it is surely debatable whether SC practice has truly overcome the 
institutional turf wars that benighted British strategic practice in Helmand. If anything, SC 
appears to fit into the trend of institutional competition documented in the preceding pages 
of this work, insofar as it has effectively won the day for the defence establishment in 
relation to the other, civilian departments of state. The “poverty reduction” agenda of the 
FCO and DfID has been demoted – rhetorically at least – from being of equal importance to 
(or essential to) security aims to being an unnecessary and impractical diversion from 
national security objectives. Meanwhile, the ascendancy of ‘national interest’ and ‘national 
security’ in defence and foreign policy discourse is such that it has now become a staple 
phrase in practically every political communique, from National Security Strategies and 
Strategic Defence Reviews down to the day-to-day parliamentary statement covering most 
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domestic and foreign policy issues. The influence of these terms – and therefore the shaping 
power of the defence community on the discursive content of Britain’s transnationalised 
policy outlook – seems greater than at any point since the War on Terror began. SC can also 
be interpreted as an extension of institutional turf wars within the defence establishment 
insofar as it has promoted expeditionary campaigns such as that of Afghanistan from the 
level of ‘discretionary conflicts’ to that of near-existential struggles for national security. In 
doing so, it has promoted the Army vis-à-vis other services by framing such conflicts as ‘vital 
national security interests’, thereby consolidating the ‘wars amongst the people’ thesis and 
the prioritisation of land forces over the more conventionally oriented Royal Navy and Royal 
Air Force.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued for viewing Britain’s operational and strategic challenges in 
Afghanistan as largely informed by the fragmenting effects of transnationalisation on the 
British state. Transnational considerations are at the heart of British foreign and defence 
policy because the UK depends on mechanisms of collective security for the furtherance of 
its national interests. Because the national interest is only realisable through such 
mechanisms, British policymakers have quite naturally opted for policies and strategies that 
strengthen the UK’s position in the transatlantic alliance system. Taking such positions 
confers significant political and diplomatic benefits to the UK, not least of which being its 
ability to continue ‘punching above its weight’ in world affairs. Costs are also evident, 
however, and the severe toll taken by Britain’s Armed Forces in Afghanistan is a case in 
point. I have argued that the UK’s role in Helmand is indicative of the iterative effect of 
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political obligation and military cooperation, whereby the UK’s pursuit of its national 
interest through compliance in collective security missions deepens its transnational 
outlook. This trend has had the dual effect of locking Britain into the collective security 
policy for Afghanistan whilst simultaneously limiting its ability to explain the purpose of 
Afghanistan in national terms.  
This ‘transnational dilemma’ has been compounded by the destabilising effects of 
transnationalisation’s twin pillars of transformation and obligation on the constituent parts 
of the British state. Under the weight of increased pressure to adapt, cooperate and 
perform in an environment of immense strategic and operational complexity, state 
institutions have often instead competed with one another, struggling inside a vacuum of 
externally imposed policy and strategy to assert their own vision of the purpose of 
intervention in Afghanistan. This fragmentation has resulted in the production of multiple 
and often incompatible ‘policy narratives’ for the Afghan campaign – those of counter-
terrorism, stabilisation, and counter-narcotics, respectively – which have tended to reflect 
institutional interests and, in doing so, have threatened to expose the calculus of realpolitik 
underpinning the transnational dilemma. Government and Defence have since attempted to 
partially rectify the disjointedness of official discourse on Afghanistan by imposing SC 
practices, centred on a core ideal of the ‘national security interest’, in order to provide 
consistency of messaging within the state and, I have argued, to attempt to circumvent the 
unstatable logic of the transnational dilemma in a manner that adequately accounts for and 
balances Britain’s transnational and national obligations.  
The limit of SC is that it does not resolve the unanswered strategic questions that 
transnationalisation imposes: as a communicative tool, it cannot provide insight on the 
location of interests or the proper relationship between policy and strategy, nor does it 
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overcome substantively the task of explaining the necessity of collective security and the 
significance of indirect security threats to the UK. In fact, in practice it has made a point – by 
focusing on the direct threat of terrorism to UK national security – to simply ignore these 
aspects altogether. This indicates another problem, namely that the centrality of 
transnationalisation processes to UK strategic practice suggests that it is doubtful whether 
ideas of ‘national interest’ can be a truly useful means of measuring risk in collective 
security operations.  UK interests are operationally, politically and doctrinally dependent 
upon the maintenance of its alliances. Its interests are as much located in the maintenance 
of structures that further or allow its interests to be pursued than in any objectively-defined 
security issue. As such, any hope of producing a clear framework for measuring the validity 
of a strategy in terms of its relationship to policy is mitigated by the abiding reality that 
much of British policy is, in fact, derivative of and therefore contingent upon the 
maintenance and protection of collective (NATO and American) policy. Thus, any analysis of 
the ‘national’ aspect of interest immediately comes up against the problem of defining 
where ‘transnational’ aspects end and national ones begin. Yet, because the abiding feature 
of transnationalisation is its ‘unstatability’, there cannot be an open discussion about the 
relationship between collective and national interests. This is unhelpful for British strategic 
thinking; indeed, it is potentially crippling. As an institutional response to this dilemma, SC 
has simultaneously contributed to setting a new foundational unit of analysis (national 
interest) for defence whilst also putting up discursive barriers that are designed to insulate 
and obscure the transnational reality and the institutional and normative parameters 
therein that both inform and conceptually confound ideas of the ‘national’.  In this reading, 
SC is a largely superficial plaster covering a gaping wound, and one that may ultimately 
cause more harm than good.  
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Thus, what follows in chapters 4-7 seeks to posit an understanding of SC as intimately 
related to, and a natural consequence of a failure of strategic thought and process at the 
national and transnational level. This contrasts with most academic and military doctrinal 
contributions to the subject, where SC and the institutional issues affecting the 
development of coherent stabilisation strategy have often been treated as separate 
phenomena. I propose that analysis of the relationship between policy, strategy and 
narrative as it unfolded in Afghanistan allows us to link the development of SC to issues of 
institutional discordance arising from transnationalised policy. This provides us with a new 
way of looking at SC and the relationship between unstated transnational policy and stated 
national policy. The empirical chapters of this work explain in greater detail how SC arose as 
a response to strategic challenges in Afghanistan, but frames it as a consequence and 
continuation of the transnational dilemma rather than as a solution to that dilemma and 
corresponding quandaries of national strategy. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODS: CONSTRUCTIVISM, 
CONTESTATION AND PERFORMANCE 
 
 
In the introductory chapter, I set out fundamental questions: how has the 
transnational dilemma affected British strategy in Afghanistan, and how has it both 
necessitated and complicated SC efforts for the war in Afghanistan? I made the case for 
conceiving of perceptions of a ‘loss of capacity for strategic thought’ as primarily the result 
of the substantial divestment of UK defence policy and strategy to the transnational level. 
This, I have argued, should be seen as the result of mid-level states like the UK seeking to 
use what power they do have in conjunction with that of the wider collective security 
apparatuses they are party to, in order to maximise the effectiveness of their response to 
global problems such as international terrorism. This is deemed necessary since such 
problems evidently require concerted, multi-national solutions. I argued that institutional 
arrangements at the transnational level (primarily in the form of NATO) are in turn 
organised and cohered around liberal normative frameworks that tend to promote liberal 
solutions to global problems such as terrorism because they reflect the lowest common 
denominator of their institutional relationships – that is, the overarching concept agreeable 
to all NATO members. The combination of institutional divestment of defence policy and 
strategy and the concordant normative limitation of the horizons of those policies and 
strategies are, I have argued, considerable factors which explain the apparent loss of 
autonomous strategic capacity in the UK. One negative implication of such arrangements is 
that the traditional ‘logic’ of strategy, that is, the linking of national power to national ends, 
has been overtaken by collective security logic where the national powers of states are 
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pooled together. Explaining the relationship between interests, policy and strategy becomes 
more challenging in such a scenario, as the traditional linkages between them are no longer 
necessarily ‘nationally’ based. States’ interests, policies and strategies become 
‘transnationalised’.  
The difficulties inherent in explaining policies and strategies that are largely 
contingent upon collective security principles and processes are encapsulated along these 
lines by what King has referred to as a ‘transnational dilemma’. Given the centrality of the 
principle of mutual aid to NATO’s functioning, it is natural that some of its policies and 
strategies have less to do with direct and – importantly – directly comprehensible interests 
(that is, those that speak to the traditionally understood link between the state and its 
citizenry), and are difficult to explain. In order to make collective security apparatuses work, 
however, these policies and strategies must nonetheless be performed, since the collective 
interest is, albeit indirectly, the national interest of any state that relies upon collective 
security goods. For many years, this dilemma was evidently not readily observable for the 
UK in Afghanistan, perhaps mostly because its contributions until 2006 paled in comparison 
to those made in Iraq. Since 2006, however, the cost of securing collective security goods 
has been significantly higher, in terms of lives lost and resources expended and, therefrom, 
in terms of political support for the mission itself. As a result of this increased perception of 
cost, the transnational dilemma has emerged as a serious political and strategic issue for the 
UK and other states, to the extent that the collective agreements between states to adhere 
to stabilising Afghanistan began to ebb away after ten years of intervention. Politicians 
began to speak less of the merits of alliance membership and more in terms of national 
justifications for being in Afghanistan. A corollary of this was that the transnational values, 
policies and strategies that the UK has been compelled to pursue for the sake of collective 
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security cohesion have had to be reframed in national terms – specifically ‘national security’ 
terms – to the point where some policies became more important for such an explanation, 
while others lost their relevance. This analysis led us to the central point of my thesis: that 
the shaping (and destabilising) effects of transnational policy on UK strategy can be 
understood by reference to an analysis of the evolution of three strategic communication 
narratives that constituted UK strategy in Afghanistan – those of stabilisation, counter-
narcotics and counter-terrorism, respectively – because such analysis reveals that these 
narratives are largely constituted by the direct or indirect effects of transnationalised 
defence policy and/or in response to the dilemmas posed to the British state therein. 
In this methodological chapter, I provide an account of the research methods and 
design employed to best analyse the evolution of these policies’ narratives, in order to draw 
conclusions on the validity of this work’s hypothesis, that is, that transnationalisation has 
played a foundational role in shaping Britain’s communication approach to Afghanistan. The 
chapter proceeds by firstly identifying the object of empirical study – the three policies 
hitherto mentioned – and contextualising them within a theoretical lens of narrative theory. 
This allows us to consider policies as narratives, and the evolution of those policies as a 
story, containing a number of isolatable variables, such as rationales, purposes, strategies, 
desired end states and so on, which can be measured against themselves over time as a 
means of demonstrating changes in policy.  Utilising narrative theory in this way allows a 
case to be made for how the strategy(ies) for Afghanistan ran along institutional lines, and 
careful study of the way they unfold demonstrate that the shortcomings of Afghan strategy 
were largely internally generated, but also externally inculcated. Isolating narrative events 
and noting where they alter allows us attribute causality and, therefore, to see how the 
narratives changed over time. We can then search for correlations between these ‘narrative 
83 
 
events’ and other events happening at the same time. This allows for an empirically sound 
accounting of the situation.  
The second part of this chapter explains the research method employed in order to 
analyse the object of inquiry. In the empirical chapters of this work, I utilise a discourse 
analysis approach to the three policies in question. This approach has required the 
collection of data pertaining to each of the three policies which, upon completion of 
collation and dissemination, constituted three distinguishable ‘policy narratives’ used by the 
UK state to explain its activities (and the purpose and significance of those activities) in 
Afghanistan. I explain the choices made in selecting data, the points of reference by which I 
searched for data, and the manner in which the data was compiled and analysed in 
database form.  The third part of this chapter covers the methodological approach taken in 
this work, and situates the data within a nominally constructivist theoretical prism. In 
seeking to demonstrate the contestation between institutions by way of reference to the 
incompatibility of the three policies analysed, I loosely apply the tenets of the constructivist 
‘cultural pragmatics’ and ‘coding’ frameworks of Jeffrey Alexander (2011) and Philip Smith 
(2005). Alexander and Smith’s approach emphasises the discursive ‘performative’ nature of 
power relations and the rooting of policy discourses on war in cultural ‘codes’. Both of these 
approaches have constructivist elements to them which facilitate interpretations of the 
state as a multi-faceted, heterogeneous collection of agents, thereby allowing for an 
analysis of internal state behaviour.   
The fourth and concluding part of this chapter consists of a brief summary of the 
findings of the analysis of empirical data as it relates to the methodology employed. Central 
to this discussion is the historical significance of SC practices within Whitehall as a potential 
corrective to the ‘transnational dilemma’. I argue that SC, as a self-conscious means of 
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shaping narratives, may be understood as a constructivist tool of the state as it attempts to 
come to terms with the strategic issues presented by the transnationalisation of foreign and 
defence policy. In making this case, I argue that SC is the product of, rather than solution to, 
the effects of transnationalised policy in two ways. Firstly, it attempts only to paper over the 
cracks of strategy by shielding the UK’s realpolitik arrangements from public view. Britain’s 
transnational dilemma is one where transnationalised policy can neither be displaced from 
its current foundational place in British interests and policy, nor openly acknowledged. Since 
this situation offers no simple or substantive solution that could break the dilemma (without 
also undermining the UK’s overall strategic position), one may assume by extrapolation that 
whatever measures can be taken may only be superficial, i.e., based in discursive practice. 
Secondly, SC’s historical origins demonstrate that it emerged out of an institutionally-driven 
malaise of strategy and communication, and served to promote the interests of one set of 
institutions (the MOD and Army) above others. In this reading, SC is not necessarily a 
solution to Britain’s strategic dilemmas as much as merely the continuation of those 
dilemmas. As such, the existence of SC leads this work to conclude that the strategic issues 
faced by Britain regarding Afghanistan will likely be repeated, so long as transnationalised 
policy remains the foundational unit of British strategic analysis. 
 
Narrative theory  
What do we mean by ‘narrative’? At root narrative is simply the act of storytelling, and 
narrative theory is the proposition that people ‘organise our experience and our memory of 
human happenings mainly in the form of narrative – stories, excuses, myths, reasons for 
doing and not doing, and so on’ (Bruner 1991:4). For narrative theorists, reality is (to varying 
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degrees) constructed through the creation and acceptance of commonly held 
understandings, and these understandings contain identifiable and analysable elements or 
variables, including actors (protagonists and antagonists), locations, motives, objectives, 
strategies and so on. There are a few key concepts by which one may systematically 
deconstruct a narrative, both for the purposes of policymakers as a means of creating 
coherence for that narrative (which is the work of SC practitioners) and for critical scholarly 
purposes of disseminating notable trends therein or changes to narrative over time. 
Understanding the components of and dynamics by which narratives are constituted is 
therefore crucial if one is to provide an account of how they develop and the factors that 
affect their evolution. Firstly, there is the foundational constructivist distinction between 
‘events’ – those actions that exist “out there” in the world – and ‘plot’ – the manner in 
which narrating agents make sense of those events (Ricoeur 1980:178; Franzosi 1998:519; 
Budniakiewicz 1978:190-191). Secondly, for events to have meaning they must be of 
interest to the producer of meaning – in this case, the narrator (Bremond 1980:390). They 
must have a utilitarian or strategic purpose. It is the relative emphasis given by narratives 
(as constructions of reality) to particular events or actions that give them ‘functional’ 
qualities (Barthes 1975:243). Thus, events are only ‘narrative events’ when they relate to 
plot; plot ‘selects’ events, and events are plotted by a narrator if they are amenable to 
thematic unities of a plot designed to fulfil some subjective and instrumental purpose of the 
narrator (Ricoeur 1980). In this way, the narrator constructs their ‘narrative reality’. The 
second distinctive feature is the sequential or successive nature of narrative (Bremond 
1980:390; Barthes 1975:243-251; Ricoeur 1980; Riessman 1993:18-19). That narratives 
operate in a sequential fashion that establishes causality between events is what 
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distinguishes it from all non-sequential discourses as well as statements that do not rely on 
the consequences of actions to move a story forward.  
Both these aspects of narrative – sequencing and causality – are inter-related; a 
narrative cannot have sequence without causality, and vice versa. By analysing a discourse 
as a constructed narrative built upon sequence and causality, one can begin to look for the 
potential motives of the narrator in their narrative constructions. For Barthes, sequences 
are ‘linked together by a solidary relation’: they begin where there is no precursory relation 
to what is being said, and end where there is no more that can be said that relates to what 
has been said (1975:253). Solidary relationships bind together pieces of information to give 
them meaning and to assign agency. This may be evidenced in what we may refer to as a 
‘rationale sequence’, several of which are observable in the Afghan narrative. For instance, 
from 2001 to 2008 Government officials spoke overwhelmingly in terms of the solution to 
Afghan instability and terrorism as located in the development of a viable Afghan 
democracy because, as the rationale went, stable democracies act as an antidote to terrorist 
activity. Following allegations of widespread electoral fraud in the 2009 Presidential 
elections, however, coupled with an intensification of insurgent violence in the country, it 
appears that Government officials made the decision to reconfigure their rationale 
sequence to one that no longer emphasised or even referenced ‘democracy’ as a required 
end-state. Since democratic governance appeared unachievable, it could no longer remain 
an intrinsic part of the narrative. Rather, the narrative was effectively reconfigured to refer 
to the ‘stability’ of the Afghan state. Democratic governance no longer had ‘any consequent 
function’ or causal utility to the narrative and was duly aborted from it. 
The most crucial aspect of narrative theory concerns the interactional attributes of 
narrative in terms of the speaker-listener relationship, roughly equating with what Gubrium 
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and Holstein (2009:33) refer to as ‘situational terrain’. This concept links back to a structural 
interpretation of narrative via Barthes’ concept of a ‘phatic function’, which in turn pertains 
to the latter half of his distinction between ‘cardinal functions’ and ‘catalyses’ (1975:248-
249). Cardinal functions, much like Michel Foucault’s discursive events, serve as ‘indices’, or 
constants in narrative formations, giving direction and purpose to the actors’ behaviour. In 
Barthes’ conception, they refer to ‘action[s]…directly affecting the continuation of the 
story… [that] initiates or resolves an uncertainty’ (1975:248). In terms of the UK’s Afghan 
narrative, such cardinal functions would include major events such as the terrorist strikes of 
September 11, 2001, the invasion of Afghanistan in October of that year, the deployment 
troops to Helmand province, the implementation of counter-insurgency, the decision to 
‘drawdown’ and the killing of Osama bin Laden, and so forth. These cardinal functions are 
used in the empirical chapters as the markers for the five ‘phases’ (discussed in the next 
section of this chapter) by which the overall campaign is divided for analytical purposes. 
Catalyses, meanwhile, act as frames of reference between cardinal functions, weaving them 
together and providing additional meaning to them (1975:249-251). Examples of catalysis in 
the Afghan narrative might include the decision-making processes that led to troop 
deployments, and the ethical, moral and rational justifications employed to link the 
significance of events.  
Thus, narrative theory allows us to make the first-order distinction between events 
that exist “out there” and the narrative that utilises them, coupled with a second-order 
distinction within narrative between those narrative events and the narrative bridges that 
connect them. It is at this level of analysis that one may isolate the self-conscious exercise of 
narrative by the narrator. Interestingly, to this end Barthes points to what he labels the 
‘phatic’ function of catalysis, in that it ‘maintains contact between the narrator and the 
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reader’, reminding the reader of the significance of the cardinal function (1975:249). The 
narrative for the Afghan war is replete with such phatic functions, which usually take the 
form of what J.L. Austin designated ‘ethical propositions’ – statements designed to evince 
an emotional response from the listener (Coulthard 1985:13). Narrative theory provides us 
with the basic tools for interpreting potentially causal variables and reconfiguring them into 
a purposive framework for analysis. This is crucial for this work because the best means for 
an ‘outsider’ looking in at state policy formulation to understand how and why changes to 
narratives occurred (and the potential significance of those changes) is by studying what is 
said by the narrators. In the case of Afghanistan, it has been possible to identify three 
currents of policy – stabilisation, counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism – that run 
alongside one another but are also often incompatible with one another.  
 
Method: Discourse analysis 
The purpose of this work is to provide an account of Britain’s strategic issues in 
Afghanistan by analysing the evolution of state strategic communication and narrative 
practices, contextualised within the contingencies of the development of policy for the 
Afghan campaign under conditions of transnationalisation. Because this work is empirically 
driven, I have chosen the somewhat unorthodox approach of describing the method of 
undertaking empirical research prior to providing an account of methodological theory. I 
have identified narrative theory as the conceptual means by which to frame this project. 
This obviously necessitates the positing of the existence of specific narratives and, therein, 
the identification of data that corresponds to such narratives. I do this by way of analysing 
the three narratives of stabilisation, counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism employed by 
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UK governments between 2001 and 2014. Britain’s involvement in Afghanistan can be 
separated into five reasonably distinct phases: 2001 to 2003; 2003 to 2006; 2006 to 2009; 
2009 to 2011; and 2011 to 2014. Throughout the empirical chapters of this work I rely on 
these five phases to show how the constraints of the transnational dilemma have shaped 
the composition and relative importance of the three policy narratives employed by the 
United Kingdom. These constraints include the role of other states (chiefly the United States 
and Afghanistan) and transnational organisations (mainly the United Nations and NATO) in 
influencing British policy and strategy, and the secondary effects of the transnational 
dilemma in terms of conflicts of interest from within the British state.  
In the first phase, for example, Britain was impelled to act alongside the United States 
in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, while the second phase, 
beginning with the NATO takeover of ISAF responsibilities in Afghanistan, can be viewed as a 
response on the part of NATO’s European members to disputes between them and the 
United States regarding the invasion of Iraq. The third phase, beginning with Britain’s entry 
into Helmand Province in early 2006, may be contextualised as a consequence of both a 
desire on the part of the Army to reduce its commitments in Iraq and as an attempt to 
redeem itself in the eyes of the Americans after relatively poor performance in that theatre 
by taking a greater role in Afghanistan. It should also be understood as the Blair 
Government’s desire to remain a key player in NATO and the chief ally of the US. The fourth 
phase, signalled by the arrival of Barack Obama to the American Presidency and the Afghan 
‘Surge’, led to a reconfiguration of objectives, end goals and strategic priorities in 
Afghanistan, and resulted in or contributed to the completion of the jettisoning of several 
aspects of the British narrative for the conflict, including that of counter-narcotics narrative 
and democratisation elements within the stabilisation narrative. The fifth and final phase of 
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Britain’s Afghan campaign, from 2011 to 2014, began with the agreement of procedures for 
ISAF’s ‘drawdown’ from Afghanistan and the May 2011 assassination of Osama bin Laden, 
the latter of which may have provided the United States with sufficient justification to 
accelerate their own forces’ withdrawal from the country thereafter. The point worth 
emphasising here is that at every stage or phase of Britain’s involvement in Afghanistan its 
activities were propelled on by factors external to its own policy-making process, a point 
amplified by the notion that its own policy-making processes have been, by design, 
subordinated to those of the United States and NATO.  
The research material used in this approach consists of a corpus of primary materials 
collated and disseminated by the author in order to create a comprehensive database of 
statements made by state officials regarding the purpose of the Afghan campaign. These 
include Hansard documents, ranging from Parliamentary statements in the Houses of 
Commons and Lords as well as official Government and Committee publications; all publicly 
available political party speeches and press conferences, as well as television, radio and 
newspaper interviews given by state officials; and all available official publications, joint 
communiques, and defence doctrine works relevant to the parameters of this thesis. In 
total, I amassed over two thousand relevant newspaper articles, Parliamentary statements, 
public interviews and speeches that took place between 2001 and 2014. I did so by utilising 
various search engines, primarily Google (for television and radio interviews as well as some 
news articles), Hansard’s online search (for Parliamentary statements, Commons and Lords 
minutes, Westminster Hall minutes, and various Parliamentary Committee reports) and 
NexisUK (for the majority of news articles). In Google searches, I systematically searched for 
all “interviews” given by every major minister or Cabinet secretary between 2001 and 2014 
in each of the various Government departments involved with Afghanistan (the FCO, MOD, 
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DfID) as well as those pertaining to senior Armed Forces personnel and, of course, those 
given by Prime Ministers. The search parameters were simple: the name of the minister and 
the word “Afghanistan”. I collated all valid search results: in total, 107 such interviews were 
found from a wide range of sources, most notably from the BBC and the websites of various 
Government departments. These contributed to a corpus of Hansard documents obtained 
using Hansard’s search engine as well as ‘Historic Hansard’ (pertaining to those statements 
between 2001 and the end of 2005). Again, the same search parameters were employed: 
the name of the ministers concerned and the word “Afghanistan”. Naturally this produced 
an unwieldy amount of results, and so I refined my search by adding the terms “counter-
terrorism”, “counter-narcotics”, and “stabilisation”. This produced something in the order of 
400 Parliamentary statements that outlined the Government and Opposition of the day’s 
position on Afghanistan and the specific policy in question. In NexisUK searches, I limited my 
search to broadsheet newspapers (the Times, Telegraph, Guardian, Independent, and 
Financial Times), again between 2001 and 2014. In order to refine my searches, I isolated 
the term “Afghanistan” with those of “counter-narcotics”, “counter-terrorism”, and 
“stabilisation”, respectively. The dataset for news articles from this method (including those 
acquired from Google web searches) amounted to 583 “counter-terrorism” related articles, 
601 “counter-narcotics” related articles, and 543 “stabilisation” related articles.  
This body of data was then analysed by grouping together the interviews found online 
with the Hansard materials into one large dataset of public statements on Afghanistan. I 
coded these data by identifying and extrapolating key elements from each speech, 
statement, interview and so forth by creating categories with multiple options. These 
categories included rationales for the conflict (with seven identifiable rationales of ‘national 
security’, ‘national interest’, ‘alliance demands / 9-11’, ‘Afghan security’, ‘Afghan 
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democracy’, and ‘global and/or regional security’) and qualifiers for those rationales 
(meaning the consequences of non-action or the ancillary justifications for action, and 
consisting of ‘the return of the Taliban’, the ‘return of al Qaeda’, the ‘fate of the Afghan 
government’, the centrality of ‘universal values’, ‘the United Kingdom’s future role in the 
world’, ‘regional instability’, the ‘sacrifices already made’, the ‘return of civil war’, the 
‘return of terrorism / more terrorism’, the ‘protection of democracy and values’, the 
‘insecurity of Allies’, the ‘insecurity of the United Kingdom’, and the ‘role of narcotics on 
British streets’). I also created categories for the ‘required end state’, comprising the 
creation of ‘a democratic Afghanistan’, a ‘stable Afghanistan’, and the ‘decimation of al 
Qaeda’. Finally, I produced a category for the strategic requirements for the fulfilment of a 
given end state. I identified in the primary data twelve such criteria: ‘military prosecution of 
the enemy’, ‘counter-narcotics’, ‘development/aid’, ‘reconstruction’, ‘good 
governance/anti-corruption’, ‘training and partnering Afghan security forces’, ‘education’, 
‘regional engagement’, the ‘alleviation of poverty’, ‘reconciliation with the enemy’, ‘troop 
reduction’, and ‘population protection’.  
With these fields established, I then mapped the responses of each category against 
the corresponding persons and their political affiliation in chronological fashion in order to 
pinpoint the moments wherein the policy narratives for Afghanistan significantly altered, for 
example from one of ‘democratisation’ to ‘stability’ as the end goal in Afghanistan, or by 
noting the historical expansion and eventual contraction of strategic requirements. I then 
sought to corroborate the apparent changes in narratives with reported events contained 
within the thematically organised news article database, as well as with an extensive 
reading of secondary literature on the subject of British participation in Afghanistan and the 
performance of its various policies in the country. This included hundreds of books and 
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academic articles on British policy and strategy for Afghanistan. By comparing the evolution 
of public statements against primary and secondary historical accounts of the campaign and 
the policy processes that surrounded it, it was often possible to identify clear correlations 
between changes in narrative and the machinations of inter- and intra-state bureaucracy, 
thus confirming my suspicions of the role played by transnationalisation and the 
transnational dilemma in both fostering the conditions for discordant policy narratives and, 
therein, creating the institutional impetus for ‘strategic communication'.  
In order to test the conclusions drawn by reference to this primary data research, I 
also conducted six interviews between January and November of 2013 with individuals 
involved in policymaking and the production of policy narratives pertaining to the war in 
Afghanistan. These consisted of interviews with politicians and bureaucrats, and 
professional strategic communication operatives. Two of my interviews were conducted 
with members of the Ministry of Defence’s Strategic Communications personnel, one with a 
former Ministry of Defence practitioner of Strategic Communication, and three with officials 
from the Blair, Brown and Cameron Governments. These interviews provided insight into 
the decision-making processes within Cabinet and the Ministry of Defence and, most 
importantly, appreciation for the level of contingency within strategic communication 
processes, which in turn informed my decision to utilise ‘cultural pragmatics’ and 
‘performance’ as the theoretical and analytical influences of this work. The result of my 
research method is, I believe, the production of the most comprehensive and balanced 
research design I could achieve with the time and resources at my disposal, and offers as 
complete a picture of the evolution of policy narratives for Afghanistan as yet undertaken. 
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Methodology: Discourse Analysis and ‘Cultural Pragmatics’  
Discourse analysis allows us to understand the challenges of the development of 
coherent policy and strategy in an era defined by collective security and risk by observing 
the ways in which the rationales and objectives of the campaign have altered as a result of 
these constraints. I utilise a structurally-infused constructivist interpretation of interest 
formation to analyse the development of UK policy for the war in Afghanistan and its 
dissemination in the form of strategic narratives. I contend that the emergence of these 
contradictory narratives often stemmed from a failure on the part of the British state to 
reconcile its internal conflicts of interests that stemmed from transnational pressures. This 
approach sheds considerable explanatory light on the mechanics of policymaking and the 
wider strategic culture that permeated the decision-making process over this period. Equally 
as important, this approach accounts for the development of institutionalised cross-
government strategic communication practices as a means of countering the ‘information 
fratricide’ that the three narrative pathways often evinced. Discourse analysis is particularly 
useful here since the theory and practice of strategic communication is a kind of 
bureaucratic discourse analysis of its own, in that its chief function is the study of the 
relationship between policy statements and popular opinion and, in practical terms, the 
rectification of any contradictions apparent in state messaging. The four empirical chapters 
of this work all follow a similar structure. By triangulating narratives, sources of interest and 
events, these chapters provide a comprehensive and detailed analysis of the challenges of 
strategic narrative by the British state in explaining the war in Afghanistan to its domestic 
public.  
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It is worth noting the limitations of the discourse analysis approach and of social 
constructivism more broadly. Subjectivist interpretations that posit postmodernist power-
knowledge hegemony tend to over-emphasise the ability of actors to ‘securitise’ issues; they 
assign perhaps too much power to structures and systems. While I accept the inescapable 
subjectivity of discourse analysis approaches – since any such work is inevitably open to 
criticism on the grounds that it is a discourse itself or, in other words, a narrative of 
narratives – the major theme of this work is that of accounting for the challenge faced by 
the British state in making the case – via various subjective interpretations – for its 
continued presence in Afghanistan. Strategic communication is an implicit admission of 
these difficulties, for if securitisation worked as seamlessly as many of its theorists posit, 
there would obviously be no need for institutionalising communication coherence in the 
first place. In short, the narratives for Afghanistan that form the basis of this study represent 
nothing if not a series of failed ‘securitising moves’, or perhaps most charitably a series of 
securitising moves that had the potential for success had they not been mutually 
contradicting, and therefore should be understood in those terms.  As a corollary, often 
discourse analysis approaches tend to under-emphasise the contingencies of politics in 
framing coherent securitising moves, which I identify as consisting of the United Kingdom’s 
collective security obligations and its ensuing effects upon individual personalities, 
institutional tensions between and within states, and ideological factors. Policies and 
strategies may often appear to evince ‘securitising’ aspects of state control when, in fact, 
they are actually the product of a lack of such control. 
These contingencies form the empirical basis of my study. Rather than adopting a 
hyper-sensitive securitisation agenda that builds an argument around inferences and 
deductions of malign intentions on the part of policymakers and state officials, I take the 
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narratives and discursive structures largely as they are presented. The point here is not to 
mistake the confluence of individually sensible rhetorical frameworks into a collectively 
confounding whole as a grand conspiracy, but rather to see each narrative move as a 
genuine political effort to increase support for the Afghan mission, but which had the 
adverse effect of creating an incompatibility between them. My approach works from an 
initial assumption that the strategic narratives investigated have the same persuasive power 
that those state officials invested in their propagation believe them to have. Of course, 
much of the content of this work relies on extrapolating meaning from correlation rather 
than precise causality, particularly relating to those areas of policy making that have little 
documentary evidence beyond the secondary data outlined above, such as the decision to 
intervene in Helmand in late 2005 and early 2006. These situations exist as objects of 
negative rather than positive historical approach, since is easier to explain something that is 
documented than something that is not. In such instances it is necessary to base 
interpretation on instances of relative probabilities in terms of correlation of data from 
different sources. 
In order to guard against the pitfalls of determinism sometimes apparent in discourse 
analyses, this work is undertaken within a nominally constructivist methodological 
approach. Constructivism is the most appropriate theoretical approach for this work for 
several reasons which I have already alluded to. Firstly, the notion of ‘contestation’ – both 
within the British state and within the institutional architecture of collective security 
mechanisms – is a key concept for understanding the heterogeneity of the state and the 
manner in which interests compete therein (Edmunds 2010; Narlikar 2013:564). Narratives 
and strategies are developed within contested spheres of state and inter-state fora; states 
and state departments struggle for influence but also are subject to socialising processes 
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that construct strategic realities and narrative pathways (Narlikar 2013:564). Secondly, SC is 
a constructivist tool of the state, employed for the express purpose – and informed by 
explicit principles – of ‘constructing’ a version of reality through the self-conscious use of 
discourse. Thirdly, understanding the potential power of SC and of ‘strategic narratives’ 
more generally requires a basic acceptance that discourses are not merely reflections of 
reality but, rather, are representations of reality made for specific purposes and informed 
by various (often competing) interests. To this end, this work is loosely influenced by 
Alexander (2006, 2011) and Smith’s (2005, 2009) models of ‘cultural pragmatics’ and 
narrative as opposed to the securitisation and risk positions adopted by constructivists. 
Alexander and Smith’s work frames the method of discourse analysis within a context that 
embraces the contingencies of power as ‘performative’ rather than as simply ‘coercive’, as 
concepts of hegemony and power-knowledge suggest (Alexander 2011:88-89; Smith & Riley 
2009:122). In these models, the mechanics of securitising moves are understood holistically 
as taking place in a reflexive and highly contested social structure where, in Smith’s words, 
the ‘legitimacy of wars, political actors, and policies comes up for grabs in such a process of 
opinion formation through public intercourse, critique, and efforts at persuasion’ (2005:15-
16). Such a view accords with the empirical basis of this study – strategic communication 
and narratives – which exist in function and form as bureaucratic attempts to consolidate 
and improve state ‘opinion formation’ capabilities.  
The overriding point is that the empirical research presented in this work 
demonstrates the banality of the quid pro quo of contested policy-making processes rather 
than any concerted conspiratorial attempt at securitising the conflict in Afghanistan. Indeed 
and once more, were this in fact the case, the principle of strategic communication would 
be for all intents and purposes moot. On the other hand, while often it might appear in the 
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grand schematic of narrative that policymakers are incompetent or naïve, the reality would 
seem to be that perceptions of incompetence and naivety are characteristics owing to the 
combination of multiple competent and sensible individual perspectives – that is to say that 
the narrative for Afghanistan appears so disjointed and nonsensical over time because there 
is no ‘one’ narrative, but a multiplicity of narratives either competing for primacy or 
attempting to coalesce into one. Indeed, rectifying these issues this is the primary reason 
why strategic communication practices came about. Such is precisely why identifying and 
accounting for the exigencies of institutional, ideological and individual dynamics are so 
crucial, and why strategic communication or the amelioration of communication difficulties 
incurred in the maelstrom of policymaking processes is the object of study. Narratives with 
many authors are predisposed towards incurring external judgments of incompetence and 
incoherence; the job of this study is to understand both the circumstances of narrative 
failure in Afghanistan as well as to assess the potential for strategic communication 
practices to overcome the sociological impediments that inform this state of affairs. 
The methodological framework of this dissertation rests on three initial propositions: 
that narratives are constituted by policy and are indicative of the evolution of policy in real-
time (‘policy narratives’); that narratives, as the discursive substance of policymaking, are 
necessarily ‘performative’ in nature – that is, they are contingent upon successful 
enunciation and are not merely ‘coercive’; and that the arena in which the performance of 
narrative takes place, occupied as it is by various actors – both individual and collective, with 
distinctive and sometimes adversarial interests and ideals – is highly competitive, where 
these actors struggle with one another for the centre ground of narrative. A consequence of 
advocating these three propositions is the view that policy narratives are not static, but 
rather are highly dynamic and subject to potentially major changes in response to unfolding 
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events. These three propositions allows this work to loosely reflect the ‘cultural pragmatics’ 
– the study of ‘the interrelation of action, institutions and culture’ within a competitive and 
performative civil sphere – approach of Jeffrey Alexander and Philip Smith as a means of 
conceptualising the evolution of UK policy narratives regarding the conflict in Afghanistan.  
Additionally, I apply Phil Smith’s (2005) ‘cultural pragmatics’ work on policy narratives 
as a ‘sense-making cultural form that links actions to cognitive, ethical, and value systems’ 
(2005:29). Narratives are the objects of inquiry by which one may map the attempts of the 
state to persuade others of the rightness of its actions, the appropriateness of its policies, 
and the soundness of its interpretation of interests. Cultural pragmatics informs the process 
of investigating the significance and meaning of narratives, while study of the empirical 
evidence taken from analysis of narratives supports the theoretical positions taken by a 
pragmatic approach to the study of state policymaking. Taken as a whole, the content of 
speeches, Parliamentary statements, interviews and press conferences undertaken by state 
representatives comprise an overarching narrative framework on a given issue. They 
provide markers for how policies develop and change over time, and when taken in 
conjunction with historical events unfolding in parallel with the narrative, they indicate the 
pressures incumbent upon policymakers operating within a context of a transnational 
dilemma. In Smith’s words, ‘[c]ultural causation is not only about the invisible processes of 
reasoning within the mind, but rather about the witnessable public activity of sense making 
and persuasion. Analysis becomes a question of mapping this life history of ideas, issues, 
and interpretations as these unfold in multiple and intersecting ways through real-time 
historical sequences and leave behind their visible traces’ (2005:83). While this work on 
occasion makes judgements on whether any of the three narrative lines in question were 
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persuasive or unpersuasive, that is not the point; the point is to show how narratives 
developed or how they unravelled.   
This is the most appropriate research programme for discourse analysis work for 
several reasons. Firstly, it holds narratives – as the sum of all policy statements on a given 
issue – as the means by which one may deconstruct the content and contexts of 
policymaking. Such an investigation of culture is ‘pragmatic’ because it starts from the 
position of the inherent frailty of policy narratives, dependent as they are upon a multitude 
of intervening variables standing in the way of the creation of a successful narrative. In 
Alexander’s view, they  
‘are not determinate. There is agency. Political actors and campaigns struggle 
for power. They are compelled to create performances, and their success is 
uncertain, contingent. It depends on skill and fortune, on commanding an 
effective stage, on media interpretations, on shifting historical constellations, 
on audiences being prepared and responding in felicitous ways. The discourse 
of civil society creates the vocabulary for political speech, but it is flesh-and-
blood actors who make this script walk and talk, who speak the words, form 
intonations, create tropes, and time rhetorical flow. These are not matters of 
culture’s structure but its pragmatics’ (2011:102).  
In other words, influence is not ready-made and easily attained, but must be secured 
through the creation of culturally acceptable stories that explain the ‘who, how and why’ of 
any particular policy decision. By identifying these ‘plot’ devices in a given narrative, one 
may draw conclusions as to the particular ‘genre’ being utilised by a state to justify its policy 
(Smith 2005).  
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Alexander’s focus on culture is echoed by Smith. In his work Why War?, Smith argues 
that the dominant ‘culture structures’ at play in several countries, including the United 
Kingdom, during a series of conflicts came to define conceptualisations of interests, how 
those interests were threatened by the opposing actors in a conflict, and therefore how the 
policies taken by the governments of the day manifested themselves. Much of these culture 
structures may be interpreted as consequences of self-perceptions of identity and perceived 
interests of the state and wider society at a given time. For example, British involvement in 
the Suez Crisis of 1956 can be viewed in cultural terms as a manifestation of a newly post-
imperial state coming to terms with its place in international order, evinced by the 
bellicosity of domestic UK newspaper editorials and the rhetoric of Prime Minister Anthony 
Eden in labelling Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser as a tyrant and an existential threat to 
the world (Smith 2005:225). Similarly, the British state’s narrative and wider public support 
for the Persian Gulf War, which strongly imitated the narrative promoted by the Americans, 
speaks in its relative synchronicity to Britain’s self-identity as an important junior partner to 
the United States (2005:227). For Smith, culture is ‘causal’ in the legitimation of a war to the 
public audience, and those codes that are acceptable to the public must be adhered to in 
order to garner sufficient support for military activity (2005:19, 388). 
By extrapolation, in this study the ‘genre’ employed to explain the conflict in 
Afghanistan by the British Government under Tony Blair was one of ‘high mimesis’, where 
military action was framed in highly emotive terms, often with apocalyptic connotations. 
The plot devices used included an appeal to Kantian norms of the universal applicability of 
liberal democracy, the ‘evilness’ of the Taliban and al Qaeda, and the purpose of 
intervention in Afghanistan as a moral enterprise for the benefit of Afghans. When studying 
the development of a policy narrative over time, we may also identify the precise points at 
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which elements of plot were altered or adjusted – such as a justification for a policy or the 
strategic objectives of that policy – or where the entire genre of the narrative undergoes 
transformation. An example of this can be found in the shift of the Afghan narrative in mid-
2008 from one that propounded a rationale and justification broadly ‘Blairite’ in substance – 
focused on the ‘evils’ of terrorism, the inherent ‘good’ of democratic governance, and the 
inherent appropriateness of democratic governance for all peoples – to one far more 
practically minded, focused as it was on a narrower, ‘low mimetic’ vision of British national 
security and the pursuit of national interests. Through examination of the changes and 
alterations made by various state actors to the three narratives in question, I will show that, 
as Smith argued, ‘genre politics is a witnessable, reportable measurable social fact that has 
determinate material consequences’ (2005:387). 
Secondly, one key assumption of cultural pragmatics – that power stems from the 
ability of a government to frame its policies within ‘normative cultural codes’ in order to 
gain the consent of the public – informs a view that places the ‘performance’ of that policy 
at the core of analysis. In Alexander’s words, persuading the public to support a policy is ‘a 
matter of performance, not coercion’. This does not mean that performances cannot have a 
coercive element to them – far from it – but rather that audiences must be convinced of the 
merits of a coercive line of argumentation. Narratives are formed and reformed with a view 
to convincing audiences of their validity and by couching them in ‘cultural codes’ or values 
that are readily understood and accepted by audiences; an authentic script is ‘one that rings 
true to the background culture’ (Alexander 2011:57-58). This is why narratives are 
important to scholars and increasingly to state officials and politicians as well, who 
recognise that policies must be explained via narratives – simple stories that explain 
causality, moral reasoning and purpose – that are convincing to audiences as well as 
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internally coherent to be effective. Narratives are, as the sum total of all statements on a 
given policy, the performance of policy in the discursive plane of politics. 
SC doctrine seems to adopt much of these ideas: a good deal of the content of state 
publications on strategic communication focuses on ways to improve the performance of 
narratives by appealing to concepts that are strikingly similar to those propounded by 
Alexander in his works on cultural pragmatics. For example, Alexander’s concept of ‘re-
fusion’ of social performances considers that such performances are required to be 
‘convincing and effective’ to a ‘society of increasing complexity’ by providing an ‘authentic’ 
narrative (2011:27). The authenticity of a policy narrative depends upon, amongst other 
factors, the framing of the purpose and objectives therein within the boundaries of what is 
culturally acceptable: in terms of Western states justifying the use of force and the loss of 
life, this may include the defence of national security or national interests, appeals to 
collective security obligations, or ridding the world of despotism and advancing liberal 
democratic governance. Official doctrine on strategic communication – located in the main 
in the Ministry of Defence’s Joint Doctrine Note 1/12: Strategic Communication – places a 
premium on the creation of adequate discursive structures or ‘strategic narratives’ as the 
means by which contemporary conflicts will be ‘won’ and, therefore, as the basis upon 
which contemporary strategies should be devised. 
Thirdly is the issue of competition. Cultural pragmatics works on the premise that the 
state – and civil society in general – is not a monolithic entity, but rather comprised of a 
number of individuals and institutions with varying interests, identities, and ideologies. They 
compete within a highly diverse social milieu over control of the centre ground of a policy 
narrative.  Strategic Communication is the ultimate object of this study because it is the 
institutionalisation of the narrative concept at the level of state and operates from the same 
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ontological framework as cultural pragmatics – one that accepts that power is contested 
discursively through competing narrative forms, that persuasion is key to power, and that 
developing convincing and authentic stories are a means to achieving such persuasion. 
Indeed, to reiterate, was it not the case that states are comprised of semi-autonomous units 
with their own interests and beliefs, it would likely render much of the institutionalisation of 
systems and doctrine designed to improve the consistency of state messaging somewhat 
pointless. Strategic Communication exists because states are heterogeneous amalgamations 
of interest groups. Competition between actors can be identified by discrepancies, 
contradictions, and even hostilities between their respective narrative lines. For example, 
this work focuses in part on the conflict of interests between Gordon Brown’s Downing 
Street and the Army Chiefs of Staff, and is discernible by examining the long running and 
often public discrepancies and hostilities of narrative between the two parties. The most 
notable of these relate to disputes over troop and equipment levels between 2007-2009, 
where disagreements between the two parties resulted in a series of public episodes and, as 
I will argue, served to fragment and undermine the overarching justification of the war in 
Afghanistan as one of ‘vital national security’.  
By tracing the evolution of each actor’s narrative decisions – the plots and the genres 
they emphasise – against the historical evidence available, this work presents an account of 
how narratives arise and come apart to be replaced by other narratives, and why the rigours 
of competition within state policymaking machinery often militate against the creation of 
coherent, consistent and effective strategic narratives. In a simple sense, narrative 
competition is the hallmark of any historical analysis of public political discourse. Competing 
viewpoints are likely unavoidable in any large-scale enterprise of policy narrative, 
particularly one that spans well over a decade in duration. This is a source of strength for 
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discourse analysis, of course, since  where competition can be located at a particular point 
in time and allocated to a particular event or actor one may posit with some credibility a 
degree of causality to how things happen and why. To reiterate, this work does not aim to 
rigorously apply cultural pragmatics or centre its analysis of empirical evidence upon strict 
ideas like ‘performance’ and ‘binaries’. These categories are eminently useful in informing 
my approach to analysing the three narratives in question, but doctrinal adherence to them 
would have the effect of promoting a kind of confirmation bias. This work tries to keep 
cultural pragmatics as a loose influence so as to avoid distorting the data, and thereby to 
allow the empirical evidence to speak for itself as much as possible. 
 
 
Conclusion: The Significance of Strategic Communication to 
Contemporary British Strategy 
 
The chapters that follow explain in significant detail how three distinctive and, in most 
cases, incompatible policies came into being for Afghanistan. These policies emerged within 
a strategic vacuum precipitated by the ongoing transnationalisation of British defence policy 
and were incubated in a policy environment where ‘showing willing’ to the United States 
specifically, and the collective security system in general, was the fundamental precept of 
British foreign and defence policy. Institutions competed with one another over control of 
their particular aspect of British responsibilities in the campaign, often to the detriment of 
overall coherence of British strategic aims in the country. This manifested itself in narrative 
terms in the production of three policies that reflected institutional visions of what the 
purpose of Afghanistan should be according to their specific interests, resulting in a 
compartmentalised and fragmented communication effort. The strategic vacuum 
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transnationalised policy creates at the state level allowed a scenario where ‘showing willing’ 
was essentially left open to interpretation, with the consequence that all aspects of Britain’s 
activities in the country could be framed as essential and equally important because, plainly, 
all aspects were important to someone. Transnationalisation thus informed the fragmented 
communications effort for Afghanistan where all aspects of state activity were subsumed 
into an unwieldy Comprehensive Approach, and where Britain’s commitment to ‘stand 
shoulder to shoulder’ with the United States left its strategic and communicative efforts at 
the mercy of American demands. As Britain’s commitments in Afghanistan grew more 
onerous and political perceptions of public dissatisfaction mounted, the complexity of the 
strategy(ies) and the incoherence of the policies produced a watershed moment in state 
communicative efforts in late 2008 and early 2009 with the advent of SC. 
As an attempt to reconceptualise British defence policy in Afghanistan specifically, and 
to coordinate the communicative effort therein – in conceptual and practical terms – more 
generally, SC evinces many of the same methodological principles of this work. In its 
retroactive positing of the centrality of Afghanistan to Britain’s ‘national security’ – that is, 
the fundamental pre-eminence of Defence interests in the Afghan campaign over and above 
all others – SC accepts both the contingent and contested nature of power and the 
centrality of performance in securing dominance in such an environment. In significant 
ways, then, the story of how Britain’s three narratives evolved is one in which the British 
state, via SC, has applied narrative theory and constructivist understandings of power as a 
means of coming to terms with the pressures of transnationalised policy and, in the case of 
Afghanistan, of overcoming (or perhaps more accurately side-stepping) the transnational 
dilemma. The central purpose of SC is to avoid the detrimental effects popular awareness of 
this dilemma could pose to Britain’s transnationalised pursuit of its interests by persuading 
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audiences of the necessity of participation in collective security operations but, crucially, 
without referencing the politics of collective security that necessitate participation. In order 
to persuade audiences – particularly domestic UK audiences – in such a way, the 
complexities of devising policy and strategy under the constraints of delegated sovereignty 
were simplified and naturalised within a traditional, culturally embedded paradigm of civil-
state relations. Narratives try to perfect imperfect reality by attempting, through discourse 
and rhetoric, to rectify the abiding contradictions of national and transnational interest. 
They attempt to square a circle but struggle to do so because they are simply part of the 
process: Britain’s role in international society dictates compromise between national and 
transnational interests, contradictions emerge, and narrative is employed to negate those 
contradictions and rescue the ‘plot’ from its own inconsistencies. 
This is why this work argues that SC is therefore not a solution to Britain’s strategic 
dilemma, but a component of it. This view stands in sharp contrast to many recent works on 
strategic communication, which are thoroughly prescriptive in their outlook and are 
seemingly designed for practitioners, and perhaps as a consequence often fail to offer 
critiques of the concept of strategic communication or narratives (Helmus et al 2009, 
Cornish et al 2009, Farwell 2012, Simpson 2012). Focusing on the utility of strategic 
communication has potentially blinded proponents of the subject to the possibilities just 
outlined. The crucial point is this: because strategic communication is a product of the 
transnational dilemma whilst simultaneously being touted as a solution, it may compound 
the strategic difficulties Britain has encountered rather than ameliorating them. The 
empirical evidence in chapters 4 to 7 suggest that strategic communication and the focus on 
narratives gained intellectual traction in the United Kingdom because of failing support for 
the war in Afghanistan and because of the concomitant need to shore up that support. This 
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development occurred in synchronicity with the publication of doctrinal and academic 
works holding up narrative as a potential solution to conflict. In the following chapters, I will 
examine the efforts of the British state in developing compatible policy narratives for 
Afghanistan along the lines of their three narrative strands: counter-terrorism, stabilisation, 
and counter-narcotics. I will explore how these narratives were ‘contested’ and ‘performed’, 
how the faltering performance of these narratives can be traced back to transnational 
pressures, and to what effect strategic communication methods were employed to rectify 
the transnational dilemma in each of the three narratives.  
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CHAPTER 4: THE RISE OF THE STABILISATION 
NARRATIVE 
 
 
It is necessary to preface the empirical chapters of this work with a brief discussion 
regarding the relationship between ‘policy’ and ‘narrative’. In the following chapters I use 
these terms interchangeably or simultaneously, but it is important to recall at the beginning 
that they mean different things. Simply put, policy is the chosen path of a government, an 
initial statement of intent and a framework for the ways, means and ends of strategy, and 
should act as a guiding light for operational activity. Narrative, on the other hand, should be 
understood as how policy plays itself out over time in the form of a story, and contains all 
the elements of a ‘storyboard’ or ‘script’ referred to in the previous chapter, including 
rationales, justifications, counter-arguments, rhetorical devices, cultural codes, and the 
various idiosyncrasies of a multiplicity of narrators. Policies inform narratives insofar as they 
are the starting point from which a narrative takes shape and evolves, but because 
narratives are the unfolding of policies over time, they also inevitably impinge upon the 
static nature of policy by breathing life into it and serving as the means by which policies 
respond to unfolding events that affect its coherence and validity. In order words, while 
policies determine narratives in their point of origin, they do not wholly constitute them. 
Thus, it is possible to speak of ‘policy narratives’ as all that is said about and in defence of a 
policy following the point at which the policy is first put into practice. It is also important to 
distinguish ‘policy narratives’ from ‘strategic narratives’ in the sense that narratives are not 
always ‘strategic’, a point the following chapters will repeatedly make. As the purpose of the 
following chapters is to chart and analyse the evolution of policy narratives as they unfold 
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against the exigencies of the transnational dilemma, I have consciously taken the step of 
treating all articulations of policy as contributing to the overall narrative of that policy: a 
‘policy narrative’.  
In each of the following three chapters, I argue that the policies that informed 
subsequent policy narratives became increasingly untenable over time as a result of the 
constraining features of the collective security framework (and the liberal norms 
underpinning it) from which they were originally conceived. The abiding realities of the 
transnational dilemma that the British state compels itself to negotiate has meant that its 
ability to direct strategy in Afghanistan has been distinctly limited and superficial, 
subordinated as it was to the direction of the United States as senior partner in the NATO 
alliance. In all three policies, this lack of strategic independence resulted in a loss of 
strategic clarity over time as to the purpose, appropriateness, and mutual compatibility of 
policy goals. This is turn came to be reflected in evermore disjointed policy narratives aimed 
at justifying increasingly incompatible policy objectives, and ultimately led to a recognition 
by the British state in late 2008 of the need for a narrative ‘reset’. As I have already argued, 
this reset took the form of a self-conscious or reflexive attempt to reframe the ‘genre’ of the 
policy narratives to one of ‘national security interests’ in order to recapture dwindling public 
support for the Afghan mission, by placing the mission in traditional realist terms that could 
be apprehended by the public (and state officials) more easily than the imprecise and 
complicated language of collective security obligations. Central to this effort was the role of 
strategic communications as a doctrinal and institutional implementation of codes of best 
practice, centred on ideas similar to that of Alexander’s organising concept of the 
‘performative’ nature of power, in order to convince audiences of the ‘national’ necessity of 
continuing military activity in Afghanistan.  
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In this sense, the story of each of the three policy narratives analysed in the following 
chapters is one of the British state struggling to assert its control, not over the material 
aspects of strategy – which were largely beyond its control – but instead over the way in 
which these policies (and the strategies that were implemented to the end of those policies) 
were presented to the British public. This, I argue, was the case for the same reason 
policymakers now speak of narratives as ‘strategic’: because, to put it plainly, the nominal 
control British policymakers had over the way in which strategies were articulated (and 
thereby ‘performed’) was one of the few aspects of state power still largely in the hands of 
the United Kingdom. In the concluding chapter of this work, I will elaborate further on the 
implications this conceptual muddling of the material and discursive elements of strategy 
may hold for the future of the subject in UK policymaking and scholarship. Before this, I 
devote these empirical chapters to demonstrating how the evolution of Britain’s Afghan 
policies indicate how the constraints of the transnational dilemma have influenced the 
original narratives of counter-terrorism, stabilisation and counter-narcotics as well as 
informing the introduction of strategic communication practices and the conceptualisation 
of narratives as ‘strategic’. Transnational demands and correlating institutional tensions 
explain how the stabilisation and counter-narcotics policies came into being, while the 
counter-terrorist narrative should be seen less as a consequence of transnationalisation and 
more as a reaction to the negative effects of transnationalisation (in terms of the 
transnational dilemma) on UK policymaking and strategy. To this end, this work discusses 
the stabilisation and counter-narcotics policy narratives first, before moving on to an 
analysis of the counter-terrorism narrative. I employ a framework of treating the Afghan 
campaign as comprised of five reasonably distinct ‘phases’, which show how collective 
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security dynamics affected the viability each policy over time and provided markers for 
changes to policy narratives in response to those dynamics.  
These phases are identified chronologically as occurring within (1) 2001-2003, (2) 
2003-2005, (3) 2006-2009, (4) 2009-2011, and (5) 2011-2014. The first phase begins with the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and ends with NATO’s assumption of control over 
ISAF in August 2003. This phase is marked by the inception of the three policies of counter-
terrorism, stabilisation and counter-narcotics and British attempts to carve out a suitable 
niche for its operations within the American-led multinational coalition in Afghanistan. The 
second phase begins with NATO’s takeover of ISAF as a means of shoring up divisions within 
the alliance resulting from international disagreement over the legality and utility of the US-
led invasion of Iraq, and ends with the preparations made by the United Kingdom in 
advance of its entry into Helmand province in early 2006. The third phase begins with the 
commencement of Herrick IV in Helmand and ends with the accession of Barack Obama to 
the US Presidency, signalling a change in policy orientation away from the democratisation 
agenda of President Bush and Prime Minister Blair to more limited aims of stabilisation and 
counter-terrorism. The fourth phase begins with Obama’s strategic reviews to the end of 
reconfiguring the United States’ policy aims for Afghanistan and ends with both the pared 
down objectives of the Lisbon Agreement in late 2010 and the assassination of Osama bin 
Laden in May 2011. The fifth and final phase, running from those events until the 
completion of ISAF ‘drawdown’ in late 2014, is marked by the full-scale revision of policy 
narratives for the campaign. Each of these phases provide context for the transnational 
dilemma’s impact upon British policy narratives for Afghanistan and, in their latter phases, 
demonstrate the ways in which the British state has worked to make ‘narrative’ compensate 
for (a lack of) strategy.  
113 
 
The Stabilisation Narrative 
The United Kingdom’s narrative for the stabilisation of Afghanistan provides the core 
of the three narratives investigated in this work, as both the counter-narcotics and counter-
terrorism narratives interweave it at various points. As such it is also the most complex and 
multi-faceted of the three, and therefore requires the greatest amount of attention and 
descriptive detail. It is the first to be addressed in this work for two reasons, one thematic 
and the other practical. In the first instance, stabilisation has the longest history within 
British defence policy, extending back before the War on Terror in the form of the Blair 
Government’s promulgation of an ‘ethical’ dimension to foreign policy and the ‘doctrine of 
the international community’ in 1997 and 1999, respectively. The following passages 
provide a brief overview of the evolution of New Labour’s commitments to a form of ‘liberal 
peace theory’ as a means of contextualising stabilisation’s role in Afghanistan. In the second 
instance, stabilisation is a practical choice for the first narrative as it constitutes the bulk of 
British and ISAF operations in Afghanistan. As such, it is also the narrative that most acutely 
portrays the difficulty of devising national strategy under the shaping effects of 
transnationalised defence policy.  
What follows is an account of the evolution of the stabilisation narrative between 
2001 and 2014, and argues that it developed from a starting position of liberal 
interventionist ideology centred on the core and inalienable objective of the 
democratisation and development of Afghanistan, and ended as one marked by a realist 
predisposition, concerned with a far less expansive security-focused stabilisation agenda, 
defined primarily by progress made in military terms and typified by a focus on short-term 
counter-terrorism concerns. The British approach to Afghanistan as a fundamentally norm-
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driven plan can be understood in two interconnected ways. The first of these is to see the 
UK as a responsible and willing player within a collective security framework, following the 
lead of a transnationally-agreed agenda of stabilisation-based liberal interventionism. This 
institutional approach allows us to view the core tenets of the stabilisation approach – 
liberalisation and democratisation – as constitutive of alliance strategy. This is because they 
served the purposes of the institution itself by acting as the common denominator between 
NATO member states which tied them and their varied interests, values, and political 
sensibilities together and allowed them to act in concert. This way of looking at NATO/ISAF’s 
Afghan strategy is one where norms have been not only the basis for the international 
community’s relationship with the Afghan state, but have also been constitutive of the 
international community’s ability to work together to a common goal – the stabilisation of 
Afghanistan – whilst also working towards often very different ends. As with any large 
coalition, ISAF members have different military specialisms and capabilities – ranging from 
counter-terrorism and military activity to provision of aid and the administration of 
bureaucratic reform – as well as diverse political cultures from which these activities are or 
are not sanctified. As a result their activities have often bore little direct connection with 
one another and sometimes have conflicted. As a common denominator between these 
states, security via liberalisation allows for a practical ‘meeting of minds’ between political 
entities that would otherwise (and more than occasionally have) failed to agree on the 
ultimate purpose of intervention or the best means to go about achieving security. The 
liberal ideas underpinning ISAF’s work in Afghanistan should, therefore, be seen as the 
unifying force binding together the apparatus tasked with carrying out the task, and without 
those ideas would not have coalesced.  
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Indeed, the centrality of liberal ideas is easily demonstrable. The democratisation and 
liberalisation of Afghanistan along lines amenable to the minimum standards expected by 
donor entities was a core proviso of most aid contributions and military commitments; 
every major agreement between the nascent Afghan state and the international community 
– from the constitutive Bonn Agreement of 2001 to the Afghan Compact of 2006 – can be 
viewed as ‘contract-like’ in their insistence on the importance – and importing – of liberal 
standards of governance (Suhrke 2010:234). In other words, in very substantive ways the 
coalition defined the nature of the mission from the beginning in a manner that reflected 
the demands of maintaining a coalition – that is, by framing the mission around norms that 
would cohere enough participants together to make the mission possible; ‘structure’ 
defined strategy (Rynning 2012:39-40; Ledwidge 2011:97, Bird and Marshall 2011:154-155). 
The significance of this viewpoint is not necessarily to stress the undeniable centrality of 
normativity in institutional behavioural dynamics, however. While it seems evident enough, 
that would be an unnecessary endeavour in a sense, since the allure of liberal peace theory 
and concomitant liberal interventionism is that it weds together rationalist and 
constructivist positions into a syncretic whole by claiming that interests and norms are, in 
fact, inseparable concepts. It posits that it is through the guiding light of norms and the 
spread of those norms that interests are served. What stabilisation represents is the 
amalgamation of two seemingly oppositional categories into a happy unity, one that 
promotes the individual interests all members have for security against terrorism, but in an 
ostensibly benign way that does not offend the sensibilities of some states in the way a 
coarser counter-terrorist agenda might. Thus, the alliance is secured, and intervention is 
possible: crucially, in this reading it is only possible because of alliance cohesion, which 
requires the animus of liberal peace theory. 
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A second way of viewing Britain’s commitment to a normative-based strategy for 
Afghanistan relates to the idea of Britain under the Labour Governments of Tony Blair as 
taking a lead within the NATO alliance as a means of bridging the gap between a rather 
militaristic United States and a more development-oriented continental Europe. The idea of 
Britain as a ‘bridge’ between the two is nothing new, of course, but has increased in 
importance since the Thatcher Government (Gamble 2003). What is somewhat more novel 
is the so-called ‘ethical’ foreign policy of Tony Blair and his Labour Governments of the 
2000s. As Jonathan Gilmore (2014:544-545) has argued, the Labour Government’s foreign 
policy contained within it strong advocacy of the ‘human security’ agenda, including ‘the 
idea that ethical responsibilities to non-citizens deserved overt attention’, and was driven by 
a commitment to and belief in Kantian ‘universal values’. The Blair Government (or at least 
Tony Blair as an individual) held a set of philosophical assumptions about the transformative 
power of military intervention and frequently made ontological claims to the innate 
universality of western norms and values to all peoples. He articulated a universalist vision 
of western democracy where all people, given the chance, embrace freedom (Blair 2001b). 
The roots of this approach are located in the late Robin Cook’s foundational statement on 
an ethical dimension to foreign policy in 1997. He argued a core element of British foreign 
policy – that which made it ethical – was the ‘promotion of democracy’ around the world, 
and that this was essential to Britain’s national interests because the defining features of a 
globalised world – internationalism and interdependence – rendered the very idea of 
‘national’ interests somewhat obsolete (Cook 1997: online). For Cook and his Labour 
colleagues, democracy promotion was the end of their ethical foreign policy as well as the 
means by which an interdependent international community must be oriented. In Blair’s 
1999 Chicago speech, the implications of ethical foreign policy for the structure of 
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international coalitions and the content of liberal interventionism was made clear; a 
‘doctrine for the international community’ was necessitated by the fact that coalitions were 
necessary to deal with global issues and, as a consequence, it was argued that the ‘national 
interest [of the UK] is to a significant extent governed by international collaboration’ (Blair 
1999: online). Again, norms are central here: the interests of the international community 
were best served by respect for a rules-based system of international law, meaning that 
strategies of intervention could only be achieved through collective security mechanisms, 
and those would only be legitimate by basing those mechanisms upon liberal peacebuilding 
norms.  
To this end, Labour’s ethical foreign policy sought to synthesise various categories: 
British interests were equated with those of the international community; British values 
were equated with ‘global values’; British strategy was a combination of interests and 
values, which were equitable with international interests and values. In its broadest 
conception, Labour foreign policy advocated the ‘merger of values and interests’ to the 
point where security and democratisation represented an inseparable unity in its own right, 
in which one without the other would be an impossibility: security without democracy was a 
false security, and democracy without security was a false democracy. By claiming that 
Britain’s interests were also its values, and that those of this country were also those of the 
international community, Blair’s doctrine placed Britain at the centre of, and to some extent 
at the mercy of alliance politics. It could lead and follow in equal measure – so equal in fact 
that ‘leading’ and ‘following’ ceased to be an adequate or meaningful binary. As a response 
to what are undoubtedly global issues requiring global responses, this approach should be 
seen somewhat charitably as a reasonable formula for international cooperation. The 
problem is one of analysis, however, since Blair’s totalising worldview not only defied 
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categorisation, but asserted as outdated the strategic utility of demarcating boundaries and 
categories in terms of states, interests, and values. The implications of such a 
reconfiguration of British foreign policy should be evident when taken in relation with the 
statements of Inge, Stirrup and Fry quoted in the introductory chapter. It is amidst these 
uneasy linkages between values and interests, and national and international interests that 
British strategy has had to navigate to rediscover its terms of reference.   
Britain’s strategic position and philosophy in the 2000s has carried with it severe 
strategic implications that cut to the core of Britain’s strategic dilemmas. First amongst 
these issues concerns the basics of strategy itself and, as noted previously in this work, 
whether stabilisation represents a coherent strategic concept (or merely an operational 
approach). Strategy links means to ends: in the case of Afghanistan, the means have been 
primarily those of military force and development aid and expertise, and the stated end has 
been the stabilisation (via liberalisation and democratisation) of the Afghan state. It is not 
clear, however, how the use of military force can meet ends which are essentially political. 
Indeed, this point has been the focus of considerable academic attention in recent years, 
with some commentators positing the diminished ‘utility of force’ in an age of ‘new wars’ 
and in stabilisation operations more specifically, where the consent of the population and 
the linking of that consent with perceptions of state legitimacy are deemed central to 
success (Smith 2006). British Governments over the last decade have largely recognised the 
validity of the need to combine military effects with civilian socio-economic measures, and 
in 2005-06 offered a solution to the problems associated with the supposed diminished 
effect of military power by producing the ‘Comprehensive Approach’ (CA) framework. As 
the organising concept informing Task Force Helmand, the CA conceived of British military 
presence as a means to an end of facilitating the primary goal of reconstruction and linking 
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improved governance to the Afghan state. The CA represented the encapsulation of the 
synthesis of security and development posited by advocates (but mostly critics) of liberal 
intervention, allowing for security concerns to be addressed via a normative framework of 
liberal peace.  
Blair’s view of the universality of liberal norms and the essential validity of liberal 
peace theory has been identified by several scholars as a contributing factor to the 
inadequacy of intelligence informing the planning process (Farrell and Gordon 2009; Egnell 
2011). It is likely that this worldview contributed to a lack of awareness or depth of 
appreciation for the Afghan mind set towards occupation. On the one hand this is surprising 
given the United Kingdom’s history with Afghanistan (encompassing three previous conflicts 
in the nineteenth century and one proxy war in the 1980s); on the other it is not, since 
Labour’s foreign policy outlook would undoubtedly view Britain’s presence in Afghanistan in 
normative and legalistic terms as a liberating force there for reasons of stabilisation, not 
‘occupation’. Of course, this is irrelevant in terms of the development of strategy: what 
matters is what Afghans think, and the British perspective in this regard must be seen, as 
with Iraq, as a severe case of ‘liberal optimism’ (Monten 2005:144). Intelligence failures 
stemming from this misjudgement fed in to incorrect assumptions regarding the size of the 
opposition that British forces would face upon entry into Helmand as well as the lengths to 
which they would go to expel the ‘occupiers’ (Egnell 2011:304). The initial intensity of 
insurgent violence against the British was evidently not anticipated by civilian and military 
planners given the focus in public statements regarding the aspirations of some that the 
move to Helmand could be performed ‘without a shot being fired’ (Reid 2006a). 
Appreciating the extent of liberal normative assumptions in the UK planning process 
for Helmand is crucial. As with NATO, liberal norms had a constitutive and coalescing effect 
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within the British state. As the name suggests, the CA was designed to be ‘comprehensive’ 
in that it was to link all elements of the state and their respective remits together into a 
coherent whole. Incorporating the work of state bureaucracies – the Armed Forces and 
Ministry of Defence (MOD), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and the 
Department for International Development (DfID) – with very different working cultures and 
priorities, the CA was a highly ambitious and perhaps unprecedented inter-departmental 
concept. As a doctrine for institutional cooperation centred upon the liberal assumptions of 
stabilisation theory, the CA viewed military force as a supporting activity and development 
and reconstruction as primary. In 2006, CA principles were applied to the Afghan Compact 
of 2006 – a document of strategic intent prefacing and informing the deployment of Task 
Force Helmand in April of that year. The Compact was similarly ambitious in scope, 
containing numerous commitments to the wholesale transformation of Afghan civil society 
and governance. The interests of each element of the British state appear to have found 
their niche within this document. Liberal norms ostensibly served to unify the institutions 
tasked with putting them into practice. However, the coalescing of institutional interests 
may have worked too well: military-government relations in the lead up to the Helmand 
deployment have been described as one of a scenario of inadequate critique and mutual 
agreement between the two parties. An aide to the Labour Government during the planning 
period for Helmand, Matt Cavanagh, has provided an account of the process where both 
sides buttressed one another’s optimistic assumptions about the feasibility of the mission 
given the resources allocated (2012:51). Assuming the nominal veracity of such claims, the 
result of this environment of collective reinforcement of a institutionally self-interested way 
of thinking about the move into Helmand appears to have been the creation of an overly 
ambitious framework of complete social transformation of the province, one that was later 
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lambasted by then-Shadow Defence Secretary Liam Fox as tantamount to applying western 
ideals to a ‘13th century’ society (Fox 2009: online). As this work will demonstrate, this 
scenario would lead, as with ISAF, to severe institutional conflicts of interest in the years 
that followed. 
Thus, this chapter argues that an early narrative adherence to norms of liberal peace 
theory set the tone for a gradual expansion of aims and objectives within the stabilisation 
approach, reaching a crescendo in 2006 with the authorisation of the ‘Afghan Compact’, and 
in 2007 under Gordon Brown’s prime ministership, who reconstituted and expanded the CA 
and promoted a vision for stabilisation that contained over a dozen different benchmarks 
for success. This expansionism in turn produced a state of strategic and communicative 
confusion over the purpose of the stabilisation mission and, taken in tandem with various 
political and military difficulties in Whitehall and Afghanistan, resulted in the 
reconfiguration of the stabilisation narrative – under the auspices of a growing 
institutionalisation of strategic communication practices – to one that did away with much 
of the substantive content of the CA. This in turn produced a political momentum for the 
further narrowing of policy objectives in Afghanistan and correlated with a contraction of 
the stabilisation narrative to such a degree that, by 2009-2010, it no longer bore much 
resemblance to the original aims and rationale articulated during the Blair era, with severe 
implications for narrative adherence to transnational normative and institutional principles.  
This chapter concludes by noting a core paradox incurred as a result of narrative 
revisionism: that by solving the issue of ‘mission creep’ created by Blair, and poor political 
communications as to the nature and purpose of the mission, the strategic communication 
practices of the Brown and Cameron Governments created the conditions whereby the 
stabilisation narrative had, for all intents and purposes, negated itself.  
122 
 
Phase I: 2001-2003 – Balancing counter-terrorism with democratic 
stabilisation 
 
From the early stages of the war in Afghanistan, Blair and his Government set out a 
stabilisation narrative that operated from the basis of ‘high mimesis’ – that is, one that 
placed the importance of stabilising Afghanistan at the same existential level as the 
elimination of international terrorism. At the heart of Blair Government’s approach was a 
Kantian discourse of democratisation and human rights as not only necessary for the 
stabilisation of Afghanistan but, as a corollary, as an ‘antidote to terrorism’ (Chin 2009:133). 
In the preceding discussion I outlined the Kantian philosophical approach of the Blair 
Government in its political messaging for the War on Terror and the conflict in Afghanistan. 
As this chapter demonstrates, throughout his tenure as prime minister Blair frequently 
made reference to the importance – indeed, indispensability – of democratisation of Afghan 
and other illiberal societies for the project of eliminating international terrorism, often to 
the point where he apparently viewed this as an imperative above and beyond the short- to 
medium-term requirements of security and international order. In this sense we may 
understand Blair’s philosophical motivation as stemming from a loose form of Kant’s 
‘categorical imperative’ of placing people – and democratisation of societies – as an end 
superior to, or at the very least equivalent to – the stability of those states and the security 
of the United Kingdom; to quote Kant, this imperative was that ‘which declares the action 
for itself as objectively necessary without reference to any aim… [or] any other end’ (Kant 
2002:31). Judging by Blair’s predilection toward divorcing narrow self-interest from political 
agency (as evidenced by his declaration in Chicago in 1999 of moving the national interest in 
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line with that of the international community), one may go forth on the premise that his 
view of the importance of ends as ‘of themselves’ was quite genuine. 
It is, however, nearly impossible to speak of Blair’s motivations without reference to 
those of the Bush Administration. Following the September 2001 attacks, the Bush and Blair 
governments rhetorically converged in a united front in their response to international 
terrorism by evoking an aggressive form of ‘liberal peace theory’ that viewed 
democratisation as ‘more important than political order’ (Desch 2007/08:10-11). For Blair, 
democratic values were both universal – in the sense that, in his view, all people aspire to 
them – and particular, in the sense that the lack of such values were what distinguished 
terrorists from civilised peoples: 
‘Our beliefs are the very opposite of theirs. We believe in reason, democracy 
and tolerance. These beliefs are the foundation of our civilised world. They 
are enduring, they have served us well, and as history has shown, we have 
been prepared to fight, when necessary, to defend them. The fanatics should 
know that we hold our beliefs every bit as strongly as they hold theirs, and 
now is the time to show it’ (Hansard 2001a). 
Most importantly, Blair’s normative view of the War on Terror implied that the object 
to be defended from al Qaeda was not primarily infrastructure, citizens, or interests, but 
values. The strategic implications of a normative approach to the conflict varied between 
Bush and Blair, however, and as such the rhetorical similarities between Blair and the Bush 
Administration did not extend far into the substance of their foreign policies. While both 
viewed democratisation as a ‘universal good’ (Dunn 2003:285), the means of achieving it 
differed substantially. Whereas Blair would seek to convince the Americans and the 
international community that ‘the humanitarian coalition to help the people of Afghanistan 
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is as vital as the military action itself’ (Hansard 2001b), the Americans held what Jonathan 
Monten (2005:141) has referred to as a ‘vindicationist framework for democracy 
promotion’, where ‘the aggressive use of U.S. power is employed as the primary instrument 
of liberal change [my emphasis]’. Rather than implement adequate post-conflict strategies 
for stabilising states like Afghanistan and Iraq, the Bush Administration, populated by a 
coterie of neo-conservatives in the thrall of democratic peace theory, believed that 
democracy can be ‘imposed’ by military means (Dodge 2010:1274). Again, in rhetorical 
terms, there is a degree of convergence between the British and American administrations 
here: both viewed the ultimate end of counter-terrorist operations to be a freer, more 
democratic world. This was not only the means to defeating terrorism but also the end of 
doing so. This was possible because Bush and Blair’s administrations argued that democratic 
and humanitarian principles, along ‘Rousseauian Romanticist’ lines of universality, were 
innate to the human condition (Biggar 2011:29). Since this was held to be hardwired in 
people, so too was the notion, according to Barkawi (2006:56), that ‘democracy and free 
market economics are the source of peace and prosperity for humankind’ and that, 
therefore, ‘modernizing the non-European world along liberal lines will lead to stability and 
development’. The significant difference between the British and American perspectives on 
democratisation was not so much a belief that, since such values are universal, all peoples 
will eventually become democratically-minded and therefore prosperous, but rather related 
to divergent views concerning the methods necessary to achieve that eventuality. Blair 
believed that reconstruction and state-building efforts would be required to set the Afghans 
on the correct course, and that this would be best achieved by joining the Bush 
Administration’s traditional, physical security concerns and the coercive military apparatus 
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with New Labour’s focus on the security of liberal democratic values and a development 
agenda to match.  
For New Labour, following up air strikes and special forces operations against the 
Taliban and al Qaeda with reconstruction, development and democratisation efforts 
represented a near-perfect opportunity to put the party’s philosophy into practice and, in so 
doing, showing willing to the US whilst maintaining its commitments to ethical foreign policy 
(Beech 2006:116). Historical accounts of the Blair Government’s relationship with the Bush 
Administration during the course and aftermath of the six-week invasion of Afghanistan 
demonstrate that this perspective was not necessarily shared by the Americans, however, 
whose political and military elite famously eschewed any notion of ‘nation-building’, and 
preferred instead to leave governance issues to the victorious Northern Alliance and 
America’s European counterparts (Seldon 2005:509-510; Hill 2005:393-394). The Blair 
Government plugged this gap in US interest. In his first address to the Commons following 
the fall of Kabul in mid-November of 2001, Blair made the case for British leadership in the 
reconstruction mission for Afghanistan: 
‘Let us be clear - the way that the world embraces and supports the new 
Afghanistan will be the clearest possible indication that the dreadful events of 
11 September have resulted in a triumph for the international community 
acting together as a force for good, and in the defeat of the evil that is 
international terrorism. I think that we all know now that a safer world is built, 
ultimately, out of secure countries representing all their people living in peace 
with their neighbours. That is how terrorism will eventually be defeated, and 
that, step by step, must be the new international order that emerges from the 
worst terrorist outrage in our history. Whatever the challenges and whatever 
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the setbacks along the way, I believe that is a vision and a world worth fighting 
for’ (Hansard 2001d). 
Blair made the case here for nation-building and principles of human security as the 
key to international security, and set the success of the mission against a liberal benchmark 
of representative government. He made it clear that in order to ‘defeat’ terrorism the 
international community would have to commit itself to fostering democratic governance 
and that, in the long run, defeating terrorism via democratisation would allow for the 
spread of a ‘new international order’. It was from this narrative context that Blair and his 
Government entered into participation in the stabilisation process begun at the Bonn 
Conference in December 2001 and carried through to the Tokyo ‘donor’ conference of early 
2002. The Conference centred on ‘security sector reform’, and was essentially a stabilisation 
‘fundraiser’. This allowed US allies that shared Blair’s liberal peace theory convictions to 
carry out the side of the War on Terror they felt comfortable participating in and, equally, 
freed the US from activities with which they were not comfortable. The participation of 
European NATO members in the state-building processes outlined in the Bonn and Tokyo 
Conferences therefore provided an ideological complement to the American counter-terror 
effort. Tokyo served two crucial institutional functions. Firstly, it connected the soft power 
approach of the British and Europeans with the militaristic American approach, thus 
strengthening the ‘special relationship’ between Britain and the United States whilst 
ostensibly tempering the latter’s bellicosity and thereby strengthening the European 
development agenda (Clarke 2007:604-605). Secondly, in shaping a policy response to 
Afghanistan defined around shared norms of democratisation and humanitarianism, it 
allowed a common European NATO policy towards Afghanistan to coalesce. It is doubtful 
whether an alliance between European states would have been possible if the mission was 
127 
 
conceived as anything other than that of reconstruction, particularly given the various 
‘national caveats’ of European armed forces. Indeed, the two institutional functions initially 
complemented one another: the Americans did not want to ‘do’ stabilisation, and the 
majority of the Europeans did not (or could not) ‘do’ counter-terrorism. As such, the alliance 
dynamic for Afghanistan was from the start a two-tier operation, comprised of the counter-
terrorist, American-led Operation Enduring Freedom and the multi-national stabilisation-
oriented International Security Assistance Force. The result was military cooperation based 
on culturally informed limits of capability: NATO members and other US allies could provide 
assistance on the basis of what their caveats would allow. Collective security dynamics 
defined the roles and responsibilities of member states, allowing each side – counter-
terrorism and stabilisation – to ‘free ride’ on the others’ capabilities. 
Typically, the British took a major role in such efforts, taking on leadership 
responsibilities for the fledgling, UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 
in Kabul, as well as securing ‘lead nation status’ for counter-narcotics responsibilities. The 
challenges of Blair’s rhetorical approach to stabilisation became evident almost immediately 
during this period, however. The Bonn Conference (aimed at post-conflict resolution) was 
plagued with divisions within the victorious Northern Alliance, with one regional warlord, 
Abdul Rashid Dostum, slamming the ensuing Agreement as unrepresentative, while former 
president Burhanuddin Rabbani explicitly rejected the formation of an international peace-
keeping force on the grounds that it would be – ironically – destabilising to the country. 
Most importantly, the leading representative of the majority Pashtun population, Abdul 
Hadir, walked out of the Conference talks stating, similar to Dostum, that the accord was 
little more than victor’s justice (Dejevsky 2001:8). The lack of Pashtun representation at 
Bonn would prove to be highly detrimental to any hopes of political reconciliation; indeed, 
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as one commentator presciently argued at the time, western acquiescence to a Northern 
Alliance-dominated post-conflict Afghanistan ‘would be the coalescing of Afghanistan’s 
majority Pashtun tribes around their Taliban leaders and the rekindling of a brutal, general 
civil war that would continue until the United States simply gave up’ (Bearden 2001:29). 
Indeed, concern for post-conflict stabilisation at this point seems to have been low, at least 
by the metric of monies invested: tellingly, while over $3 billion had been spent by the 
Americans in late 2001 on counter-terrorism operations, only $20 million had been pledged 
by the international community to reconstruction efforts (Sengupta 2002:6).  
Notwithstanding these early problems, following the establishment of the Afghan 
Interim Authority in January 2002 the stabilisation narrative was firmly entrenched and 
highly optimistic in presentation, so much so that British assessments of its role in ISAF 
hinted at completion by the end of March, with all British troops having left Kabul by mid-
April (Evans & Bone 2001; Harding 2002:20). In February, Blair sought to disassociate 
military effects from soft power by speaking of the impending peace-keeping and 
stabilisation role for the United Kingdom whilst alluding to the impending cessation of 
military activity. By mid-March, however, these plans were complicated by the 
Government’s acquiescence to American requests for counter-terrorism assistance in 
eastern Afghanistan, and agreed to deploy an infantry battlegroup. Just as stabilisation was 
about to become the focus of British operations, the British presence in Afghanistan was 
altered to be a balance of counter-terrorism and stabilisation (Norton-Taylor 2002:1). Oddly, 
whilst obviously a response to a US request, Britain was by no means forced to take on a 
combat role. One journalist would later report that, according to an American source, the 
Government were offered either an ‘expanded peacekeeping role’ or ‘joining the combat 
forces’ and ‘opted for the latter’ (Macintyre 2002:16). Suddenly the limited military 
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operation and long-term stabilisation plan had become an ‘open-ended commitment’ to 
counter-terrorism, according to Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon (Norton-Taylor & Borger 
2002:5). Whilst in the months previous the Government had made much of emphasising the 
reconstruction effort in the country, Hoon chose here to emphasise the ‘war-fighting 
operations’ the Royal Marines would be involved in (Gilligan 2002:15). The discrepancy in 
Government statements about the nature of the mission led to confusion in the media as to 
whether the British role was in Afghanistan was primarily counter-terrorist or stabilisation in 
scope (Watt 2002b:5). Compounding the confusion of Blair’s comments in February of an 
open-ended stabilisation campaign and Hoon’s comments in early March of an open-ended 
counter-terrorist campaign, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw claimed in a BBC interview in late 
March that, in fact, both operations were to be of a short duration: 
‘We do indeed have an exit strategy … of course we do, I don't think that our 
troops are going to be there, the combat troops, for very long, I, nobody can 
say for absolutely certain and nobody is saying that because war is uncertain 
business but their purpose in Afghanistan, the combat troops, is a very specific 
purpose to root out the remaining Al Queda terrorists and once that is done 
our troops will leave, and as for those troops involved in the international 
stabilisation and assistance force which is confined by international law at the 
moment to Kabul and the surrounding area, well we said we'd be there for a 
matter of months as a lead authority it's going to be extended for a little while 
but again in the long march of history this is a very limited operation’ (Straw 
2002: online). 
The disparity of messaging in this early phase of the conflict evinces some uncertainty 
amongst ministers as to purpose and duration of British involvement in Afghanistan, 
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perhaps because it was not yet clear what the British role would be beyond the cessation of 
counter-terrorist activity by American forces. Clearly, the scope and scale of what was 
required was uncertain to British policymakers, due in all likelihood and in equal parts to the 
volatility of the mission and the fact that strategy in Afghanistan was being largely directed 
from Washington. While Blair stated that he did not see any ‘mismatch’ with combining 
stabilisation and counter-terrorism operations (Watt 2002a:12), this uncertainty was 
recorded amongst members of the press, who argued that Government must decide the 
nature of the mission it was conducting (Independent 2002:2). The debate over the role of 
British forces would quickly become irrelevant, however, as the counter-terrorist mission in 
Afghanistan ground to a halt in mid-2002: the ‘remnants’ of the Taliban and al Qaeda had 
failed to surface, and the key aim of American punitive operations – to capture or kill the 
senior leadership of al Qaeda – had come essentially to nought. According to journalist 
Jason Burke (2002:18), the dissipation of the counter-terrorist mission led Rumsfeld to 
dictate to Coalition troops that their role was now to ‘ensure that Afghanistan can develop 
economically and politically so the country would not become a haven for terrorists in the 
future’. By mid-June, the last of the British combat forces had departed the country (Carr 
2002:8). The implication of this is simple: the stabilisation mission grew out of the remnants 
of the counter-terrorist mission and its failure to complete its stated objectives. For all the 
Blair Government’s stabilisation rhetoric, the bulk of its operations in the first year of the 
conflict was of a counter-terrorist nature, and moreover almost entirely directed by the 
Americans. The mission aims and the policy narrative therefore altered to accommodate a 
realisation of the complexities and difficulties of attempting to ‘eradicate terrorism’; until 
this point of epiphany, the stabilisation mission lacked serious substance. Indeed, it was not 
until the end of November 2002, when the United States began to seriously commit its own 
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forces to stabilisation efforts and announced a shift in its operations to one of ‘75% 
reconstruction and humanitarian, and 25% security and combat operations’ (Goldenberg 
2002:15), that stabilisation looked anything other than a rhetorical afterthought to counter-
terrorism operations. It was only at this point in time that the UK, following the American 
lead, established its provincial reconstruction team (PRT) (Norton-Taylor & MacAskill 
2002:17; Beeston 2002:20). Once the Americans were satisfied the counter-terrorism 
mission was complete, Blair could return to the stabilisation narrative, declaring the need 
for ‘a coalition to re-build the nation of Afghanistan as strong as the coalition to defeat the 
Taliban’ (Blair 2002b: online). 
UK stabilisation efforts as generally dictated by US counter-terrorism concerns is a 
view that can be corroborated by patterns elsewhere in the War on Terror. The role of Iraq 
is crucial in understanding both the strategic and narrative shift to stabilisation in 
Afghanistan as well as the composition of stabilisation forces within ISAF. Blair’s decision to 
support the Americans in their diplomatic manoeuvrings against Saddam Hussein was made 
explicit by late September of 2002, at which point he delivered his ‘weapons of mass 
destruction’ speech to the House of Commons (Hansard 2002c). Although Blair reaffirmed 
his Government’s commitment to Afghanistan in this speech, stating that ‘we will stick with 
then until the job of reconstruction is done’, the attention of the Government was by this 
point firmly placed on the unfolding situation in Iraq. By early February of 2003, reports 
began to emerge of the United States shifting its resources away from Afghanistan and 
toward Iraq, precipitating a visit to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by a pensive 
Hamid Karzai to plead that the Bush Administration does not ‘forget Afghanistan’ (Fisk 
2003:17; Reeves 2003:15). His apprehensions do appear justified in retrospect: as the 
invasion of Iraq was underway during March and April of 2003, insurgent violence in 
132 
 
Afghanistan rose sharply, a correlation that has been interpreted as a result of Coalition 
neglect (Gall 2003:13). Perhaps reflecting the relative demotion in the eyes of the Bush 
Administration of Afghanistan in favour of Iraq, in May of 2003 Rumsfeld stated that 
operations in Afghanistan had ‘moved from major combat activity to a period of stability 
and stabilisation and reconstruction activities’ (BBC 2003: online). In reframing Afghanistan 
as a stabilisation mission, Rumsfeld’s statement can be seen in the light of diplomatic 
tensions between the United States and Britain, on the one side, and France and Germany, 
on the other, over the legality of an invasion of Iraq that led to a crisis for the future of the 
NATO alliance. According to Bird and Marshall (2011:154-155), Afghanistan presented an 
opportunity to those European states that refused to participate in Iraq with an opportunity 
to redeem themselves and NATO in the process. For Blair, the potential for an enhanced 
focus on Afghan stabilisation allowed his Kantian moral philosophy to reassert itself and, in 
doing so rehabilitate the normative claims made throughout early 2003 for the invasion of 
Iraq. In mid-July, Blair reaffirmed his universalist, democracy-laden stabilisation narrative to 
the United States Congress with a forceful speech linking the war on terror with a global 
development effort: 
‘the threat comes because in another part of our globe there is shadow and 
darkness, where not all the world is free, where many millions suffer under 
brutal dictatorship, where a third of our planet lives in a poverty beyond 
anything even the poorest in our societies can imagine, and where a fanatical 
strain of religious extremism has arisen that is a mutation of the true and 
peaceful faith of Islam. There is a myth that though we love freedom, others 
don't; that our attachment to freedom is a product of our culture; that 
freedom, democracy, human rights, the rule of law are American values, or 
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Western values; that Afghan women were content under the lash of the 
Taleban; that Saddam was somehow beloved by his people; that Milosevic 
was Serbia's saviour. Members of Congress, ours are not Western values, they 
are the universal values of the human spirit. The spread of freedom is the best 
security for the free. It is our last line of defence and our first line of attack. 
And anywhere, anytime ordinary people are given the chance to choose, the 
choice is the same: freedom, not tyranny; democracy, not dictatorship; the 
rule of law, not the rule of the secret police’ (Blair 2003: online). 
 
Phase II: 2003-2005 – Consolidating the rhetoric of democratisation 
Perhaps reflecting both the rapidly deteriorating security outlook in Iraq and the 
relative benignity of Afghanistan, there was very little focus by politicians, academics or the 
press on stabilisation efforts in Afghanistan for the majority of this period. In retrospect this 
period is of significance, however, in the sense that it was in August of 2003, when the 
United Nations Security Council gave unanimous approval to NATO’s takeover of the ISAF 
mission and the expansion of operations beyond Kabul that stabilisation efforts truly began 
to take shape. In the aftermath of the division of NATO over Iraq, Afghanistan presented 
itself as a perfect storm of renewed interest from all parties. It was in this environment that 
the imperatives of maintaining the collective security alliance re-emerged. Various non-
governmental aid organisations clamoured in the press for ISAF expansion in order to 
extend their own operations, while the Karzai government, unhappy at international efforts 
and aid contributions to this point, were equally keen for the writ of its authority to be 
extended beyond the capital (Marsden 2003:95). Those European states that had been 
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unwilling to take on military roles in Iraq found reconstruction and peace-keeping efforts 
amenable to their own interests and political cultures, which the United States found useful 
as a means of allocating to those European states post-war ‘mopping up’ duties and thereby 
freed American forces and money to concentrate on Iraq (Bird & Marshall 2011:114-118). 
This in turn placated NATO as it provided it a more concrete and culturally acceptable role 
within the War on Terror and ostensibly solved the pan-Atlantic crisis created by the Iraq 
affair. Finally, the United Kingdom’s political classes found solace in all these events, as it 
allowed the Labour Government to focus on reconstruction and development work whilst 
mollifying the Conservative opposition of the unity and longevity of collective security 
arrangements.  
Thus – and again serving the interests of all involved – the political narrative 
emanating from Downing Street and Whitehall in the latter half of 2003 and most of 2004 
was decidedly upbeat with regard to Afghanistan, and even more so by comparison with the 
tempestuousness of Iraq. By November of 2003, Jack Straw gave a typically optimistic 
assessment of progress made to stabilise and democratise the country by focusing on 
development indices: 
‘Our efforts are paying off. Four million Afghan children are back at school, 
including girls and young women who were denied an education under the 
Taliban; the economy grew by an estimated 30 per cent. in 2002–03; and 
more than 2.5 million refugees have returned. Next month, the Afghans will 
decide for themselves a new constitution, to be followed by elections next 
year’ (Hansard 2003b). 
Despite such favourable portrayals by the Foreign Secretary, the United Nations 
Refugee Agency claimed in the same week that the security situation in Afghanistan was 
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rapidly deteriorating, to the point where development work was fast becoming untenable 
(Astill 2003:20). Meanwhile, reports of a resurgent Taliban became steadily more prevalent 
in the British press (Hussain 2003:15; Burke 2003:23). Compounding matters was the 
sluggish start to NATO’s expansionist activities in Afghanistan, with diplomats speaking of 
‘limited temporary engagements’ beyond the capital; a British official claimed that ‘the idea 
[of the expansion] is to give ISAF more flexibility, not to cover the whole country’ (La 
Guardia 2003:14). Throughout early 2004, mixed messages continued to surface 
sporadically, threatening to undermine the legitimacy of the stabilisation policy narrative. 
On the one hand, the news was supportive: the postponement of elections in March of 2004 
– due to security issues related to the need to ‘disarm warlords’ (Fox 2004:25) – was met 
just days later with announcements from the Blair Government and NATO of the expansion 
of ISAF in a counter-clockwise fashion around the country as a means of bolstering security 
to ensure the democratic process (Norton-Taylor & MacAskill 2004:11; Beeston 2004a:14). 
On the other, however, the stabilisation approach appeared to founder: the Berlin ‘donor’ 
conference in April managed to attract only £4.6 billion in funding out of a target of £15 
billion (Beeston 2004b:20). Although a mere microcosm of the stabilisation efforts as a 
whole, these two events demonstrated an ongoing theme of disparity between words and 
deeds that would come to define the conflict for its duration.  
Such disparities came into sharp relief in the summer of 2004 with the publication of 
the Foreign Affairs Select Committee report, ‘Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against 
Terrorism’. Following earlier comments made by Committee members in the House of 
Commons that Afghanistan was becoming a ‘basket case’ and that NATO expansion was at a 
state of ‘virtual non-delivery’, the report outlined progress made in Afghanistan as 
substantial but also criticised the international community for its tendency to place rhetoric 
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above action, stating that ‘fine communiqués and ringing declarations are no substitute for 
delivery of the forces and equipment which Afghanistan needs on the ground’ (Hansard 
2004c; 2004:9). In its most critical passage, the Committee warned that ‘[t]here is a real 
danger if these resources are not provided soon that Afghanistan — a fragile state in one of 
the most sensitive and volatile regions of the world — could implode, with terrible 
consequences’ (2004:9). Blair’s response to such comments was to play up achievements 
made whilst simultaneously playing down future expectations: 
‘The actual prognosis for Afghanistan is good. Sure there are big problems. 
These nations are failed states of total and absolute degradation. You don't 
turn them around in two or three years so they become first world countries 
en route to joining the European Union. It's not like that for a country like 
Afghanistan… [It is] absolutely wrong and unfortunate if people thought no 
progress had been made in Afghanistan over the past two or three years… 
There are five and a half million kids in school including over two million girls 
who were banned from school. The economy has grown by 30 per cent this 
year and is expected to grow by 20 per cent’ (Brown 2004:6). 
Straw and Blair’s statements utilised the same talking points: stabilisation was 
working, and could be evidenced by improvements in education and economic 
performance. However, the real test of stabilisation in Afghanistan was security, and it was 
partly to this end that the NATO Summit in Istanbul was convened in July of 2004. Billed in 
the press as a ‘make or break’ opportunity to maintain Alliance unity in the wake of 
festering animosities between the United States and “Old Europe” – in the main, France and 
Germany – over Iraq, the Summit was a nominal success in that it cemented the extension 
of NATO authority over the stabilisation operation in Afghanistan and secured further troop 
137 
 
commitments from European member states (Maddox 2004:12; Black & White 2004:11). 
This amounted to the furtherance of PRT projects in the country and, importantly, 
additional security cover for the upcoming December presidential election. While the move 
was lauded by Blair as a major step forward in the democratising mission for the country, his 
former Foreign Secretary and Iraq War critic Robin Cook noted an essential paradox in 
increasing the international military presence in Afghanistan as undermining the 
stabilisation and reconstruction mission: although aid organisations required a secure 
environment in which to work, by linking military personnel with aid workers the security 
situation had the potential to deteriorate as the insurgent forces would increasingly 
associate aid staff and development projects with military occupation (Cook 2004:35). A 
more general critical principle could also be applied here, namely that the promotion of 
elections as a force for legitimising ISAF and the Karzai government was not necessarily 
amenable to stabilisation (Barkawi 2006:56). Of course, such an analysis rests on the 
assumption that the strategy was entirely dedicated to Afghanistan’s needs. The Istanbul 
Summit was not: it was primarily about NATO’s needs and how efforts in Afghanistan could 
meet those needs. Democratisation and stabilisation efforts were the means to healing a 
fractured NATO. Supporting democratisation efforts was a way to validate Alliance 
members’ essential unity; as such, the acknowledgment of the complexities of stabilising 
such a fractious state and society was secondary to the complexities of cohering a culturally 
differentiated NATO. Democracy promotion was the binding force for the mechanism that 
could deliver stabilisation to Afghanistan. It was neither the end nor the means of stabilising 
Afghanistan; rather, it was the means to the end of NATO unity. Thus, when Blair stated that 
democracy was ‘the biggest blow that there can be to international terrorism’, he was 
correct in the sense that it was a necessary normative basis for the institutional cohesion of 
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those tasked with the job (Hansard 2004f). At the Labour Party Conference in September, 
Blair made his democratic peace position clearer still, arguing ‘I believe democracy there 
means security here’ (Blair 2004: online).  
Given the natural charitableness of the level of expectation regarding the probity of 
Afghanistan’s first election since the end of the Cold War, the process can be seen in 
retrospect as a reasonable success. The aims of security established at the Istanbul Summit 
were largely met, as insurgent forces largely failed to disrupt the voting process or deter a 
large proportion of the electorate. Indeed, it was taken as a victory for stabilisation by the 
international community, which in turn took this as an opportunity to begin talk of 
transition and of winning ‘hearts and minds’ in order to secure the democratic advance of 
the Kabul government (Meo 2005:19). Reconstruction and democratisation became the 
political watchwords in the United Kingdom throughout 2005 as the Labour Government 
carried out negotiations with its NATO partners and senior military commanders in 
preparation for the deployment of British troops into the southern quadrant of Afghanistan 
in early 2006. Collective security negotiations dominated these proceedings, with several 
factors coming into play. Firstly, it was widely publicised that the Bush Administration 
wished to pull a substantial number of its combat forces from Afghanistan to contribute to 
counter-insurgency operations in Iraq, which by mid-2005 had reached a new nadir of 
insecurity and internecine violence (Rashid 2005:21). Secondly, and conversely, was the 
British military desire to get out of Basra, where its forces had been compelled to retreat 
from its stabilisation approach and whose presence had been rendered strategically 
obsolete (Harding 2005:11). Afghanistan represented a fresh start and, according to one 
former official, was viewed by General Richard Dannatt as an opportunity for good 
soldiering. Thirdly, there was the political dimension: given its shortcomings in Iraq and the 
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Americans’ combined renewed emphasis on Iraq and loss of interest in Afghanistan (Norton-
Taylor 2005:15), the British Government felt it necessary to display leadership in the 
international community by taking responsibility for ISAF and leading the push to the south.  
Moreover, whereas the war in Iraq had proven politically disastrous for the Labour 
Party and Blair personally, the mission parameters for Afghanistan were much more 
politically favourable in domestic terms (Personal Interview, 2013). The aims of the ISAF 
expansion – reconstruction, democratisation, development and counter-narcotics – were on 
paper decidedly benign, based on shared norms and fitting neatly within the confines of a 
Labour-friendly focus on human security. Afghanistan, unlike Iraq, remained the ‘good war’ 
in popular perception, with (at this point in time) a relatively clear and valid rationale for 
entry and, crucially, was untainted by allegations of illegality, ulterior and selfish motives, 
unilateral imperialism, and the most quintessential anti-Labour pejorative of ‘spin’, 
stemming from claims in the press that the Government’s dossier outlining Iraq’s weapons 
of mass destruction was ‘sexed up’. Whilst the Butler Report that investigated these 
allegations did not affirm their validity, it did raise concern regarding ‘the informality and 
circumscribed character of the Government’s procedures which we saw in the context of 
policy-making towards Iraq risks reducing the scope for informed collective political 
judgement’, otherwise known as Blair’s tendency to favour a “sofa government” approach 
of assuaging concerns and offering quid pro quos (Butler et al. 2004:10). Despite the lessons 
ostensibly learnt by the Blair Government as to the pitfalls of such an approach – 
particularly given the fact that there were indeed no weapons of mass destruction to be 
found in Iraq – the historical record to date appears to favour the conclusion that the 
planning process informing British deployment to Helmand took a similarly informal route as 
that of Iraq. Former Downing Street special adviser Matt Cavanagh provided an insightful 
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account of the policy-making process, describing it as being directed by a small number of 
ministers, centred upon Blair and Defence Secretary John Reid, and a small number of 
senior military commanders. Both parties agreed on the basis of the plan, argues Cavanagh, 
because their respective institutional and international agendas were met in doing so:  
‘there was a mutually reinforcing dynamic at the top of government: almost 
all the key ministers thought the overall decision was clear, reinforced by their 
sense that the military were happy with it; for their part the senior military 
were indeed happy, but also reinforced by their sense that the politicians had 
made up their minds, so they might as well get on with it’ (Cavanagh 2012:51).  
The dynamic described appears, as with the Tokyo Conference and Istanbul Summits, 
to be one of meeting the various institutional interests of those involved. The implications 
of this convergence of interests on the stabilisation narrative are stark and have persisted 
throughout the remainder of the campaign. In many ways it is reminiscent of the categories 
of ‘groupthink’ as expounded by Janis (1972:174-175). Reading Cavanagh’s and others 
accounts (including former British Ambassador to Afghanistan, Sherard Cowper-Coles 
(2011:11)), leads one to the not unreasonable inference that the planning process for 
Helmand evinced several of the core features of groupthink, including ‘excessive optimism’ 
and a ‘belief in the group’s inherent morality’, ‘collective efforts to rationalize’ the 
intervention as being strategically viable, a ‘shared illusion of unanimity’ of judgement, and 
‘direct pressure on any member who expresses strong arguments against any of the group’s 
stereotypes, illusions, or commitments’ (Janis 1972:174-175). The plan was based on an 
assumption of the correctness of liberal peace theory and democratisation-led stabilisation, 
and was constituted as such by a kind of institutional compromise where all parties agreed 
to contribute to a larger objective, but only on the basis that their specific interests would 
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be met and maintained. Moreover, Cavanagh’s account suggests that as a result of these 
inter-personal dynamics the strategy of undertaking reconstruction in Helmand in a ‘semi-
permissive environment’ was evidently devised without recourse to an alternative plan; it 
appears to have been a result of eager politicians and civilian bureaucrats agreeing terms 
with equally eager military commanders.  
Consequently, the tenor of the transnationally-driven stabilisation policy narrative as 
it developed through 2005 was one that appeared to satisfy all elements of national and 
collective interest groups, fulfilling both the interests of the British state’s constituent parts 
as well as its sense of obligation within the NATO alliance. It was strategic in the same way it 
was comprehensive: it met the strategic objectives of those participating as much as (if not 
more so than) the strategic requirements of stabilising Helmand. The Government would be 
content that Helmand supported their overall aims of counter-narcotics and stabilisation, 
and would increase their credibility as a reliable partner in the eyes of the United States. 
The military, meanwhile, could be satisfied that Helmand offered them a chance to restore 
their reputation internationally and provided them with a pretext for reducing its 
commitments in Basra. It appears that this climate of mutual satisfaction of interests 
correlated with a lack of strategic consideration and, interestingly, resulted in a highly 
cohesive and convincing narrative with all parties agreeing on the purpose of the mission as 
both existential (in terms of global security) but also couched in a strong moral argument for 
democratisation and human rights.  The reason for this is relatively straightforward: the 
narrative was strong because all parties agreed that it was, and the strategy was weak 
because this agreement via the satisfaction of various interests meant the viability of the 
plan was not sufficiently challenged. There were few involved in the process and those that 
were involved were all pushing in the same direction. The narrative therefore had a 
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semblance of unity of effort. The strategy, however, was weak as a result of the lack of 
deliberation: the military goals that emerged from this unity were made to sit alongside the 
reconstruction aims, which were in turn assumed to be compatible with counter-narcotics 
objectives. This was the high point of stabilisation: the remainder of the campaign can be 
traced by looking at the points of convergence, departure, inflation and deflation of 
narrative in relation to strategy. The stabilisation policy narrative would remain unified until 
it became plainly evident to all concerned that the strategy it spoke of was insufficient, at 
which point the strategy would be strengthened but at the expense of the coherence of 
narrative. When it became clear that the strategy was still failing to deliver on the original 
rationales as set out in the stabilisation narrative, the narrative was reconfigured to meet 
the demands of coherence between them. The result was not only the fracturing of the CA, 
but of the institutional consensus that informed its creation.  
Even at this point, however, there were differences of views from mid-ranking officers 
as to what the mission in Helmand would entail, how it could be conducted, and how long it 
would take. For example, in late May of 2005 Colonel James Denny, the then-commander of 
British forces in Afghanistan, argued that ISAF’s nation-building responsibilities would 
require ‘a generation’ to complete before withdrawal would be possible, whereas the 
projections given by politicians was a mere three to five years; another British officer within 
NATO, Colonel Huw Lawford, commented that the mission would not be benign, stating that 
'[y]ou will not be going out in Land Rovers, you will be going out in armed Warrior vehicles, 
and you will not be walking around in a beret, you will be going out in a tin hat, with a rifle 
and body armour.' (Bentham 2005:21). This plainly jars with estimations made by Reid and 
others at the time, who spoke of an aim of ‘building a democratic, pluralistic, and politically 
and commercially non-corrupt Afghanistan’ through a strategy of ‘build[ing] up the 
143 
 
economy, civil society and security forces of the Afghan Government’ (Hansard 2005c). 
Those at the upper echelons of the state spoke the language of a relatively benign, post-
conflict environment generally conducive to stabilisation, whilst those at the operational 
level appear to have viewed the deployment as involving a greater degree of kinetic effort. 
It would seem that the Blair Government was either unaware of the nature of the mission 
confronting them or, as Betz and Cormack (2009:326-327) argued, that their reconstruction 
rhetoric evinced ‘severe strategic lassitude’ in that they ‘wanted to play the reconstruction 
theme of the opera and did not overly concern themselves with how or by whom the other 
elements of the orchestra would be conducted’. Interestingly, Betz and Cormack’s view 
intimates that the demands of a strong narrative undermined the development of a strong 
strategy. In this reading, ministers’ views on the deteriorating security situation on the 
ground appeared entirely out of step with those of the military commanders in-theatre: 
Reid spoke of his belief that British forces would be given ‘a great welcome’ by Afghans, 
while Minister of State for the MoD Adam Ingram argued rather counter-intuitively that the 
stabilisation strategy was appropriate because the placing of forces on the ground to 
facilitate reconstruction would cause the conditions required for reconstruction to worsen: 
he did ‘not believe the situation is deteriorating. Incidents can occur because contact has 
been made with people who are being pursued because they are intent on making the 
situation worse’ (Hansard 2005a). For the remaining four and a half years of Labour 
government, the sense of Government as out of step with reality (or of trying to mould 
reality to fit the preferred narrative) would become ever more pronounced, stretching civil-
military relations to near breaking point and, as a consequence, producing the 
circumstances that would produce an incoherent stabilisation policy narrative. 
 
144 
 
CHAPTER 5: THE FALL OF THE STABILISATION 
NARRATIVE 
  
 
In this second stabilisation chapter, I chart the demise of the high idealism of the UK’s 
stabilisation narrative for Afghanistan. Upon the entry of British forces into Helmand 
Province in April 2006, the assumptions underpinning the democratisation and 
reconstruction elements of Labour’s stabilisation policy came into contact with the harsh 
realities of southern Afghanistan for the first time. This chapter argues that the weight of 
events in Helmand rapidly undermined the Blair Government’s ‘comprehensive approach’ 
and resulted in a gradual yet unmistakeable reduction of stabilisation aims in the narrative, 
ultimately resulting in a revised, national security-centric narrative from late 2008 onwards. 
This trend may be understood as the result of the implementation of strategic 
communication processes as a means of overcoming substantial intra-state tensions 
regarding the purpose of the Helmand mission, which were in turn the result of Government 
attempting to meet its transnational obligations to the United States and NATO.  
 
 
Phase III: 2006-2009 – Stabilisation and the breakdown of civil-
military relations 
 
The months preceding the arrival of Herrick IV to Helmand province in April 2006 were 
fraught with diplomatic manoeuvrings as the Blair Government struggled to create a 
substantial NATO coalition for ISAF’s expansion to the south of Afghanistan. With the 
French, Germans and Spanish refusing to contribute in a war-fighting capacity, and the 
Dutch government being forced to put the deployment of its armed forces to a 
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parliamentary vote – which eventually passed – the British had to rely on a force primarily of 
smaller states such as Denmark, eastern European NATO newcomers like Estonia, and other 
Anglophone states, namely Canada and Australia (Norton-Taylor 2005:21; Castle 2006:2). 
Despite the by-then common problem of alliance cohesion, the issue of deployment to 
Helmand went largely uncontested in the United Kingdom; aside from a handful of critical 
opinion pieces in The Guardian, countervailing voices were largely absent and the press 
were largely supportive of the mission (Independent 2006:26; Daily Telegraph 2006:23). 
Similarly, despite their future position of criticising Labour’s ‘dreamy ideas’ of stabilisation, 
the Conservatives were amply collaborative with Government upon the announcement of 
the mission by John Reid to the Commons, with shadow Defence Secretary Liam Fox opining 
that the ‘defence of our national security and the construction of a free and democratic 
Afghanistan are noble ideas shared on both sides of the House’ (Guardian 2006).  
The London Conference in late January coalesced the ISAF forces moving south around 
an ambitious programme of state-building that represented nothing less than a 
commitment to the wholesale transformation of Afghanistan’s political, economic and social 
structures. With most targets set for the end of 2010, the ensuing ‘Afghan Compact’ bound 
the Afghan government and the international community together and reaffirmed in the 
British Government the centrality of liberal normativity and adherence to collective security 
principles to the stabilisation policy narrative, and contained a raft of measures aimed at 
such a policy, including establishing a functioning judicial system, curbing the narcotics 
industry, ‘ensuring macroeconomic stability’, reducing corruption within the state, 
developing the country’s ‘human, social and physical capital’ and promoting ‘democratic 
governance and the protection of human rights’ (London Conference 2006:2-5). In early 
February, Reid addressed the Commons with a finalised statement that described British 
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troops’ role in Helmand in light of the Compact as one of ‘working to ensure that we provide 
Afghanistan with a seamless package of democratic, political, developmental and military 
assistance in Helmand’ (Hansard 2006a). 
In mid-February – just a fortnight after the Compact was agreed upon – relations 
between the military chiefs and government ministers took a negative turn as Blair 
apparently reneged on the alleged civilian end of the Helmand bargain by refusing to 
withdraw troops from Iraq until the security situation there had improved (Rayment 
2006:1). This led to a series of articles exposing the mixed messaging between the Armed 
Forces and the Ministry of Defence: while senior military figures including the former Chief 
of the Defence Staff, Lord Guthrie, spoke out publicly warning of ‘overstretch’ from fighting 
wars on two fronts, Reid argued the defence chiefs had informed him that the Helmand 
operation was manageable without withdrawing forces from Iraq (Sengupta & Taylor 
2006:19; Rayment 2006:1; Norton-Taylor 2006:11). It is perhaps telling that in the light of 
public rebukes that argued that the Government had neglected its duty of care by providing 
inadequate resources to military operations, the period of late February and early March 
featured Reid making more frequent statements reiterating the peace-keeping aspect of the 
mission, most famously articulated in his misconstrued quotation highlighting his desire to 
‘leave in three years without a shot being fired’: 
‘The mission is quite clear. We'd go there not to hunt terrorist, though if we're 
attacked by terrorists or insurgents we will obviously defend ourselves. We go 
there to defend President Karzai's government, the democratically-elected 
government of Afghanistan, and civilian authorities who are helping him from 
the whole international community, to build their economy, build their 
democracy, and build their own security forces’ (Reid 2006a: online). 
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Here Reid makes clear the difference between counter-terrorism and stabilisation. At 
the same time, however, it is apparent that although Reid did frequently warn of the 
potential for attacks against British personnel, there was little in the way of contingency 
planning that could alter the mission accordingly if it was deemed that a reconstruction 
approach was no longer suitable. Almost immediately upon commencing operations under 
Herrick IV, however, Reid’s stabilisation narrative was proven irrelevant as British forces 
found themselves engaged in fierce battles across Helmand province and focused on force 
protection rather than on reconstruction efforts. Senior officers and infantrymen alike 
expressed their concerns to the press that the mission had lost its purpose practically on 
arrival: one stated that he believed the ‘government is hiding the truth from the public’ to 
save Blair from criticism, while another lamented that the government needed ‘to decide 
what our mission out here is - because we can't do hearts and minds and this (fighting). It 
just won't work’ (Smith 2006:4; Walsh 2006:18). The appearance of statements such as this 
in the press represented a fundamental challenge to the Government’s stabilisation policy 
narrative. Initially, however, they appear to have had little effect: the official response to 
the rapid (and public) unravelling of the Taskforce Helmand strategy was to deflect 
attention from the perceived inadequacies of the planning stage and to reinforce the 
reconstruction narrative in spite of the fact that, at that time, intense kinetic activity had 
precluded almost all hope of reconstruction. While it is true that the reconstruction element 
of stabilisation must logically be preceded by fighting to pacify the area in question (as the 
‘clear, hold, build’ approach makes clear), the intensity of the fighting taking place and the 
almost total absence of reconstruction work during the early stages of the Helmand mission 
appears to have undermined perceptions that the plan was workable. This did not give 
cause within Government to change its rhetorical approach, however. Altering strategy – or 
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at least the presentation of it – was apparently being sacrificed in order to preserve 
narrative, despite ample evidence showing the latter to be intrinsically untenable.  
Criticism of the stabilisation strategy came from outside the military as well. Michael J 
Williams (2011:72-73) has described how, within weeks of the start of Helmand operations, 
the ‘Stabilisation Unit’ (the successor organisation to the PCRU) reported that ‘UK objectives 
in Helmand [were] not achievable’ as formulated in the Afghan National Development 
Strategy (ANDS). This implied that not only was the Helmand plan untenable, but by 
extrapolation that the liberal normative basis for it was flawed. It is probable that, even if 
Government had committed the entire resources of its Armed Forces to Afghanistan from 
the beginning, it would have still been insufficient to stabilise the province – the population 
of which was well in excess of one million persons – in the manner called for by the ANDS. 
Moreover, the plans made for stabilisation were inherently state-centric – specifically, 
focused on extending Kabul’s authority to Helmand – a concept of governance essentially at 
odds with the social mechanics and cultural sensibilities of the province. In spite of this 
advice – or perhaps because of its catastrophic implications – Cabinet appears to have 
simply ignored it, preferring to continue to speak the language of reconstruction 
irrespective of the feasibility of policy. As though to downplay the significance of planning 
altogether, the newly appointed Defence Secretary Des Browne would push the bounds of 
credulity by commenting in July that the ‘deployment was always going to inform us better 
than the pre-plan part of the assessment’ (Wintour 2006:18). Thus, suspicions that the 
strategy was ‘ad-hoc’ were countered by Browne by claiming that ‘ad-hocery’ was a natural 
part of the planning process. Perhaps most perniciously of all, Browne would also claim that 
the mere questioning of the Government’s pre-war planning acumen would be tantamount 
to endangering the lives of British military personnel: 
149 
 
‘If there are suggestions of confusion, or … that we are there primarily to do 
something entirely different, that is played back by the Taliban into their 
communities and people think these British soldiers are coming to starve 
them or attack them, then that is putting our soldiers at a level of risk that is 
unnecessary’ (Wintour 2006:18).  
To translate, the ostensible logic of Browne’s statement was that the stabilisation 
policy narrative must be protected at all costs, and that criticism of the Government’s 
planning process was tantamount to treasonous behaviour. It was in this politically charged 
atmosphere that, throughout the summer and autumn of 2006, public animosity between 
military officers and government ministers continued to grow. The former made more 
frequent comments to the effect that the government was inadequately funding military 
operations, and that it was without strategic direction: retired Colonel Tim Collins would 
comment to the press that ‘the government has no idea of what it wants to do. It's invited 
the Army to go to Iraq, to Afghanistan, and do stuff. It would be a bit like giving your keys to 
builders and say go and do some stuff in my house’ (Norton-Taylor & Vasagar 2006:16). 
Despite such warnings from officers about the untenable nature of reconstruction as then 
conceived, ministers continued to talk the language of a conflict defined not by battle but by 
social development, once more in ways that represented their own institutional interests. 
For example, International Development Secretary Hillary Benn would claim in November 
that ‘the most significant change since the fall of the Taliban is that girls can go back to 
school again’ (Benn 2006: online). Blair’s optimism remained resolute, and he would issue a 
statement at the end of NATO’s November Riga Summit claiming that ‘I think there is a 
sense that this mission in Afghanistan is not yet won, but it is winnable and, indeed, we are 
winning’ (Sengupta & Castle 2006:36). Taken in tandem, the Government’s approach 
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throughout 2006 appears to have prioritised the coherence of political messaging about the 
campaign above the changing dynamics at the operational level. While military commanders 
were compelled to publicly state their fears over a lack of strategic direction, the 
Government sought to downplay any assertion that the stabilisation narrative they had 
employed since 2002, grounded as it was in democratisation, development and 
humanitarianism, was no longer fit for purpose. For Blair in particular, liberal peace theory 
remained central, even in the face of seemingly insurmountable countervailing realities. By 
early 2007, responding to increasing calls to abandon liberal interventionism, he expressed 
his exasperation by remarking that he found it ‘so difficult when people say, the situation in 
Iraq or Afghanistan is really challenging and difficult, therefore we should remove ourselves. 
Surely, the first question to ask is, do the people in those countries want democracy and 
freedom, answer yes they do’ (Blair 2007: online). Blair’s commitment to liberal norms 
precluded him from stating that security should be the first question. In short, Blair’s 
narrative line of democracy and freedom for Afghanistan as the end of British operations in 
Afghanistan remained undiminished. 
Upon Blair’s departure from Downing Street in June 2007, it had become apparent 
that the strategic approach to Afghanistan needed to be upgraded from mere rhetorical 
gesture. His successor, Gordon Brown, would spend the remainder of 2007 undertaking a 
policy review process that, contra Blair, assumed that the people of Afghanistan’s first 
priority may be grounded in more practical issues like security than those more abstract 
issues relating to the merits of liberal democracy. Indeed, a review was necessary for 
reasons other than those of narrative presentation. Brown inherited Helmand at a time of 
transition: in February Britain had handed command of ISAF over to an unimpressed United 
States after the embarrassing loss of Musa Qala to insurgent forces and, perhaps in part as a 
151 
 
consequence, operations in Helmand had taken on a far more aggressive counterinsurgent 
tactical approach (Sengupta 2007:2). Partly due to troop increases and a concomitant rise in 
contact with insurgents, troop casualties across the summer months of 2007 had risen by 
more than fifty percent compared with 2006, and the amount of bullets expended by British 
troops had increased sharply under the first Herrick mission under Brown’s leadership 
(Herrick VI – 12 Mechanised Brigade) (Bird & Marshall 2011:176-177; Fergusson 2008:324). 
Despite the fact that British forces were now defeating the Taliban in almost every military 
encounter, brigade commander John Lorimer would famously refer to the fighting process 
as ‘mowing the grass’, in a reference to the difficulties encountered in implementing the 
‘clear-hold-build’ approach central to the CA under what was widely perceived as conditions 
of insufficient force-to-population ratios (Wright 2009:21; Farrell & Gordon 2009:22; King 
2010b:317). By the time Brown came to office, then, the realities of the conflict and the 
practical limitations of the CA had begun to impress upon the minds of leaders of the 
international community. Just a week after his premiership began, an UN-led conference on 
reform of the Afghan judicial system took place in Rome, devoid of much of the pomp and 
optimism of London eighteen months previous. A major issue at the conference was the 
impact of rising Afghan civilian casualties on the stabilisation effort, with UN Secretary-
General Ban Ki-Moon voicing particular concern (Ban 2007). Perhaps as a result of the 
uneven toning down of Blair’s totalising normative rhetoric, messages from the Brown 
Ministry appeared mixed following Blair’s departure. Some, such as Des Browne, had 
noticeably toned down the Kantian content of their public statements in favour of a more 
measured approach, and spoke less of transforming Afghan society and instead focused on 
helping the Afghans ‘have the best future they can have in an already challenging 
environment’ (Guardian 2007). Others such as Foreign Office minister Kim Howells 
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remained trenchant of the view that Afghanistan should become ‘an independent 
democratic state (Howells 2007:43). Whereas departmental representatives pressed the 
relevance of their respective priorities to the UK Afghan strategy, Brown himself was 
conspicuous in his lack of policy statements on Afghanistan for the first five months of his 
tenure. Meanwhile, the press had begun to call for a shift in Afghan policy toward ‘an 
approach based on realism rather than blind optimism’ (Independent 2007). The problem 
for the United Kingdom was that ‘blind optimism’ was not just a rhetorical problem: it was 
the foundation of British strategy in Helmand; it was a basic requirement of rhetorically 
adhering to the obligations of, and thereby asserting the adequate functioning of, collective 
security mechanisms on which the national interest depended. 
In early December, following a state visit to Afghanistan, Brown addressed the 
Commons with a definitive statement on his government’s policy for the conflict. Taking 
place on the same day as the re-capturing of Musa Qala from insurgent forces, Brown’s 
speech outlined his ‘comprehensive approach’ to Afghanistan and, in a manner typical of his 
attention to detail, was delivered meticulously, focusing on a raft of areas deemed 
necessary to stabilise the country. These went beyond military prosecution of the 
insurgency to include counter-narcotics, promotion of good governance, training the 
nascent Afghan National Security Forces, regional engagement with Pakistan and Iran, the 
alleviation of poverty, reconciliation with the rank-and-file of the insurgency, and a raft of 
long- and short-term development and aid projects designed to address the day-to-day 
concerns of Afghan civilians (Hansard 2007d). Crucially, Brown spoke of his government’s 
approach as one of ‘hard-headed realists, not idealists’, effectively signalling the move away 
from the grand rhetorical gestures of the Blair era (Hansard 2007d). For all the differences 
between Brown and Blair in terms of narrative emphasis and style, however, the former 
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could not easily escape the political inheritance of his predecessor: the speech remained 
firmly within the confines of a worldview that posited the centrality of a democratic Afghan 
state and adherence to its liberal constitution as key to defeating the insurgency and 
eliminating terrorism, as well as the means of maintaining the legitimacy of both the British 
mission and the Karzai government. Nonetheless, Brown’s statement garnered encouraging 
words from the Opposition leader David Cameron, who noted his satisfaction that Brown 
had apparently moved away from the Blairite devotion to imposing ‘a fully-fledged western 
democracy in a deeply traditional society’ (Hansard 2007e).  
While Brown’s policy refresh possibly served as an improvement over the strategically 
shallow orating of the Blair Government, his detailed articulations of what was required for 
success in Afghanistan had its own drawbacks. To recall an earlier point, the strength of 
Blair’s argument was precisely that: the argument, focused single-mindedly on a narrative of 
democratic peace as a panacea to the ills of post-modernity, upon which was built the 
normative basis of collective security, and through which Britain’s military activity could be 
morally and strategically justified. The strength of this argument was, therefore, not simply 
its communicative power to domestic audiences: it was also to be found in its ability to 
define and defend British interests as consistent with those of NATO and the US. Brown’s 
‘comprehensive approach’, whilst of almost infinitely more value in terms of the substance 
of strategic and operational planning, was entirely devoid of the style and panache 
associated with Blair’s rhetoric. It did not forcefully make the case for the UK’s role as an 
international collaborator in the same way as Blair had. Explaining the importance of a 
collective security operation premised on foreign internal defence, where the national 
interest is defined by another nation’s security, stability and democratic credentials, and 
which could only be secured by panoply of stabilisation efforts carried out in conjunction 
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with a myriad of state and non-state collaborators, is a confusing and imprecise venture. By 
contrast, explaining a conflict as an existential, Manichean struggle between the forces of 
good and evil within a transnational framework bound together by commonly held 
democratic values, as was Blair’s (and Bush’s) wont, was far more amenable to the public 
imagination, despite its almost complete lack of utility to the realities of the conflict.  
To put it another way, Brown’s obsession with the details of the strategic and 
operational requirements for victory in Afghanistan came at the cost of a lack of effective 
communication: it was neither grounded in the cultural coding of Blair’s liberal 
internationalism, nor could it be explained simply or with reference, in the first instance, of 
why it mattered to British interests. Instead, it drew its conclusions of its significance by 
degrees: Britain’s national interest required participation in collective security operations, 
which thereby secure Britain itself, and in doing so it participates in Afghanistan, with the 
aim of democratising and stabilising the Afghan state, so that it might provide the economic, 
social and institutional reconstruction efforts necessary to pacify its people and tangentially 
defeat an insurgent force which, by virtue of its previous association with the terrorist group 
al Qaeda – which attacked Britain’s chief ally and guarantor of its security – poses an 
indirect threat to the United Kingdom by its continued presence in Afghanistan where, if it is 
not defeated or sufficiently marginalised, may in some hypothetical future scenario allow 
the return of said terrorists, which would then destabilise the Afghan government and 
potentially create an ‘ungoverned space’ from which to plan and carry out further terrorist 
atrocities, which may be targeted at the United Kingdom. Blair, by contrast, summed up his 
policy in far fewer words: ‘democracy there means security here’. Brown’s decision to 
continue with the strategic foundations for stabilising Afghanistan as established by Blair, 
but also to abandon much of the rhetorical basis for the accompanying policy narrative 
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(coupled with a rapidly deteriorating security situation and a corresponding sharp increase 
in British casualties) meant that he would struggle to conceptualise an effective 
communications approach to the conflict.  
As such, Brown’s narrative approach was essentially honest yet unfathomably 
labyrinthine. Much of his prime ministership should be seen in the light of an equally 
amorphous, almost improvisational approach to government communications, where each 
relevant member of his Cabinet would focus on their own compartmentalised message. His 
focus on the minutiae of stabilisation can be seen as giving succour to the already 
established patterns of institutional self-regard. Ultimately, this is the historical milieu from 
which the institutional practice of strategic communication emerged, as an attempt to 
coordinate and synchronise political communications to avoid ‘information fratricide’. For 
much of 2008, however, this had yet to take effect and, no doubt because the 
Government’s comprehensive approach placed a premium on highlighting the non-security, 
developmental aspects of Britain’s endeavours in Helmand, the stabilisation narrative took 
on a rather shapeless form. The triumvirate of ministers delegated by Brown to lead on the 
comprehensive approach – Browne, Foreign Secretary David Miliband, and International 
Development Secretary Douglas Alexander – all continued the trend of displaying a 
penchant, quite naturally given the circumstances of Brown’s policy, for speaking about the 
developmental indicators of progress even while the insurgency was inexorably escalating.  
A typical offering is provided here, courtesy of Alexander in February of 2008. 
Presented with a point of view by his interviewer that, given the deterioration in security, 
‘things are going pretty badly out there’, the minister responded by saying ‘I would actually 
disagree with that description’ before going on to base his argument for ‘real progress on 
the ground’ on the increased uptake of girls in school (Alexander 2008: online). Education 
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was important to Alexander because it was a DfID issue. Miliband, meanwhile, spent much 
of late 2007 and early 2008 on diplomatic speaking tour duties, outlining the need for a 
political process centred upon effective delivery of the comprehensive approach. Curiously, 
despite Brown’s Commons attempt to clamp down on ‘idealism’ within his Government, 
Miliband spoke frequently on this tour of his party’s ‘universal message’. Whilst making the 
case for delinking the Government’s democratising proselytism from that of Blair and the 
neoconservatism of the Bush administration, Miliband nonetheless made a point to argue 
that ‘human dignity and human rights, democratic accountability and checks on arbitrary 
power’ were ‘universal values’ that were ‘real and popular’, and that it was therefore ‘not 
“western” to assert’ them in foreign policy (Miliband 2007b; 2007c; 2008a; 2008b; 2008c; 
2008d; 2008e). The promotion of liberal democratic governance was an FCO area of 
responsibility. In Miliband’s defence, however, his rhetoric was significantly weightier than 
Blair’s when regarding the specifics of implementing his version of liberal peace theory, 
arguing that ‘democracy which lasts requires both a state that has the capacity to offer 
protection, welfare and justice to its citizens, and the accountability to ensure it acts as a 
servant, not a master, of the people’ (Miliband 2008c). In a sense, Miliband’s rhetorical 
positioning was symptomatic of the Brown premiership in general: big on specifics and 
practicalities, but still ideologically and historically wedded to the grandiose promulgations 
of the Blair era. 
Over the spring and summer of 2008, the compartmentalisation of messaging 
according to institutional interests and a general narrative emphasis on the finer points and 
underlying philosophy of stabilisation theory would begin to dissipate, however, in the face 
of mounting criticism of the Brown Government’s handling of defence matters by the 
broadsheet press and the Conservative opposition. Britain’s collective security obligations 
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grew increasingly onerous over this period and consequently sowed even more discord in 
government-military relations. Britain’s decision to begin the process of ‘overwatch’ in Iraq 
in 2007 meant that by mid-2008 there were still 4,000 troops in Basra, representing a much 
higher level than had been desired or anticipated by military commanders during the 
planning stages for Helmand (Evans 2008a:22). This was compounded by the failure of 
April’s NATO summit in Bucharest to secure substantial resolution to the ever-present issue 
of national caveats and an increasing sense that Britain was bearing a disproportionate 
burden of the combat in Afghanistan (Kirkup 2008a:20). In the wake of these two events 
Brown faced a series of challenges to his reputation from the press that he was sacrificing 
Britain’s (specifically the military’s) interests to a collective security framework 
characterised by European ‘free riding’, and from the senior military in his inability to match 
his acquiescence to collective security demands with adequate military resources and 
equipment. The obligation-cooperation cycle had ensnared him in a double bind reflective 
of the transnational dilemma: the necessity of contributing versus the costs of operations.  
The pressures of transnational policy were duly exploited by Brown’s political 
enemies. This new round of recrimination began with Shadow Defence Secretary Liam Fox’s 
public insinuation that, in apparently advocating closer European Union military integration, 
the Prime Minister was undermining NATO unity (Fox 2008:25). This was soon followed by 
then-Chief of the General Staff Richard Dannatt commenting to the press that the 
Government was underpaying soldiers by noting that they earn less than traffic wardens; 
Fox added to the chorus of criticism by stating that such facts demonstrated ‘how badly the 
Military Covenant has been broken’ by the Labour government (Kirkup 2008:6). Brown’s 
perceived failure to rectify the excesses of policy and insufficiencies of resourcing that 
plagued the Blair era, and his decision to block Dannatt from becoming Chief of the Defence 
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Staff in retaliation for his remarks to the press (Smith 2008:7), appear to have produced 
something of a media pincer movement against his leadership for the remainder of 2008, 
with high-profile former military commanders including Dannatt, Lord Boyce, and General 
Mike Jackson, the senior Conservative leadership, and the centre-right broadsheet press 
coalescing to form an ad hoc coalition (Coughlin 2008a:22; Evans 2008b:21). Amidst 
recriminations of undervaluing the Armed Forces and short-changing the defence budget, 
matters were compounded by the emergence of the September 2008 financial crisis, which 
further tightened the Treasury’s purse strings against increased defence spending (Cornish 
& Dorman 2009:247-248). As well as damaging the reputation of Government in its handling 
of Afghanistan and supposed mistreatment of the Armed Forces, this very public falling out 
between Downing Street and military brass would have profound consequences at the level 
of strategic planning and coordination; according to Dannatt, he and Brown did not speak to 
one another for six months over late 2008 and early 2009 (2011:433). The pressures 
incumbent upon Downing Street to meet the demands of collective security membership 
whilst satisfying the institutional interests of the constituent parts of the UK state were now 
obvious. British leadership on Afghanistan was not merely strained; it was essentially 
bifurcated between its military and civilian components. 
Against this backdrop of disunity and narrative fragmentation, Des Browne departed 
as Defence Secretary in October and was replaced by John Hutton, signalling a step change 
in Government relations with the Armed Forces and, crucially, in terms of the stabilisation 
narrative, between the Ministry of Defence on the one hand, and the Foreign Office and the 
Department for International Development on the other. Hutton’s view was markedly more 
sympathetic to the Armed Forces than that of Brown and Browne (understandably, perhaps, 
given the fractious relationship that had escalated hitherto) and his policy articulations 
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appear more conciliatory to Army interests for a reframing of the stabilisation mission along 
lines more amenable to military prosecution. The substance of ministerial debate between 
Miliband, Alexander, Hutton and Brown, and the policy implications of Hutton’s arrival is 
imprecise, but the effect on the trajectory of the stabilisation policy narrative was stark. 
Within days of his appointment as Defence Secretary, Hutton would recalibrate the 
messaging of the mission to one that emphasised, ‘first and foremost’, ‘the UK’s long term 
national security interests’ (Hutton 2008a: online). Hutton shifted the locus of intervention 
away from what it meant for Afghanistan to how it served British counter-terrorism 
requirements. His apparent reversion to prioritising military effects in the stabilisation 
narrative seems to reflect a growing mood within Whitehall that the comprehensive 
approach had begun to spiral out of control.  
The crucial turning point in this process of narrative revivification occurred on 
Armistice Day, when Hutton delivered a keynote speech to the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies (Hutton 2008b: online). This speech reoriented the defence approach to 
Afghanistan by framing it unreservedly as a matter of ‘vital’ national security rather than as 
a democratisation mission or predominantly in terms of a collective security operation. This 
can be understood as a consequence of what he saw as the problem of ‘free riding’ in NATO. 
A narrative divestment of UK contributions in terms of the language of collective security is 
understandable in the context of a situation where others were not playing their part: 
articulating Afghanistan in terms of self-interest made more sense than explaining it in 
terms of collective sacrifice when Britain was sacrificing more than most of its partners. In 
the face of multiple failed attempts since 2004 to impel partner nations to improve their 
capabilities, it is reasonable to posit a more distinctively ‘national’ approach was a tacit 
acceptance of this unresolved issue (Prince 2008:18). The pronounced use of ‘security’ is 
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also interesting in the specific historical context: while Hutton desired to increase resources 
to the Armed Forces, he would announce significant budgetary cuts to defence projects just 
one month after the IISS speech (Fox 2008:18). Given such circumstances, the emphasis on 
military means appears something of a quid pro quo with his military colleagues: if the 
resources for a comprehensive approach would not be forthcoming, then the narrative 
focus for stabilisation should be narrowed to what could be reasonably achieved. Indeed, an 
Afghan strategy dependent upon impending machinations in the American presidential race 
implies there was little strategic work Britain could do other than tinkering with narrative.  
This kind of work has significant utility however: reframing the justificatory framework 
for Afghan stabilisation as fundamentally about British interests – rather than being about 
collective or Afghan concerns – contributed to the stabilisation of Government as well. 
Firstly, it went some distance in repairing civil-military relations insofar as it created the 
narrative impetus for circumscribing the aims of the mission to those the military could 
realistically achieve. By framing the mission in ‘national security’ terms and by highlighting 
the military aspects of the mission above the ‘soft power’ elements, the Army would be 
partially placated and the chances of another ‘Dannatt’ – a military officer going ‘rogue’ in 
narrative terms – was significantly reduced. Secondly, and as a result of the narrowing of 
discourse, it would nominally pacify all parties by producing a narrative pathway that the 
public could support, by arguing that the losses incurred in Afghanistan were necessary for 
the safety and security of British citizens. This would benefit the Prime Minister, who was 
seen by several in the Armed Forces as uninterested in Afghanistan but deeply concerned 
about its effect on public opinion. Thirdly, and perhaps most significantly, Hutton’s narrative 
reconfiguration allowed the state to sidestep the transnational dilemma by affording 
ultimate ownership of the stabilisation narrative to the Army and Ministry of Defence. That 
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is to say that by placing a national security emphasis on the narrative, the burdens of 
collective security membership could be alleviated by keeping true to international 
commitments whilst denying their fundamental shaping power on operations. 
Hutton’s repositioning of the stabilisation narrative appeared to strike a chord with 
the centre-right broadsheet press, with one journalist commending him for his ‘plain-
speaking’ amidst a Government suffering from ‘intellectual confusion’ about the purpose of 
the mission, and castigating those within the Department for International Development for 
continuing to frame Afghanistan as a reconstruction mission (Coughlin 2008c:26). 
Notwithstanding the revolutionary significance of Hutton’s narrative approach within the 
confines of the Labour government, the historical record demonstrates that recourse to a 
narrative of national security and military prioritisation was, in fact, a creation of the 
Conservative Party. Indeed, while Hutton coined the unusual term ‘national security 
interest’, it was in June of 2008 that Liam Fox first articulated the national security 
approach, a full four months prior to Hutton, stating that ‘we are in Afghanistan for reasons 
of national security, to deny a safe haven to those who would commit indiscriminate acts of 
terrorist murder on men, women and children’ (Hansard 2008a). What Hutton’s reframing 
of narrative really signified, therefore, was the outmanoeuvring of the Labour Government 
by an ad hoc coalition of Conservatives, generals, and the centre-right broadsheet press, 
and the completion of a pincer movement that undermined the reconstruction and 
development aspect of the stabilisation narrative and replaced it with a realist national 
security rhetoric. The demands of adhering to NATO defence policy had created the 
condition for treating the satisfaction of US expectations as paramount, which produced the 
opportunity for the perception of a unique stabilisation role for the UK that was actualised 
by a cohering of institutional interests to that end. When this approach began to fail on the 
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ground, as it almost certainly would since it had institutional interests and not Afghan 
interests at the forefront, the institutional interests seemingly forsaken by Government 
sought revenge. Although not entirely apparent at the time, the implication of this 
fracturing was broader still, signalling the beginning of the end for the entire normative 
element within liberal interventionist discourse. As a result, the stabilisation narrative would 
soon be completely turned on its head. 
 
Phase IV: 2009-2011 – National Interest and ‘Managing 
Expectations’: Strategic Communication arrives 
 
In this penultimate phase of the Afghan campaign, bookended by the catalyses of 
Barack Obama’s ascendance to the American presidency in January 2009 and the killing of 
Osama bin Laden in Pakistan in May 2011, the British narrative for the stabilisation 
campaign in Afghanistan completed its metamorphosis. It began as one that embraced 
collective security by emphasising the democratisation of Afghanistan as an end in itself and 
as a key foundation of global security, and ended as one that sought to traverse the 
transnational dilemmas of expectation, obligation, cooperation and free-riding by 
prioritising the mere stability of the country as an end of British national security interests. 
The narrative proceeded from one that was grounded in internationalism and liberal peace 
theory to one based almost solely on principles of realpolitik and rationalist national security 
concerns. Fundamental to this process of narrative transformation was the emergence of 
strategic communication as an institutional force within Whitehall, and the Ministry of 
Defence in particular, as the British sought to come to terms with the strategic changes 
wrought by the incoming Obama administration and the shifts in narrative emphasis that 
would ensue.  
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As with all other phases of the conflict, the role of Iraq was pivotal in determining the 
strategic course of events in Afghanistan during this period, and as a result much of the 
Obama administration’s actions in 2009 can be seen as an attempt to transplant lessons 
learned in the former warzone into the latter. On an operational level this meant attempting 
to replicate the ‘Surge’ process, but on the level of political and ‘strategic’ communication 
this translated to an attempt to ‘lower expectations’ regarding what could be achieved in 
Afghanistan. According to Ricks (2009:165), the so-called ‘COIN revolution’ within the 
American military establishment (populated with ranks of ‘soldier-scholars’) brought a more 
nuanced, culture-centric approach to counterinsurgency operations that stood in sharp 
contrast to the rather monolithic worldview of the neoconservative old guard within the 
Bush Administration (Lindsay 2011:769-773). Ricks and Barkawi (2006:56) have both noted 
that these scholars eschewed the notion that democratisation and stabilisation were 
naturally supportive concepts; in fact, as Steven Metz was quoted, ‘[f]ew things are more 
destabilizing and prone to chaos than democratization’ (Ricks 2009:165). This represented a 
major change in policy, which in both Iraq and Afghanistan had to this point remained one 
rooted in ethnocentric assumptions about the universality of Western cultural and political 
norms; as Holland (2008:48) noted, ‘[t]he tendency of NATO has been to make assumptions 
about what it is that Helmandis want, as viewed through a westernised democratic lens, and 
to apply these assumptions to all and sundry, when the reality shows that no such template 
can or should be imposed.’ From an institutionally-oriented perspective, this is only half the 
story: viewing what Helmandis want through western lenses should be seen as equivalent to 
simply pursuing what Western states wanted. Judging by the content of Obama’s first major 
Afghan policy address in March 2009, these principles were indeed to be taken forward in 
the stabilisation campaign; there were no mentions of the necessity of ‘democracy’ to the 
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stability of Afghanistan to be found (Obama 2009: online). Indeed, the understanding 
garnered from Washington in the weeks preceding Obama’s announcement presaged this 
change of approach towards a ‘new realism’ where democratic movements would be 
supported but not directly imposed (Traynor 2009:18; Patterson 2012:33; Etzioni 2012:86).  
What this equated to in narrative terms was akin to a genre shift in Washington from 
the high mimesis of democracy as the panacea of violence and instability to a low mimetic 
framework of national security and stabilisation as a regrettable necessity. As if to underline 
this genre shift, just over a week after Obama’s inauguration his incumbent Defence 
Secretary Robert Gates provided a clear indication of the future direction of American 
foreign policy in Afghanistan and elsewhere by drawing a line under past democratisation 
efforts as utopian and absurdist: 
‘If we set ourselves the objective of creating some sort of central Asian 
Valhalla over there we will lose because nobody in the world has that kind of 
time, patience or money to be honest… It seems to me we ought to keep our 
objectives realistic and limited in Afghanistan… Otherwise we will set 
ourselves up for failure’ (Spillius 2009:14). 
Gates noted the lack of political will as a fundamental obstacle blocking the goal of 
liberal stabilisation. In mocking the Bush Administration’s (and, by proxy, the Blair 
government’s) desire to create a modern, liberal democratic “central Asian Valhalla”, Gates 
set in motion a popular rhetorical device that would be imitated by members of successive 
British Governments to attempt to create distance between their own revisionist goals and 
those declared at the height of Blair’s tenure.  Ministers would frequently use their 
imaginations to juxtapose some Western locale with that of the impoverished Afghans in 
order to downplay the human security and democratisation elements of the stabilisation 
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process; some of the more inventive ways of communicating official disinterest in 
democratisation include claiming Britain is not in Afghanistan to ‘create Hampshire in 
Helmand’, ‘Switzerland in Afghanistan’, and ‘the new Jerusalem in the Hindu Kush’ (Simpson 
2012:123; Watt & Wintour 2010:13). This point is worth raising because it demonstrates 
two points. Firstly, it shows the extent to which British government took its lead from the 
Americans not just in terms of matters of policy and strategy, but also in terms of how those 
policies or strategies are conveyed, even down to creating geographically- and culturally-
tailored variations of off-the-cuff idiosyncrasies.  
Secondly, it reveals once more the impact of the Iraq Surge on the mentality of 
policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic, for it was during this period that the revisionist 
technique of reductio ad absurdum originated in an opinion piece by public relations 
consultant Tim Hames, who argued Iraq would never become ‘Sweden with beards’ (Hames 
2007:19). It is, of course, undoubtedly understandable that this approach would become 
common currency amongst political leaders, given the stuttering impact of stabilisation 
efforts in Afghanistan by early 2009 and the all-consuming imperative of achieving a 
semblance of security in the country. In this respect, the reductio ad absurdum narrative 
technique can be seen as an eminently sensible, if somewhat crass corrective for the 
erstwhile pervasiveness of universalistic claims to western-centric normativity. Narrative 
changes did not change the operational realities of Afghanistan, however; the entire 
stabilisation process remained predicated on a developmental and governance initiative 
founded on the Afghan Compact of 2006, which called for nothing less than a complete 
transformation of Afghan social, political and economic life within just four years. Thus, 
whilst ministers were labouring within a framework expressly committed to creating such a 
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grandiose and utopian eventuality, they were simultaneously undercutting it by deliberately 
and concertedly downplaying its feasibility.  
Within Whitehall, Obama’s new strategic approach would have been welcomed by 
most, not least within the Ministry of Defence which, under Hutton’s leadership, had set in 
motion a more circumscribed account of the Afghan mission the previous November. Whilst 
remaining true to the overarching democratisation element within the stabilisation 
narrative by referring to Britain’s role in ‘securing the Afghan democracy’, Hutton also 
distinguished himself from Miliband’s by then long established mantra that ‘there will not 
be a military solution’ to the conflict by appearing to confirm interviewer Jon Sopel’s 
suggestion that the international community could ‘militarily beat the Taliban’ (Hutton 
2009: online). This chimed with the operational approach on the ground in Afghanistan at 
the time, which was ‘focused on defeating the insurgency’ in a ‘fairly conventional military 
campaign’ (Chaudhuri & Farrell 2011:272-3). Even Miliband, the intellectual descendant of 
Blair’s ‘universal values’ mantra, went to some effort to reduce his insistence on human 
security and democratisation by arguing in greater force for the centrality of national 
security and against the cavalier tendencies of Blairite liberal interventionism (Miliband 
2008e). Indeed, according to Norton-Taylor (2009:7), by mid-January it was the popular 
opinion (privately uttered) within Whitehall  that ministers and officials would be better 
placed in attempts ‘to get their message across [of the importance of the war in Afghanistan 
to the British public] if the emphasis is placed on Britain's interest rather than on improving 
the lives of Afghans’. With this in mind, it is telling that by the end of January it was reported 
that the Cabinet Office was seeking to hire several ‘strategic communication’ practitioners 
to, as one journalist interpreted it, assist in the ‘massaging’ of bad news (Walker 2009:8). It 
is almost certain that this shift in both emphasis and method of delivery of the stabilisation 
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narrative was in place across the whole of Whitehall by the end of February, and that it was 
the implementation of Defence-led SC practices within Whitehall that cemented the 
national security angle to the stabilisation policy narrative. Kirkup (2009: online) would write 
in The Telegraph of developments within the Ministry of Defence, where it was working to 
tone down stabilisation efforts and make them more prescient and relevant to an 
increasingly sceptical British public, that 
‘the MoD is now trying to refine its Afghan "narrative" to focus on national 
security: we send our boys to fight and die over there to stop you dying over 
here, in crude terms.  This strategy dictates that any decision to send more 
British troops must be explained in terms of the immediate UK national 
interest, not esoteric diplomatic considerations: we're not doing this to please 
the guy in the White House, we're doing this to keep you safe.’    
In addition to this new approach essentially representing a victory for the Army and 
MOD’s SC work (both in terms of consolidating messages across Whitehall and of 
repositioning communications in a manner that reflected the sacrifices of the military), such 
an interpretation represents a succinct articulation of the Government’s desire to ignore the 
politically unstatable realities of the transnational dilemma in favour of a realist-centric 
approach to communication. This new approach would be compromised by The Telegraph 
the following day, however, in an article that argued that a prevailing sentiment within 
Whitehall was that ‘we should cut our losses and get out’ of Afghanistan, and that reasons 
of alliance dependency were dictating both the narrative revisionism taking place and the 
lack of dissenting voices within the political establishment: 
‘a depressing uniformity of outlook prevails among politicians in the two 
major parties, namely that a critical view of what is happening in Afghanistan 
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might undermine the western alliance. Our young soldiers are being killed just 
to show willing in Washington, doubly so now that a popular Obama has 
replaced Bush’ (Burleigh 2009:22).  
The transnational dilemma was becoming as politically toxic to communication efforts 
as Blair’s universalistic rhetoric had been several years prior. Again – and this is a point in 
need of reiteration – the problem of explaining the relevance of collective security 
operations honestly and accurately is that one cannot do so simply and quickly. To do so 
would require the conceptualisation of a largely indirect threat in Afghanistan in a manner 
that appeared immanent and direct. Likewise, to seek to explain, simply and quickly, the 
dynamics, expectations, and responsibilities of membership to a collective security 
framework will necessarily incur a good deal of omission. The SC efforts made by 
Government officials to reconstitute in the British public’s consciousness the purpose of 
Afghanistan as foundationally a national security issue – where Afghanistan was a means to 
an end of British security – was useful and necessary to overcome both the international 
issues of carrying a disproportionate amount of the burden of stabilisation and the domestic 
institutional fallout associated with issues of obligation and cooperation. However, by 
gutting the normative aspect of the mission – that which constituted the institutional make-
up of NATO and thereby made the stabilisation strategy possible – the stabilisation narrative 
was also substantively compromised by narrative reconfiguration. This in turn led to doubts 
amongst some about the supposed necessity of Afghanistan to British security in the face of 
equally prescient risks elsewhere. Afghanistan did represent a threat to Britain’s national 
security, but no more so than Somalia or Yemen and certainly less so than neighbouring 
Pakistan. Rather, the importance of Afghanistan to the national interest and security of the 
United Kingdom remained the same as it ever did, and certainly the same as it did since 
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NATO acquired ownership of ISAF in 2003: to act as a proving ground to bind the members 
of NATO together in order to ensure the survival of the pan-Atlantic collective security 
mechanism, through which, and only through which, Britain’s security needs can be 
delivered. Such a reading provides an honest appraisal of why Afghanistan is important; this 
is not, however, the same as arguing a proven link between British operations in 
Afghanistan and a verifiable diminishing of Afghan-based terrorism against the United 
Kingdom.  
This, then, was the purpose of British strategic communications practice: to square the 
circle between the mundane realities of collective security responsibilities, on the one hand, 
with the public desire to be told that the losses incurred by the state in blood and treasure 
in Afghanistan were of some immediate and direct utility to national security. To put it 
another way, SC sought to avoid the potential for critiques that could conceive of British 
sacrifices in Afghanistan as a regrettable but necessary kind of collateral damage in pursuit 
of maintaining Britain’s place within the international community. Remarkably, however, it 
appears that the feud between Downing Street and the Armed Forces would work to 
mitigate the effectiveness of strategic communication efforts from practically the outset. In 
what one might see as the second round of Brown versus Dannatt, the Chief of the General 
Staff renewed hostilities by allegedly making an offer, in conjunction with Hutton and 
without the knowledge or approval of Brown, of two thousand additional troops to the 
Americans on the eve of Obama’s ‘Af-Pak’ policy announcement (Evans & Coates 2009:1). 
Indeed, just a few days later, Dannatt would take part in an interview with The Times, in 
which he undid strategic communication efforts by citing the unstatable transnational 
dilemma in claiming that the quid pro quo of alliance negotiations was the reason Britain 
entered Helmand, and posited that then-Chancellor Brown had been reticent to provide the 
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necessary financial resources for the mission (Evans 2009:30; Usborne & Merrick 2009:14). 
In one fell swoop, rightly or wrongly, Dannatt had brought Brown’s reputation into 
disrepute and undermined the national security argument in order to defend the Army’s 
institutional interests. 
Despite British efforts to downplay the disadvantages of collective security 
membership, events in the first months of 2009 indicated that alliance cooperation was 
indeed a central issue for all parties concerned. Gates expressed dismay as to the poor 
likelihood of securing greater commitments in troops from America’s continental allies, and 
rumours were circulating within the British press that the Obama Administration was 
unimpressed by the progress made by British forces in Helmand, to the point where one 
journalist argued that American forces in Helmand ‘refused to take orders’ from the British 
there (Guardian 2009b; Starkey 2009:24). Ostensibly due in parts to the pressure exerted 
from the Armed Forces to either materially support the mission as it stood or scale down 
ambition, the pressure from the Treasury to not stretch public funds beyond breaking point, 
the pressure in narrative revisionism from both the Americans and from within his own 
Cabinet (courtesy of Hutton), and the pressure from having British leadership in Helmand 
compromised by the assertiveness of the American contingent, Brown took the step in late 
April to reframe the mission in distinctively counter-terrorist phraseology, typified by his 
rhetorical labelling of the Af-Pak theatre as the ‘crucible of terror’. He informed the 
Commons that, rather than democratising Afghanistan as a worthy goal in itself, Britain’s 
‘strategy is to ensure that the country is strong enough as a democracy to withstand and 
overcome the terrorist threat’ (Hansard 2009b). While still nominally asserting the validity 
of the liberal peace thesis, the stabilisation mission in Afghanistan was presented in its 
starkest terms yet as almost purely about British security needs and, as a corollary, 
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essentially marked the end of the democratisation pathway of the stabilisation narrative 
(Wintour 2009:8). Despite his efforts to reframe the mission in minimalist, security-centric 
terms, Brown still incurred heavy criticism from the usual sources, with The Telegraph and 
the Conservative opposition arguing that, in failing to agree to the two-thousand troop 
increase advanced by Hutton and the Armed Forces, he had damaged Britain’s reputation 
with the Americans and had ‘betrayed’ the Armed Forces (Coughlin 2009:30). The double 
bind of transnationalised defence policy remained: balancing the obligations made to 
collective security partners with those made to the military seemed to be an 
insurmountable task. At the end of the first week of June, following a failed Blairite putsch 
against his leadership, Brown had led the biggest Cabinet reshuffle of his tenure and 
accepted Hutton’s resignation, presented as resulting from ‘family problems’ (Porter & 
Adams 2009: online).  
By the end of the summer, emphasis on national security informed a stabilisation 
policy narrative that had become a hollow facsimile of its former self and, consequently, 
was practically unrecognisable from the aims and ambitions of its original position in 2006. 
The civilian goal of entering Helmand – to pursue a reconstruction and development agenda 
as a counterbalance to the counter-terrorism focus of the American forces – had been 
reduced to almost an afterthought in narrative terms. With the decision to reduce the area 
of operations of British forces from the entirety of Helmand to a smaller zone within the 
centre of the province in July, so too had the ambitions of the generals – to redeem Britain’s 
military reputation post-Iraq by pacifying Helmand and defeating the Taliban – been 
rendered obsolete (Griffin 2011:318). Coughlin (2009b) would lament this decision as 
resulting in Britain finding itself ‘once more in the humiliating position where we are having 
to rely on the Americans to do the job’. Indeed, to the extent that the Americans had saved 
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the British in the latter, so too had they negated the desire for British autonomy in the 
former, for the British operational plan was rendered subservient to the strategic direction 
of the Obama administration. It is clear that by this point the process of narrative 
articulation started by Hutton in late 2008, and cemented by Obama in early 2009, was 
building a self-perpetuating momentum within the British state: narratives were reframed, 
resources were reallocated, strategies were reordered, and ambitions were contracted.  
This represented a complete reversal of the trend established from 2002 to 2008, 
where the stabilisation approach and corresponding narrative had expanded almost 
exponentially to cover the tertiary requirements (reconstruction and development) for a 
secondary objective (stabilisation) to allow for a primary goal (counter-terrorism) to be 
achieved.  It is perplexing then that, in making the case for the counter-terrorism approach 
and for Britain to continue adhering to its commitments in Afghanistan, British officials 
would tend to undercut their own argument. An ideal example comes again from Dannatt, 
who spoke at a Royal United Services Institute lecture in June of 2009 of the need to ‘do 
whatever is necessary’ in Afghanistan because ‘success’ there was ‘not discretionary’ 
(Norton-Taylor 2009b:26). Of course, the point Dannatt was trying to make was the 
centrality of stability in Afghanistan to Britain’s national security, which should be 
considered non-negotiable and beyond compromise. In reality, however, success in 
Afghanistan by this point was wholly discretionary, since the vast array of targets and 
objectives that were originally conceived as necessary prerequisites for success were no 
longer given much importance, and instead were replaced – as a matter of discretion based 
on resources available and feasibility – with a counter-terrorism approach that favoured 
realistically achievable goals. In fact, even the term ‘success’ is discretionary; whereas wars 
(including this one) are usually understood in traditional terms of victory and defeat, the 
173 
 
lexicon for protracted counter-insurgencies is now one of ‘success or failure’, indicating, 
once more, that success itself is a term discretionarily revised down from the original 
narrative of victory (Snyder 2011:25).  
Putting issues of semantics aside, the disunity in civil-military relations had reached 
new heights by the end of the summer, and the arguments therein – focusing on equipment 
and helicopter levels – gave an impression that there was not universal acceptance of the 
crucial nature of the mission in Afghanistan or, if there was, that the means by which Britain 
could assure its own security was indeed discretionary. This was almost certainly Dannatt’s 
point, however: that because the mission went to the heart of Britain’s security interests, 
Government should therefore not spare any expense in providing the military with 
everything they say they require. Transnational policy dilemmas emerged once more: Brown 
was again pressed by the Americans to increase troop contributions whilst also refusing to 
meet the demands of the service chiefs, the chiefs once more circumvented his authority by 
going public to the press, stating that additional helicopters and equipment were necessary 
to save soldier’s lives, thereby delivering Brown with an ultimatum of either acceding to 
their demands or risking public wrath by being seen as indifferent to the safety of British 
troops (Sengupta & Morris 2009:10; Hinsliff 2009:18). The obligation-cooperation cycle was 
out of control and the tensions that it produced were undermining Government credibility. 
The collective security obligations imposed upon the United Kingdom – which was by this 
point ‘running hot’ in terms of both its military capabilities and its budgetary expenditure, 
was having the institutional effect of breaking the fabric of civil-military relations, and 
therein incurring a knock-on effect on the ability of the state to communicate effectively 
and in unison on the purpose of and reasoning informing continued participation in 
Afghanistan. In an interview with a former official, the equipment ‘scandal’ was presented 
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to the author as the coup de grace to communication between elements within the military 
community and the Brown government: 
‘Richard Dannatt, then chief of the military, actually argued that this would be 
a good opportunity for good soldiering. He was a firm advocate of the strategy 
and when the going got tough he was nowhere to be seen actually justifying 
the rationale for it’ (Personal Interview, 2013).  
Dannatt’s fervent advocacy of the Army’s interests was having severely deleterious 
effects on British messaging. For Dannatt’s part, his decision to go ‘off-message’ was driven 
by what he perceived as his responsibility to defend the interests of the Army against a 
Government he viewed as riding roughshod over the Military Covenant. Indeed, this was a 
long-standing position for Dannatt, stretching back to 2006-2007; in his autobiography, he 
claims that ‘national leaders seemed unprepared to speak up for’ Afghanistan in the face of 
increasingly negative media reporting, and that it was from that point that he decided to 
pursue his own communications agenda (2011:354-355). He claims that it was his 
outspokenness on Afghanistan – in direct contravention of Government’s ‘agreed lines’ – 
that precipitated a highly personal attack on his character by Labour ministers in the months 
leading up to his departure from his position as Chief of the General Staff in 2009 (2011:27-
28). Despite the Labour Government’s misgivings about what they perceived as Dannatt’s 
unprofessional conduct, elements of the national press feted him as a courageous advocate 
for an underappreciated Armed Forces (Grice 2009:17). Whatever the virtues of Dannatt’s 
actions, the rift between political and military leaders over the summer of 2009 - the 
deadliest for British personnel since the conflict began, with sixty five deaths between May 
and September – demonstrated the difficulties of maintaining a coherent narrative (and 
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through that, sustained public support) for Afghanistan in the absence of unified leadership 
and the presence of severe institutional in-fighting.  
The one area of convergence highlighted by all state representatives by the autumn 
was the centrality of the mission to British national security. Indeed, the damage done to 
the stabilisation narrative likely made national security the only common ground left. As 
such, all non-military and non-security aspects of stabilisation in Afghanistan were 
downplayed or openly disparaged as excessive, unrealistic, or secondary.  This focus on 
British interests and security developed to the extent that ministers openly disregarded the 
objective of improving Afghanistan for the Afghans’ sake as a means of emphasising the 
core goal of British security. Rammell spoke of continuing the mission ‘not because we want 
to make the world a better place in that part of the world’, while Miliband, for whom 
universal values and democratisation were once so central, made the point that ‘the 
government has committed our troops to Afghanistan not for Afghan democracy but for our 
security’ (Miliband 2009b: online). There were aberrations to this trend, of course: for 
example, the build-up to the Afghan presidential elections in August provided some within 
the Labour Government an opportunity to renew the goal of democratisation (notably Denis 
MacShane, who claimed those who advocate withdrawal from the conflict were ‘defeatist[s] 
who care nothing for democracy, human rights or the need to send a "No Pasaran" signal to 
those who hate democracy’ (MacShane 2009)). Such aberrations in messaging would prove 
short-lived, however, as the election was widely perceived as being compromised by 
fraudulent activities, much of it levelled at Karzai supporters. By the end of 2009, Shadow 
Defence Secretary Liam Fox issued a call for an end to democratisation efforts (rather 
superfluously, given it had all but disappeared by this point anyway) and advocated a 
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further narrowing of goals, ostensibly presented not as a failure of liberal universalism but 
as a kind of anti-colonialist celebration of differences:  
‘we've got to stop judging Afghanistan by Western standards. We're not trying 
to apply a Jeffersonian democracy to a 13th century state. If we try that, we'll 
be unsuccessful.  I think we've got to stop trying to make judgements from 
outside about what's good for the Afghan people. What we want to see is a 
stable enough Afghanistan, so it's not a risk to our national security’ (Fox 
2009: online). 
Indeed, whilst the narrative trend from within the Brown ministry had been to 
advocate much the same throughout its duration, their language was understandably more 
measured given the diplomatic responsibilities of power. Interestingly, in the face of 
criticism of both its support for Afghan democracy and of allegedly turning its back on 
Afghan democracy, Labour ministers spent the remainder of Brown’s period in power 
downplaying the expectations for lasting democratic governance or human rights 
protections in the country. Rammell, for example, would argue for a ‘reality check’ on overly 
optimistic expectations for the ‘fifth poorest country in the world that doesn’t have a 
tradition and a history of democracy’, while Ainsworth, when confronted on television by a 
fellow panellist for failing Afghan women, argued that ‘Afghanistan will always be a very 
different country to our own and will have different values, and we are not there to create 
some eastern version of Great Britain’ (Rammell 2009b: online; Ainsworth 2010: online). 
Given this trend under the leadership of Gordon Brown, the Conservative-led Coalition 
Government could continue the pared-down stabilisation narrative in a near-seamless 
transition. It is unsurprising that this should be the case precisely because the Labour 
process of narrative deflation – highlighting national interest and security above all other 
177 
 
aspects – begun in earnest by Brown in 2007, and with renewed vigour by Hutton in 2008, 
were actually Conservative policy positions in the first place, dating back to David Cameron 
in 2006 and Fox in mid-2008. In this sense, then, the Coalition was well placed to advance 
further the narrowing of the aims of the mission once in power. Indeed, they wasted  little 
time in doing so, with Cameron announcing, just over a month after becoming Prime 
Minister, his intention to begin a timetable for withdrawal, or ‘drawdown’, of five years at 
the G8 summit in Toronto in June (Wintour 2010:1). According to one former official, this 
announcement came as a total surprise to all and was never discussed in Cabinet or the 
National Security Council, nor was the Ministry of Defence given advanced warning 
(Personal Interview, 2013). It would appear that while the decision was taken, as one former 
official said, ‘pretty much unilaterally’ by Cameron in the United Kingdom, he was also 
acting in concert with Obama, with whom Cameron held a pre-Toronto meeting and, like 
Cameron, held the view that, in the wake of ISAF commander General Stanley McChrystal’s 
sacking just days prior to the meeting, the operational approach of ‘population-centric 
counterinsurgency’ was not producing results quickly enough. Indeed, much like the United 
Kingdom, the Obama Administration was riven with division over the best approach to   
drawing down forces in Afghanistan and whether counter-insurgency was the most suitable 
option for American strategy in the country (Sanger 2012:34-38; Hastings 2013:134-135). 
Cameron’s decision to place a timetable on drawdown irrespective of events created 
yet another narrative discrepancy within Whitehall, placing him at odds with military chiefs, 
who opposed the idea, and Fox at the Ministry of Defence, who remained adamant that a 
timetable would be counter-productive and allow the Taliban to simply wait ISAF out, as 
well as representing a ‘shot in the arm to jihadists everywhere’ (Watt 2010:13). It would be 
nearly a fortnight before Fox would eventually step into line with the timetable plan, at 
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which point he argued that ‘[t]here has always been a timetable’, quite at odds with his 
previous statements (Kirkup 2010: online). Once it became clear within the international 
community that Britain (for so long among the most committed of major European states to 
the stabilisation process and among the most willing to carry the burdens of an unbalanced 
alliance and, of course, the convening nation for that process begun in London in 2006) was 
making haste to depart Afghanistan, the long-term stabilisation programme Blair and Brown 
had advocated quickly disappeared. The Dutch and Italians announced their withdrawals, 
and increasingly think tanks such as the International Institute for Strategic Studies and 
various academics advocated a pared-down counter-terrorist approach, including the use of 
unmanned aerial ‘drones’ undertaking ‘targeted assassinations’ in the Af-Pak tribal areas 
increased vastly (Cassidy 2010:42; Blackwill 2011:46-48; McCrisken 2011:797; Hudson, 
Owens & Flannes 2011:122-132; Belcher 2012:260).  
The timetable process was formally agreed by NATO member states at the November 
Lisbon Summit; by the end of 2010 the ‘whole thing was pretty well done and dusted’ 
(Personal Interview, 2013). Running alongside this rapid period of change was a similarly 
hasty attempt to further revise the stabilisation narrative for public consumption. The 
Coalition’s staple narrative for Afghanistan had now taken on the form of a more forceful 
denial of an ongoing role for democratisation in the stabilisation process, with ministers all 
producing some variation of the comments that ‘we are not in Afghanistan to build a perfect 
democracy’ or ‘a carbon copy of western democracy or convert people to western ways’ 
(Cameron 2010; Hansard 2010d; Fox 2010b, 2010c; Harvey 2010). Peculiarly, for some in the 
Labour Opposition who followed suit, this involved denying democratisation had ever been 
a core element of the stabilisation campaign; Ainsworth declared in a September 2010 
interview on the future of British operations in Afghanistan that ‘no one has ever believed 
179 
 
that you can create a Western-style democracy in Afghanistan’ (Ainsworth 2010b: online). 
However, the Labour Governments of 2001 to 2008 that preceded his tenure as Defence 
Secretary certainly spoke of it frequently. Crucially, their Kantian worldview rejected the 
very idea that democracy should be understood as a culturally-specific phenomenon. In the 
face of mission objectives that could not be met, to which the leadership of all parties had at 
the time pledged their support, the politicians of all parties chose to close ranks by opting to 
rewrite the history of the stabilisation campaign to one that fit with the only narrative left 
by which success could be found. 
 
Phase V: 2011-2014 – Conclusion: Drawdown and National Interest  
The trajectory of the stabilisation narrative from internationalist liberal rhetoric to 
narrowly-defined realism was all but complete by the beginning of the fifth and final phase 
of the Afghanistan campaign, and the killing of Osama bin Laden in May 2011 provided the 
Obama and Cameron governments a useful foil for measuring progress in the country and 
justifying the narrowing of objectives and ambitions between 2010 and mid-2011 (Dodge 
2011:69). In June, Obama announced the beginning of the end of the ‘surge’ and the 
withdrawal of 33,000 troops by the end of 2012 (Obama 2011: online). The day after 
Obama’s announcement, Cameron indicated a similar intention to withdraw British troops 
in an incremental fashion; by the end of 2011, Cameron would put forward proposals to 
advance the drawdown to nearly half the British contingent by the end of 2013 (Kirkup & 
Spillius 2011:1, 2; Hopkins 2011:1). In the face of such clear political signals, the United 
States’ and Britain’s allies duly followed suit, and the period 2011 to 2014 witnessed the 
disorderly acceleration of drawdown timetables by several NATO member states, notably 
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the French in January 2012. Dorman (2012:303) has noted that the months leading up to the 
May 2012 NATO summit in Chicago were marked by a failure on the part of alliance 
members to agree on an alliance-wide exit strategy. With the British and the Americans no 
longer pressing the case for a ‘conditions-based’ withdrawal and, on the contrary, leading 
the way for withdrawal by introducing an effectively non-negotiable timetable process 
grounded in national security interests, it appears as though the institutional and normative 
ties that bound lesser European states to the Afghan mission quickly unravelled. Lisbon and 
Obama’s post-bin Laden speech had effectively opened the floodgates for a disorderly ‘dash 
for the exits’ (Dorman 2012). It was in this context that the Chicago Summit was convened 
to mitigate the worst effects of the dissolution of political will for continuing on in 
Afghanistan. The result of the Summit was a further speeding up of the drawdown process, 
with the end-date for combat operations pushed forward from the end of 2014 to mid-2013 
and a focus on ‘transitioning’ with and training Afghan security forces between 2012 and 
2013.  
The accelerated nature of the coalition drawdown from Afghanistan was undoubtedly 
the result of a loss of political desire to carry out the stabilisation process as envisaged by 
Brown three years earlier. Brown’s multi-dimensional, long-term vision for the rehabilitation 
of Afghan civil and economic life was deemed unrealistic by his political opponents, who 
managed to win skirmishes with the Labour leader over the nature of the mission through 
various means, not least of which by pointing out the dangerous degree to which the 
original objectives had spiralled outwards as a result of the ‘comprehensive approach’. By 
reducing the scope of the mission and reframing its purpose as primarily – and eventually 
solely – about Britain’s national security and national interest, the Brown and Cameron 
Governments managed to correct the course of the strategy and, in doing so produce a 
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policy narrative amenable to a gradual retrenchment of core objectives and capable of 
deflecting criticism resulting from the inevitable shortcomings of Afghan democratisation 
efforts. The view within Whitehall that gaining and maintaining public support required such 
a transition allowed the narrative and strategy to synchronise to a degree unseen since the 
initial weeks of the Helmand mission, and in doing so temporarily improved the prospects 
for sustaining the mission until the core task of stabilising the central government and its 
security apparatuses had been nominally achieved. However practical and politically 
necessary this course of action may have been, it had the result of an unfortunate no-win 
scenario of choosing between two unattractive pathways: to use a medical analogy, doing 
nothing to stem the infection of a narrative out of sync with events and risk total collapse, 
or taking action to stop the rot through partial amputation of the narrative and invariably 
risking losing the patient altogether. It is not the place of this work to engage in postulating 
its own hypotheticals, so we may dismiss the former option. Britain and its allies chose the 
latter, and in doing so undermined the preceding efforts and thereby called into question 
the point of the stabilisation mission altogether. A narrative focus on national security as a 
means of avoiding the political unpleasantness of the transnational dilemma in order to 
sustain the alliance and to sustain the coherence of the British state ironically contributed to 
the dissipation of alliance unity by inculcating the conditions whereby the primacy of 
collective security to Britain’s interests in Afghanistan could be essentially ignored in favour 
of individual domestic political concerns. 
In broad terms, the Coalition Government did achieve the core tenet of strategic 
communication doctrine as outlined in JDN 1/12 by realising the synchronisation of word 
and deed: they successfully moved the stabilisation policy narrative from its disconnected 
heights of Helmand in 2006 and early 2007, when what was being said about Afghanistan 
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bore little to no relation with what was actually happening there, to one where 
communication about the conflict was more or less equivalent to the ground truth. Solving 
this dilemma is not to be underestimated, but it invariably came at a cost by creating a 
whole new dilemma which was partly ethical and partly practical. The paradox of strategic 
communication in Afghanistan is that the reduction of strategic goals, initiated as it was by 
Hutton’s 2008 speech, came at the expense of the wider strategic coherence of the 
intervention as a whole. In other words, the need to explain the conflict clearly and 
succinctly led to a simplification of the institutional and normative basis of the strategic 
paradigm for the conflict itself; but because the strategy was progressively simplified and 
cleaved away from that point, the narrative no longer made sense and exposed new 
contradictions as a result, effectively bringing the utility of the stabilisation policy narrative 
full circle to return it to its original point of incompatibility with strategic necessity. By late 
2013, Cameron would offer to assembled media his opinion that efforts in Afghanistan had 
been successful, but only according to the metrics his Government had set out: 
‘Here we are in Helmand Province. There was no Afghan National Army. There 
were no Afghan National Police. There were no women going to school, girls 
going to school. We see a situation totally transformed… I think it is good 
enough. It is not perfect, it is still a very poor country, it is still a democracy 
that has a lot of development yet to do, but our aim has always been, can we 
make sure that this country is no longer a haven for terror and terrorists. I 
think we have done that, and in the process we have trained up an Afghan 
National Army and an Afghan National Police force that are capable of 
delivering the basic security this country needs… I think our troops can leave 
with their heads held high over a job very well done’ (Cameron 2013: online). 
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In giving little credit to the narrative focus on the comprehensive approach as 
essential to Afghan stability and global security in favour of a minimalist security-centric 
approach, Cameron and the Coalition left themselves open to accusations of abandoning 
much of the substance of the mission: among these include democratisation, human rights 
and the advancement of women, the consolidation of a liberal Afghan constitution, and 
various other aspects of the Afghan National Development Strategy as enshrined at the 
2006 London Conference. In addition, the Coalition’s narrative revisionism has left it 
vulnerable to recriminations relating to the argument that Afghanistan was crucial to 
maintaining the collective security framework: the ‘rush to the exits’ was the culmination of 
years of faltering attempts to unify and cohere NATO member states and their armed forces 
into an efficient and well-structured security umbrella capable of meeting twenty-first 
century challenges of the type represented by Afghanistan (Dorman 2012). What is more, 
the long-standing rationale that guided the slow but steady expansion of mission objectives 
and sub-objectives in Afghanistan – that a continued presence was necessary lest the 
jihadist opposition get the idea the West had capitulated – appears to have been completely 
undermined by the rapidity of NATO’s drawdown process. This may explain Fox’s (indeed, 
the vast majority of all British policymakers and military leaders apart from the Prime 
Minister) apparent reticence to agree to the timetable process advanced by Cameron, lest 
such extremists receive ‘a shot in the arm’ (Hansard 2010d). Finally, and perhaps of greatest 
significance for the future of western power, is the effect drawdown may have on the 
institutionalisation and normative legitimacy of liberal interventionism. That the drawdown 
process took place in parallel with the so-called Arab Spring is worth noting, for while the 
stated objectives for Afghanistan by this point contained little if any reference to 
democracy, the popular uprisings across the Arab world appeared to also give a shot in the 
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arm to the Kantian streak in some politicians. For example, Liam Fox’s rhetoric on the 
removal from power of Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi was reminiscent of Blair and Miliband 
when he opined that  
‘the Arab Spring and what NATO has been helping to achieve in Libya is so 
important. It shows that violent extremism is not the only route to change. It 
demonstrates that representative government and freedom are not simply 
'western' values but represent a universal aspiration’ (Fox 2011b: online). 
As was the case with Afghanistan, however, events in the Arab Spring would rapidly 
undermine this return to the democratising streak in British policy narratives however. As 
Dalacoura (2012:71-76) recently noted, the revolutionary fervour across the Middle East 
may have produced calls for democracy, but the notion that democratisation would result in 
anything like the western liberal variety would be ‘wrong and simplistic’; indeed, time and 
again this has since proven to be the case, with popular uprisings in Egypt and elsewhere 
producing Islamist governments and, as Dalacoura asserted, more often came about as a 
result of widespread animosity to perceived neo-liberal hegemony than in support of 
Western norms. Additionally, the West was remarkably selective in its support for 
revolutionary movements during this time: while Egyptian protesters were (belatedly) 
offered solidarity, and Libyan rebels were provided with NATO military support during the 
civil war against Muammar Gaddafi’s forces, movements in Bahrain and Yemen were 
regarded with ambivalence or hostility. The ongoing civil war in Syria has produced even 
more controversy, for while Britain and the United States have offered considerable support 
for elements of the anti-Assad insurgency, they failed to secure popular or parliamentary 
mandates for military intervention and, in attempting to do so, appear to be at odds with 
the stabilisation policy in Afghanistan – that is, seeking to shore up one regime that was 
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tasked with fighting Islamist insurgents whilst simultaneously attempting to destabilise 
another that was doing much the same thing.  
As it were, the general political discomfort on display during Cameron’s fateful 
decision in August 2013 to seek parliamentary consent for increasing Britain’s role in the 
Syria affair signalled a distinct loss of appetite for military adventurism in general, and also 
indicated that Cameron’s narrative revisionism in Afghanistan may have created blowback 
on Britain’s wider foreign policy aims: by demarcating the objectives in Afghanistan to those 
solely concerned with British national security interests, he may have undermined the 
appeal to intervene in Afghanistan on purely normative grounds of preventing the use of 
chemical weapons on Syrian civilians (Personal interview, 2013). Loss of political appetite to 
intervene on the scale required for the comprehensive approach was also evident in the 
Libya campaign of 2011 and the campaign against the ‘Islamic State’ in Iraq in 2014, in which 
coalition forces restricted themselves to maintaining no-fly zones and air strikes and 
explicitly ruled out the use of large-scale ground forces. This lack of stabilising presence can 
be pointed to as a possible causal factor in the resultant destabilisation of neighbouring 
north African states, notably Mali, as insurgent forces were freed from the restrictions 
imposed by the Gaddafi regime. 
 
Conclusion 
By reconfiguring the stabilisation narrative in such a wholesale fashion, the Brown and 
Cameron Governments have risked the obsolescence of the entire rationale for Britain’s 
presence in Afghanistan since the NATO takeover and expansion of ISAF in 2003. This is, of 
course, a distinct irony given that reconfiguring the narrative was necessary for shoring up 
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domestic and international public and political support for the mission, in order to prolong it 
to the point where a reasonable and responsible withdrawal was possible (Jones & Smith 
2010:115). Ultimately, the historical record will (and increasingly already is) coming to a 
critical conclusion regarding the stabilisation mission as a regrettable waste of time, 
resources and lives. If, as the stabilisation narrative from 2008 to 2014 suggested, the goal 
of the United Kingdom and its coalition partners had been as minimal as Cameron’s 
quotation above argues – that of a stable (not necessarily democratic, at least as far as it is 
understood by Western peoples) Afghan state and an Afghanistan that does not provide a 
‘safe haven’ for terrorist organisations – the question naturally arises of whether bothering 
with much of the work of stabilisation was necessary in the first place. Since the objectives 
of the mission were pared down to equate, in historical terms, with those that preceded the 
inception of the stabilisation narrative in mid-2002, one might critically conclude that the 
majority, if not the entirety, of the stabilisation narrative developed from 2002 onwards 
may be called into question. To indulge in one hypothetical, It is just as possible that the 
minimalist objectives emphasised by the Coalition could have been negotiated in 2002 with 
remnants of Taliban as it is to posit that to do so would invite insecurity for the United 
Kingdom and its allies. Equally, it is far from evident that the counter-factual exercise of 
predicting the negative effects of leaving Afghanistan in a morass of post-conflict instability 
in 2002 would have been more deleterious to British national security and interests than the 
negative effects of staying in Afghanistan until 2014.  
In jettisoning the non-security elements of stabilisation to the margins of narrative, 
these questions are actually given greater force; indeed, it is uncertain whether the NATO 
alliance can organise itself for stabilisation operations in the future without a core 
democratisation ethic (Birkle, O’Hanlon & Sherjan 2011:11). The one common thread upon 
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which stabilisation efforts hung – albeit so precariously throughout – was the grand 
ideological vision of improving Afghanistan as not just an end for global or national security, 
but as a morally worthwhile exercise with the end of improving the prospects of the Afghan 
people. Without this core ethic of liberal interventionism, the realist, nationally oriented 
manifestation of the latter stages of the stabilisation policy narrative has made itself 
vulnerable to the same self-defeating relationship between communication and strategy 
that became so apparent under Blair. However, it would appear that it was simultaneously 
necessary reconfigure the stabilisation narrative in such a way to heal the rifts that the 
stabilisation policy’s entropic expansion had caused within the political and military 
establishment of the United Kingdom. Although distinctly limited in in its actual policy 
options to this end as a consequence of the prevailing necessities of maintaining alliance 
cohesion and its relationship with the United States, and of preventing the total implosion 
of civil-military relations in the eyes of the public, the paring down of the stabilisation 
narrative provided the Brown and Cameron Governments with the discursive pretext for the 
eventual transition to a more limited version of stabilisation that was, in time, compatible 
with the over-riding objective of maintaining its political and military obligations to the 
United States. The same dynamics are evident in the next chapter pertaining to the other 
normatively-based aspect of UK operations in Afghanistan: counter-narcotics. 
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CHAPTER 6: THE COUNTER-NARCOTICS 
NARRATIVE 
 
 
In many ways, an account of Britain’s counter-narcotics narrative appears to be simply 
an adjunct to the wider stabilisation narrative outlined in the previous chapter. Indeed, 
counter-narcotics did indeed arise out of the same philosophical and institutional milieu as 
the stabilisation agenda. The assumptions informing the development of counter-narcotics 
policy in Afghanistan fit the criteria of liberal peace theory insofar as it represented a 
challenge to the development of liberal-democratic governance. Those involved in the 
manufacture and trafficking of opium were considered to be malignant social actors 
comprising an alternative locus of power to the Kabul Government’s officials, and so 
combatting their activities could be reasonably seen as a means of promoting a more 
accountable system of administration and the growth of licit economic activities. Pursuit of 
counter-narcotics in Afghanistan also fulfilled other aims implicit within stabilisation. It 
coincided with New Labour’s ethical foreign policy by focusing on the evils of heroin use on 
the streets of Britain. Moreover, counter-narcotics held ostensibly strategic aims for global 
security, as the opium economy was seen as a considerable source of revenue for al Qaeda 
and the Taliban. Perhaps most importantly, Britain’s role in counter-narcotics operations in 
Afghanistan fulfilled its own strategic objective of maintaining the alliance system by 
contributing not only to Britain’s ‘soft power’ development agenda but also, crucially, by 
‘showing willing’ to the alliance by performing a task assumed to be beneficial to the US-led 
War on Terror but which the Americans were themselves reticent to participate in.  
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Despite the commonalities between counter-narcotics and stabilisation (and to some 
extent counter-terrorism), the counter-narcotics policy narrative is quite distinct and 
independent from those of stabilisation and counter-terrorism in one important respect: 
unlike with the counter-terrorism and stabilisation policy narratives, counter-narcotics 
policy was the only aspect of Britain’s efforts in Afghanistan that was at any point within the 
near total control of its government.  Curiously, as of the end of 2014, it is also the one area 
of policy that has effectively disappeared from official statements on the purpose of British 
participation in the conflict. What the evolution of the counter-narcotics policy narrative 
demonstrates most clearly is that the abiding realities of Britain’s institutionalised 
acquiescence to the demands of collective security have prevented it from maintaining 
control over its own policies in Afghanistan, thereby rendering the articulation of consistent 
messaging on said policies a near impossibility. This is made most obvious in the case of 
counter-narcotics because it is one where policy was, at some point, nominally within the 
control of the Government and where its rhetoric and accompanying strategies were 
devised with large degrees of autonomy from (but still occurring within) a multi-national 
framework. By this I mean that Britain’s ownership of the counter-narcotics policy narrative 
can be seen as a result of its lead-nation status on the issue within the international 
community, which is itself a reflection of a distinct lack of interest in counter-narcotics on 
the part of the United States for much of the Afghan conflict. The more American interest in 
counter-narcotics grew (and ultimately dissipated), the more Britain’s policy narrative had 
to alter to remain in tune with that of its senior partner. In other words, the relative 
independence of British policy formulation on counter-narcotics eventually had to be 
reconciled with external factors related to collective security dynamics – specifically 
pressure from the United States on the United Kingdom to modify and eventually drop its 
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counter-narcotics policy to reflect Washington’s point of view – thereby ultimately causing 
the policy narrative to lose its coherence over time.  
 
 
Phase I: 2001-2003 – The Domestic Policy Origins of the Counter-
Narcotics Narrative 
 
In order to understand how the United Kingdom came to be responsible for the 
seemingly Sisyphean task of dismantling and destroying the Afghan opium economy, we 
must first say a few words about the Blair Government’s views on drugs in Britain. New 
Labour’s drugs policy was at the heart of its much publicised ‘tough on crime, tough on the 
causes of crime’ rhetoric established during its time in Opposition during the mid-1990s. 
Central to this approach was the relocating of drug offences within a wider context of anti-
social behaviour and criminality symptomatic of the ‘wreckage of our broken society’, as 
Blair put it (Blair 1995: online). This was something of a departure from earlier approaches 
that sought to distance drug addiction from interdiction efforts and instead place it firmly 
within the confines of a social health issue (Stimson 2000: online; Hunt & Stevens 2004). 
New Labour’s accession to power in 1997 was followed by a White Paper entitled ‘Tackling 
Drugs: Where We Are Now’ in April of 1998, the content of which focused on the social, 
psychological, economic, criminal, and health-related ‘evils’ of drug use and promoted a 
vision of a ‘healthy and confident society increasingly free from the harm caused by the 
misuse of drugs’ (HM Government 1998:9). Indicative of the ‘causes of crime’ mantra 
espoused a few years earlier, the Paper outlined the need for a comprehensive approach to 
drug policy that cut across domestic and foreign policy boundaries. Specifically, the Paper 
made numerous references to the international dimension of its drug interdiction efforts, 
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pointing to the commencement of a corollary ‘strategic review of international drugs 
activity’ that entailed ‘a clear overall commitment of all the law enforcement, intelligence 
and diplomatic agencies to reduce the flow of illicit drugs to the UK’ (1998:11). Thus, by the 
time of the 9/11 attacks on the United States, talking tough on drug use and the sources of 
drug use as a cause of crime was a firmly established policy for the first Blair ministry.  
In a keynote speech to the Labour Party Conference in Brighton just five days prior to 
the commencement of military activity in Afghanistan, Blair laid out his domestic vision of 
the social harm of drugs within the international context of global terrorism. The speech 
highlighted the connection between al Qaeda and the Taliban, and set out providing 
ancillary, humanitarian reasons why the removal of the latter from power in Afghanistan 
was the moral and logical course of action, claiming that, 
‘It is a regime founded on fear and funded on the drugs trade. The biggest 
drugs hoard in the world is in Afghanistan, controlled by the Taliban. Ninety 
per cent of the heroin on British streets originates in Afghanistan. The arms 
the Taliban are buying today are paid for with the lives of young British people 
buying their drugs on British streets. That is another part of their regime that 
we should seek to destroy’ (Blair 2001b: online). 
Blair thereby set out to establish a correlation between the drugs trade, which 
adversely affected Afghan and European society, and terrorism, which whilst a concern of all 
western states, was for all practical purposes the United States’ sole priority. This statement 
is consistent with Blair’s personal belief in the possibility of eradicating social ills from British 
(and international) society, and his conviction outlined in earlier chapters of the 
fundamental interconnectedness, and sameness, of the world’s peoples as a result of 
processes of globalisation. A speech at the Trade Union Congress’ Conference in Blackpool 
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reinforced Blair’s stern attitude towards drug-related offences, demanding that drug-
addicted offenders would be offered an ultimatum of ‘treatment’ or ‘custody’ as a means of 
favouring the victims of crime, the logic being that to protect the innocent, punitive steps 
must be taken (Blair 2002: online). The idea that coercive measures could rid, or at least 
ameliorate, the drug problems rife in British society were reflected by the Blair 
Government’s commitments to Afghanistan. The task of rebuilding Afghanistan’s internal 
security was divided into sections amongst the G8 nations at the Tokyo Conference of 
January 2002: Italy was tasked with reforming the judiciary, Germany was allocated police 
reform, the United States was in charge of military reform, Japan with reintegration of 
enemy combatants and, finally, the United Kingdom was given the responsibility of counter-
narcotics with the remit ‘to rebuild an agricultural system and eliminate poppy cultivation’ 
in the country (Hansard 2002a). Although there is no substantial evidence explaining how 
and why each state was given each task, it seems a reasonable inference that Blair’s 
penchant for tackling drugs may have played a role in matters.  Counter-narcotics was 
clearly something Blair saw as morally right, strategically useful and, most importantly, 
complementary to the Americans’ counterterrorism efforts. In other words, agreeing to lead 
nation status on counter-narcotics would allow the United Kingdom to play a major role in 
the policy end of achieving – through collective effort – the stabilisation and eventual 
democratisation of Afghanistan. Following the Conference, Secretary for International 
Development Clare Short reported to the House of Commons the obligations taken on by 
Government. Short’s statement lacked detail and focused only on the UK’s responsibility to 
‘offer people alternative crops’ and ‘a legitimate life that will be better than the illegitimate 
life’ of producing poppy (Hansard 2002c). Planning for how this would be achieved appeared 
non-existent. Indeed, Short acknowledged to the House that,  
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‘there is not a firm strategy in place to deal with the poppy crop that has 
recently been planted and is still in the ground in Afghanistan…we will engage 
both the Foreign Office and my Department in trying to ensure that such a 
strategy is in place’ (Hansard 2002a). 
This statement makes it clear that, from the outset, the narrative of combatting drugs 
abroad to reduce drug abuse and drug-related crime domestically came before any serious 
strategic thinking about the subject. In the months following the Tokyo Conference, little 
explanation had been given to relate how a coercive approach to drug interdiction abroad 
would work. Rather, the narrative suggested a prevailing assumption that, given a legal 
alternative crop, Afghan farmers would automatically reject the production of heroin poppy. 
Which crop would provide an alternative to heroin, and would be as hardy and valuable, 
was a theme left unexplored. The substance of Short’s address was effectively that all that 
was required was a firm financial and political commitment from the international 
community, and the problem could be solved. The short-term strategy for already-planted 
poppy crop was one of payoffs. Orchestrated by the Secret Intelligence Service, the 
‘compensation for eradication’ scheme was an attempt to purchase and destroy the entire 
poppy crop prior to its harvest and processing into opium, on the proviso that Afghan 
growers would agree not to plant poppy the following season (Meo 2003:10; Elliott 2001: 
online; Loyd & Khel 2003:17). Although the plan managed to destroy roughly one-fifth of the 
crop, it failed to stem the tide of heroin exports, with much of the allocated funds being 
siphoned off or diverted into the pockets of power brokers. According to some 
commentators, the compensation programme had the deleterious effect of actually 
promoting the production of poppy, with farmers seeing no disincentive since growing the 
crop would result either in its sale to traffickers or its destruction by eradication teams and 
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eventual recompense (Eagar 2006:32). In the view of Felbab-Brown (2009:106), this 
represented a moral hazard for the British, for the obvious reason that their compensation 
scheme enriched middle-men and, by inadvertently incentivising the trade, fuelled the 
expansion of poppy cultivation. In a narrative sense, it also served as a moral hazard that 
indicated the relatively simplistic perspective through which British policymakers viewed 
Afghan society. 
This early setback did little to dissuade Government narrative efforts guided directly 
from Number 10. The counter-narcotics policy for Afghanistan became more strongly linked 
to domestic drug policy as 2002 went on, particularly in the public statements of senior 
members of the Labour Government. The phrase ‘on our streets’ took on special resonance 
in their messaging activities, with Blair, Short and Foreign Secretary Jack Straw all 
commenting, in varying degrees of emotiveness, on the ‘mayhem, human suffering and 
criminality’ inflicted on British streets by the Afghan poppy crop (Hansard 2001c; 2002b). 
Indeed, as was often repeated by such Cabinet members, some ninety to ninety-five percent 
of all heroin consumed in Britain originated in Afghanistan at this point. The rhetoric of ‘on 
our streets’ performed an important phatic function to drive home this point, akin to the 
counter-terrorism narrative (explored in the next chapter), of bridging the geographical 
divide between what was happening thousands of miles away from Britain in Afghanistan 
and in Britain itself. Without the phatic function implicit in such a speech act, Britain’s 
counter-narcotics responsibilities in Afghanistan could easily be construed as having no 
merit in terms of realist appraisals of national interest.  
As with the phatic functions of relating the counter-terrorism and stabilisation policies 
to ‘national security’ or ‘national interest’, the ‘on our streets’ rhetoric can be construed as 
a cultural coding of collective security activity within a national framework of interest and 
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security, utilised to persuade the public of the moral value and strategic relevance of 
counter-narcotics efforts to British society. It also served a narrative function of 
simplification, by pointing out the direct effect on Britain rather than opting for a more 
complicated stabilisation story that posited the necessity of counter-narcotics to undermine 
drug barons and to buttress the new political and economic order. By linking the Afghan 
opium trade to the social ills of drug addiction in the cities of the United Kingdom, the Blair 
Government also fulfilled one of its primary philosophical tenets of viewing regional and 
national issues within a global context. During this period, therefore, an inversion of 
Labour’s transplanting of domestic drug policy onto its international commitments was 
taking place: by emphasising the importance of Afghan counter-narcotics to UK public 
health, the counter-narcotic aims of the British in Afghanistan, ostensibly an offshoot of 
individual priorities within Cabinet reflecting their coercive mentality towards drugs policy in 
the UK, became a core element of the domestic drug policy.  
A preliminary inference is that by attaching foreign policy targets to domestic ones, 
the counter-narcotics narrative for Afghanistan became fully wedded to the domestic ‘war 
on drugs’ narrative. Success or failure in one area could therefore be logically coupled to the 
success or failure of another. Foreign Office Minister Mike O’Brien summed up the narrative 
logic at work here, arguing that Britain was ‘putting in place policies … not only because it is 
right for Afghanistan but also because it will prevent people dying on our streets if we are 
successful’ (BBC 2002: online). These political stakes were raised by Kabul’s Afghan National 
Drug Control Strategy of May 2003, which declared an even more ambitious aim – to 
completely eradicate the cultivation of poppy in Afghanistan within ten years (UNODC 
2004a: online). This policy was endorsed by all key players, including the United Kingdom 
(which committed itself to contributing £70 million over three years) and the United Nations 
196 
 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Running concurrently with these developments was 
the publication in February 2003 of the United States’ National Drug Control Strategy. This 
strategy supported UK-led ‘alternative livelihoods’ approaches but also called for 
‘comprehensive eradication efforts’, a measure deemed ‘politically impossible’ in early 
Foreign Office assessments (Elliott 2001: online; The White House 2003:38). The American 
approach, by no means united (due to internal rifts between the Pentagon and the State 
Department over the correct approach to counter-narcotics), nevertheless at this point 
viewed drug control within the rubric of counter-terrorism operations, not, as was 
normatively and institutionally the case with the British, as an end in itself. The White 
House’s overriding concern was disrupting the financing of al-Qaeda, seen largely as being 
generated from opium revenues. The British perspective, meanwhile, appeared more 
nuanced, acknowledging that the size of the opium industry in Afghanistan effectively 
meant everyone in the country was directly or indirectly affected by it (Hopkins 2001: 
online). This difference in priorities led to the beginnings of long-standing friction between 
the two countries in terms of methods of eradication. Whereas the Afghan strategy and the 
British approach considered eradication possible only where it would not detrimentally 
affect stability in the country – that is, where ‘alternative livelihoods’ could be secured – the 
American approach increasingly turned toward the need for quicker, non-military 
eradication techniques, namely through aerial spraying, a technique explicitly disavowed in 
the Afghan drug strategy (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2003:21). The first documented 
case of aerial spraying in Afghanistan is dated to June of 2003, just one month after the 
release of the Afghan strategy (Harding 2003: online). Despite private opposition by the 
British to the American approach, any hope of meaningfully pushing back on US demands 
was complicated by the fact that the resources made available by the British for Afghan 
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efforts were not sufficient to carry out an effective ground-based approach. In early August 
2003, the head of the Afghan Counter Narcotics Directorate publicly criticised the British 
efforts: 
‘I was expecting Mr Blair to do more. We need funds and assistance. This is 
not a job that can be done by the Kabul government alone … My men are 
dedicated. But they have only tens of thousands of dollars from the UK, not 
hundreds of thousands. Compare that to spending on the war on terror’ (Meo 
2003:10). 
The British approach in this first phase of the conflict quickly unravelled. It found itself 
in the unenviable position of attempting to placate two diametrically opposed parties in the 
United States and Afghanistan, and was unable to criticise either. The narrative framework 
set out by the Blair Government was one that championed the necessity – both moral and 
strategic – of combatting the opium trade in Afghanistan, not just for the well-being of 
British citizens but also for the internal stability of the Afghan economy and social and 
political systems. By making this case in narrative, and then following it up by agreeing to 
take the lead on counter-narcotics at the Tokyo Conference, the Blair Government left itself 
with little rhetorical or political space in which to negotiate. An idealistic interpretation of 
the situation on the ground in Afghanistan and the resources required to effect meaningful 
change contributed to a rapidly deteriorating situation in the country during the first two 
years of the conflict, indicated by an increase in cultivation of something approximating 
1,400 percent between 2001 and 2003. The policy, in short, was a failure; but abrogation of 
responsibilities would have meant not just a party political failure for the Government,  but 
also one that would have repercussions in its international standing, as well as opening it up 
to the potential for attacks from the public that it had ‘gone soft’ on drugs or from 
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countervailing voices that could deconstruct and lay bare the discrepancies between the 
original policy, events on the ground, and the policy narrative that accompanied those 
events. Blair’s Government had set itself a ‘discourse trap’ (Michaels 2013) with what would 
amount to two equally unsavoury options going forward: either continue with a failing 
policy and remain constant with the upbeat assessments of the accompanying narrative, or 
jettisoning the strategy and risking the political backlash of a defunct policy narrative. 
 
Phase II: 2003-2005 – ‘Fitful Progress’ 
Following the handover of reconstruction and stabilisation responsibilities to 
NATO/ISAF in August 2003, the counter-narcotics situation in Afghanistan became more 
fraught with inter-state tensions. The American position of treating counter-narcotics as a 
concern subsidiary to counter-terrorism remained intact in the late summer of 2003, with 
officials voicing fears that enhanced interdiction measures would alienate their warlord 
partners and adversely affect their ability to prosecute the Taliban and al-Qaeda; one 
American official remarked succinctly that ‘if you take the warlords out, the whole system of 
government goes’ (Norton-Taylor & Astill 2003: online). The British and the UNODC, 
meanwhile, attempted to steer US opinion towards a point of view that appreciated the 
interconnectedness of international terrorism and the narcotics industry. A British official in 
Kabul argued that the huge sums of money at the disposal of drug ‘kingpins’ could end up in 
the hands of ‘any number of groups’, whilst Antonio Costa of the UNODC made reference to 
the potential for Afghanistan to become a ‘failed state’ if ‘narco-terrorists’ were not dealt 
with using ‘energetic measures’ on the ground (Loyd & Khel 2003:17; Loof 2003: online). 
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The term ‘narco-terrorist’ was also used by Afghan President Karzai in public addresses 
(Hansard 2004d).  
By early 2004, following a British-convened counter-narcotics conference in Kabul to 
‘promote greater sharing of the problem’, which reiterated the British and Afghan view of 
the need for a variety of levers and the importance of ground-based eradication, the 
Americans appeared more open to giving greater political attention to the opium issue 
(UNODC 2004a: online). However, this piquing of interest came with a series of scathing 
attacks on British counter-narcotics efforts, culminating in a thinly-veiled statement by 
Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Robert Charles 
that concluded British efforts were too slow, insufficient in scope, and under-funded 
(Charles 2004: online). While Charles’ testimony placed, for the first time, the focus of 
counter-narcotic efforts more firmly within the purview of a stabilisation operation rather 
than just a counter-terrorist one, it also reemphasised the American view that ‘the current 
set of eradication targeting criteria, while designed with the best of intentions, may be 
overly restrictive’ – essentially meaning that aerial eradication and a reduced emphasis on 
alternative livelihoods programmes as directing eradication efforts were necessary 
measures. 
The timing of Charles’ statement, on the eve of the Berlin Conference declaration 
(which affirmed the need for wider and more intensive participation in counter-narcotics 
efforts), was conspicuous in its conflict with the Afghan Government’s Declaration on 
Counter-Narcotics issued at the Conference on the same day. In contrast with the American 
approach, the Declaration provided no mention of aggressive eradication measures, instead 
choosing to focus on regional cooperation and interdiction exclusively (Government of 
Germany 2004: online). On the other hand, the main Declaration of the Berlin Conference 
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appeared to give succour to the American approach in stating that Afghanistan and its 
international partners would ‘do everything … to reduce and eliminate’ poppy cultivation 
(IAF 2004:2). A wider tension between American and Afghan approaches represented 
something of a circular argument: the Americans proposed that counter-narcotics efforts 
must be rapidly increased in order to stabilise the Afghan regime, whereas the Afghans 
themselves believed their regime must be stable beforehand in order for counter-narcotics 
efforts to be successful (IAF 2004: online). In practical terms this clash of views meant that, 
for the Americans, the Afghan government could not stabilise whilst the opium economy 
operated unabated, whilst the Afghans themselves believed attacking the opium economy 
too aggressively and without sufficient alternatives in place would only serve to undermine 
its authority and legitimacy. Opposition Members in the House of Commons appeared to 
take note of this discordance of views; Conservative Member George Osborne in particular 
raised the question of whether there was  
‘a tension between the desire of the international community to create a 
strong central government in Kabul and the desire of the American-led forces 
hunting al-Qaeda, who use regional warlords to help them in that important 
fight’ (Hansard 2004a). 
The official response of the Labour Government was to downplay any rift between the 
United States and Afghanistan and its European partners regarding the best means of 
reducing opium production. Whilst there was some concession by Foreign Office Minister 
with portfolio for the counter-narcotics effort, Bill Rammell, of ‘differences of emphasis’ 
between counter-narcotics contributors, the overarching narrative theme was of unity of 
effort and coherence going forward. In May of 2004, two months after the Berlin 
Conference, Rammell released a statement to the Commons which reemphasised the British 
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commitment to working in cooperation with, and strategic deference to, the Afghan 
Government, but also included several references to increased eradication efforts and 
funding (Wintour 2004:12). Rammell’s comments represented a detailed statement of 
British counter-narcotics policy after Berlin, outlining the British position of strategic 
patience and the imperative of alternative livelihoods. Significantly, Rammell spoke in 
response to an impassioned speech by Labour backbencher David Cairns, a strong advocate 
of the counter-narcotics mission; In making the case for strategic patience, Rammell’s 
comparatively measured tone had a considerable element of managing expectation to it, 
warning Cairns that 
‘We should have a sense of realism … about the time scales that will be 
necessary if the problem is successfully to be tackled. Elsewhere in the world, 
experience of successfully tackling the problem suggests that it will take up to 
a decade to achieve that in Afghanistan’ (Hansard 2004d).  
At this time British narrative position was essentially sound in the sense that it fairly 
accurately matched the scale and scope of the mission at hand. It placed utmost importance 
on the long-term goals of counter-narcotics strategy, and emphasised the need for patience 
so that the alternative livelihoods system could take root. In what could be perceived as a 
message to the Americans as much as any other party, Rammell pressed this issue in his 
Commons statement, arguing that 
‘[a]nyone who considers the issue will conclude that if we are to persuade 
poppy farmers to stop undertaking that activity, they must be given an 
alternative income. That is why DFID is so engaged, why it has trebled its 
budget and why this is a particularly important strand of its activities’ 
(Hansard 2004d). 
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Judging by the public statements coming from the Foreign Office in the months 
following Rammell’s address, considerable progress had been made in synergising UK-US-
Afghan counter-narcotics policies. In August, the FCO announced that all parties now were 
working to a 'common agenda and shared commitment for next year across the whole 
range of counter-narcotics work' (Smith 2004: online). Despite this affirmation, the autumn 
of 2004 was met with a series of news articles carrying American critiques, often on-the-
record, of the British counter-narcotic approach. Requests made by the UK for the 
Americans to employ forces to assist in ground-based interdiction and eradication were 
publicly rebuffed by one official, who admonished the UK for its ‘naïve’ approach, arguing 
that going after drug lords would undermine any leverage ISAF and OEF had in the restive 
Pashtun provinces of the south and east of Afghanistan (Smith 2004: online). The US 
criticism of what they perceived as a sluggish time-scale cropped up on several occasions 
during this period as well. Doug Wankel, a Kabul-based State Department official, 
commented to the press that, from the US perspective, the British 
‘don't seem to have the same sense of urgency… where we see it's not moving 
at the ... level or the speed we think, we're going to step in and we're going to 
work with them to help them get it to the level and to the speed which we 
think it needs… We really believe that within two years, we've got to see the 
pendulum swing’ (Zoroya & Leinwand 2004: online). 
This statement, similar to several others made at the time, made it clear that the US 
were moving to take greater control over the counter-narcotic mission by increasing the 
operational tempo and, as a corollary, by shortening time frames for success. The British 
long-term strategy and the narrative themes of alternative livelihoods and strategic 
patience were simply no longer compatible with what the Americans were saying publicly, 
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who were still largely of the view that counter-narcotics was, first and foremost, a counter-
terrorism issue rather than a stabilisation issue. The empirical evidence available suggests 
that, following these public admonitions by the United States, the Foreign Office opted to 
acquiesce on its core themes in the face of American pressure. Rammell would later tell the 
press that  
‘We do have the plans and the strategy in place to meet our targets and begin 
to reverse, I would hope, the tide by this time next year’ (Zoroya & Leinwand 
2004: online). 
In the face of increased critical attention from the Americans, the British policy 
narrative positioning had changed considerably in a matter of mere weeks, moving from a 
message that emphasised long-termism and a goal of ten years, to one that pinned long-
term success on a tangible reduction in real terms of poppy cultivation within just one year. 
Whilst continuing to press for a comprehensive approach that prioritised alternative 
livelihoods and intensive ground-based interdiction and eradication efforts, the narrative 
approach taken by Whitehall began to reflect an attempt at diplomatic balancing between 
the US and Afghan points of view. Events that followed made this effort progressively more 
difficult. In the remaining two months of 2004, the US rhetoric on counter-narcotics grew 
stronger still, indicated by increasing calls in the United States Congress for aerial spraying. 
In November 2004, President Bush validated these calls by approving a fund of 
approximately $150 million earmarked for aerial eradication (Jones 2006: online). 
Incidentally, by the end of November reports emerged of a ‘mysterious’ aircraft engaged in 
spraying in Nangarhar province in the east of Afghanistan, for which the United States 
denied responsibility (Burke 2004: online). The Karzai regime responded to this news with 
condemnation, whilst local people began to report illnesses amongst their livestock. 
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Whether or not the correlation between Bush’s funding of aerial spraying and the reported 
spraying incident were causally related is unclear, but a blight of Afghan crops (including but 
not limited to opium poppy) likely contributed to a drop in cultivated area and opium 
tonnage in 2005, representing the first such reduction since 2001 (UNODC 2005:50).  
Despite the widespread outrage at the spraying event, ground-based eradication 
efforts during this period also incurred unwanted consequences. Attempts at eradicating 
poppy crops were often met with hostility and occasionally with violence by Afghan farmers, 
to the point where UNODC monitors were unable to carry out surveys in several districts 
(Felbab-Brown 2009:107; UNODC 2004b:78). In Nangarhar province, where counter-
narcotics operations achieved an eighty percent reduction in cultivation in one planting 
season, locals complained that promises of aid and alternative livelihoods were not 
forthcoming and that the alternative crops had effectively ruined their local economy 
(Coghlan 2005b: online). The UNODC confirmed this by commenting that it was only ‘at 
times’ that aid and development money complemented eradication efforts (UNODC 
2005:iii). Other commentators noted that for the goal of complete eradication to be met 
without destabilising Afghan society and its economy, there would need to be a vast 
increase in human and financial resources committed to the country (Loyd 2004:20). 
Throughout this second phase of the conflict, however, this level of commitment simply did 
not exist. 
Multiple impediments to delivery have since been identified, all of which stand in 
sharp relief to the rather simplistic narrative begun by Blair in late 2001 and illustrate the 
dangers of creating non-negotiable ethical and moral imperatives in narrative. Firstly, the 
aid money given was often siphoned off by local governors, who were often implicated in 
the very trade they were tasked to clamp down on; inequities in land ownership and, 
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therefore, in political power meant that the farmers too often did not receive their share of 
the money. Secondly, the scale of infrastructural work, such as field irrigation networks and 
road networks for transporting goods, was underestimated. Thirdly, the issue of what 
alternative crops could deliver as much revenue for farmers remained unresolved, with 
opium bringing approximately ten times the profit one could derive from growing wheat. 
Fourthly, it is possible that imbalances between ‘sticks’ and ‘carrots’ may have resulted in 
the impoverishment and subsequent alienation of Afghan farmers.  
On the one hand, a more coercive approach to counter-narcotics appears to have 
made an impact in 2005, with over fifty percent of Afghan farmers polled who no longer 
grew poppy citing fear of imprisonment and crop eradication as being the main determinant 
in their decision (UNODC 2005:60). However, the lack of visibility of available alternatives to 
poppy cultivation in the face of such coercive measures only served to harden local attitudes 
towards the counter-narcotic strategy, evidenced by the return to full planting in Nangarhar 
in late 2005 and the determination amongst some farmers that fresh attempts to eradicate 
their crops would be met with violent resistance (Coghlan 2005a: online). By the end of 
2005, the shortcomings of the British alternative livelihoods effort were fully exposed, with 
both the Americans and Karzai openly criticising them as woefully insufficient (Karzai 2005: 
online). Fifthly and perhaps most importantly were the issues beyond the immediate control 
of any national counter-narcotics strategy, namely the weather and the global market. Good 
weather results in high yields, bad weather in low yields. High yields may mean less acreage 
cultivated, whilst low yields may mean more land usage. High market prices for opium may 
stimulate planting, whilst low prices may discourage planting. It would be a mistake, 
therefore, to assume a correlation between success in counter-narcotics and a reduction in 
cultivation, since this could be indicative of any of these extemporaneous factors. In short, 
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the natural forces guiding the Afghan opium industry have had at least as much impact on 
the opium economy as any concerted state-led efforts, evidenced by cyclical patterns of 
growth and decline between 2001 and 2005.  
All of these obstacles to Blair’s original counter-narcotics policy position did not have 
the effect of giving the Government pause to reconsider either the efficacy of their strategy 
or the parameters of the narrative employed to explain and defend it. While the British 
narrative by mid-2005 readily accepted that these complications and contingencies were 
affecting efforts to meet targets, the overriding message coming from ministers was that 
the failings incurred simply indicated a need for greater effort in persisting with counter-
narcotics activities. The notion that counter-narcotics required a more comprehensive 
approach that included broad reconstruction, development and governance efforts was 
cited widely by Government ministers. Because such efforts were seen as necessary to 
buttress counter-narcotics work, it is vital to note that stabilisation and reconstruction 
efforts from 2005 onwards were ultimately driven by the counter-narcotics agenda which, 
of course, had as its own end the shrinking of financial resources available to terrorist 
organisations. Eradication and alternative livelihoods were ascendant in the policy agenda; 
counter-terrorism, by contrast, had by this stage of the conflict faded in importance, and 
many figures within the Afghan and American governments downplayed and even discarded 
the threat of terrorism and insurgency to Afghan stability (BBC 2004: online). Rather, the 
focus at this point was almost solely on counter-narcotics as the most important aspect of 
stabilisation.  
This perspective was compounded by a rapid rise in 2005 of insurgent activity as ISAF 
forces continued their counter-clockwise expansion across Afghanistan; as stabilisation 
forces came into greater contact with insurgent forces, so too did the perception increase 
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that counter-narcotics and stabilisation were inseparable elements. By late 2005, when 
British deployment to Helmand province was confirmed, the counter-narcotics agenda was 
portrayed in media reports as the number one priority in stabilisation efforts. One senior 
military official told the Sunday Times that ‘[f]rom a military perspective, we see 
Afghanistan as something that can be resolved but we need to ... realise that counter-
narcotics is central’, whilst a spokesperson for the Ministry of Defence informed The 
Scotsman that while counter-insurgency activity was necessary, ‘breaking up this opium 
business is just as important. It is a building-block’ (Lamb 2005:2; The Scotsman 2005: 
online). In a speech delivered at NATO headquarters in Brussels, Defence Secretary John 
Reid declared that ‘drugs are now the single greatest threat to Afghanistan’s long-term 
security and stability’ (Reid 2005: online). The message coming down from state institutions 
was unequivocal, and would remain so throughout the first half of 2006: defeating terrorism 
requires the destruction of the opium industry, which can only be achieved by intensive, 
military-led reconstruction. In the attempt to shore up the discourse trap started by Blair in 
2001, the mission in Afghanistan began to expand in scope rapidly, but was oriented around 
the premise that the success of counter-narcotics efforts was the key to stabilising the 
country. 
 
Phase III: 2006-2009 – Helmand: Rise and Fall of Counter-Narcotics 
As noted in the preceding stabilisation chapters, the balance of available evidence 
suggests that the policymaking process for Britain’s foray into Helmand Province was 
shaped in a kind of ‘perfect storm’ of interests between ministers and military officials. 
There exists little in the way of primary documentary evidence surrounding the decision-
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making process within Downing Street in the run up to the Herrick deployment in the spring 
of 2006. Michael Clarke’s study of the policy process in the months prior to deployment 
underlines the point about a lack of paper trail; he comments that ‘no evidence has 
emerged either from documents or interviews that the choice between Helmand and 
Kandahar was regarded as strategically important by the British’ (2011:16). Of course, it 
would appear that Clarke’s thinking about strategy entailed a traditional view of relating the 
ways and means of policy and operations with the end of stabilising and/or democratising 
Afghanistan. Throughout this work, however, I have argued that understanding Britain’s 
actions regarding Afghanistan is indeed challenging if one views its strategy as being 
undertaken with Afghanistan as the end of policy. Rather, it is useful to conceive of Britain’s 
preparations for, and initial work in Helmand as a consequence of two strategic factors: the 
first of these being the strategic requirement of achieving unity of effort between the 
Government and the military, and the second being the strategic requirement of 
demonstrating Britain’s utility and loyalty to their American partners. If one is to 
conceptualise Britain’s policy decisions and strategic direction through this lens, it becomes 
instantly apparent that all of the apparent blunders of participation in Afghanistan begin to 
make sense.  
In the preceding chapters we have considered the possibility that Helmand was the 
result of international political pressure from the United States, maintaining the coherence 
and credibility of NATO, or as a means for the British military to redeem itself from its 
perceived failure in Basra in the eyes of the martial world by using Afghanistan as ‘an 
opportunity for good soldiering’. Indeed, in many ways deployment to Helmand fulfilled the 
counter-terrorism, stabilisation and counter-narcotics narratives simultaneously, even 
allowing them (perhaps coincidentally) to coalesce together for a brief time. In counter-
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terrorism terms, Helmand restored the British military to a leading role in the ‘good war’ (as 
opposed to the highly controversial and divisive Iraq War) that was more clearly linked to 
prosecuting the war on terror. In terms of stabilisation, the mission worked because it was 
marketed to the public as primarily ‘non-kinetic’ in nature, focusing rather on reconstruction 
and protection of civilians and the fledgling ‘democratic’ Afghan state. Finally, with respect 
to counter-narcotics, the Helmand deployment allowed the United Kingdom to enter into 
Afghanistan’s opium production heartland. With an ostensibly comprehensive package of 
security, development and governance at its disposal, it offered the Blair Government an 
opportunity to vindicate its stabilisation-based approach to counter-narcotics and to truly 
take lead nation status within the collective security framework.  
In the months preceding the deployment of 16 Air Assault Brigade, Government 
ministers – most notably Defence Secretary John Reid – provided public statements laying 
down the rationale for and purpose of the Helmand mission. In a manner reminiscent of the 
Blair Ministry’s narrative during the first months of the intervention, Reid spent much of late 
2005 and early 2006 reiterating the phatic function of Afghan heroin ‘on our streets’, a point 
made more relevant by the conspicuousness of its absence between 2002 and 2004 
(Hansard 2005b, 2005c). In late January 2006, Reid outlined to the Commons the Helmand 
mission in detail. He began by identifying three main culprits to be combatted: the Taliban, 
terrorists, and drug traffickers (Hansard 2006a). International security from terrorism, 
regional security from the Taliban, and national security from the Afghan drugs trade were 
identified by Reid as issues of vital importance: 
‘We cannot risk Afghanistan again becoming a sanctuary for terrorists. ... We 
cannot ignore the opportunity to bring security to a fragile but vital part of the 
world, and we cannot go on accepting Afghan opium being the source of 
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90 per cent. of the heroin that is applied to the veins of the young people of 
this country. For all those reasons, it is in our interests, as the United Kingdom 
and as a responsible member of the international community, to act’ (Hansard 
2006a). 
In making the case for viewing each of these issues as in the interest of the United 
Kingdom, Reid effectively argued that they were of equal importance. Reid further 
articulated this point in stating that  
‘we cannot look to resolve just one of those issues. Everything connects. 
Stability depends on a viable, legitimate economy. That depends on rooting 
out corruption and finding real alternatives to the harvesting of opium. That 
means helping Afghanistan to develop judicial systems, her infrastructure and 
the capability to govern herself effectively, which in turn brings stability and 
security’ (Hansard 2006a). 
Since everything connected for Reid, counter-narcotics was clearly an integral part of 
British planning for operations. The centrality of counter-narcotics in Reid’s statements has 
led some to question whether the decision to enter Helmand – as opposed to Kandahar, the 
spiritual capital of the Pashtun resistance in the south of the country – was primarily 
motivated by the counter-narcotics agenda. Clarke (2011:16) has argued that personalities 
played a key role, claiming that  the ‘Foreign Office was content that UK forces should go to 
Helmand, and Prime Minister Tony Blair was personally keen on the province – the heart of 
Afghanistan’s narco-economy – as that would be consistent with the anti-narcotics lead 
role’. Clarke’s incredulity over the strategic wisdom over the decision to deploy to Helmand 
is by no means unique, however; former ISAF Commander and Chief of the Defence Staff 
General Sir David Richards has also gone on the record as stating that he has ‘never yet had 
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a good reason given me why that decision was taken’ (Fergusson 2009:233). This is perhaps 
the crucial question for both the strategy and narrative for Afghanistan from 2006 onwards: 
was deployment to Helmand largely a consequence of counter-narcotics policy? According 
to a report from the Defence Committee in April 2006, the Ministry of Defence had said that 
‘it had chosen to deploy in Helmand Province specifically because it was an area containing 
continuing threats to stability from the narcotics trade, the Taliban, and other illegally 
armed groups’ (Defence Committee 2006:16). Indeed, events on the ground prior to the 
British deployment support the Ministry’s statement. Specifically, one may point to the 
decision to oust the governor of Helmand, Sher Mohamed Akhundzada, at the UK’s request 
due to his links to the opium trade. Akhundzada was replaced by former Afghan counter-
narcotics head Mohamed Daud – a clear indication of intent on the part of the British (Jones 
2008:14; King 2010b:71).  
Other factors may have played a role, however. The most convincing of these is the 
simple fact that the decision to expand ISAF’s jurisdiction to the south had been taken, that 
it therefore required leadership from NATO member states, that few of those members 
were willing to volunteer, and Britain – in its desire to play a leading role in Afghanistan for 
all the reasons aforementioned – took on the mantle of responsibility. Within this reading of 
events, it has been posited that part of Britain’s rationale for taking on Helmand specifically 
(as opposed to other provinces in the south) was a result of negotiation with NATO partners, 
particularly the Canadians, who wanted to be posted in Kandahar; Britain’s desire to give 
greater roles to NATO partners may have swayed their decision to take Helmand as a 
concession to the Canadians (Clarke 2011:15). Of course, it may simply be that what was 
allocated was largely beyond the control of the UK. Equally, Canada’s preference for 
Kandahar might also have been a consequence of not wanting responsibility for Helmand 
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and the counter-narcotics responsibilities entailed: as one Canadian military officer would 
later put it, their forces ‘have nothing to do with poppy eradication.  We stay away from it 
as far as we can’ (CTV 2007: online; PBS 2007: online). Similarly, one may draw an inference 
from negotiations with the Dutch government, which stalled on its level of commitment to 
the ISAF expansion to the south, as perhaps informing the allocation of their forces to the 
more benign Uruzgan province (Baker 2005:36). A combination of institutional politics 
within NATO, on the one hand, and the personal and institutional enthusiasm on the part of 
the British for development within a narcotics environment is likely the most accurate 
portrayal of events. 
A further development in the counter-narcotics narrative occurred several days after 
Reid’s Commons statement with the convening of the London Conference on Afghanistan in 
early February 2006. Serving as the successor template to the Bonn and Tokyo conferences 
of late 2001 and early 2002, the Conference set out the aims and objectives for state-
building in Afghanistan until 2010. Held in London and chaired by Blair (ostensibly as a 
display of solidarity and leadership), the Conference produced the ‘Afghanistan Compact’, 
which set out a range of development and security initiatives. Counter-narcotics appeared 
here as a ‘vital and cross-cutting area of work’ and set a target of achieving ‘a sustained and 
significant reduction in the production and trafficking of narcotics with a view to complete 
elimination’ (London Conference 2006:4). Interestingly, although practically all other aspects 
of the Compact required completion by the end of 2010, counter-narcotics targets remained 
somewhat indeterminate, with most benchmarks alluding to merely having structures in 
place by the end of 2010. This represents something of a lowering of expectations, 
particularly when judged against previous determinations of the Blair Government to turn 
the tide in opium production or completely eradicate it within a similar timeframe.  
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By the time Herrick IV began in April 2006, the limitations of the counter-narcotics 
narrative were almost immediately laid bare. Development and reconstruction 
opportunities for the British Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) were put on hold as 16 
Air Assault found itself in an intensive and protracted kinetic campaign, losing thirty soldiers 
in the process. The commander of Herrick IV, Brigadier Ed Butler, would later describe 
conditions on the ground in Helmand as constituting a ‘semi-permissive environment’, 
meaning that the ability for the British Task Force to undertake any development work, 
much less counter-narcotics, was more compromised than they had hoped (Defence 
Committee 2009:Ev17). However, a larger theme was likely at play here. Perhaps reflective 
of these conditions or, equally as likely, reflective of institutional tensions over 
responsibilities foisted upon them by Downing Street and the Foreign Office, the military’s 
appetite for counter-narcotics was never very substantial. Richards would later tell one 
author that ‘counter-narcotics ‘was never on the Army’s agenda’ (Fergusson 2009:228). 
Indeed, this view was evidently shared by commanders at brigade level as well; in a media 
interview at the start of the Herrick mission, Butler acknowledged that counter-narcotics 
efforts could lead to ‘destabilisation’ in Helmand (McGrory & Hussein 2006:31). As 2006 
wore on, the compatibility of the themes of reconstruction and counter-narcotics were 
increasingly called into question in the national press, most notably by Simon Jenkins of The 
Guardian, who questioned the logic of attempting to combine the counter-narcotics and 
stabilisation briefs into the UK military commitment (Jenkins 2006:31). In early May, the day 
before Reid left his position as Defence Secretary to take up a new position as Home 
Secretary, he responded to a question in the Commons regarding the cooperation between 
those involved in the opium trade and Taliban insurgents. His response was to the negative, 
stating that 
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‘[t]here are reports that Taliban have been encouraging Afghan farmers to 
grow opium poppy and offering protection to farmers against eradication of 
their poppy crop. I am not however aware of conclusive evidence of a direct 
link between drug traffickers and the Taliban leadership in Afghanistan, 
although both benefit from instability’ (Hansard 2006d). 
This represented nothing short of a complete reversal of the position taken by Reid 
and all other Labour Government officials in the preceding years. The narrative that had 
begun on a proposition that the Taliban was a regime ‘funded by the drugs trade’ had 
morphed into one that attempted to downplay the linkages between the drugs trade and 
the Taliban. Rather than admit the incompatibility of counter-narcotics and stabilisation, 
Reid would instead undermine a fundamental tenet of the counter-narcotics narrative in 
casting doubt on the centrality of narcotics to the insurgency – that the Taliban, terrorists 
and drugs were all ‘absolutely interlinked’. The narrative line was breaking: it no longer 
unequivocally argued that ‘everything connects’. The relevant point here is not so much that 
Reid was incorrect in his early assessment; on the contrary, insurgency and narcotics remain 
interconnected to this day. The problem, rather, was that the narrative that initially 
embraced the connectedness of these issues began to weigh upon the realities of the 
campaign – that is to say that by emphasising the linkages between them, it became more 
difficult to engage with either the insurgency or the narcotics issue, precisely because they 
were inseparable. This point would be iterated several times over the remainder of 2006 by 
senior military officials from both the UK and the United States, most prominently by 
outgoing Chief of the General Staff General Mike Jackson, who referred to counter-narcotics 
efforts as ‘counterproductive’ to stabilisation efforts (Fickling 2006: online). Upon Reid’s 
departure from the Ministry of Defence, his successor, Des Browne, took a narrative 
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approach that reflected the military opinion that counter-narcotics was ancillary to 
stabilisation and potentially compromising of it. In early 2007, Browne repositioned the 
counter-narcotics policy narrative to a lower priority than under Reid, remarking to the 
Commons that, 
‘[i]t is important that we do not allow Afghanistan to become a state that is 
dependent on narcotics, as too much of its GDP currently is. Narcotics can 
fund the forces that undermine the Government of Afghanistan and allow it to 
become a failed state, and have allowed it in the past to become a training 
ground for terrorists. However, our fundamental objective is to support the 
democratic Government of Afghanistan and allow their writ to run across the 
country, so that never again will we, the developed world, be subject to the 
possibility of terrorist attacks emanating from the failed state of Afghanistan’ 
(Hansard 2007a). 
Browne’s comment to the Commons represented the beginnings of a deflation of the 
counter-narcotics narrative in favour of one that prioritised stabilisation. Rather than 
asserting, as Blair and Reid did before him, that narcotics, insurgency and terrorism are 
intrinsically interconnected and therefore strategically inseparable, the emphasis here is on 
the potential for narcotics to destabilise Afghanistan and of treating stabilisation and 
counter-narcotics as possibly distinctive elements. Instead of being a ‘vital’ element equal to 
that of stabilisation and counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics was relegated to the status of 
mere ‘importance’. As Blair’s tenure wound down in the spring of 2007, the narcotic 
discourse had altered markedly in the space of just a few months. The ‘on our streets’ phatic 
function had all but disappeared from the Government narrative. It had instead been co-
opted by Parliamentary critics of the counter-narcotics policy to highlight the failings of the 
216 
 
counter-narcotics strategy and Government drug policy in general. Labour backbenchers 
such as Paul Flynn were quick to use the phrase, for so long utilised by ministers as a 
sacralising code for framing counter-narcotics efforts as a national issue, as a means of 
pointing out that the street price of heroin in the UK was cheaper than at any point in thirty 
years (Hansard 2006c, 2007b). The facts on the ground in Afghanistan were held by critics 
such as Flynn to be directly responsible for the low cost and high availability of heroin in 
Britain. By the time of Blair’s resignation from Downing Street, the Afghan opium crop was 
the largest not only since the start of the conflict, but at any point since the Taliban 
assumed power in 1994. The amount of opium in Helmand province contributed well over 
half of the record breaking 2007 crop, and cultivation in Helmand itself had increased by 
forty eight percent compared with 2006, and by 288 percent compared with 2005 (UNODC 
2005, 2006, 2007).  
Following the unwelcome news of the 2007 opium crop, familiar themes emerged in 
the behaviour of Britain’s partners. In the United States, members of Congress, the 
Department of State, and various government departments such as the Drug Enforcement 
Agency (DEA) led a new push for aerial eradication in Afghanistan (Hemming 2007: online; 
Semple & Golden 2007: online). As though to underline this view, the Bush Administration 
appointed William Wood, also known as ‘Chemical Bill’ for his advocacy of spraying 
techniques, as their new ambassador to Afghanistan as the 2007 harvest wound down. 
Intra-departmental tensions remained strong over this period, with the Pentagon and the 
military brass still highly sceptical of militarising counter-narcotics (USA Today 2007: online). 
Similar rivalries also emerged within the Afghan state: whilst President Karzai remained 
adamantly opposed to aerial eradication, his vice president Massoud spoke out publicly in 
favour of the technique, and in the process severely criticised the British effort in an article 
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for The Telegraph (Massoud 2007:22). Britain’s credibility and ownership of the counter-
narcotics strategy was severely compromised by mid-2007 when Gordon Brown assumed 
Prime Ministerial duties. As with the stabilisation narrative, the rhetorical approach taken by 
Brown to counter-narcotics was decidedly more temperate and analytical than the high-
mimetic moral approach of Blair and Reid. Judging by his public statements, Brown did not 
share their views on the ‘evils’ of drugs. In his maiden speech on the subject in December 
2007, there was no reference to the link between Afghan opium and British heroin 
addiction. Indeed, in a characteristically in-depth statement given to the Commons, Brown 
devoted just over one hundred words to counter-narcotics out of a total address of two-
and-a-half thousand words. Drastic increases in troop casualties and a corresponding 
upsurge in media attention, coupled with a near-constant assault on Brown’s budgeting for 
the war by the Conservatives and several serving or retired high-ranking military figures all 
likely contributed to a reduction in the frequency and emotiveness of counter-narcotics 
rhetoric. Brown’s statement also appeared to distance the Government from the 2003 and 
2006 benchmarks for poppy cultivation reduction whilst moving the responsibility for such 
efforts more directly onto the Afghans: 
‘I am not setting a target. What I will say is that while the combination of the 
measures that we outlined is necessary, what is also necessary is a central 
Government who are prepared to take the action. That is why I am impressing 
on President Karzai the importance of his taking a lead’ (Hansard 2007d). 
The general policy narrative trend under Brown, therefore, was one of managing 
expectations and divestment of responsibility, reflecting a loss of control – both in rhetorical 
and practical terms – of the counter-narcotics strategy. In April of 2008 at the NATO 
Bucharest Summit, member states agreed for the first time to carry out counter-narcotics 
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operations directly (as opposed to the previous arrangement of offering logistical and 
training support to Afghan counter-narcotics units). The old divisions between civilian and 
military agencies remained, and Britain’s main European partners in the southern region of 
Afghanistan – the Dutch and the Canadians – continued to display reticence about the 
wisdom of this increased role vis-à-vis their main aim of stabilisation (USA Today 2007: 
online). Bucharest represented an attempt at a greater ‘buy-in’ from the international 
community in counter-narcotics – precisely the kind of formalised burden-sharing 
arrangement British state had been seeking since the summer of 2006. Whereas the slow 
drip of authority away from Britain towards the United States since 2006 was replete with 
public spats and rebukes from the Americans – and resultant about faces from British 
ministers – Bucharest signalled this in official and institutionally recognised terms. The 
perception voiced at Bucharest – that counter-narcotics was a cross-NATO issue – 
effectively freed the British from the shackles of ‘lead nation’ status; by November 2008, at 
a ministerial meeting in Budapest, NATO finally agreed to utilise ISAF forces directly in the 
counter-narcotics effort (BBC 2008: online). In this sense, the summit represented 
something of a ‘get-out clause’ for the discourse trap set by Blair in 2001 and by Reid in 
2005-6. The result in narrative terms was an increasing emphasis on ‘core’ stabilisation 
objectives in a manner quite distinct from the Blair Government’s assessment of the 
inextricable linkages between narcotics and stability. The same circular argument existed, 
namely that successful counter-narcotics depends on adequate security, but adequate 
security depends on the absence of narcotics; the difference at this point was now that it 
had been agreed that counter-narcotics had been relegated in transnational importance in 
narrative terms, one could simply focus on the issue of security irrespective of the validity of 
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connections between narcotics and instability. DfID Secretary Douglas Alexander spoke in 
these terms when he opined that  
‘although it's a complex challenge dealing with poppies, at its heart is a very 
simple equation. Where you have law and order and security you can 
eradicate poppy. And where you have insurgency it's far more difficult. That's 
why we have to support not just British soldiers but Afghan soldiers in 
bringing law and order to those areas affected by the insurgency’ (Alexander 
2008: online). 
Alexander’s view that the equation was ‘simple’ – a linear construct beginning with 
security and ending with successful counter-narcotics – obviously jars with the original 
position for Helmand taken by Reid that security, reconstruction and counter-narcotics work 
must be undertaken simultaneously. Despite such inconsistencies, by mid-2008 the pre-
eminence of stabilisation over counter-narcotics was a staple of political communications 
for the Brown Government. This was only possible because transnational policy decreed it 
to be the case. There is some question, however, over whether the refocusing on security at 
the expense of counter-narcotics was a form of political cover for the failure of counter-
narcotics itself. To illustrate, Lord Malloch-Brown – then Minister for the Foreign Office – 
claimed in late 2007 that the ‘‘Taliban do not pose a credible threat to the democratic 
Afghan government. The Taliban do not control a single province or have the ability to hold 
territory, showing they are far from being a resurgent force’ (Malloch-Brown 2007: online). 
Seven months later, however, in addressing a Member of Parliament who wanted 
assurances about Britain’s commitments to the counter-narcotics effort, Brown stated that, 
‘[w]e are continuing to fight the war against heroin as well, but … the reason 
that we are in Afghanistan is to stop the Taliban taking over there and to stop 
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al-Qaeda coming back in that country. Our aim is to remove the threat to the 
Afghan people and the whole of Europe, including our own country’ (Hansard 
2008d). 
As much of the counter-narcotics narrative of this phase of the conflict demonstrates, 
the notion that British forces were in Helmand ‘to stop the Taliban taking over there’ is a 
myopic and somewhat misleading portrayal of events. Task Force Helmand’s remit was to 
support Afghan efforts to reconstruct the province and to suppress the drugs trade; it was 
largely framed as a non-combat mission. Reid’s comments in 2006, like Malloch-Brown’s in 
late 2007, do not accord with one that posits a fundamental aim of stopping the Taliban 
‘taking over’; the narratives they expressed indicated that the Taliban were more of a 
nuisance than an existential threat to the Afghan state. Of course, such narrative 
revisionism represents a microcosm of the British counter-narcotic discourse over this 
period. What started as a, if not the, core element of deployment to Helmand, requiring a 
comprehensive and simultaneous effort, evolved over time to become an ancillary and even 
counter-productive by-product of stabilisation. Intra-departmental conflict between the 
military and the civilian bureaucracies in the UK, inter-state tensions over correct methods 
between the United States, Europe and Afghanistan, and personal convictions over the 
relative significance of the narcotics trade in Afghanistan all contributed to an almost 
complete reversal of narrative emphasis between 2006 and 2008. The Brown Government 
had, through a combination of rhetorical deflation and a loss of control of counter-narcotic 
strategy, effectively escaped the counter-narcotics discourse trap.  
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Phase IV: 2009-2011: Abandoning the Policy, Disappearing the 
Narrative 
 
Obama’s accession to the US Presidency in early 2009 signalled a new chapter in allied 
commitments to Afghanistan. Over a period of several months and multiple strategic review 
processes, the White House opted to attempt a replication of the population-centric 
counter-insurgency ‘surge’ that had ostensibly garnered results in Iraq in 2007-2008. Whilst 
the American review process carried on into the spring and summer of 2009, Brown faced a 
series of Afghanistan-related crises, carried out in the full glare of the media, regarding 
troop levels and alleged equipment shortages. By the end of September, British forces had 
suffered the deadliest summer fighting season to date, with fifty seven troop casualties, 
twenty two of which took place in July alone. Amidst the fire-fighting public communication 
process that ran alongside these unfolding events, there was little to no mention of counter-
narcotics measures. In a Commons debate on Afghanistan on the 16th of July, the Brown 
Government was criticised for the lack of information on the opium situation. In early 
August, the Foreign Affairs Committee published a report arguing that, in assuming 
responsibility for counter-narcotics in Afghanistan,  
‘the UK has taken on a poisoned chalice. There is little evidence to suggest 
that recent reductions in poppy cultivation are the result of the policies 
adopted by the UK, other international partners or the Afghan government’… 
‘the lead international role on counter-narcotics should be transferred away 
from the UK, and that the Afghan Government should instead be partnered at 
an international level by the United Nations and ISAF which are better 
equipped to co-ordinate international efforts’ (FASC 2009:52).  
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This statement served as a public rebuke of the long-standing narrative line that the 
UK’s counter-narcotics policies were making a difference, clearly contradicting the Labour 
Government. In testimony published in the Report and received by the Committee in May, 
Lord Malloch-Brown gave insight as to the state of mind of the Brown Ministry regarding its 
continued counter-narcotics remit, pointing in the main to alliance dependency issues (and 
in the process providing a near perfect articulation of the transnational dilemma at work): 
‘we are trying at least to be a NATO country that meets our share of the 
responsibility on [Afghanistan]. We are the second biggest troop contributor. 
We feel that we need to help the Americans by leading on different policy 
issues where they wish us to. Yes, it is not a comfortable position to be in. It is 
not great PR to be in charge of counter-narcotics’ (FASC 2009:Ev67). 
Perhaps fortuitously for the British, the Obama Administration’s interest in counter-
narcotics proved to be much less than that of Bush’s tenure. Obama’s appointment to the 
position of ‘Special Envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan’, Richard Holbrooke, wasted little 
time in criticising eradication efforts as wasteful and counter-productive (BBC 2009: online). 
In the strategy announcement made by the Administration in March there was an evident 
shift in direction away from eradication towards more intensive interdiction methods, and 
the second review address, which incorporated much of incoming ISAF Commander General 
Stanley McChrystal’s assessment, made no mention of counter-narcotics whatsoever. In an 
ironic turn of events, the reduction of emphasis on counter-narcotics in both the American 
and British narratives for Afghanistan in 2009 coincided with a considerable reduction in 
poppy cultivation nationwide (123,000 hectares compared with 157,000 in 2008) and in 
Helmand (at just under 70,000 hectares, compared with 103,590 in 2008, a reduction of 
one-third) (UNODC 2009). The reasons for this reduction were quite naturally contested, 
223 
 
however. The UNODC’s Antonio Maria Costa argued that the improved outlook was the 
result of counter-narcotic efforts, pointing to enhanced interdiction work and alternative 
livelihoods programmes. Interestingly, however, Brown and Foreign Secretary David 
Miliband drew greater attention to the fluctuating commodity prices over 2008 and 2009 as 
a primary cause for the reduction in poppy cultivation; in 2009, wheat was a far more 
lucrative crop than opium poppy (Hansard 2009c, 2010a). Their brevity in accounting for 
market factors beyond the control of a national counter-narcotics strategy may be a 
reflection of the relative divestment of responsibility of the UK from that strategy, whereas 
Costa’s reasoning could be understood as indicative of his organisation’s explicit interest in 
furthering that strategy. Freed from the confines of the counter-narcotics discourse trap, 
the narrative coming from the Brown Ministry appeared more transparent than in years 
previous. The crucial point informing this relinquishment, of course, was that it was only 
when the United States largely omitted counter-narcotics from its strategic requirements 
for Afghanistan that the United Kingdom could reconfigure its own policy narrative, even 
though its own interest in the matter had demonstrably diminished years earlier. This 
represents clear testament to the power of transnational dilemma in shaping British foreign 
policy. 
The slow divestment of the British role in Afghan counter-narcotics was all but 
completed following the London Conference on Afghanistan in January 2010. The 
Conference focused on increasing Afghan ownership of ISAF activities – referred to in 
bureaucratic parlance as ‘Afghanisation’ – in correlation with a decrease in direct 
involvement from the international community (Mancini 2011:7). In a Commons session in 
February, Miliband responded to a question by a fellow Member regarding the future of the 
British role in counter-narcotics: 
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‘the concept has not worked well. It was not formally buried at the meeting 
last week, but the emphasis that has been placed over the past two or three 
years on Afghan leadership and international support reflects a recognition of 
a different, and better, way of doing things’ (Hansard 2010b). 
In the months following the London Conference leading up to the May General 
Election, counter-narcotics ceased to exist in narrative terms for the Brown Government. As 
far as they were concerned, British responsibilities in counter-narcotics were over. Indeed, 
during the televised election debates preceding the election, counter-narcotics was not 
mentioned at all and, upon the electoral defeat of the Labour Party and the formation of a 
Conservative-led Coalition Government, this trend continued. The Cameron Ministry’s 
overall Afghan narrative focused solely on matters of ‘national interest’, paring down the 
stabilisation narrative from one that balanced British security needs with a comprehensive 
view of Afghan stability, to one that prioritised British security and, in doing so, delimited 
the stabilisation requirements of Afghanistan to the building up of its nascent security 
apparatus. According to one source, the view within the new Cabinet was that pursuit of 
counter-narcotics was dead in the water, particularly in terms of the overarching Afghan 
narrative:  
‘By the time Cameron had made his timeline, counter-narcotics had got 
virtually bugger all to do with it. We hadn’t made much progress on counter-
narcotics, there wasn’t much prospect we were going to, it was quite a hard 
sell to the public that the purpose of Afghanistan was to keep drugs of the 
streets, and if it was it wasn’t working at all. So it wasn’t a very appealing part 
of the narrative. Now that didn’t stop me in 2010 from going and talking to 
the Afghan ministries responsible and regional governors and so on, but in all 
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honesty it had almost become an irrelevance by that point, in my memory. It 
certainly wasn’t one of the things I would go into a TV studio and say why 
we’re there’ (Personal Interview, 2013). 
The previous chapter explains how the Coalition narrative agenda was one of 
simplification, impelled in part by an increased emphasis placed on strategic 
communication. This informed a desire to keep the narrative straightforward and 
uncomplicated by the confounding logic of counter-narcotics and the comprehensive 
approach. The consistent failure of British counter-narcotics did not help matters, either. Of 
course, the counter-narcotics narrative was not a Conservative or Liberal Democrat 
creation; since the Coalition did not own the narrative, they did not need to defend its 
historical record. In a speech in September 2010, Defence Secretary Liam Fox provided a 
succinct verdict of Britain’s experiences in Helmand, arguing that 
‘we assessed that Afghan-grown narcotics posed a greater threat than Afghan-
based terrorism. On the basis of the sporadic attacks from Al-Qaeda and their 
limited effect, it looked as if the threat was being contained. Well, we were 
wrong, and our presence in Afghanistan now is a consequence of this 
misjudgement’ (Fox 2010b: online). 
Fox’s speech served as an epilogue for British involvement in counter-narcotics, 
essentially blaming it for the shortcomings of the mission itself. It confirmed that entry into 
Helmand was primarily about counter-narcotics, and that the UK’s lead nation status on 
counter-narcotics shaped the course of the mission. Furthermore, it implied that the 
Government’s primary foreign policy responsibility of extricating British forces from 
Afghanistan was in part a response to the strategic inflation of the original counter-
terrorism mission into a counter-narcotics mission, and from that into a nebulous and 
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confused plan to restructure the entirety of Afghani politics and economics. The Coalition 
mantra that ‘we are in Afghanistan for our own national security’ can be seen in part, 
therefore, as a narrative corrective for the rhetorical excesses of previous Governments. 
 
Phase V: 2011-2014 – The Disappeared Policy Narrative 
Given the line drawn – both in narrative and institutional terms – under counter-
narcotics by the Brown Ministry and the Coalition Government, the final phase of Britain’s 
military involvement in Afghanistan contained precious little regarding the subject. Financial 
commitments to alternative livelihoods schemes remained in place (albeit at a much 
reduced amount compared with sums allocated under the Brown Government), but in 
rhetorical terms counter-narcotics was given only passing mention in any policy statement 
delivered by members of Cabinet. Indeed, in December of 2013, Prime Minister Cameron 
stated in an interview with reporters that the mission in Afghanistan was for all intents and 
purposes accomplished, emphasising once more that ‘our aim has always been, can we 
make sure that this country is no longer a haven for terror and terrorists’ (YouTube 2013: 
online). In declaring that the Afghanistan was a ‘mission accomplished’, however, Cameron 
made no reference to the tenuous and deteriorating narcotics situation in the country, or 
Britain’s historic role in attempting to ‘completely eradicate’ the opium trade by the end of 
2013. 
In the wake of the NATO/ISAF decision to absolve itself of counter-narcotic duties, 
Russian attention to counter-narcotics in Afghanistan increased, spurred on in part by an 
influx of Afghan heroin into the country and a corresponding surge in cases of heroin 
addiction. The Russian response to this domestic crisis culminated in the appointment of 
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former Russian foreign minister Yury Fedotov to the role of Executive Director of the 
UNODC in mid-2010, which by 2011 was the only foreign organisation that remained 
directly committed to tackling the issue. Familiar issues dogged their efforts, however, most 
notably in the guise of fluctuating market prices for the drug, which soared to $241 per kilo 
for dried opium in 2011, representing an eighty one percent increase on 2010 prices 
(UNODC 2011). Despite considerable increases in eradication efforts and the continuation of 
alternative livelihoods schemes funded by the international community, cultivation is 
currently once more on an upward trend: from 131,000 hectares in 2011, the most recent 
estimate (for 2013) stands at 209,000 hectares, representing the greatest land use for 
opium cultivation ever recorded, surpassing even the heights of 2007 (UNODC 2013). In a 
most ironic turn of events, it was the Taliban during this period that made the headlines for 
taking measures to eradicate poppy cultivation in the country, representing a reversal in 
their policy following the lifting of their ban on cultivation in 2001. A spokesperson for the 
UNODC, Jean-Luc Lemahieu, heaped praise on their efforts, declaring the UNODC ‘welcome 
this new approach and would hope that this is not a one-time exception but that the 
Taliban, and others alike, would take a principled stance against the narcotics business’ 
(Graham-Harrison 2012: online). Bizarrely, the international community’s counter-narcotics 
narrative had come full circle: from targeting the Taliban as a ‘regime funded by the drugs 
trade’ – with that drugs trade financing terrorism – to one that publicly thanked those who 
colluded with the terrorists for taking steps to reduce it, quite irrespective of the methods 
they employed in doing so.  
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Conclusion 
One can hardly disagree with the Foreign Affairs Select Committee’s appraisal of the 
United Kingdom’s role as lead nation on counter-narcotics as anything other than a 
‘poisoned chalice’. What makes the counter-narcotics narrative distinct from the counter-
terrorism and stabilisation narratives, however, is the fact that it was largely a poisoned 
chalice of the United Kingdom’s own making, driven as it was by a narrative informed, in the 
main, by Blair’s personal views on drugs and his party’s desire to blend American counter-
terrorism with British humanitarianism. Helmand in turn can be seen as a redoubling of 
Labour’s preoccupation with the drugs trade, impelled by the UK’s desire to placate the 
Americans after Basra, as well as its need to be seen as a responsible leading nation within 
the international community and the NATO alliance. Until the counter-narcotics narrative 
came face to face with the difficult realities of implementation in Helmand in mid-2006, it 
was characterised by a high mimetic quality that sought to link the social ills of heroin 
addiction in the streets of the United Kingdom to the successes or failures of Afghan 
eradication, interdiction and alternative livelihoods programmes.  
Whilst this was a powerful discursive move, it also produced immense expectation on 
both domestic and foreign drug policy, where success or failure in one area indicated the 
same in the other. The pre-eminence of counter-narcotics within the meta-narrative for 
Afghanistan – framing it as equal to or above counter-terrorism and stabilisation, and as a 
national security issue in its own right – produced a narrative that propelled policy along 
with it, effectively locking the UK into pursuing a counter-narcotics agenda that rarely 
appeared to be working and was always affected by factors – most importantly fluctuations 
in agricultural commodity prices – that were beyond the scope of a national drug control 
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programme. It was only when those responsible for the creation of the Afghan narrative 
departed from power – most notably Blair and Reid – that counter-narcotics could be 
reduced in its relative importance and eventually phased out altogether. Circumstances in 
other areas, such as an upsurge in insurgent violence and a corresponding rise in troop 
casualties between 2006 and 2009, and the decision of the Obama Administration to reduce 
its own emphasis on the importance of counter-narcotics work facilitated public officials in 
their easing of counter-narcotics off of the policy agenda and out of the Afghan narrative, 
but only to the extent that they were compelled to admit that the policy had failed, and that 
the wider Afghan strategy had been compromised by a fundamental misreading of what 
Britain could achieve with the resources at its disposal. Here, more than in any other case in 
this work, the creation of a narrative contributed to the relegation of strategic choice below 
the demands of rhetorical viability – hence the repetition of the stabilisation and counter-
terrorism narrative that asserts, quite selectively, that the mission in Helmand was always 
consistent, and that that mission was not primarily – or even partially – undertaken in order 
to control and reduce the narcotics trade. Of course, what this chapter demonstrates is 
precisely the opposite: that it was the counter-narcotics narrative, not counter-terrorism, 
that informed narrative British explanations of the purpose of its expedition into Helmand 
specifically; the discourse created its own trap.  
Relationships of collective security helped create the counter-narcotics policy and also 
played a pivotal role in its disappearance as a policy narrative. The Blair Government took 
on a leadership role for Afghan counter-narcotics because its transnational outlook viewed 
such work to be in the interest of British society, but conceived of British society as just one 
component in a wider international social order. It was, as such, the perfect articulation of 
Blair’s dialectical worldview where issues of local and global, national and transnational, 
230 
 
military and non-military, war and crime, and social and security could be combined and 
reconciled as compatible and mutually reinforcing. In this sense, counter-narcotics was, on 
paper, an ideal means by which Blair’s personal philosophy and affinity for a British role in 
an ‘international society’ could be fulfilled. However, it is for the same reasons that counter-
narcotics policy ultimately came undone: it was always unlikely to succeed because it was 
never truly ‘strategic’ for the UK – it did not sufficiently link policy to operations; rather, it 
was from the first simply policy masquerading as strategy. It was devised by politicians and 
emerged from a planning process wherein ministers and military officials sought to 
implement a policy that would serve their respective interests. Rather than developing as a 
‘strategy’, it came about as a consequence of a kind of gentleman’s agreement between 
civilian and military leadership: the military would be given a fresh start – a new 
‘opportunity for good soldiering’ in the wake of Iraq – and in return ministers would be 
given an opportunity to prove Britain’s significance to the Americans by taking on a 
leadership role that would also provide an opportunity to showcase its ‘comprehensive 
approach’ to stabilisation. This goes some way in explaining the power of the ‘policy 
narrative’ in this instance: because the policy was the strategy, the policy narrative trumped 
operational reality, even to the extent that the unworkable nature of those operations was 
misrepresented in order to present a picture that suggested they were, in fact, largely 
successful.  
Aside from the obvious problems of applying a policy instead of a strategy to an issue, 
counter-narcotics was dropped because it existed for purposes of maintaining transnational 
cohesion and ended up creating discord. On the one hand, it served a purpose of 
demonstrating British commitment to the Americans as an assumed prerequisite to 
stabilising Afghanistan. When it became clear that the Americans no longer considered the 
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British contribution to counter-narcotics to be productive – to the point where American 
officials were issuing hostile public statements to that effect – it became more than evident 
that counter-narcotics’ purpose as a transnationalised policy had backfired. On the other, it 
served to bind together the Defence establishment with civilian departments (Downing 
Street, the Foreign Office, and the Department for International Development) by providing 
a context around which the comprehensive approach could unify effort and maximise 
output. The lack of strategic consideration in pursuit of such an end inevitably produced 
tension between planners and operators, however, and with the emergence of Defence-
driven strategic communication processes, the policy would be dropped – in similar 
circumstances to aspects of stabilisation – as it was evidently deemed surplus to defence 
requirements. It was not a ‘national security’ priority.  
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CHAPTER 7: THE COUNTER-TERRORISM 
NARRATIVE 
 
 
In the preceding three chapters, I have argued that (1) the transnational dilemma has 
impelled the British state to alter its policy narratives explaining its presence in Afghanistan 
from one that was based on liberal-centric norms of collective security to one focused on a 
realist-centric national context; that (2) both of these two approaches to policy narratives 
created political pressures on the state’s ability to articulate its purpose in Afghanistan; that 
(3) both  of these approaches produced a kind of disconnect between what was said about 
the policy and the requirements of strategy on the ground; (4) that strategic communication 
practices and processes have sought to avoid the communicative and strategic difficulties 
innate to the transnationalised policy at the heart of Britain’s collective security 
membership in Afghanistan by working to give communication a greater role in shaping 
Britain’s strategic direction; and (5) that narratives organised around principles agreeable to 
the Defence community have allowed the British state to partially heal the rifts between 
Government and Defence. 
In this final empirical chapter, the implications of the failings of stabilisation and 
counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan – and, by proxy, the shortcomings of the 
institutional and normative bases by which those policies were conceived and undertaken – 
are explored by reference to an analysis of the (chronologically speaking) first and last policy 
narrative of counter-terrorism. This narrative is now the dominant way British officials 
account for the history of the Afghan conflict and the performance of the British therein. As 
such, it is worth exploring the current position of the British state. An example of this can be 
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found in a press briefing given by Prime Minister David Cameron at Camp Bastion in 
December 2013. Cameron used the occasion of his visit to emphasise the beginning of the 
end of British combat operations in Afghanistan by stating that, in his view, the UK’s mission 
was essentially accomplished. During this briefing he argued that, 
‘the absolute driving part of the mission is a basic level of security so 
[Afghanistan] doesn't become a haven for terror. That is the mission, that was 
the mission and I think we will have accomplished that mission and so our 
troops can be very proud of what they have done’ (BBC 2013: online). 
Cameron’s statement makes the claim that the United Kingdom’s narrative for 
Afghanistan has always been consistent, has always been about countering international 
terrorism, and that the UK has achieved that objective. Whether or not Britain and its NATO 
partners have accomplished the mission of securing the country so that it does not become 
‘a haven for terror’ is beyond the scope of this work, and is a question that will only be 
answered in the fullness of time. The issue of exactly what the purpose and objectives of the 
Afghan mission were in 2013, and what the purpose and objectives were in the years prior 
to Cameron’s statement, are highly contestable, however. The assertion that Britain’s 
mission was successful is only possible if one takes it as given that the primary aim of the 
intervention throughout its duration was the prevention of further terrorist plots forged in 
the country. Certainly, the counter-terrorist narrative strand had been present in the 
overarching Afghan narrative since 2001, and issues of security – whether national (for the 
United Kingdom), regional (for Afghanistan and its neighbours) or global – have indeed 
provided the core rationale for the commitment of forces in the country. In an interview 
with the author, an MOD official opined that counter-terrorism has always been at the core 
of the British narrative for Afghanistan: 
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‘the one consistent theme throughout our narrative since 2001, is the national 
security threat, 9/11, and that’s international terrorism having the freedom to 
operate in Afghanistan and thus to launch attacks against western countries’ 
(Personal Interview 2013). 
Intentional or not, there is much nuance in this statement; indeed, it forms the 
premise of much of the analysis that follows. It raises critical questions of whether counter-
terrorism has been consistently stated as the reason for British participation, and if other 
themes existed. Clearly, the preceding two chapters have affirmed the second question. This 
chapter addresses the first by arguing that the counter-terrorist policy narrative has been 
central to the UK narrative for Afghanistan, but with a number of significant caveats that 
essentially undermine the consistency of messaging. Firstly, there is the conceptually simple 
case of counter-terrorism being subsumed by consequent narratives for stabilisation and 
counter-narcotics. This divergence of narrative away from the core message of counter-
terrorism was most pronounced prior to and during the UK armed forces’ entry into 
Helmand in 2006, quite understandably as a reflection of the fact that this mission was 
explicitly framed as not one of counter-terrorism but to do with counter-narcotics and 
reconstruction. As the mission in Helmand encountered an unforeseen depth of strategic 
and political obstacles to its realisation, however, the narrative of counter-terrorism 
eventually and gradually resurfaced, and as a result simplified and streamlined multiple and 
often discordant explanations of British involvement into one key strand. Strategic 
communication’s primary function here has been the returning of counter-terrorism to a 
central position, unburdened by talk of ancillary rationales. This return informs the second 
point of this chapter, which explores the variation between early and latter stages of the 
conflict in the referent object of the counter-terrorism narrative. For Blair, this was not the 
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physical security of Britain but the physical security of all countries; not only was the very 
idea of ‘national’ interests and security largely anathema to Blair’s internationalist 
discourse, he rhetorically conceived of security not solely or even primarily in physical 
terms, but in ideational terms. As we shall see, this understanding of counter-terrorism fit 
with the prevailing realities of the conflict. Conversely, the revamped counter-terrorism 
narrative promoted first by the Brown ministry and then by the Cameron ministry argued, 
often in hypothetical terms, that Afghanistan was integral to protecting the physical security 
of the UK specifically, rather than the physical and/or ideational security of the international 
community as a whole. We can understand this shift in emphasis in part by taking account 
of the rise and nominal decline of the Blair Ministry’s affinity for a vision of the national 
interest as located within a construct of ‘international society’, and juxtaposing this in 
relation to the relative realpolitik-infused messaging of the Brown and Cameron 
Governments, which favoured a more distinctively nation-centric rhetorical approach and 
reflected a gradual change in emphasis towards counter-terrorism by the Americans under 
Barack Obama.  
 
Phase I: 2001-2003 – Counter-terrorism, Internationalism and 
Humanitarianism 
 
At the heart of the Blair Ministry’s response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001 was an appeal – ostensibly aimed foremost at the Americans – to wed 
humanitarianism to their military activity in Afghanistan. Underpinning this approach was 
New Labour’s ‘ethical foreign policy’: a kind of neo-Kantian or Rawlsian moral philosophy 
that reflected their core theoretical concepts of the ‘categorical imperative’ and the ‘original 
position’ and, as a consequence of these concepts, promoted a vision of the universality of 
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their normative principles of freedom and democracy. Blair’s personal conviction was that 
the ‘War on Terror’ could be more than simply a punitive campaign against terrorist 
transgressors; it could also be (indeed, it must be) a rehabilitative process by linking military 
activities to developmental activities. His penchant for dialectical synthesis of seemingly 
discordant themes is arguably embedded in the political composition of New Labour as a 
whole, such as it was influenced by Anthony Giddens’ ‘Third Way’ philosophy which 
advocated much the same. In early October of 2001, Blair spoke at the Labour Party 
Conference, outlining his vision for a synthesised counter-terrorism / humanitarianism 
approach: 
‘out of the shadow of this evil, should emerge lasting good: destruction of the 
machinery of terrorism wherever it is found; hope amongst all nations of a 
new beginning where we seek to resolve differences in a calm and ordered 
way; greater understanding between nations and between faiths; and above 
all justice and prosperity for the poor and dispossessed, so that people 
everywhere can see the chance of a better future through the hard work and 
creative power of the free citizen, not the violence and savagery of the 
fanatic…’ (Blair 2001b: online).  
In setting out counter-terrorism as complementary with, rather than anathema to the 
various peace-building and humanitarian considerations at the core of Labour’s foreign 
policy, Blair sought to utilise a ‘genre guess’ which emphasised the binary opposition of the 
universality of Western values and the apocalyptic threat of Islamist terrorism in order to 
sway American and world opinion towards his own objectives which, incidentally, as his 
political philosophy informs us, were in his view really everyone’s objectives. As discussed in 
the previous chapters, Blair and his Cabinet consciously chose to view the national interest 
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of the United Kingdom as inseparable from the collective interests of the international 
community. Labour’s ethical dimension to foreign policy was structured around this 
principle, which was, in turn, informed by a liberal reading of international relations that 
held interdependence to have broken down the demarcations between national and global 
interests. In order to do so, however, a natural consequence was the breaking down of 
national relationships between domestic interests – be they private, public, or communal – 
and the foreign policy of the state. In a paper by then-Foreign minister Peter Hain, this 
principle was articulated as ‘convergent policy-making’, which posited that ‘there is little 
incentive … to focus on shared long-term interests in which we shall all lose unless we are 
willing to look beyond the demands of today’s powerful lobbies at home’ (Hain 2001:31). 
This internationalist streak duly informed the moral substance of Blair’s philosophy for 
interventionism which held, at its core, the precept of acting in accordance with a Rawlsian 
‘original position’, where all people are imagined as of equal importance when 
considerations for intervention are made (Rawls 1999): 
‘we are a community of people, whose self-interest and mutual interest at 
crucial points merge, and that it is through a sense of justice that community 
is born and nurtured. And what does this concept of justice consist of? 
Fairness, people all of equal worth, of course. But also reason and tolerance. 
Justice has no favourites; not amongst nations, peoples or faiths’ (Blair 2001b: 
online). 
Such positions allowed Blair to articulate the normative and strategic position of the 
United Kingdom as one in line with the mutual aid principle outlined in Article V of the NATO 
Charter.  Therewith, he could quite reasonably assert that ‘what erupted on the streets of 
New York on September 11 was not an attack on America alone. It was an attack on us all’ 
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(Blair 2002a: online). Bearing in mind the ethical dimension prevalent in his post-9/11 
rhetoric, it is crucial we recognise that Blair did not simply refer to a physical threat. Blair’s 
first point in his first address to the Commons three days after the terrorist attacks on the 
United States emphasised that the fundamental threat was to the values of western 
democracy: 
‘these attacks were not just attacks upon people and buildings; nor even 
merely upon the United States of America; these were attacks on the basic 
democratic values in which we all believe so passionately and on the civilised 
world’ (Hansard 2001a). 
In Blair’s genre position, security went beyond material and national boundaries; what 
was attacked, and what needed to be secured, was also in the realm of the metaphysical 
and ideational. The concepts of freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law were 
the long-term objects of security and means by which – and only by which – a just and 
therefore sustainable international security order could be realised. By securing and 
adhering to this principle for international community, alliances could be bound together 
under a common normative denominator. As common foundational interests and principles, 
these values provided the basis for what Blair hoped would amount to a new 
multilateralism. Simply put, for Blair the 9/11 attacks were ‘upon us all’ not just, or even 
primarily, because they indicated an impending threat to citizens and property in the United 
Kingdom or in mainland Europe or elsewhere, but because they were attacks upon a shared 
sense of collective morality and well-being. Because of this understanding, security, like 
interest, could not be conceived of as nationally-oriented under the Blair Government, 
particularly when related to Afghanistan; ‘solidarity’ between nations was recognised as the 
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‘route to practical survival’ for all states within the international community (Blair 2002: 
online).  
This strand of multilateralism was not necessarily recognised by the Bush 
Administration, however, which preferred to undertake military ground operations in 2001 
almost entirely unilaterally, with the British acting in a naval and air support capacity only. In 
contrast with Blair’s early speeches, the involvement of British ground troops in counter-
terrorism activities during this phase was limited to a series of engagements by the Special 
Air Service and Royal Marines in Paktia and Khost province along the Afghan-Pakistan 
border in the spring of 2002. Despite the failure of Coalition forces to capture or kill Osama 
bin Laden, the missions were considered a strategic success and the British battle 
contingent was drawn down and replaced with a smaller force, based in Kabul. In June of 
2002 the Afghan Interim Authority held a Loya Jirga at which the constitution for the Islamic 
Republic was agreed upon by tribal representatives, thereby bringing to a close the initial 
period of combat operations in the country. Throughout this period, references to counter-
terrorism by members of the Government became less frequent as a reflection of changed 
priorities away from counter-terrorist operations and towards stabilisation and 
reconstruction. This narrative alteration was reflected in the conclusion of Operation Veritas 
(the British contribution to American-led counter-terrorism operations) and the 
establishment of the International Security Assistance Force, for which the United Kingdom 
was the initial lead nation. What references did exist remained true to the original narrative 
positions of values, internationalism, and multilateralism. In an interview with David Frost in 
March of 2002, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw outlined the continued presence of British 
forces in the country along these lines, stating that  
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‘the key factor determining our deployment of troops is perfectly obvious, it's 
the damage that was done on September the 11th and the potential that the 
Al Qaieda terrorists pose and continue to pose to the security of Afghanistan, 
to the region and to the world’ (Straw 2002: online). 
It is vital to note that, throughout this period, the author could not locate a single 
explicit reference made by any member of the Blair Government that operations in 
Afghanistan were being performed specifically for the purposes of British national security. 
As with Straw’s statement, counter-terrorism in Afghanistan was related either to that 
country’s stability, the security of the south Asian region, or global security; equating the 
mission with security in the United Kingdom simply was not a narrative device employed by 
the Government. This is not particularly surprising, for three rather obvious reasons. Firstly, 
the purpose of the intervention was, as Straw declared, at this point self-evident, given the 
relative freshness of 9/11 in the minds of the British public. Secondly, the UK’s involvement 
in counter-terrorism operations was limited in comparison with the Americans. Thirdly, the 
logic of Blair’s liberal interventionism precluded talk of a distinctively national security 
policy, in rhetorical terms at the least. A fourth reason relates to the emergence in mid-2002 
of Iraq as the foreign policy priority of the United States and, consequently, of the Blair 
Government. By September of 2002, the ratcheting up of rhetoric against the Saddam 
Hussein regime reached new heights with Blair’s announcement in the House of Commons 
of the ‘WMD dossier’; political and media attention by this point was firmly on the 
controversial subject of invading Iraq, while Afghanistan scarcely featured. When mentioned 
by members of the Cabinet, the trend was to refer to the conflict element of British 
involvement as completed, and to reiterate commitments to the reconstruction of the 
country. For example, the Defence Secretary, Geoff Hoon, spoke in the Commons of 
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progress made and of drawing down troops in the country as early as October of 2002, 
indicating that the view of Government was that military action in Afghanistan was finished 
and that, as such, the threat posed to global security by Afghanistan was much reduced 
(Hansard 2002d). The rhetoric of security by this point had moved onto Iraq, and would 
remain there until preparations for the Helmand deployment were made public in 2005. 
Interestingly, the one clear mention of a national security threat to the United Kingdom 
during this first period related not to Afghanistan, but Iraq, in the form of the potential for 
states with WMD capability to combine with Islamist terrorist organisations. In setting out 
the case for intervention in Iraq, Blair drew upon the threat to British security, stating that  
‘they share one basic common view: they detest the freedom, democracy and 
tolerance that are the hallmarks of our way of life. At the moment, I accept 
fully that the association between the two is loose—but it is hardening. The 
possibility of the two coming together—of terrorist groups in possession of 
weapons of mass destruction or even of a so-called dirty radiological bomb—
is now, in my judgment, a real and present danger to Britain and its national 
security’ (Hansard 2003a).  
History has since dismissed the credibility of these claims, and Blair’s own belief in 
their veracity is still open for questioning. The point worth making here is that Blair utilised a 
high mimetic, apocalyptic genre interpretation in order to press the point of the importance 
of preventing such a possibility – a point which was by no means conclusive, self-evident, or 
overwhelmingly accepted by parliamentarians or the public. Crucially, given the high stakes 
of securing legislative backing for the invasion of Iraq, Blair appears to have grounded his 
claims not in the internationalist realm of values or in the collective realm of security, but 
rather in a nation-centric cultural coding of security, ostensibly in order to impress the 
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importance of participating in a potential invasion of Iraq to a sceptical audience. As 
controversial as the issues of British national security and the WMD dossier were, this was 
also just one of several reasons Blair and his Cabinet colleagues gave to justify the invasion 
of Iraq. Most of their rationales remained normatively-based: removing the dictatorship of 
Saddam Hussein from power, bringing democratic government to the Iraqi people, 
strengthening international institutions such as the United Nations, developing the 
transatlantic relationship between Europe and the United States, and the shaping of 
American foreign policy towards a more multilateral outlook were all cited by Blair as 
primary or secondary rationales (Hansard 2003a). These were less controversial than the 
national security claim: in response to that rhetorical route, allegations arose that the 
Government had ‘sexed up’ the dossier to make the national security issue appear more 
urgent and existential, typified by the claim that Iraqi WMDs could be deployed against the 
UK within ‘45-minutes’. With the benefit of hindsight it would seem that, in the face of a 
‘hard sell’ to a sceptical British public unconvinced by humanitarian or internationalist 
discourses, the Blair Government made the decision to emphasise the imminent risk posed 
by Hussein to the lives of British people. As we shall see, this theme recurs in relation to 
Afghanistan in the narrative reset of 2008. 
 
Phase II: 2003-2005 – The Peak of Collective Security Discourse  
Given Britain’s lead role in counter-narcotics, NATO’s takeover of ISAF, the war in Iraq 
and the relative calm of Afghanistan between 2003 and 2005, the counter-terrorism 
narrative did not feature much in the speeches and statements of Government officials 
during this phase of the conflict. Where it did, it was characterised by a totalising view of 
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Afghanistan as one front within a wider War on Terror, where Iraq and Afghanistan were 
spoken of as being two parts of a coherent whole. In rhetorical terms, at least, it was natural 
that this was so, since speaking of a global War on Terror as the problem – rather than two 
distinct campaigns with drastically different social, economic and geographic makeups and 
animated by quite different rationales – fit into Blair’s (and Bush’s) Kantian meta-narrative 
for global democratic transformation as the catch-all solution to terrorism and failing states. 
In theoretical terms, it is worth noting that this amalgamation of two quite different 
conflicts within a framework of a global counter-terrorist war fits well with Smith’s ‘high 
mimesis’ framework: by claiming both conflicts to be central to and indivisible from a global, 
existential struggle against terrorism, the decision to pursue two conflicts simultaneously 
could be given greater authoritativeness. Whether this approach actually worked in practice 
is another issue, however, as from the moment the Coalition invaded Iraq, and even more 
so once the security situation began to deteriorate rapidly in the autumn of 2003, there had 
been calls for the Government to leave Iraq and focus on the more credible security issues 
that Afghanistan represented. Blair’s understanding of the nature of terrorism and the 
United Kingdom’s role in combatting it would not allow any such distinction to be made, 
however.  
‘The truth is that if we withdrew from Iraq, we would be told to withdraw 
from Afghanistan, and if we withdrew from Afghanistan, we would be told to 
withdraw from the whole of the middle east, and then we would be made to 
withdraw even more… the hon. Gentleman asked whether we had not made 
ourselves a bigger target by our action in Iraq. My answer is that we are a 
target for these people by our very existence and the values we believe in, 
and that the only way to defeat them is to get after them’ (Hansard 2004b). 
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Thus, in Blair’s mind, terrorism was a security issue for all people and all states, 
because terrorists do not pick their targets on the basis of what those targets’ policies 
consist of or what they are understood to have done, but because of the values that they 
represent. Here we can observe a clear link between Blair’s value system and unequivocal 
rhetorical support for collective security operations. Arguing for an understanding of 
warfare (and of the motives of self and enemy) as one centred upon values rather than 
tangible material or political factors meant that the Blair Government did not need to 
perceive the conflicts as separate; rather, because of the logic of interdependence and 
globalisation that pervaded New Labour’s foreign policy, all things and all peoples were 
connected, willingly or not, in the struggle against international terrorism. Thus, the 
strategic details and operational implications of foreign policy decisions appear to have 
been almost an irrelevance for Blair. Since values were the animus for terrorist activity, not 
intervention and invasion, Britain and all other liberal democratic states were at risk 
whether they participated in Iraq and Afghanistan or not: 
‘what now happens in Iraq and Afghanistan affects us here as it does every 
nation, supportive or not of the actions we have taken’ (Hansard 2004e). 
In the face of the logic of a values-centric conflict which implied that terrorists would 
not distinguish between the boundaries of troop contributing and non-troop contributing 
states (but rather focused on the type of polity each state adhered to), the obligation for 
multilateralism and interventionism can only appear as a rational imperative. It is worth 
considering this view on its own merits: despite the difficulties associated with Iraq in mid-
2004, notably in the form of a tactical defeat in Fallujah and the breaking of the Abu Ghraib 
prison abuse scandal, there were grounds for optimism in Afghanistan that supported Blair’s 
internationalist language. The Afghans had ratified a new constitution, the international 
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community had pledged some £8 billion to reconstruction and development efforts at the 
April Berlin Conference, and the remit of NATO’s ISAF mission had been expanded to take 
eventual control over the security of the entirety of Afghan territory at the Istanbul summit 
in June. Stabilisation in Afghanistan offered the more reticent European NATO states the 
opportunity to participate in the War on Terror in a largely combat-free posture, and in 
doing so validated Blair’s counter-terrorism narrative as a truly international and 
comprehensive effort. In this vein, Blair could reinforce his core points – that the War on 
Terror was a global, democratic and multilateral response to terrorism, and it was so 
because terrorism represented a threat to all free peoples and manifested itself most 
frequently in places around the world where freedom was lacking: 
‘we will stick with this and see it through, because it is in the interests not only 
of security in those countries [Iraq and Afghanistan] but of global security’ 
(Hansard 2004f). 
To press the point, the Blair Government’s focus was on looking at terrorism as a 
global issue requiring global action for global solutions; there was scarcely a single reference 
in the Government’s counter-terrorism narrative of international terrorism as an explicit 
threat to the ‘national’ security of the United Kingdom. Blair’s focus was on international 
and transnational solidarity and the importance of maintaining collective security alliances. 
Indeed, this theme was echoed by senior NATO officials throughout 2003 and 2004, 
suggesting that collective security and not counter-terrorism was the animating feature of 
expanding and consolidating the international presence in Afghanistan. On the day NATO 
assumed control of ISAF, then-Deputy Secretary General Alessandro Minuto Rizzo remarked 
that, 
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‘[t]his new mission is a reflection of NATO’s ongoing transformation, and 
resolve, to meet the security challenges of the 21st century. But most of all, 
NATO’s increased involvement demonstrates our nations’ continuing, long-
term commitment to stability and security for the Afghan people’ (Rizzo 2003: 
online). 
It is noteworthy that Rizzo combines these two elements – NATO transformation and 
stabilisation of Afghanistan – as the main features of the ISAF command decision. 
Intriguingly, while he states that the stabilisation imperative was the ‘most’ important of the 
two, Rizzo also claimed that the ISAF mission was ‘a reflection’ of NATO transformation. The 
nuance here is unmistakeable: according to Rizzo, NATO’s transformation was the key driver 
of the mission, and increased involvement in Afghanistan was a consequence of the 
demands of transformation and multi-national cohesion. One may infer from his statement 
and ordering of rationales therein that the needs of the Alliance shaped the mission; in fact, 
to a degree the expansion of the Afghan mission was conceived in terms of testing the 
mettle of the Alliance. Simple chronology suggests this to be the case, since NATO’s 
transformation agenda was set in motion just months prior to its decision to take over ISAF. 
Evidence of this ordering of priorities appeared again in a speech given by former NATO 
Secretary General Lord George Robertson in October 2003 when he listed the reasons for 
NATO’s new role: 
‘if we abandon the people of Afghanistan, the international credibility of 
every NATO nation, and of the Alliance itself, will lie in tatters. The risk from 
mass terrorism will increase exponentially. And the prospect of ending the 
scourge of Afghanistan sourced drugs on the streets of Brussels and other 
European cities will vanish’ (Robertson 2003: online). 
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Again, the self-preservation of NATO appears as the foremost rationale for expanding 
the ISAF mission, followed by the mitigation of international terrorism and eradicating the 
narcotics trade. Interestingly, the well-being of the Afghan people was not listed as a reason 
for involvement by Robertson, just as international terrorism and the ‘scourge’ of heroin 
were not mentioned by Rizzo two months earlier. The theme of NATO’s credibility being 
presented with a fundamental test in the form of Afghanistan remained constant for over a 
year, with Robertson’s successor Jaap de Hoop Scheffer employing this argument as late as 
October 2004 (Scheffer 2004: online). What this suggests is that institutional demands – 
specifically the maintenance of Alliance cohesion in the face of a major military operation, 
and therein the validation of NATO as a post-Cold War institution – were of paramount 
importance, and at the very least were equal in importance to the task of stabilising 
Afghanistan. It was not a pure form of ‘strategic logic’ – the threat posed to Europe by 
Afghanistan – but multi- or transnationally informed ‘institutional dynamics’, specifically 
‘Europe’s political commitments and interdependencies’,  as re-configured in light of the 
Iraq affair, that defined the NATO decision and shaped the course of ISAF operations (King 
2011:25). Indeed, it would not be until two years after the NATO takeover that a senior 
British statesman would explicitly relate Afghan instability to British ‘national’ security. In a 
speech to the Labour Party Conference in Brighton following the July 2005 bombings in 
London, then-Chancellor Gordon Brown noted how the denizens of the capital had moved in 
twenty four hours from the ‘joy’ of winning the prize of the host city for the 2012 Summer 
Olympics to 
‘the horror of homegrown suicide bombers maiming and killing fellow British 
citizens … let no one doubt that we will spend what it takes, bear each and 
every hardship, endure each and every sacrifice … both internationally in 
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Afghanistan and Iraq and at home, we will at all times have the strength and 
resolution so that there is no hiding place for terrorists - or those who finance 
terrorism - and so we will protect and defend the security of the people of this 
country’ (Brown 2005: online). 
Brown’s statement is interesting on a number of levels. Firstly, and most obviously for 
our purposes, it signalled the emergence of a nascent ‘national security’ element to the 
counter-terrorist narrative as a consequence of the first successful Islamist terrorist attack in 
the United Kingdom. The bombings exposed the vulnerabilities of the national security 
apparatus in a manner that left few in any doubt of the dangers posed by religiously-
inspired terrorism. In making this rhetorical move, however, Brown did not jettison the 
overarching logic of the internationalist vision expounded by Blair. For the sake of narrative 
coherence it was fortunate that Blair’s approach was flexible, because the facts of ‘7/7’ did 
not directly support it.  The perpetrators of the bombings were British citizens, not Afghans 
or Iraqis; they had visited not Iraq or Afghanistan in preparation for their activities but 
Pakistan – an ally in the War on Terror; and it was likely that Britain’s involvement in 
Afghanistan and Iraq had actually increased radicalisation of Muslim communities in the UK 
and, therefore, the likelihood of terrorist attacks on British soil. These issues did not prevent 
Brown from linking the attacks to al-Qaeda activities in Britain’s theatres of operation and, 
as a consequence, from equating Britain’s collective security commitments in those 
countries as being directly in the country’s national security interest. The mere fact that the 
London bombers were ‘inspired’ by al-Qaeda was sufficient to make the claim that they 
were connected to the terrorist ‘network’ and, therefore, indicative of an existential 
struggle that knew no geographical or administrative limits but, on the contrary, was 
defined by norms. This fit neatly into Blair’s dialogical view of a battle of ‘values’, which 
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allowed judgments on the strategic worth of occupying or invading states on grounds of 
collective security to be unhindered by the fact that the only terrorist attacks successfully 
carried out in Britain since 9/11 were perpetrated by residents of Britain. Tellingly, however, 
Brown’s national security approach was not repeated by Blair when he took the stage at the 
Party Conference the following day. Instead, Blair remained true to his internationalist roots 
in reminding the audience of the rationale for Britain’s leading role in the War on Terror: 
‘I never doubted after September 11 that our place was alongside America 
and I don't doubt it now. And for a very simple reason. Terrorism struck most 
dramatically in New York but it was aimed then, and is aimed now, at us all, at 
our way of life’ (Blair 2005: online). 
For Blair, justifying collective security principles required the maintenance of a 
discourse that eschewed ‘national’ considerations and placed the conflict in ideological and 
normative terms that emphasised the essential unity of alliance members as an 
international community of like-minded democratic actors. This is not to argue that one 
could not independently read a ‘national’ aspect into Blair’s statements and speeches; on 
the contrary, the strength of Blair’s position was that it could bridge the divide between 
international obligations and domestic political pressures with limited contradiction. Rather, 
the issue was that Blair’s internationalist outlook predicated that the first of these (foreign 
relations) could not be sacrificed for the second (domestic political expediency). As such, 
where pressures emerged from within the UK that challenged Britain’s liberal 
internationalism, Blair’s response was limited in that the normative narrative edifice built 
around that principle was inflexible: alliance commitments were for his Government a ‘red 
line’ that could not be sacrificed by reversion to a populist realist revisionism. In retrospect, 
Blair’s Brighton speech appears as the high point of his particular brand of internationalist 
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rhetoric. His achievements up to then were significant: an unprecedented third consecutive 
victory for Labour in the 2005 General Election, leadership on the world stage unsurpassed 
by his European counterparts, and contribution to the undertaking of an historic 
parliamentary election in Afghanistan. Britain’s entry into Helmand in 2006, however, would 
mark a shift change in emphasis of the counter-terrorist policy narrative away from 
international security and towards a more restricted form of national security. 
 
Phase III: 2006-2009 – From Afghan Democracy to British Security 
Preparations for Britain’s participation in ISAF’s move to the south of Afghanistan in 
early 2006 were accompanied by a rhetorical dimension that initially reaffirmed the Blairite 
conceptualisation of foreign affairs as one defined by interdependence, solidarity among 
NATO allies, and a strong vein of Kantian ethics. Much of the spokesperson duties to this 
end were performed by Defence Secretary John Reid, a close ally of Blair’s, who spoke 
publicly on the subject of deployment at least eleven times between June of 2005 and the 
beginning of the operation in April of 2006. Reid explained the role of Task Force Helmand 
as a reconstruction and security-building mission, and in doing so emphasised the 
distinction between ISAF operations and those of the American-led Operation Enduring 
Freedom, which were delimited to counter-terrorism operations (Hansard 2005d). He took 
care to frame Britain’s operations within the multilateral framework established by Blair, 
declaring in January 2006 that the drive into the southern quadrant of Afghanistan was 
‘truly… an international, multinational effort’ (Hansard 2006a). In a joint press conference 
with United States Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in February, Reid articulated the 
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multilateral approach in a manner reminiscent of Blair’s ‘relocation of interest’ Chicago 
speech, stating that 
‘[t]here’s a reason that NATO is involved in Afghanistan and it’s that this is the 
21st Century.  Problems are not specifically nation state problems, they’re not 
specifically even regional problems and in many instances they’re global 
problems.  It requires an alliance like NATO to recognize and adjust and face 
the challenges that exist in this new century’ (Reid 2006: online). 
In Reid’s view, then, Helmand represented a multilateral, even transnational response 
to the problem of failed states, of which the British were one component within a 
transnationalised defence edifice working for the end of global security. The NATO alliance’s 
full participation in the stabilisation and reconstruction of Afghanistan was necessary 
because all were subject to the threat posed by instability in that country to their own 
security, and because all nations’ security were at risk from terrorism on the basis of their 
shared values (and the idea that al Qaeda hated not individual states’ foreign policies, but 
rather their democratic freedoms), the security threat was a global one rather than a 
national one. Because the threat of terrorism was considered indivisible between NATO 
states, it followed that counter-terrorism, whether pursued directly in the form of capture-
or-kill missions, or indirectly through stabilisation and reconstruction activities, was the 
responsibility of all NATO states. In this sense, Reid was outlining a classic interpretation of 
collective security logic. Ten days after his press conference, in an interview with the BBC, 
Reid linked the national security of the United Kingdom to that of the success of the 
collective security mission by connecting the indivisibility of national security to the 
solidarity necessary for the success of the mission. 
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‘We're there because Afghanistan under the Taleban and Al Qaeda, was the 
place where not only were the plans to murder thousands of people in New 
York prepared, but they were actually trained for, and launched. And if 
Afghanistan is ever to slip back into the hands of the terrorists again then we 
would be just as much in that front line of threat as the people of, the 
thousands who tragically died in New York’ (BBC 2006b: online). 
Reid did not entirely comport with Blair’s totalising counter-terrorism approach, 
however. In the same BBC interview he drew a subtle distinction between Afghanistan and 
Iraq, stating that Britain ‘went in there unlike Iraq with the united world community through 
the United Nations’ (BBC 2006b: online). This was presumably an attempt to enhance the 
legitimacy of the Afghan mission vis-à-vis Iraq in the eyes of a sceptical British public by 
presenting its multilateral, UN-sanctified credentials, and possibly also represents a nod by 
the Defence Secretary to the British military’s dissatisfaction with Iraq and their desire to 
shift the locus of their operations out of Basra and into Helmand. This move represented a 
sharp diversion from the Blair approach of treating Iraq and Afghanistan as two fronts, of 
equal legitimacy, in the same war, and can also be seen retrospectively as the beginnings of 
a narrative line that prioritised the comparative treatment by British officials of Afghanistan, 
contra Iraq, as ‘the good war’ (Kavanagh 2012:50).  
By the autumn of 2006, the framing of the counter-terrorist policy narrative had 
begun a period of gradual change, most notably in the altering of the referent object of 
security from the ‘global’ to the ‘national’. This change of emphasis was likely the result of 
rhetoric meeting reality on the ground in Helmand: for all the pre-deployment talk of 
reconstruction and development, the environment encountered by British forces from April 
2006 was highly ‘kinetic’, involving a series of violent clashes between insurgents and thinly-
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spread British troops and culminating in a negotiated cease-fire and tentative truce in Musa 
Qala (King 2010b:317-318). From the start of operations to the end of August, sixteen British 
troops had been killed in the fighting, compared with just four in the entirety of the 
campaign between 2001 and 2005 (three of which were non-battle related). Naturally, this 
discrepancy between rhetoric and reality was latched upon by an increasingly critical British 
press, which published articles questioning the coherence and logic of the mission aims of 
reconstruction and counter-narcotics in such an environment (Campbell 2006). Recourse to 
a high-mimetic narrative that linked British military activity and casualties to the protection 
of British citizens at home can be seen in this light, as with the 45-minute claim,  as a rather 
instinctive and defensive narrative position to take in the face of mounting criticism. 
The beginnings of this trend were tempered in their attempts to balance the high-
concept normative basis for a global or collective security imperative with the rhetorical 
impulse for national security. Blair spoke at the September 2006 Labour Party Conference of 
the dangers of withdrawing prematurely from Iraq and Afghanistan as akin to ‘a craven act 
of surrender that will put our future security in the deepest peril’, but remained resolute in 
his internationalist vision by noting that although ‘[t]he British people today are reluctant 
global citizens’, it was up to his Government and the Labour Party to ‘make them confident 
ones’ (Blair 2006: online). The Opposition leader, David Cameron, spoke in similar terms the 
following month, claiming that leaving Afghanistan will ‘create another cocktail, another 
hotbed of terrorism. That is bad not just for Afghanistan but bad for the world. Bad for us 
here …in the United Kingdom’ (Cameron 2006: online). Balancing these demands was not 
necessarily problematic since they were based on a hypothetical claim that had long been a 
staple of the British (and international) counter-terrorist narrative, indeed one that 
underpinned the entire rationale of ISAF stabilisation activities: that an unstable Afghanistan 
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would, as a matter of course, return to the state of affairs pre-9/11. Of course, this 
assessment was unfalsifiable, but had the trauma of 9/11 to support it. It was also 
uncontroversial in its ubiquity throughout the policy positions and public statements of 
members of the NATO alliance. An early exception to this rule is found in an interview 
conducted by the BBC with Shadow Defence Minister Liam Fox, who prioritised national 
security as the primary rationale for involvement in Afghanistan for the first time:  
‘[i]t's absolutely essential that for the future functioning of the UN and its 
authority, but more importantly for the cohesion and the reputation of NATO, 
that we have success in Afghanistan. And it has a direct impact on this 
country's national security, which is top of the list [my emphasis]’ (Fox 2007: 
online). 
Fox paid homage to the core interest of the United Kingdom in maintaining the NATO 
alliance but also categorically stated the pre-eminence of British interests by introducing an 
explicitly ‘national’ security argument. At this stage, however, Fox’s statement represented 
something of an exception to the rule. So long as Blair remained Prime Minister, the rhetoric 
of both his ministers and his political opponents generally maintained their consistency, 
speaking to the normative basis of the mission and the political advantages of national 
security concerns, but almost always within a wider context of global or collective security. 
What is remarkable about Fox’s interview was that his ostensible purpose of appearing on 
the programme was to criticise what he perceived to be the lack of adequate ‘burden-
sharing’ within NATO, noting that the British, along with the Americans, Canadians, and 
Dutch were performing a disproportionate amount of the most dangerous work in the 
country, while NATO members such as Germany, who operated under strict national 
caveats dictating their rules of engagement, remained in relatively benign northern parts of 
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Afghanistan. The perception that British personnel were incurring higher casualty rates than 
many of their continental counterparts could not have helped the narrative device of 
multilateralism, particularly within the Conservative Party which, whilst populated by a 
number of internationalist-minded parliamentarians, did not share Blair’s vision for 
‘relocating the national interest’ within the international community. Citing ‘national 
security’ therefore made ideological sense and had the fortuitous added benefit of political 
expediency. 
Gordon Brown’s accession to the role of Prime Minister in May 2007 was 
accompanied by a enhancing of the national security discourse within the counter-terrorism 
narrative. In general terms, Brown sought to distance himself and his policies from that of 
his predecessor, moving away from the grandiose rhetoric of Blair and toning down the 
‘special relationship’ with President Bush (Dunn 2008). This appears to have been a very 
conscious move: it may be argued that Brown’s motivation as framing himself as a contrast 
to Blair and with the goal in mind of mitigating the damage done to Labour by Iraq. As far as 
concerns Brown, however, Iraq was something of a moot point by the time he took over 
from Blair, as the wheels were put in motion by the military chiefs in the early 2007 to begin 
drawing down from Iraq and reallocating troops and resources to Afghanistan (Seldon & 
Lodge 2011:26). Nonetheless, as Dunn (2008:1135) notes, the trend of political discourse 
under the Brown ministry was to disassociate the Government from the negative 
implications of the Blair era, specifically the popular perceptions of ‘poodleism’ and the 
acquiescence of the British state to the demands of the Bush Administration on Iraq. This 
was arguably an element of the counter-terrorism policy narrative for Afghanistan that had 
become toxic under Blair by its association with Iraq, and therefore required British 
policymakers to move away from emphasising the collective security dimension of the 
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Afghan mission. By asserting Britain’s independence from the United States, it was therefore 
perhaps a natural corollary that the language of national security would become more 
prominent. A result of this shift in tack was that members of the Cabinet, freed from Blair’s 
influence, were quick to point out the differences between Iraq and Afghanistan in public 
statements, focusing on the importance of the latter by implicitly casting doubt on the 
security relevance of the former. For example, in an interview in July of 2007 laying out the 
Brown Government’s foreign policy agenda, just two months after Blair’s departure, Foreign 
Secretary David Miliband made the following remark: 
‘I hope we can move to a situation where we don't have Iraq and Afghanistan 
in the same breath… they are different conflicts with different dynamics. I 
think the situation in Afghanistan is a central aspect of national security. If you 
think about 9/11’ (Miliband 2007: online). 
Moving to separate Afghanistan from Iraq by emphasising the national security 
element set in motion a chain of events throughout the remainder of this phase which 
would culminate in the pre-eminence of the national security argument above all others. 
Throughout the remainder of 2007 and the first half of 2008, the modus operandi of official 
statements on Afghanistan was to highlight the multi-faceted ‘comprehensive approach’ to 
securing a democratic Afghan state and society. National security was an important, but still 
not paramount, element in the counter-terrorism narrative. Miliband in particular embarked 
on a speaking tour promoting, in a manner reminiscent of Blair, the British effort in 
Afghanistan as one that ‘symbolises our dual goal of protecting our national security and 
promoting human rights’ (Miliband 2008: online). In October of 2008, however, with the 
departure of Browne and arrival of John Hutton as Defence Secretary, the narrative rapidly 
altered to one that placed national security, and specifically ‘national security interests’, at 
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the forefront. According to Seldon and Lodge (2011:207) Hutton’s appointment as Defence 
Secretary in early October 2008 was met with some consternation by the Foreign Office and 
the Department for International Development. During Browne’s tenure, Seldon and Lodge 
argue, a ‘consensus had existed’ between him, Alexander and Miliband of ‘finding a political 
solution and building up Afghan institutions… rather than laying too much weight on a 
military defeat of the Taliban’. Hutton, they contend, was perceived by Brown as ‘the voice 
of the military in Cabinet, rather than the voice of government in the MoD’. In this reading, 
Hutton could hardly have been more different from Browne. The narrative change appears 
to have been near instantaneous: whilst Miliband and Alexander had for the previous year 
spoken frequently of the need for a comprehensive approach, Hutton wasted little time in 
making several statements and speeches arguing for more robust military activity and 
resourcing.  
In November, Hutton gave a speech outlining his view of Afghanistan as representing a 
‘vital national security interest’. He began by addressing the reasons for going into 
Afghanistan, arguing that the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States were an 
‘attack on our national interests’, and claimed it was ‘a crime by Al Qaida against the entire 
civilised world’ (Hutton 2008: online). His remarks can be interpreted as being somewhat 
paradoxical and, as such, quintessentially in keeping with liberal normativity, insofar as it 
attempted to synthesise a realist appraisal of state interest with a liberal internationalist 
assertion of interdependence.  Whilst couching 9/11 and the war in Afghanistan in a 
distinctly ‘national’ context, Hutton essentially echoed the same logic as Blair’s 
internationalist rhetoric seven years previous, presumably because he recognised that one 
cannot say a national interest has been attacked as a result of an attack on a foreign city 
without making reference to institutional and/or liberal norms implicit in collective security 
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arrangements. Yet, in doing so, the implication is that one naturally mitigates much of the 
‘national’ aspect of the interest itself. Given the distinctiveness of such a turn of phrase and, 
centrally, this implication, it is worth querying why Hutton might have taken this narrative 
approach and, more importantly, why Hutton’s national security narrative became 
entrenched within the Brown Government thereafter.  
There are several possible reasons we can consider. The first relates to collective 
security demands: specifically, the recognition by the British political establishment of 
changing circumstances in the United States and the fact that both presidential candidates 
in the 2008 election were ‘pro-surge’ (Defence Committee 2008: online). Under such a 
surge, Britain would be expected to contribute even more resources to the Afghan 
campaign, which concomitantly would increase the likelihood of more fighting, more 
casualties, and more negative media attention. As such, reconfiguring the conflict as 
nationally-focused and about British security and interests would ameliorate the potential 
for officials to become rhetorically muddled. A second issue relates to the challenges of 
producing a convincing stabilisation narrative that aligned with the broader expectations of 
civil society. A narrative that focused on developmental and political issues whilst 
accounting for the costs associated with deteriorating security on the ground was no simple 
task, particularly given the media’s tendency, in one MOD official’s view, to be ‘only 
interested in reporting on security’ (Personal Interview, 2013). The view in Whitehall was 
that British messaging had become too narrow in scope, and that an enhanced national 
security narrative would be useful in ‘lifting it back out of Helmand’ – in other words, by 
emphasising less the specifics of development and more the broader theme of Afghan 
stabilisation as the means to the end of counter-terrorism (Personal Interview, 2013). This 
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view has been corroborated in an interview with an MOD official, who explained to the 
author that the narrative had been 
‘simplified but not in a negative sense. I think you’ve got to have a consistent 
message. You may get into more detail with different audiences… But in terms 
of our key messages, broadly deployable key messages aimed at the average 
person in the street, I think they have to be kept simple because you just lose 
them if you get into the real complexities of that kind of stuff. So, I don’t think 
it’s been simplified in a way to hoodwink the public or be disingenuous, I think 
it’s to help them by being clear and simple as to the primary reasons why 
we’re there. If they’re interested and want further information then there’s 
plenty of sources out there, and we absolutely push the shades of grey to the 
people who can understand that and continue to pass on that message… one 
thing we’ve learned is just to keep the message simple, especially when you’re 
immersed in it every day, the temptation is to write quite a complex 
statement or reactive line, you kind of want to explain all the nuances, but you 
just lose the reader. And I think that’s almost a disservice to them. If you keep 
it simple, so your line is more likely to appear in its entirety in the newspapers 
and the media, then you’re helping the public by getting that balance to the 
media perception of what’s going on’ (Personal Interview, 2013).   
 A third potential reason is party political: the Brown Government’s adoption of the 
national security discourse from the Conservative Opposition (particularly from Cameron 
and Fox), who had been arguing with some consistency for two years – and with greater 
intensity in the summer and early autumn of 2008 – for a national security-based narrative 
for the conflict. This in turn may have been the result of the close links between Hutton and 
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the military, and between the Conservatives and the military. A fourth contributing factor is 
economic, that is, the impact of the global financial crisis on public spending, and a 
concordant recognition by Brown that the necessities of spending cuts would potentially 
impact the scope and breadth of what could be achieved in Afghanistan, thereby making it 
prudent to focus the narrative on a core issue of national security (Cornish & Dorman 
2009:248). Whatever the reasoning (or combination thereof) behind the narrative 
transition, the language used in Hutton’s speech was new, particularly the term ‘national 
security interest’: 
‘the decision to stay was based on a hard-headed assessment of our clear 
national security interest in preventing the re-emergence of Taleban rule or 
Afghanistan’s decline into a failing state again. Either of those outcomes 
would have allowed Al Qaida to return and recreate their terrorist 
infrastructure’ (Hutton 2008). 
Hutton’s use of the term ‘national security interest’ was, in fact, a first for the 
narrative for the war in Afghanistan. What exactly does this term mean? There is little that 
is ‘clear’ about it upon first inspection; rather, it seems to be merely a hybridisation of the 
terms ‘national security’ and ‘national interest’. When one talks of national interests it is 
important to recognise that the referent of those interests is, at the fundamental 
philosophical level, disputed; as Arnold Wolfers noted, ‘when political formulas such as 
“national interest” or “national security” gain popularity they need to be scrutinized with 
particular care. They may not mean the same thing to different people. They may not have 
any precise meaning at all”’ (Williams 2012:8). While we do not know precisely what Hutton 
meant by it, or whether he meant anything by it at all – it may well have been an 
uncontemplated rhetorical idiosyncrasy – the term itself stuck, and would be frequently 
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employed by the Brown and Cameron ministries in the years that followed (Hansard 2011; 
Defence Committee 2013:Ev71). A reasoned inference may be that the use of the term 
‘national security interest’ is a rather clever attempt to reconcile the divergent political 
philosophies of realism and liberal internationalism. To say that a stable Afghanistan is ‘in 
the national interest’ does not necessarily imply that it is a security threat to the United 
Kingdom; it may be so, but may also be in the national interest because of collective security 
demands or so that Britain’s place in the world remains at its current disproportionate 
status. Equally, to imply Afghanistan is a national security issue outright (as opposed to a 
‘security interest’) would be to give rise to an understanding that it poses a ‘direct’ threat to 
the UK, thereby taking on a rigidity that contrasts with a national security interest. Indeed, 
examinations of the rationale for participation in Afghanistan of NATO member states  
reveals that national security is often subordinate to alliance cohesion concerns since, 
rather than enhancing national security, many NATO members were of the opinion that 
involvement made them less secure (Guardian 2009).  
Specifically, to say that Afghanistan represents a national security threat to the United 
Kingdom requires some evidential basis that can be easily deployed to substantiate the 
argument. A ‘national security interest’, however, does not, since its hybridisation of 
interest and security indicates a flexibility of application. Precise causality has seldom been 
forthcoming by state officials in this regard, although this may simply be a reflection of the 
clandestine demands of British intelligence institutions. Whatever the truth may be, the lack 
of exact causality in Afghan messaging was partially remedied by Hutton, however, by resort 
to personal conviction and hypothetical supposition: 
‘We undertook military action in Afghanistan because this was the base from 
which Al Qaida leaders, through the sanctuary offered by the Taleban, were 
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planning and directing major terrorist operations throughout the world - 
operations that would, without any doubt at all in my mind, have been aimed 
at the UK…let us be clear: if they had the means no moral compunction would 
restrain the unleashing of those kinds of destructive forces on the streets of 
Britain’ (Hutton 2008).  
Hutton’s line of argumentation could point to the terrorist attack of July 7th, 2005 (as 
well as the foiled attempt of a fortnight later) to vindicate his view with some plausibility. 
However, phrases such as ‘without any doubt at all in my mind’ and ‘if they had the means’ 
represent in the main unfalsifiable personal opinions; whether these opinions were 
supportable by evidence is not clear, but any such evidence was not provided in Hutton’s 
speech. As with the term ‘national security interest’, such hypotheticals would become 
commonplace in the latter stages of the campaign. Despite the longevity of this narrative 
device, the limitations of such an approach were exposed relatively early – in October 2008 
– during a Defence Committee hearing, in an exchange between Committee member and 
Conservative MP David Heathcote-Amory and Miliband: 
‘Heathcoat-Amory: Frankly, recent international terrorist threats, as far as we 
can assess them, have not been solely or even mainly derived from 
Afghanistan. 
Miliband: That is because we are there. 
Heathcoat-Amory: It is desirable to have a democratic, strong Government in 
Afghanistan, but that is too far removed from our own security to be a 
realistic or precise war aim that we can judge that we have met and so end 
the campaign. 
263 
 
Miliband: Obviously, that is a ridiculous argument. You are saying that there is 
no reason for us to be there. I am saying that we are there to prevent the 
Taliban from overthrowing the Government and thereby providing a home for 
al-Qaeda. You are saying that there is no evidence that al-Qaeda is a threat in 
Afghanistan. Precisely, but that is because we are there’ (Defence Committee 
2008). 
Heathcote-Amory’s questioning shed light on the paradoxical nature of the 
suppositional position taken by the Brown ministry, namely that Afghanistan is a national 
security threat because of 9/11 and, because of this past reality, if Afghanistan were to fall 
back into the hands of the Taliban there would be a substantively higher risk that al Qaeda 
would return and seek to attack Britain. However, because Britain and its ISAF partners 
were in Afghanistan this threat was being contained, and as such Afghanistan did not 
currently represent an immanent security threat to the United Kingdom. Heathcote-Amory’s 
criticism is indicative of exactly the kind of rhetorical trap a Government messaging policy of 
positing Afghanistan as centrally a counter-terrorism mission can fall into. Similarly, such a 
position opens up to questioning the validity of pursuing a democratisation agenda in 
Afghanistan if the sole aim of Britain’s involvement in the conflict was national security. 
Because the focus had shifted from international to national security, the scrutiny increased 
on the democratic and development aspects. A consequence of the discourse of national 
security was the emergence of a situation where stabilisation was relegated to the status of 
a means to the end of a nationally-focused counter-terrorist agenda. This would set the 
trend for the final five years of Britain’s participation in the Afghan campaign and provide 
the catalyst for the undoing of the stabilisation narrative. 
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Phase IV: 2009-2011 – Consolidating National Security Rhetoric 
During the fourth phase of the Afghan conflict the frequency of the national security 
line of inquiry increased dramatically. Substantial revisions and expansions of the counter-
terrorist narrative took place during this period, including the incorporating of Pakistan into 
the foreign internal defence stratagem, which reflected the requirement of British policy to 
be in step with President Obama’s March 2009 reorientation of US policy to the ‘Af-Pak’ 
paradigm (The White House 2009a: online). Obama’s speech defined the mission as the 
elimination of al Qaeda safe havens along the border of the two countries, thereby 
validating the British political establishment’s national security discourse. It also provided a 
greater delimitation of the mission’s parameters and confirmed a shift in US policy and 
resources away from Iraq and toward Afghanistan, undoubtedly improving relations with 
America’s increasingly war weary continental European counterparts. By late 2009, with the 
announcement of Obama’s Afghan ‘Surge’, practically all major NATO members had 
announced an increased troop contribution to the conflict. The way the governments of 
these member-states spoke about the importance of the mission differed dramatically from 
that of Britain, however. Kreps (2010:203-209) notes that practically all of Britain’s major 
NATO allies (excluding the United States) – Germany, France, Canada and Italy – employed a 
rationale that affirmed, more than any other factor, the importance of multilateralism and 
alliance cooperation, not national security concerns, as the prevailing reason for sustaining a 
troop presence in the country. Britain’s counter-terrorist policy narrative for Afghanistan, 
conversely, sought to distance its military operations from internationalist security rhetoric 
and continued to focus on a narrower, nationally-oriented conception of security.  
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Following the Hutton speech and the introduction of strategic communication 
processes in the Ministry of Defence, the national security rhetoric coming from 
Government was emboldened. Labour ministers jettisoned language that emphasised 
indirectness of threat, and frequently employed terms that evoked, for the first time, a 
direct link between instability in Afghanistan and ‘terror on our streets’ in the United 
Kingdom. Between April and November of 2009, for example, Brown spoke of the potential 
for Afghan terror plots to be carried out, via a ‘chain of terror that links the mountains of 
Afghanistan and Pakistan to the streets of Britain’ (Hansard 2009a). This rhetoric hit new 
heights over the summer of 2009, with Brown, Miliband, newly appointed Defence 
Secretary Bob Ainsworth and Armed Forces Minister Bill Rammell taking the lead in arguing 
the national security case for sustained involvement amidst some of the fiercest fighting 
(and fiercest media criticism), and the highest summer troop death toll (fifty-seven between 
May and August) of the conflict to date. The ‘Af-Pak’ theatre was given various metaphors 
to drive home this new enunciation of threat, including the ‘crucible’, ‘incubator’, 
‘epicentre’ and ‘nexus’ of terrorism (Hansard 2009a, 2009b). To support this claim, ministers 
repeatedly referred to the fact that ‘three-quarters of the most serious terrorist plots 
against the UK have germinated in the mountains between Afghanistan and Pakistan’, but 
also – counterproductively for their purposes – that ’seventy percent of the terrorist attacks 
planned in the UK have links back to Pakistan’ (Miliband 2009a: online). This clearly implied 
that a majority of terrorist plots are concocted in Pakistan, whereas hardly any (something 
to the order of five percent) are conceived in Afghanistan. Public officials such as General 
David Richards would address the concerns of those who doubted the Government’s 
national security reasoning on the basis that Pakistan was more of a threat to British 
national security than Afghanistan by practicing a rhetorical argumentum ad ignorantiam, 
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ostensibly to shift the burden of proof away from the counter-terrorism narrative and onto 
its detractors by securitising the debate: 
‘There are some that question whether a victory for the Taliban would lead 
automatically to a resurgence of al Qaeda inspired terrorism in the UK and 
other western countries.  I ask you this, can you be certain that it would not?’ 
(Richards 2009: online). 
Richards’ statement can been seen in one sense as eminently sensible in its neat 
articulation of the risk paradigm: can the intellectual and strategic poverty – and political 
necessity – of positing unfalsifiable scenarios be overcome by simply rejecting it outright on 
the basis that it is a logical fallacy? Doing so would no doubt in his view represent little more 
than an abrogation of a state’s first duty to defend its citizenry against attack. Indeed, there 
seems little justification, given the context of British operations in Afghanistan in 2009, in 
blaming public officials for feeling duty-bound to highlight national security demands. 
The logic of emphasising national security is unassailable given the situation with 
mounting troop casualties and dwindling public support for the mission, which by 2009, 
according to opinion polls, amounted to more than half the electorate ‘questioning their 
country’s mission’ in Afghanistan (Angus Reid/BBC 2009: online). By focusing on the national 
security element of operations, the Government sought to provide the strongest and most 
culturally embedded justification for participation they had at their disposal. The problem 
with this narrative approach was that it quickly confounded itself as a result of political 
strategic developments taking place in the United States. Specifically, it is worth considering 
the timing of the Government’s shift to the counter-terrorism narrative from more Afghan-
centric arguments and the emergence of ‘national security’ as the focal point of all policy 
narratives, which coincided in late 2008 with the strong showing of Barack Obama in the 
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run-up to the US presidential election. Obama’s official position on the War on Terror was to 
move away from the dogmatic thought processes that led America and its allies into Iraq, 
and focus instead on the core aspects of US national security. One may therefore postulate 
that the British Government’s narrative shift toward national security was in part in 
anticipation of Obama’s likely electoral victory. If this was a contributory factor, it would 
quickly be complicated by Obama’s strategic reset in mid-2009 to incorporate Pakistan into 
counter-terrorism policy (otherwise known as the ‘Af-Pak’ strategy). Britain’s natural 
inclination to follow America’s lead in counter-terrorism and emphasising the ‘national 
security’ element was effectively undermined by following this next lead, that it was, by the 
Government’s Foreign Office Minister Lord Malloch-Brown’s own admission, Pakistan, and 
not Afghanistan which represented the primary national security threat to the United 
Kingdom (Telegraph 2011: online). By placing national security over and above regional or 
global security – and therefore over the stabilisation requirements for Afghanistan – the 
Brown Government inadvertently undermined the logic of the ISAF mission altogether, since 
it could no longer appeal to the non-counter-terrorism-related accomplishments by placing 
counter-terrorism at the core, it therefore called into question the relevance of Afghanistan 
in comparison with Pakistan and elsewhere. As Brown’s aide Matt Cavanagh would later 
opine, if the mission was solely about British national security, could we not ‘achieve that in 
a different way with fewer troops and casualties, and less money? Indeed, if it’s all about al 
Qaeda, why are we in Afghanistan at all, rather than Pakistan, or even Somalia and Yemen?’ 
(Cavanagh 2010: online). Such implications were evidently elusive to Brown’s ministers; in 
their efforts to make the shift in narrative toward a narrow, nation-centric conception of 
counter-terrorism, they created ramifications for nation-building to the point where, in 
order to make the point that Afghanistan was at root a mission of national security, they 
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seemed to disparage the notion that there were any non-security aims to the mission 
whatsoever: 
‘the point I think we consistently need to make clear is that we’re in 
Afghanistan, not because we want to make the world a better place in that 
part of the world, but because fundamentally this is about our national 
security and our national interest’ (Rammell 2009b: online). 
This statement rather plainly contradicts Blair’s rhetoric outlined in the first phase of 
the conflict, to say nothing of the aims of the stabilisation mission. The counter-terrorist 
narrative as originally conceived by Blair had the transformation of Afghanistan into ‘a 
better place’ at its very core, often to the detriment of the supposed rationalist prime 
directive of security imperatives by placing the national security interests of the United 
Kingdom as an indirect goal at best. Perhaps this was merely a reflection of the perception 
that security had not improved as much or as quickly as Blair anticipated: by late 2009, 
when Rammell made the comment just quoted, the security situation in Afghanistan 
remained perilous, with most of the developmental benchmarks as set out in the Afghan 
Compact of 2006 unachieved and a presidential election left in disrepute by allegations of 
widespread fraud (Miller 2011:56; Asia Foundation 2011:31). Indeed, Rammell was not 
alone: the frequency of similar statements suggests this downplaying of non-security issues 
was an agreed upon line of Government communication policy. The extent of this reframing 
of the purpose of Afghanistan is further exposed by Miliband’s November 2009 statement, 
in which he demarcated the policy aim of preventing Afghanistan ‘being used again, by Al 
Qaida under the umbrella of Taliban rule, as a launching pad for international terrorism’ 
from ‘the strategic plan – to support the development of Afghan institutions to deliver this 
goal’ (Miliband 2009c: online). This was quite a different position from the Miliband of 2007 
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and early 2008, who spoke of ‘protecting national security and promoting human rights’ as 
being a ‘dual goal’ and of the betterment of Afghan society as essential to British interests. 
On the other hand, the Miliband of 2009 demonstrated significant conceptual progress in 
his ability to demarcate policy from strategy. Interestingly, both Rammell and Miliband’s 
comments came just weeks after Shadow Defence Secretary Liam Fox appeared on the BBC 
to lambast the Brown Government’s communication efforts and their tendency, in his view, 
to muddle messages of security with those of Afghan development: 
‘you have to be very clear about what the military mission is and what the 
subsequent mission about reconstruction and so on, which is for the 
international community to do. Because… the public understand sending our 
troops to fight for our national security. They don't understand the concept of 
fighting for an education policy on the other side of the world’ (Fox 2009: 
online). 
Fox’s comments appear to once again have had a significant impact on, or at least 
anticipatory of, Labour messaging efforts. They also represent a concise summarisation of 
British strategic communication doctrine as found in Joint Doctrine Note 1/12, which stated 
that ‘[t]he logic of the strategy and its appeal should be compelling and easily understood … 
in its totality should be simple, or at least capable of explanation in simple terms.’ (DCDC 
2012:1-4). This involved focusing on public opinion by relating the message to the public in 
terms that they can understand. Fox believed that this required framing the conflict with 
reference to the United Kingdom’s national security demands. The stated aim of strategic 
communication in JDN 1/12, to ‘advance national interests’, was a theme repeated by Chief 
of the Defence Staff Jock Stirrup in December of 2009 when he remarked that ‘[a]ll we do at 
the tactical and operational level needs to be rooted in good strategic soil, and therefore in 
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our national interest’ (Stirrup 2009: online). In order to root policy in the national interest, 
however, the Government were evidently compelled to renege on the internationalist vision 
for Afghanistan and the core element of stabilisation, which while rooted in the national 
interest by degrees of separation, was not directly amenable to the concept in the same 
way as the counter-terrorism narrative. 
Stirrup’s argument of relating strategy to the national interest must be viewed in light 
of both the empirical evidence available and through the lens of an interpretation of mid-
level state behaviour that emphasises transnationalisation of defence policy. In 2011, the 
Daily Telegraph published a Government communique from mid-2009 made available for 
public scrutiny by the website Wikileaks which clearly showed that Britain’s strategic 
decision-making was rooted in, according to the communique’s authors, awaiting the 
‘outcome of the U.S. assessment of operations in Afghanistan as a prerequisite for 
determining key aspects of British strategy in Afghanistan’ (Telegraph 2011: online). This 
way of thinking demonstrates in no uncertain terms the political realities facing Britain’s 
ability to devise strategy; that is, it cannot be devised in any substantive way independently 
of strategies pursued by its primary partner in collective security operations. Given that this 
nuance must not have been lost on Stirrup, one may infer that rooting what Britain does in 
‘good strategic soil’ and in ‘the national interest’ means either that Stirrup considered such 
soil to be of reasonable quality despite it being located without the United Kingdom, or that 
– as the core of the theoretical section of this dissertation argued – that for senior 
policymakers and military officials the national interest is largely inseparable from the 
interests of the collective security framework. Whichever of these two options best applies, 
they both speak to the transnational dilemma at the core of British policymaking and 
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strategic thinking: that Britain is inexorably at the mercy of the will of the collective security 
system (specifically that of the United States) in order to realise its interests. 
 Curiously, despite eighteen months of pressing the ‘national’ security element in 
Britain’s collective security operations in Afghanistan, some in the Government spent the 
spring of 2010 attempting to restore the internationalist dimension of the counter-terrorist 
narrative in a manner reflective of Blair’s original genre guess. In April 2010, Ainsworth 
released a ‘Labour vision for defence policy’, presumably designed to differentiate Brown 
Government from the Conservatives in the run up to the 2010 General Election. In his 
speech, Ainsworth highlighted many of the themes that Blair had promoted and that had 
been cast away from the narrative in the years following his departure from office:  
‘today we are fighting in Afghanistan as part of an international coalition to 
protect global security from the threat of terrorism. Labour believes it should 
always be the role of powerful nations, such as our own, to support a rules-
based international system. We believe in universal human rights, democracy 
and multilateralism… We are in Afghanistan to ensure that the country cannot 
again be used as a base to export terrorism that is a proven threat to our 
citizens’ (Ainsworth 2010: online).  
Ainsworth’s attempt to encapsulate the core elements of Labour’s defence policy 
reads as a post-hoc corrective to the steady move away from internationalism under Gordon 
Brown. In most of the significant alterations of the counter-terrorism narrative towards a 
more avowedly ‘national’ focus on defence, the Conservatives were chronologically prior in 
making the case. It is perhaps unsurprising that, following the electoral defeat of the Labour 
party and the coming of the Conservative-led Coalition Government, the national security-
based counter-terrorism narrative continued in much the same vein as it had under Brown. 
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As such, they also incurred the same problems as the Labour Government in making the 
case for Afghanistan as a counter-terrorism mission, with ministers being frequently 
questioned in the media about the veracity of such a narrative approach given that the 
majority of terrorist plots against the United Kingdom were planned or carried out by British 
nationals (Rammell 2009a: online; Fox 2011a: online). A narrow focus on national security 
also drew criticism from supporters of the stabilisation agenda – particularly those 
interested in the advancement of women and girls in Afghan society – in response to Fox’s 
comments of ‘not fighting for an education policy’ (BBC 2010: online; Fox 2010: online). The 
logic of staying in Afghanistan until it was stable was equally criticised, however. A month 
after the election, Ainsworth appeared on the BBC to defend the national security logic of 
remaining in Afghanistan and was subjected to a scathing critique by Guardian columnist 
Zoe Williams: 
‘[t]here’s never going be a position where we can say there’s absolute 
national security, still less is there ever going be a position where you can say 
‘we in the UK are nationally secure against terrorist action’. It’s completely 
ridiculous… it’s unprovable, it’s unfalsifiable, it’s absurd, so really what you’re 
talking about is government versus public opinion, and that is, that is just a 
matter of time really’ (BBC 2010: online). 
Whilst deeply uncharitable, Williams’ point of view encapsulated all of the weaknesses 
of the national security-based counter-terrorism narrative, and in doing so put the narrative 
in juxtaposition with the strategic communication imperative of having a ‘compelling’ and 
‘easily understood’ logic. Indeed, the weeks following this exchange would prove pivotal in 
addressing the content of Williams’ argument. Just three days later, Cameron would address 
the Commons on Afghanistan for the first time, reaffirming the national security rationale of 
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Britain’s continued involvement in the conflict and warning against premature drawdown by 
arguing that any assessments for such action ‘must be done on the basis of the facts on the 
ground, not a pre-announced timetable’ (Hansard 2010c). At the G8 Conference in Toronto 
at the end of June, however, the call for strategic patience had been reversed, with 
Cameron announcing – unilaterally and without consultation with Cabinet, according to one 
source – a timetable for withdrawal by the end of 2015 (Personal Interview, 2013; 
Hennessey 2010: online). This action would have a precipitous effect on the transition 
process. In an interview with the author, one former official gave his view that this decision 
was ‘quite a game changer, and you’re then beginning to evolve a narrative that is looking at 
the sort of last lap scenario. Whereas Gordon Brown’s more expansive view was thinking a 
long way into the future’ (Personal Interview, 2013). This process was formalised by 
Cameron at the NATO Lisbon Summit in November 2010, which set the end of 2014 as the 
deadline for complete transfer of security and combat operations to the Afghan National 
Security Forces (NATO 2010). The Foreign Affairs Committee took a dim view of Cameron’s 
actions, commenting in February 2011 that, 
 ‘the Government’s current national security narrative is out of step with the 
current situation and, in light of the announcement of 2015 as a date for 
combat withdrawal, now out of line with the general thrust of UK policy. The 
2015 date jars with the Government’s national security justification which 
signals something very different; namely that the UK must do whatever is 
necessary to secure the safety of British interests. The two positions are not 
compatible and send mixed messages to the public’ (Foreign Affairs 
Committee 2011:87). 
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In effect, the Lisbon settlement represented an agreement between partners within 
the collective security framework of NATO that reflected a loss of political will to continue 
stabilisation efforts at the level and for the duration of time stated as necessary in Obama 
and Brown’s strategic reviews of just eighteen months earlier. Britain’s counter-terrorism 
policy narrative ostensibly supported this eventuality by gradually narrowing the scope of 
discourse, allowing the substance of Lisbon to fit the narrative rather than jarring with it, as 
would have been the case had Blair and Brown’s strategic narrative not been deflated. The 
issue that the Foreign Affairs Committee highlighted, however, was that in reframing the 
counter-terrorism narrative as one concerned only with national security in order to 
maintain public support for seemingly indefinite operations in Afghanistan, it also allowed 
the Government the pretext for putting in place a definitive timetable for withdrawal at the 
expense of the collective security system’s strategic requirements. This was nothing less 
than an irony of the most monumental proportions. The national security focus within the 
counter-terrorism narrative had been produced in order to put the expanding aims of the 
conflict in Afghanistan (and particularly in Helmand) back into perspective with the original 
purposes of the mission, but paradoxically only served to undermine the rationale. By 
lowering expectations of success to the point where it arguably contradicted the strategic 
requirements of national security, the counter-terrorist narrative had effectively out-
rationalised itself. It had emerged from a situation where the political will for nation-
building – the entire point of ISAF and stabilisation post the initial phase of counter-
terrorism operations in 2001-2002 – was fast disappearing, and attempted to salvage the 
mission by reducing the importance placed on long-term stabilisation. It was a discourse 
couched in counter-terrorist rhetoric but with the referent object of a campaign that was 
fundamentally concerned with stabilisation; if the object was counter-terrorism then, as 
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Cavanagh opined, bothering with human security issues appears rather superfluous. The 
sum of the narrative configuration was the creation of a paradox for strategic 
communicators. The counter-terrorist narrative re-emerged as an attempt to effectively 
communicate the purpose of the stabilisation element of the conflict, but in doing so 
actually subverted the purpose of the conflict to meet the demands of the narrative 
because the narrative belied the transnational nature of collective security requirements. In 
attempting to communicate ‘strategically’ to the British public that Afghanistan was about 
national security, the counter-terrorist narrative sought to circumvent the complicated 
theoretical story of stabilisation and all its connotations of liberal norms, collective security, 
multinational cooperation and questions of the relationship between direct and indirect 
threats. The end result, however, was the creation of a ‘discourse trap’ or narrative 
‘blowback’, where the national security element, once embarked upon, overtook and 
rhetorically negated the liberal-normative basis of the strategic importance of stabilisation 
(Michaels 2013).  
 
Phase V: 2011-2014 – Drawdown and Narrative Blowback 
The killing of Osama bin Laden in May 2011 likely served as a fillip to the by-
entrenched counter-terrorist narrative for Afghanistan. It allowed statesmen and women to 
draw a direct link between the distant origins and aims for the conflict by pointing out that 
the figurehead of the al Qaeda movement had been dealt with. Obama used it to his 
advantage in his June 2011 ‘drawdown’ speech: 
‘We’re starting this drawdown from a position of strength.  Al Qaeda is under 
more pressure than at any time since 9/11.  Together with the Pakistanis, we 
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have taken out more than half of al Qaeda’s leadership.  And thanks to our 
intelligence professionals and Special Forces, we killed Osama bin Laden, the 
only leader that al Qaeda had ever known.  This was a victory for all who have 
served since 9/11’ (Obama 2011: online).  
This victory narrative may have provided national catharsis for Americans and 
provided a semblance of closure to the near decade-long quest for retribution against the 
alleged orchestrator of the 9/11 attacks, but it was left unstated as to how killing bin Laden 
aided the strategic objective of stabilising Afghanistan. The Coalition Government, by 
contrast, was forthright in asserting a causal link of the significance of bin Laden’s death. In 
a statement to the Commons in July of 2011, Cameron noted that ‘Osama bin Laden has 
been killed and al-Qaeda significantly weakened’ and that ‘British and international forces 
have driven al-Qaeda from its bases’, which in his view justified ‘entering a new phase in 
which the Afghan forces will do more of the fighting and patrolling’, with the mission 
‘changing from “combat to support”’ (Hansard 2011). By extrapolation, what Cameron’s 
statement demonstrated was that focusing on counter-terrorism in the wake of bin Laden’s 
death allowed his fellow statesmen and women to play down the intermediate and difficult 
stabilisation and counter-narcotic aims of the Afghan campaign from the second, third and 
fourth phases of the conflict. It is worth noting that the counter-terrorist aims Cameron 
alluded to in his Commons statement had all effectively been achieved in 2002 following 
Operation Anaconda; by contrast, the work of defeating the insurgency and stabilising 
Afghan society, the true test of ISAF operations, was paid short shrift. The reasoning behind 
this appears to be quite clear: during this final phase of the conflict, the counter-terrorist 
narrative underwent a process of reconfiguration to reflect what had been accomplished as 
ministers shifted emphasis towards ‘drawdown’ efforts in the country. This may be 
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interpreted as Government taking on a new phatic function of highlighting only security-
related aspects, mainly in the form of noting progress in ANSF capacity building efforts and 
thereby downplaying any perceived failings of stabilisation by moving the goalposts of 
success. 
As the drawdown process gathered pace through 2011 and 2012, the Coalition’s 
counter-terrorism narrative was reined in to give an impression of a task completed. 
Interestingly, Cameron’s Commons speech noted that while Gordon Brown ‘told the House 
that some three quarters of the most serious terrorist plots against Britain had links to 
Afghanistan and Pakistan’, the proportional threat posed by the region to British national 
security was ‘now significantly reduced’ (Hansard 2011). Whether the threat was reduced in 
relation to 2009 when Brown frequently referenced that statistic or in relation to 2001 was 
not clear, nor was it evident by what metric or to what degree a threat must be reduced in 
order to justify an accelerated withdrawal. Whatever the case, members of Cabinet, most 
notably newly appointed Defence Secretary Philip Hammond, continued to make the case 
for British involvement in Afghanistan as being primarily about ‘keeping us safe from 
terrorism on our streets’ (Hammond 2011: online, 2012: online). Throughout the remaining 
three years of the drawdown process, such revisionism remained a staple part of the 
counter-terrorism narrative. To illustrate: in December 2011, Chief of the Defence Staff 
General Sir David Richards reminded his audience that 
‘our own national security underpins what we are doing in Afghanistan.  Ten 
years ago I would have felt no need to mention it.  It is interesting to note how 
quickly many outside government forget that the ungoverned, unstable space 
that was Afghanistan became everyone’s problem on 9/11 and the UK’s own 
home-grown 7/7 bombers were trained in Pakistan’ (Richards 2011: online). 
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While Richards’ comment on the tendency of the public to lose interest over time was 
undoubtedly accurate, the notion that 9/11 was a ‘national security’ issue rather than a 
collective security issue is highly problematic, as is the case for Afghanistan as a national 
security imperative when, in the next sentence, he admits that it was Pakistan, not 
Afghanistan, that accommodated the ‘training’ of the 7/7 bombers. In this way, Richards’ 
comment demonstrates how the justificatory framework of collective security remains the 
only sensible and coherent way of explaining British participation in Afghanistan. A national 
security-based argument encounters problems such as those described by Richards: 9/11 
was an attack on the United States (unless one directly appeals to the logic of collective 
security), and Pakistan is not Afghanistan (the latter of the two being the focus of British 
national security issues). Thus it would appear, as King (2011:388) remarked, that the 
political and military elite of the United Kingdom remained perplexed in how best to 
communicate the transnational dilemma that has characterised British participation in 
Afghanistan. Rather, as Richards’ comment indicates, uncomfortable truths and 
inconvenient facts are simply brushed aside, ignored, or worst of all, uncritically subsumed 
within the chosen narrative pathway. This is not a uniquely British practice, either; take, for 
example, the following comment by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen:  
‘Never forget that the main reason why we are in Afghanistan is to prevent 
the country from once again becoming a safe haven for terrorists that could 
use Afghanistan as launching pad for attacks against Europe and North 
America and in that respect we have been quite successful. You haven’t seen 
major terrorist attacks launched against Europe and North America since we 
started the military operation in Afghanistan’ (Rasmussen 2012). 
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Rasmussen refers to the international political objective of counter-terrorism but 
ignores the strategic objective of stabilising Afghanistan. Interestingly, the national security 
line taken by Britain and Rasmussen is, according to research by Ringsmose and Borgesen 
(2011:521-523), strikingly similar to that of Rasmussen’s Afghan narrative during his post as 
prime minister of Denmark – a country, incidentally, whose sacrifices to the Afghan 
campaign have exceeded those of Britain in proportion to its population. Rasmussen could 
argue that the political objectives underpinning his reliance on counter-terrorism had largely 
been achieved (even though the original aim under Bush and Blair was to eradicate 
terrorism as a method, not simply to remove ‘safe havens’ for those who practice it), but 
even by this minimal criteria he makes revisions by pointing out that there have not been 
attacks on the scale of 9/11 ‘since we started the military operation’. The point of 
stabilisation, of course, was to leave Afghanistan in a state where future attacks – planned 
and carried out after the withdrawal of NATO troops – are prevented. In emphasising the 
original purpose of the mission, which the public is frequently called upon to remember, it 
would appear that a corollary is the desire for the public to forget the non- counter-terrorist 
aims of the mission. Narrative revisionism has proven, in short, the only way for politicians 
to assert a modicum of success to the mission; this thereby allowed Cameron to make the 
argument that ‘what we have done in Afghanistan is we came here to stop it being used as a 
base for terrorist activities. That has been and is successful’ (Watt 2013). Asserting success 
required the negation of stabilisation and counter-narcotics-related aspects of the 
campaign. 
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Conclusion 
Counter-terrorism was the original and last policy narrative employed by British 
Governments in explaining the purpose of its participation in Afghanistan. It is obvious that 
the Afghan campaign began as a response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
and has continued since 2001 with the objectives of either eliminating terrorism as a 
method of warfare or of managing the threat of terrorism emanating from within the 
borders of Afghanistan. In the most minimal sense, this policy has been consistent 
throughout the thirteen years of the conflict. However, in terms of the policy narrative – the 
sum total of statements, justifications, and rationales uttered by British officials over time – 
the articulation of the counter-terrorism approach to Afghanistan has changed markedly. 
When taken in tandem with the two other policy narratives employed by the British state 
explored in the previous chapters, it is clear that emphasis on counter-terrorism has not 
been particularly consistently delivered either in of itself or in relation to the other two 
narratives. Counter-terrorism began as a liberal normative and collective internationalist 
policy, and ended as a rationalist, nationally-oriented articulation of UK security interests. 
Counter-narcotics and stabilisation policies emerged out of counter-terrorism policy as 
strategies designed to deliver the ultimate objective of a pacified Afghan civil society largely 
freed from the spectre of international terrorism, but along the way these two ancillary 
policies became the dominant policy narratives utilised by Government. This chapter has 
shown how the counter-terrorism policy narrative effectively disappeared from state 
articulations explaining the significance and purpose of British participation in Afghanistan 
as a consequence of the increased focus on ancillary or supporting policies, and only re-
emerged as the central focus of such communication efforts once it became overwhelmingly 
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evident to state elites that the counter-narcotics and stabilisation policies were failing to 
succeed on the terms by which they were originally pursued. A major consequence of the 
restoration of the counter-terrorism policy narrative as the pre-eminent line of justification 
for Britain’s continued presence in Afghanistan has been the downplaying of ancillary 
objectives required to achieve this aim, thereby doing harm to those objectives but also to 
the internal logic of the counter-terrorism policy narrative as well. 
A strong case can be made for explaining the ebbs and flows of the counter-terrorism 
policy narrative as a consequence of collective security dynamics. Counter-terrorism policy 
in Britain began as a result of following the American policy approach and the fact that 
British operations in Afghanistan were beholden to US strategy. The Blair Government’s 
approach to articulating its policy was, in essence, to frame its own activities in Afghanistan 
as closely as possible to those of the Americans. Again, this was not conceptually difficult for 
Government given its predilection towards maintaining the ‘special relationship’ and, more 
generally, given its affinity for framing national interests as normatively grounded in the 
doctrine of international community as articulated by Blair in his 1999 Chicago speech.  This 
in turn allowed Blair to give a normative basis to counter-terrorism as mutually supportive 
of democratisation and stabilisation, and to frame the threat of terrorism as not a national 
issue, but rather one of global significance that defied the use of national specificities. 
Collective security and counter-terrorism were conceptually inseparable and rhetorically 
gainful for Blair; his totalising approach to foreign affairs thus afforded him the ability to see 
the ancillary policies of counter-narcotics and stabilisation as part of a coherent whole of 
strategy (where the British could plug the gaps the United States had ignored) and policy.  
Centrally, however, the Blair Government’s acquiescence to the United States meant 
that its counter-terrorism policy (as well as its ancillary policies of counter-narcotics and 
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stabilisation) was almost entirely dependent on that of Washington, thereby rendering its 
strategies subservient to inter-state dynamics of policy rather than necessarily what was 
required on the ground. On the one hand, one may view the counter-terrorism narrative as 
less a result of the transnationalisation of defence policy (as has been the case with the 
stabilisation and counter-narcotics narratives), and more an example of how 
transnationalisation has been rhetorically rejected for reasons of domestic political 
expediency and of justifying a reduction in commitments to Afghanistan.  Narrative 
frameworks prioritising liberal peace theory and a normative, institutionalist approach 
security possess a significant explanatory power for collective security operations. They 
explain the purpose of a conflict in international or transnational terms by appealing not to 
national interests but to the indivisibility of individual nations’ interests.  This is possible by 
framing the object of security as one of values, thereby transcending distinctions that 
otherwise might be made concerning the policies of individual states and the undoubted 
differences in levels of threats felt by various NATO member states. They place a high 
degree of importance on combatting illiberal state practices and the transformative power 
of democratisation as an end in itself and, crucially, as the only means by which security can 
be attained. In short, liberal norms bind collective security members together in how they 
understand themselves and how they relate to both the mission at hand and their allies; 
they have a distinctive and unrivalled constitutive power. Thus, in this reading it is possible 
to view a shift from such language to that of counter-terrorism – focused as it is on 
‘national’ security and interests –as a rhetorical move away from transnationalised defence 
policy.  
On the other hand, one may see counter-terrorism’s current dominance in 
Government defence narratives as the most powerful and effective means available of 
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maintaining transnational defence policy under conditions that are simply no longer 
amenable to a liberal normative explanatory framework. In the absence of high idealism to 
coordinate the interests and policies of collective security members, appeals to counter-
terrorism as the foundational and inalienable rationale of collective security efforts in 
Afghanistan (and elsewhere) can be understood as an alternative (indeed, perhaps the only 
alternative) narrative pathway for maintaining alliance solidarity. Counter-terrorism does 
not meet any high idealist principles (this chapter has shown how it has categorically 
rejected any such principles), but it does contain within its narrative structure a not 
inconsiderable rhetoric of high mimesis that is actually highly useful in maintaining 
transnationalised defence policy. Terrorism is perceived as an existential threat by many 
NATO member states: it threatens global security as well as national security. The threat 
posed to citizens and infrastructure is a real one, and one that is readily apprehended and 
generally accepted by electorates. Articulating the purpose of collective security operations 
along counter-terrorist lines allows for the maintenance of transnational defence policy 
whilst simultaneously providing officials with the rhetorical freedom to place transnational 
policy demands within a domestic setting. In an ironic rhetorical turn, the language of 
transnationalised policy has been abandoned seemingly in order to secure the continued 
existence of transnational policy. More specifically, transnational policy has evidently moved 
beyond liberal normative articulations as a consequence of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the 
language of counter-terrorism can be seen as reflecting a much-reduced strategic 
programme that speaks to the bare essentials of individual states’ national security 
interests.  
A synthesis of these two perspectives could be that the counter-terrorist narrative 
grew out of a flagging, norms-based stabilisation narrative that, whilst providing the most 
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complete and accurate representation of NATO’s mission in Afghanistan, had been 
overtaken by events and was no longer fit for purpose. This work has argued that 
transnational policy has shaped Government strategy and narratives, and that those 
narratives are geared ultimately towards the maintenance of transnational policy. This is 
because maintenance of transnational policy is an end in itself.  The stabilisation narrative 
can be understood as reflective of Britain’s desire to satisfy American expectations in 
contributing to collective security operations by adhering to transnational policy norms, but 
the process of doing so has stretched the UK state because it obligated itself to stabilisation 
policies it could not carry out. This in turn produced conflicts within the state that 
undermined the credibility of Government and the Afghan mission, thereby threatening the 
unity of the Alliance system. Thus, the emergence of the counter-terrorism narrative may be 
seen as an attempt to salvage the mission and, by proxy, to insulate the collective security 
framework from internal rot. This perspective allows us to see how the tensions between 
departments of state caused by the strategic dilemmas of the stabilisation approach were 
ultimately rectified by Hutton in 2008 in his repositioning of the meta-narrative for 
Afghanistan as one of ‘national security interest’ rather than being intrinsically about 
Afghanistan. This allowed counter-terrorism discourse to unshackle itself from the fetters of 
state-building policy narratives and to focus instead on British national security. Strategic 
communication’s institutional emergence within the Ministry of Defence during Hutton’s 
tenure suggests that the re-emergence of the counter-terrorism policy narrative was an 
effort by the Defence establishment to entrench its own interests by utilising policy to affect 
strategy, insofar as the counter-terrorism narrative at this time served to circumscribe non-
military activities and stem the concordant entropy in messaging.  
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The re-emergence of the counter-terrorism narrative can therefore be seen as holding 
functional qualities beyond the mere focus on improving public understanding of the 
purpose of Afghanistan. Indeed, its ultimate contribution was to inform, through diplomatic 
manoeuvres in Washington and Lisbon, a justificatory framework for the redirection of 
alliance-wide strategy on Afghanistan to one of definitive timetables for withdrawal and the 
severe curtailment of stabilisation strategy in the country. The problem remains, however, 
that stabilisation and counter-terrorism are, in both narrative terms and in the substance of 
Afghan strategy, incompatible. They represent two poles in a zero-sum game. Indeed, the 
point of the stabilisation narrative was always to emphasise the insufficiency of a counter-
terrorist approach since, according to liberal normative thinking, counter-terrorist activity 
would fail to address root causes of conflict and, in all likelihood, exacerbate terrorism in the 
long run. Likewise, the emergence of counter-terrorist discourses has carried with it the 
implication (seemingly by design) that stabilisation objectives must be downplayed and to a 
considerable extent discarded in order to sustain a nominal degree of commitment to 
Afghanistan by NATO members. Thus, the counter-terrorism narrative can perhaps be best 
understood as an attempt to preserve Alliance unity via a transnationalised policy agenda in 
Afghanistan by, paradoxically, undermining the language of transnational policy and, in 
doing so, the significance of Alliance efforts in Afghanistan. 
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION – THE STATE OF 
BRITISH STRATEGY AND THE UTILITY OF 
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION 
 
This work makes three contributions to the literature outlined in the opening two 
chapters. The first is an empirical contribution concerned specifically with the performance 
of the British state in communicating its strategies for Afghanistan and the significance of 
Defence-led strategic communication. The second contribution is concerned with a critique 
of the role of the national interest as a referent object of strategy given the effects of 
transnationalisation of defence policy. The third and final contribution this work makes is 
one of critiquing the prevailing theoretical assumptions of literature on strategic 
communication and ‘narratives’ and the dangers of ‘narrative-led’ strategies and of 
‘strategising’ policy. 
 
British Narratives and Defence-Led Strategic Communication in 
Afghanistan 
 
Taken individually, the three narratives for the British experience in Afghanistan 
explored in this work demonstrate serious deficiencies in the crafting and maintenance of 
strategic communication. This work has shown that these narratives are not consistent over 
time and in each case suffer from almost total incompatibility when studied as a unitary 
whole from the start of military operations in 2001 to its cessation in 2014. Despite the 
existence of strong arguments (see Ledwidge 2011, 2013; Betz 2011) that British 
communication efforts in Afghanistan were inconsistent – the fact that ‘strategic 
communication’ protocols are now in place should be evidence enough that such a view 
prevailed in Whitehall as well as in scholarship – this consensus is not universal. Ringsmose 
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and Borgesen (2011), for example, have claimed that UK messaging on Afghanistan ‘has 
from the very beginning argued in a clear and consistent manner that the purpose of the 
mission is to protect the security interests of the UK’. The problem with their analysis is that 
they do not critically analyse UK communication efforts in their own right, but rather 
employ a comparative approach between NATO members, wherein the UK apparently 
performs better than some of its allies. The first and foremost contribution this work makes 
is to challenge such assumptions by undertaking an in-depth analysis of the UK’s track 
record on communicating the purpose of Afghanistan on its own merits. This work shows 
that each of the three narratives analysed contained their own internal inconsistencies that 
militated against unified and coherent exposition, resulting from the various domestically 
and internationally located pressures of statecraft, diplomacy and the uncertainties inherent 
in military conflict and state-building. The three policies were never compatible with one 
another: counter-narcotics efforts were inherently de-stabilising, effective stabilisation 
meant accommodating narcotics to a great extent, focusing on counter-terrorism implied a 
reduction in emphasis on stabilisation, and the link between narcotics and terrorist activities 
was never as undisputable as the early policy suggested.  Given the difficulties of reconciling 
contradictory policies, and the considerable challenge of attempting to reconfigure each 
policy narrative away from a starting point of high mimetic idealism and gross 
oversimplification of reality, it is therefore perhaps uncharitable to assume that 
communication efforts could ever have been hugely successful. It is surely the case that 
what has been lacking in Britain’s presentation of its policies and strategies for Afghanistan 
has always ultimately been the ‘lack of a workable political objective’ and, from that, a 
dearth of ‘clarity about what we are “selling”’ (Betz 2011:629; Ledwidge 2011:256). This is a 
point endorsed by British strategic communication doctrine in no uncertain terms: 
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‘[s]trategic communication will fail where there is an absence of policy and strategy, or it is 
not crafted integral to the strategy, or what is said and done do not align with the strategy’ 
(DCDC 2011:1-4). Indeed, one may be forgiven for assuming that these words were written 
with Afghanistan in mind, for each of these shortcomings is evident in the empirical work 
that precedes this conclusion. 
If one can speak of a ‘meta-narrative’ encompassing these three divergent policy 
strands, it is difficult to conclude that such incompatibility could have ever produced a 
coherent whole. When attempted, the meta-narrative under Blair can be seen as an 
attempt to coalesce incompatible sets of policies (and the interests behind them) into a 
coherent whole despite overwhelming evidence suggesting otherwise. Thus, for the first 
half of Britain’s involvement in Afghanistan, the policy narratives became detached from 
political and strategic realities.  They began as a Kantian articulation of the importance of 
collective security norms and internationalism, human security and liberal interventionism, 
democratisation and comprehensive nation-building, claims for the innate existence of 
universal values and categorical imperatives, and an idealistic belief in the transformative 
power of a ‘moral use of force’. They ended as a realist articulation of the centrality of 
national security and national interest and a downplaying of collective security logic, a 
minimalist conception of stabilisation that largely precluded non-security aspects, the 
relativity of values and a prioritisation of the British subject over all others, and a deep-
rooted pessimism regarding the utility of the use of ground forces and democratic 
stabilisation in general. When comparing the messaging of the first half of the conflict with 
that of the latter half, it is evident that, there exists a state of binary opposition on 
practically every conceivable distinguishing feature of the meta-narrative. This point is made 
more interesting when one notes that the latter half of the meta-narrative appears in direct 
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contradiction to the rhetorical and philosophical ethos of the Blair Government, which 
maintained that the meta-narrative was a coherent whole, that counter-terrorism, 
stabilisation and counter-narcotics not only could coincide with one another, but that the 
meta-narrative and overarching strategy for Afghanistan would not make sense without 
their coalescing. Whereas Blair may have believed that Britain is ‘a country that could 
combine opposites and reconcile the contradictory’, it was never apparent how his 
tendency toward narrative synthesis could work in strategic terms on the ground (Freedman 
2007:616).  
The point that needs to be stressed here is that Blair’s penchant for reconciling 
contradictions was, in this author’s view, a reflection of his Government’s proclivity for 
seeking to achieve the optimal presentation of reality. This was at times arguably more 
important than the reality itself, for obvious reasons of gaining advantage in the maelstrom 
of party political gamesmanship and the less obvious reasons of maintaining the UK’s 
relevance amongst its international partners. Because the reality of things was always of 
less importance than the presentation of reality, a natural consequence was a dearth of 
strategic planning. Strategy, to reiterate, is the linking of ends (policy objectives) with ways 
and means (the tactical and operational methodologies employed and the resources at 
one’s disposal to achieve those ends), and exists within a dynamic and highly contingent 
environment. Under Blair, the ways and means of achieving the ends of policy, and the 
dynamism and complexities of the situation faced in Afghanistan, were never fully 
apprehended primarily because they served as impediments to the realisation of the 
strongest possible articulation of the policy – i.e., of the strategic narrative pathway. This 
narrative pathway was attached to the policy of stabilisation as a means of demonstrating 
British commitment to Afghanistan, and through that its loyalty to the United States and the 
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transatlantic alliance.  In this line of inquiry, it is possible to view the original narrative for 
Afghanistan as remarkably strong, focusing as it did on a core idealist philosophy that 
encapsulated the political zeitgeist of the post-9/11 era: a bold and assertive foreign policy, 
a focus on internationalism and the combination of military force with a benign 
developmental agenda and, above all, a firm conviction that Britain could balance its self-
interest for security, freedom and prosperity (via collective security and the practice of 
foreign internal defence) with an ostensibly benevolent programme of ameliorating global 
injustices and inequalities. Most importantly, Blair’s worldview allowed the synthesis of 
seemingly contradictory aspects of statecraft – political realism and liberalism – by framing 
whatever the collective interest happened to be as fundamentally synonymous with the 
‘national’ interest of the United Kingdom, simply because the national interest was declared 
to be only realisable within a collective setting. Such a philosophical position, while 
politically useful in that it is oriented directly at Britain’s core interest of supporting the 
United States, has also prevented the realisation of strategic prudence for the United 
Kingdom since it for the most part negated the conceptual basis of “national” strategy. 
Conversely, the ways and means of strategy, properly analysed and applied, would have 
mitigated the possibility of such an articulation and instead produced a rather staid and 
banal meta-narrative – much like the one that has operated since late 2008. The problem 
with this approach is precisely the opposite of that of Blair, however, in that it negates the 
possibility of a candid and open strategic re-think by obfuscating Britain’s subservient role to 
the United States, a precept that remains at the heart of all considerations of policy and 
strategy. 
Seen in the light of this problem, then, it is apparent that the task of strategic 
communication practices was to bring political rhetoric back into line with political 
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possibilities. In order to rehabilitate the core narrative (counter-terrorism), the ancillary 
ones (counter-narcotics and stabilisation) were subjected either to marginalisation or 
complete dismissal. Although central to the UK fulfilling its political obligations to the 
international community, the pursuit of stabilisation and counter-narcotics policies created 
severe institutional tensions within the state. As such, the only recourse for British officials 
to win back public, military and political support for the mission was to effectively reach 
back into the past to a point prior to the advent of the stabilisation and counter-narcotics 
narratives and re-present the meta-narrative for Afghanistan as being about – and as only 
ever have been about – counter-terrorism and British national security.  
An implication made in this work is that the reconfiguration of the Afghan narrative 
undertaken since 2008 was one that was Defence-led, and as such primarily reflected 
defence interests. In a 2011 Chatham House report, Cornish, Lindley-French and Yorke 
noted that, unlike in the case of the United States, which has developed its own version of 
strategic communication ostensibly as a pan-government initiative, British strategic 
communication had, at the time of publication, been largely limited to defence activities. In 
observing that defence doctrine has preceded a cross-government initiative, Cornish et al. 
inferred potential deleterious consequences: ‘the British approach has some of the 
appearance of the tail wagging the dog, in that until recently the defence contribution has 
been offered before a national concept has been established’ (2011:5). In other words, 
national strategic communication practice appears to be led by Defence primarily with 
Defence purposes in mind. This point has been confirmed by this work: the 
institutionalisation of strategic communication within the MOD emerged out of a specific 
point in time during the Afghan campaign in which the meta-narrative’s future trajectory 
was in the balance, between one that favoured a national security approach and one that 
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remained focused on the liberal interventionist mantra of national security through 
development and the pursuit of human security ends. It is in this context that we may 
understand strategic communication as primarily about the pursuit of ‘the national interest’ 
along the narrative lines of defence and security. The empirical evidence supports the thesis 
that strategic communication – in its domestic form – was ostensibly undertaken in the 
United Kingdom as a means of realigning the mission along the lines of its original purpose 
of counter-terrorism because of the strains exerted upon the liberal-normative meta-
narrative by the emergence of the transnational dilemma into public discourse. This appears 
to have been done in order to cement into the narrative the military aspects of the 
intervention and, as a corollary, to undermine the almost entropic tendency of non-security 
aspects of the meta-narrative to expand exponentially in response to the growing demands 
of the Comprehensive Approach. What all of this leads to is the conclusion that strategic 
communication as currently practiced within Whitehall, and particularly that which 
emanates from the Ministry of Defence, is ‘strategic’ insofar as it is concerned with 
supporting (consciously or not) the interests of one element of the state – Defence – in the 
face of wider state apparatuses whose predisposition is aimed at democratising and 
developmental efforts . As a matter of course it rejects many of the core tenets of liberal 
internationalism and interventionism espoused by the Blair Government in the earlier 
stages of the Afghan campaign, rooted as it is in realist conceptions of national interest and 
security as the referent objects of British defence and foreign policy. This grounding means 
it cannot easily incorporate the use of powerful ontological assertions of universality or 
grand visions of the transformative power of liberal interventionism, nor can it decisively 
appeal to the principles of sacrifice and mutual aid central to collective security 
membership, since it is foundationally based on a discourse of self-interest. In short, 
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strategic communication in its current form appears as an institutionalised safeguard 
against the excesses of liberal strategic logic. 
Thus, in sociological terms, communication is strategic because it promotes state-wide 
adherence to a traditional, realist understanding of strategic thought that is grounded in the 
interests of the foundational unit of the nation-state, as opposed to a liberal international 
relations theory understanding of its basis in collective security mechanisms informed by 
interdependence dynamics or, beyond that, by human security discourses that place the 
referent object at the level of individual human beings. In doing so, strategic communication 
goes some distance in resolving the transnational dilemma facing the United Kingdom 
outlined in the first chapter of this work by utilising policy narratives as a weapon of 
statecraft. Disagreements between alliance members over appropriate levels of ‘burden-
sharing’, informed in part by divergences of political culture, policy objectives, and national 
strategies remain unresolved, and are unlikely to drastically improve in the short-term. This 
has created pressure for states such as the United Kingdom, which have borne a 
disproportionate amount of the collective burden, by making it more difficult to utilise 
narratives that emphasise the importance of engaging in collective security operations and 
the benefits of membership to a collective security community. In response, strategic 
communication practices have reflected a natural tendency – in the face of the problem of 
free riding – of reasserting a realist understanding of interests and emphasises, in no 
uncertain terms, the importance of stabilising Afghanistan in terms of a singular, national 
security interest. A more proscribed and nationally-focused form of strategic 
communication combats the excesses of the values-centric rhetoric of liberal foreign policy 
that NATO adheres to, giving British policymakers relatively greater freedom in how they 
articulate the purpose of  interventions to the British public in the future. This also allows 
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for a kind of corrective function in the policy process by keeping political discourse and 
strategic narratives grounded in a realist appraisal of what is possible, and as such prevents 
the possibility of producing a narrative detached from reality that may potentially produce 
‘mission creep’ and lead to intractable conflicts driven by unachievable objectives. This is 
what makes strategic communication ‘strategic’ in a classical sense: the linking and 
delimiting of available policy options and the speech acts that constitute and make real 
those options, to similarly delimited operational approaches used to achieve those policy 
ends. Making such a move came at a cost, however. The abrogation of these ancillary 
narratives from the corpus of the meta-narrative could not rectify the overall 
incompatibilities within the meta-narrative by temporarily glossing them over, precisely 
because those ancillary narratives came about under the logic of liberal peace theory as 
necessary to support the core strategic narrative of ‘counter-terrorism’, for it was held that 
counter-terrorism could only be achieved if accompanied by stabilisation and, within that, 
counter-narcotics. SC was ultimately necessitated as a means of bringing the strategic 
narrative for Afghanistan back into line with something approximating reality, but arriving at 
this endpoint produced as many problems for the coherence of narrative as it has solved.  
 
 
National Interests, Transnationalisation and the Problems of 
Strategic Thought 
 
The second contribution this work makes is an engagement with recent literature on 
UK strategy and the role of ‘national interest’ as its referent object. Throughout this work, I 
have argued that it is a fundamental lack of state autonomy over policy that has led to 
unworkable political objectives and a corresponding series of unsuitable strategies for 
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Afghanistan. I have argued that Britain’s defence policy is sufficiently subject to 
transnationalisation processes so as to make autonomous decision-making unviable, and 
that transnational policy tends to produce strategies that are highly contingent upon the 
institutional dynamics of those involved. The pursuit of such a policy has had an iterative 
effect on the British state, where political obligations and state transformation to the ends 
of supporting collective mechanisms has, in conjunction with the dearth of national 
leadership caused by a lack of autonomy and strategic agency, led to severe intra-state 
tensions. Such developments have induced significant strains on the state as it struggles to 
both conceptualise its role in the world and to implement policies and strategies to meet 
transnational expectations. In the case of Afghanistan, where transnationalised policy has 
produced considerable political costs on successive Governments, one may observe the 
emergence of a ‘transnational dilemma’, wherein the obligations of the British state to its 
collective security partners compels it to undertake activities that, on the balance of costs 
and benefits, are difficult to conceptualise or explain as being in the national interest.  
In this line of inquiry, one can view the existence of the ‘selling’ exercises or 
‘performances’ of SC as a direct response to the structural and functional limitations of 
British policy and strategy processes as they become exposed against the challenges of 
collective security operations such as those described in this work. Conflicts require 
justifications, and conflicts without clear objectives (or with objectives unrelated or 
additional to stated objectives) require more persuasive narratives to justify them. Various 
ways of relating far-flung conflicts to the immediacy of the public’s imagination have been 
deployed to this end, and most of these have centred upon connecting British operations in 
Afghanistan to a traditional, rationalist continuum of state activity that links interests to 
policies and policies to strategies by framing participation in Afghanistan as foundationally 
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about protecting British citizens and property in the United Kingdom from Afghan-based or 
Afghan-inspired terrorists. Naturally, this articulation for Afghanistan jars with those made 
at the start of the campaign by Blair, with the existence of counter-narcotics and 
stabilisation policies in Afghanistan and, of course, with the fact that Afghanistan can, in the 
main, only be deemed an existential threat to British national security by way of the United 
Kingdom’s association with the United States. As has been established, however, all of these 
factors arose from a transnational diplomatic scenario wherein Britain’s ability to 
autonomously and fundamentally re-shape the policies and strategies informing its 
narrative articulations would inevitably contradict its own core interests. In this sense, 
refining communication on Afghan policies was the only ‘strategic’ work that Britain could 
do, insofar as focusing on improving public opinion on Afghanistan appeared at certain 
points to be a greater priority for policymakers than re-evaluating the feasibility and 
purpose of the mission altogether.  
This is not to claim that strategic communicators have necessarily behaved with 
duplicity with the British public about Afghanistan. Rather, it would appear – given the 
frequent commitments to internationalism given by successive Governments in national 
security strategies and strategic defence reviews – that the gulf between international 
diplomatic reality and British policy narratives is one that is deep-rooted in the social 
conventions and culture of the state itself. Part of my argument has centred upon offering 
an explanation for why it is that British Governments since the end of the Cold War have 
done so little to rectify the strategic shortcomings it faces. My answer relies on 
constructivist theory: specifically, I have argued that the obligation-cooperation cycle at the 
heart of the UK’s transnationalised defence policy has inculcated a situation where interests 
are constituted and replicated in part by the repeated act of pursuing those interests. When 
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interests are pursued collectively, the pursuit of a common good has a normative 
constitutional force to it, allowing for the idea of international society where the pursuit of 
collective interests becomes a normative pursuit of its own, equal with and giving moral 
force to the pursuit of material interests. In this way, the iterative processes by which British 
interests are pursued have come to be partly constitutive of its national identity, curiously in 
a way that is fundamentally transnational in disposition. In other words, British state 
identity is in all practical senses one that perceives collective security and the special 
relationship as the normative and material bases for its own freedom, security and 
prosperity. Consequently, distinguishing between different sets of interest is not only 
difficult, it is also a question that is rarely asked, since collective security is taken to be so 
obviously beneficial to Britain that it is unimpeachable as a logical basis for its international 
standing. This is so for the simple reason that conceiving British foreign policy without it 
being a member of international society would be, rather paradoxically, to act against the 
national interest. For Britain to exercise significant agency in the world, it must work within 
a transnationalised defence structure that negates much of its agency to act independently. 
This has not prevented the resurgence of ‘national interest’ as a referent object of 
strategy, however. Paul Newton, Paul Colley and Andrew Sharpe, for instance, argue that ‘a 
clearly articulated Grand Strategy begs a plain definition of what is in the national interest’ 
(2010:48). Luis Simon and James Rogers (2011:57) have similarly argued for a renewed 
understanding of UK interests on the basis that the United States ‘has grown less able and 
willing to place British designs at the centre of its own effort’, while Peter Layton (2012) has 
called for greater consideration of ‘grand strategy’ in UK policymaking. These studies stand 
in sharp distinction to those of Tim Edmunds (2011), Anthony King (2010) and Patrick Porter 
(2010). Porter in particular argues that the idea of British grand strategy is problematic 
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precisely because the UK does not operate independently of the United States, but rather 
‘continues to organise itself as a satellite’ of American strategy (2010:9). Indeed, from a 
constructivist perspective that accounts for the iterative effects of transnationalised 
defence policy articulated by Edmunds and King, advocates of a ‘return of British strategy’ 
evince a kind of realist ‘black boxing’ of state agency. They point to ‘national interest’ as the 
referent object of strategy but take it as a given rather than as a term requiring deeper 
analysis. Where such analysis is provided by realists in asserting the terms use for defence 
policy, as Colin Gray has done, it takes the form of a set of ordered priorities of interests 
crucial to national “survival”, those that are “vital”,  those that are “major”, and “others” 
(2010:169). The transnational structure that pervades UK strategic and defence policy is not 
present in such discussions. 
Indeed, the unproblematic positing of national interests goes hand-in-hand with a 
realist perspective precisely because the existence of clear and unambiguous national 
interests is what underwrites the activity of strategy itself. For realists, national agency (as 
opposed to transnational role-playing) requires national strategy, which must be based 
upon national interests. Maintaining the possibility of national and grand strategy ‘privileges 
the power of agency’ (Suhrke 2013:272), whereas imputing the pervasiveness of 
transnationalised policy’s structural limitations on ideas of strategy and interest implies that 
‘one is essentially admitting loss of governmental control’ over its own agency (Eriksson and 
Rhinard 2009:253). In other words, once the ‘national’ element of interests is 
problematised, the potential for national or grand strategy to exist – much less to solve the 
problems of current UK strategy or the lack thereof – becomes less clear. It is for this reason 
that I have argued that the utility of ‘national interest’ is largely limited the discursive arena 
– that is, to dealing with the political drawbacks of transnationalised defence policy. 
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Strategic communication exists within this paradigm, so I have argued, to serve the purpose 
of preserving British interests and its concordant policy positions against its own logical 
inconsistencies, all of which stem back to overcoming the difficulties of conceptualising and 
explaining transnationalised policy to domestic audiences, a problem which emerges in 
situations where the symptoms of the transnational dilemma are apparent. Its functions 
include unifying the state through a narrated reality of ‘national’ interest, which promotes 
the alignment of various interests within the state and thereby acts as an institutional 
measure aimed at the avoidance of information fratricide; utilising such processes as a 
means of gaining public support for collective security by framing operations as nationally 
based – in other words, to protect British national interests secured via collective security 
mechanisms by not mentioning those mechanisms; and overcoming a lack of control over 
policy and strategy by using ‘strategic’ communication of policy to influence the behaviour 
of external state actors by signalling its unwillingness to tolerate imbalanced burden-sharing 
– otherwise known as the ‘defence’ approach to communication.  
The result of all three of these functions is that policy has increasingly become 
synonymous with strategy within the British state. This is because the maintenance of 
British interests via transnationalisation reduces the state’s autonomous agency, and 
requires policies that produce strategies (in this case, the ‘strategy’ of communication) that 
do little more than refine and justify the discursive delivery of policy in order to present 
British interests without reference to transnational dilemmas. This has the strategic purpose 
of influencing public opinion that British ‘national’ interests are at stake (and that is not to 
say they necessarily are not), thereby securing support for a given policy and positing the 
compatibility of transnationalised policy with traditional understandings of national security. 
In this sense, communication can indeed be strategic, as it secures the end of policy by 
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simply existing as a policy finessed. Moreover, by the metric of Britain’s national interest in 
maintaining collective security mechanisms, strategic communication has been rather 
successful: Britain’s relationship with the United States remains strong. Herein lies the 
problem for British statecraft, however: the equation of policy with strategy, and of 
communication as a kind of strategic policy or politicised strategy, means that the search for 
a solution to the state of British strategy is simply ignored. In the absence of meaningful 
control over strategy or policy for Afghanistan, the work of strategic communication has 
been one of realigning complex transnational reality with a simplistic, politically 
advantageous story. Rather than coming to terms with the strategic shortcomings 
surrounding Britain’s role in Afghanistan, the trend in political communications has been 
simply to posit an alternative reality where failings were not really failings because they 
were never really important to the political and strategic objectives of the mission in the 
first place.  
The utility of interest-led strategic communication has its limits, however. Whatever 
its uses in favourably altering the presentation of Britain’s strategic dilemmas, those 
dilemmas still exist; they will not simply disappear because states have devised new ways of 
talking about them. Reconfiguring Afghanistan as a ‘national security interest’ did not 
change the fact that the collective security through NATO remains the modus operandi of 
British defence policy, nor did it have a significant impact on inducing change within the 
political cultures of Britain’s NATO counterparts to take on greater burdens in the conflict. 
Britain remains tied into frameworks that will demand sacrifices from the realm in terms of 
blood and treasure, and more often than not these conflicts will not be irrefutably and 
obviously related to an existential struggle for national survival (Porter 2010:356). Rather, 
they will be precisely the type of risk management scenarios represented by stabilisation 
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missions such as that in Afghanistan, Iraq, and more recently in Mali, or in more limited 
engagements such as in Libya and the campaign against the ‘Islamic State’ in the Levant. 
Thus, in the face of such institutional obligations, it is clear that merely talking about British 
defence policy in realist terms cannot overcome the inherently liberal internationalist 
posture of UK foreign relations; the point, of course, is that because this is the case, it is also 
evident that policymakers do not actually aim to transform the substantive content of 
British defence policy into an avowedly realist formulation.  
There is, therefore, a communication gap at the heart of British statecraft between 
what must be said – that all interventions undertaken in the name of collective security are 
in fact directly in the national interest, for national security reasons, or in the ‘national 
security interest’ of the United Kingdom – and what cannot be said – that even if they are 
not directly in such interests, it behoves the state to participate regardless. This is a double-
edged sword, of course. The former is often a convenient truth since, because the British 
‘national interest’ is logically inseparable from the collective security interest, all collective 
interests may be understood as national interests. The latter, however, is an inadmissible 
reality for the same reason: even though, in realist terminology, one may judge interests in 
direct and indirect levels or hierarchies regarding their importance to an individual nation-
state, collective security imperatives do not allow this, for if they did alliance members 
would simply pick and choose when, where and how they wished to contribute to collective 
security operations and thereby compromise the effectiveness of the mechanism. This is, of 
course, the story of NATO in Afghanistan, and is an irony given that a major aim of NATO in 
Afghanistan was to strengthen the collective security mechanism. This also goes some 
distance in explaining Britain’s repeated willingness to take on a disproportionate level of 
responsibility within NATO operations in Afghanistan, for it is the only means by which 
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Britain’s global interests can be maintained. Such involvement has come at a great price to 
Britain in terms of casualties, financial cost and its geopolitical and martial reputation, and 
as such has stretched the fabric of the UK’s capability to explain its involvement in 
Afghanistan within the normative and material confines of collective security logic. Strategic 
communication will continue to be necessary in the future so that states such as the United 
Kingdom can articulate to their general publics the complex yet mundane workings of 
collective security mechanisms in simple and stark realist phraseologies of security, 
interests, and ‘security interests’.  
Given this analysis, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, in talking about collective 
security in strictly realist terms, British officials have contributed, consciously or not, to a 
distortion of reality. It is a simplification to claim that the primary reason for participating in 
Afghanistan was a response to a mortal threat to the security of citizens on British streets, 
just as it was a simplification to retroactively redact much of the narrative content of 
democratisation, development and counter-narcotics and posit, in its place, that the aim of 
British involvement was limited to counter-terrorism only. Even if the heightened emphasis 
on British national security and counter-terrorism was the ‘whole truth’ (and, as a caveat, it 
may well be, but the public – including, of course, this author – are not privy to the security 
services’ unpublished intelligence estimates), the historical evidence of the narratives 
analysed in this work, as well as the evidence provided by Government regarding the ‘chain 
of terror’ from Britain to the tribal regions along the Afghan-Pakistani border, suggest not 
only the relative unimportance of the national security argument until 2008, but also that 
the primary threat to the United Kingdom in south Asia comes from Pakistan, a country with 
greater links to the UK and without substantial British military presence (and likely 
destabilised further as a result of NATO operations in Afghanistan). Reframing the Afghan 
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narrative in national security terms was politically convenient, but by framing Afghanistan as 
a vital national security issue, rather than as an issue primarily related to Britain’s strategic 
positioning within the international order, the state has precluded the opportunity for a 
reasoned public debate about the virtues of intervention there and about Britain’s future 
role in the world. Although this author is hesitant to endorse the more radical intellectual 
contributions to securitisation theory (on the basis that one accepts that events and threats 
or risks are real and that policymakers, as fallible human beings, must exercise their own 
subjective agency in reaching a conclusion about the nature and significance of those events 
and threats or risks, and therefore the correct course of action to be taken in pursuit of its 
remedy) it is evident that strategic communication in the latter stages of the war in 
Afghanistan does indeed represent something akin to a ‘securitising move’ by the British 
state. The reconfiguration of the Afghan narrative to one of nationally-oriented counter-
terrorism fulfils the criteria of both securitisation theory and of Smith’s mimetic binary by 
resorting to mere raison d’état in arguing that Afghanistan represents an existential threat 
and therefore is not subject to the scrutiny of everyday political debate. 
The degree to which this move has been successful is a matter for future inquiry. In 
the short term, it would appear that reconfiguring the Afghan narrative from a high-mimetic 
position of development, democratisation and global security to one of military activity, 
circumscribed stabilisation and national security paid dividends, insofar as it allowed a 
subsequent reframing of strategic priorities at Lisbon and facilitated a more rapid 
drawdown from the conflict. The longer term trends may be counter-productive, however. 
There is a danger that narrow realism will contribute to a growing isolationism in British 
political culture. Blair’s aim to make a nation of ‘reluctant global citizens’ more confident 
and assertive to that end appears to have foundered, not least because of his own 
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government’s actions on Iraq. Almost certainly as a consequence of that legacy, British 
politicians today rarely speak in the grandiose fashion of Blair and Miliband, and instead opt 
for a language of prudence and caution regarding intervention. However, by delimiting 
available narrative pathways – even if for rational and sensible reasons – to the language of 
political realism, the British state risks creating a new ‘discourse trap’ where any advocacy 
of liberal interventionism effectively becomes viewed as an unthinkable and foolish policy 
option. This is what appears to have happened in the recent case of the failed Commons 
vote on Syria in August of 2013.  
In that case, Prime Minister Cameron tabled a motion calling on the House to agree 
that the alleged use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad required 
‘a strong humanitarian response’ and to agree that ‘this may, if necessary, require military 
action’ by the United Kingdom and its NATO allies (Hansard 2013a).  Interestingly, whilst 
clearly making the case for the importance agreeing in principle to intervention in Syria 
primarily on normative grounds of maintaining the ‘taboo’ on the use of chemical weapons, 
and secondarily on humanitarian grounds and with the support and legitimisation of the 
international community, Cameron chose to emphasise these points by arguing that 
intervention was necessary for the national interest. While he refrained from positing, as 
one of his party’s junior Members did, that Syria’s use of such weapons constituted a direct 
threat to British national security (Hansard 2013b), Cameron argued that ‘a stable middle 
east is in the national interest, but there is a specific national interest relating to the use of 
chemical weapons and preventing its escalation’ (Hansard 2013a). While he received little 
argument on that point, the majority of his contemporaries – including over forty 
Conservative and Liberal Democrat Members – disagreed with his premise that intervention 
in the conflict in Syria would serve the national interest, with the consequence that the 
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motion failed. Indeed, during the debate some within the Conservative Party argued that 
maintaining the taboo on the use of chemical weapons was not a distinctively national issue 
and was, therefore, not a national interest at all:  
‘[w]hy is it any of our business? Has Syria ever been a colony? Has it ever been 
in our sphere of interest? Has it ever posed the remotest threat to the British 
people? Our job in Parliament is to look after our own people. Our economy is 
not in very good shape. Neither are our social services, schools or hospitals. It 
is our job to think about problems here’ (Hansard 2013d). 
The Government’s failure to carry the motion raises familiar questions about its ability 
to communicate the linkages between the national and international and to relate the 
indirect requirements of collective security membership to the more conceptually simple 
terrain of direct threats to national security and ‘national’ interests. Displaying political will 
in opposing and potentially intervening against al-Assad was not a ‘national’ interest even 
though it was in the ‘national interest’; it was not a ‘national’ security issue but it was 
important in terms of maintaining international order through which national security is 
sustained. Agreeing in principle to a willingness to use military force to that end was a 
collective security requirement and, given Britain’s conception of its national interest as 
located within the international community, reaching such an agreement on the 
appropriateness of the use of force should have been relatively unproblematic. This explains 
Cameron’s resort to the use of realist language in advocating such a stance, but in framing 
participation in collective action in these terms, it also explains how he provided those 
opposed to such action the discursive upper hand. Appealing to national self-interest 
permitted the ascendancy of a narrow, traditionalist and arguably isolationist articulation of 
political realism to come to the fore and compromise the Government’s argument. In 
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contrast, a Blairite appeal to human security and humanitarian and liberal norms and values, 
and the importance of collective security mechanisms in maintaining international order, 
would possibly have incurred less semantic confusion and contradiction. Interestingly, 
Cameron’s former Defence Secretary, Liam Fox, for so long the architect of moving the 
Afghan narrative away from such arguments, opined in this debate along liberal 
interventionist lines in claiming that, while ‘there is no national interest for the United 
Kingdom in taking a side in that civil war’, Britain should show willingness to intervene in 
Syria for reasons of humanitarianism and global security (Hansard 2013c). This appears to 
be an archetypal case of ‘blowback’: in utilising one narrative framework to escape the 
discourse trap of another in order to facilitate the extrication of forces from one conflict, the 
British state unwittingly created the conditions for the development of yet another 
discourse trap that would prevent the possibility of deploying forces in potential conflicts in 
the future.  
Indeed, the pitfalls of utilising rationalist narratives to justify collective security 
operations continue to reverberate to the present day in reference to the situation in Iraq 
and Syria regarding the so-called ‘Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant’ (ISIL). Britain has 
committed itself to supporting an ad-hoc coalition of states led by the US and has 
undertaken air strikes against several ISIL targets in Iraq, but has explicitly ruled out the 
possibility of deploying ground forces in the region.  Perhaps as a reflection of satisfaction 
with this limited level of engagement, the Commons overwhelmingly approved the use of 
force against ISIL. What is of greatest interest to this work, however, is the manner of the 
appeal made by Cameron to the Commons in making the Government’s case for 
intervention. As with the failed motion of 2013 regarding Syrian chemical weapons, 
Cameron placed the instability of Iraq and Syria firmly within a rationalist discourse of 
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national interest. Unlike the 2013 motion, however, the motion for intervening in Iraq in 
2014 was based on the positing of a direct security threat to the United Kingdom. 
Interestingly, these two elements – national interest and national security – formed the 
basis of his argument: 
‘If we are to do this, a series of questions must be answered. Is this in our 
national interest? In particular, is there a direct threat to the British people? … 
The answer is yes. ISIL has already murdered one British hostage and is 
threatening the lives of two more. The first ISIL-inspired terrorist acts in 
Europe have already taken place, with, for instance, the attack on the Jewish 
museum in Brussels. Security services have disrupted six other known plots in 
Europe, as well as foiling a terrorist attack in Australia aimed at civilians, 
including British and American tourists… This is not a threat on the far side of 
the world; left unchecked, we will face a terrorist caliphate on the shores of 
the Mediterranean and bordering a NATO member, with a declared and 
proven determination to attack our country and our people’ (Hansard 2014). 
 Again, it is worth reiterating the caveat that ISIL may indeed represent a direct threat 
to the UK in a way that would justify the high mimetic quality of Cameron’s statement: the 
details of intelligence at this stage are naturally not available to the general public. It is 
interesting to note, however, that Cameron makes the argument that ISIL are a ‘direct’ 
threat to the British people without providing evidence to substantiate that any direct 
threats to the British people have indeed taken place. Rather, he cites the death of a British 
journalist in Syria, an attack in Belgium, plots across Europe, and a foiled plot in Australia. 
None of these can be considered incontrovertible evidence of a direct threat, but more as 
constituting an indirect threat or a direct risk. Indeed, what Cameron appears to be speaking 
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to is the principle of collective security of alliance partners rather than an issue of direct 
national security. The notion that Government has locked itself into a rationalist discourse 
to explain what remains a fundamentally transnational defence policy is further highlighted 
by comparing Cameron’s rationale with that of Obama: just a fortnight before the Commons 
motion he declared, contrary to Cameron, that the US had ‘not yet detected specific plotting 
against our homeland’, but rather that ‘ISIL leaders have threatened America and our allies’ 
(The White House 2014: online). Again, the point is not to cast doubt on the veracity of their 
claims, but rather to note that, while Obama’s rhetoric makes concessions for the level of 
threat posed to American citizens, Cameron explicitly refers to the direct and present threat 
to national security posed by ISIL rather than noting the empirically stronger case that ISIL 
had some involvement in attacks and plots against Britain’s allies. Relying on realist 
justifications – particularly those that emphasise direct threats – appear to have become the 
only way Britain can articulate its collective security obligations to its domestic audiences. 
 
The Dangers of ‘Narrative-Led’ Strategy or ‘Strategising’ Policy 
 
Britain’s transnational dilemma in Afghanistan has been one where the state has been 
subjected to conditions of collective security membership that have increased tensions 
within the state to find ways to extricate itself from the more unrealistic obligations it had in 
the conflict, but to do so in a manner that did not compromise its international relationships 
and standing. SC can be seen as the state’s solution to this problem and as a solution that 
arose in institutional terms because of the existence of this problem. Reconfiguring 
narratives to achieve such ends between states is one matter; what has subsequently 
developed, however, is the academic and doctrinal supposition that these narratives have a 
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‘strategic’ value in shaping outcomes in theatre to meet the demands of coalition policy. 
The final contribution of this work is to query the validity of such postulations, given the 
ostensibly unintended consequences strategic narratives have had in the war in 
Afghanistan. It is telling that the majority of the mentions of ‘narratives’ in official British 
documents referred to those of the enemy, particularly that of al Qaeda, and the need for a 
UK counter-narrative to fight a ‘battle of the narrative’ (Cabinet Office 2008:26, 2010a:16, 
2010b:6). However, over time the need for a counter-narrative has morphed into a more 
fundamental examination of the relationship between strategy and communication, lending 
itself to the development of strategic narratives that stand alone, independent of an enemy 
narrative, that describe strategy at the highest level. An example of this can be found in the 
current doctrine for British strategic communication and narrative formation, Joint Doctrine 
Note (JDN) 1/12, which explains the need for a strategic narrative and communication as 
‘integral to strategy, both informing and supporting policy. Good strategy is 
usually forged from a single big idea, or a coherent collection of smaller ideas, 
with a clear underpinning rationale and unifying purpose. To be effective, the 
strategy must be instantly communicable if it is to gain traction at home and 
abroad. The logic of the strategy and its appeal should be compelling and 
easily understood. It must seek to gain and maintain the initiative and be set 
firmly in the context of the political purpose. It should bind the key players 
and the instruments of power, and in its totality should be simple, or at least 
capable of explanation in simple terms’ (DCDC 2012:1-4). 
This excerpt demonstrates the vastness of the role assigned to strategic 
communication, including the remarkable contention that the ‘logic’ and ‘appeal’ of a 
strategy should be ‘compelling’ and ‘easily understood’. Of course, if there is one aspect of 
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collective security operations such as those carried out by Britain in Afghanistan that should 
be abundantly clear, it is that there is little about the strategies and policies therein that 
evinces compelling and readily apprehensible logic. Collective security operations by their 
very structure and function confound easy explanation – hence the need for strategic 
communication and narrative, not just for the benefit of public understanding, but also so 
that policymakers tasked with prosecuting policy and strategy may understand what it is 
they are trying to achieve. Strategic communication exists because contemporary strategy is 
not easily explainable:  the ability of a strategic narrative to explain a strategy is contingent 
upon the relative merits of the strategy itself, yet the need for strategic narrative and 
communication could only emerge from a scenario in which communication of strategy had 
been hitherto lacking in coherence and effectiveness, ostensibly because of a flawed (or 
ulterior) policy. Beyond the level of policy formulation, however, there is the issue of 
interest and collective security dynamics, the inherent complexity of which prevents the 
reconciliation of ‘simple’ explanations with accurate explanations. Perhaps this quandary 
explains why strategic communication’s role in ‘informing’ policy, and thereby guiding 
strategy, has been put forth as a potential solution to this dilemma. If the West is involved in 
‘a war of ideas’, and its ability to explain a strategy is found wanting in a strategic 
information environment that places a premium on making strategic logic ‘compelling and 
easily understood’ to audiences, reason might dictate a strategy that is led, or ‘informed’ by 
narrative. This notion is emergent in military and academic circles, with some even calling 
for the further development and institutionalisation of ‘narrative led operations’ (Nissen 
2012). Scholarship on this subject is nascent but growing, and ranges in the degree of its 
prescription. Carsten Roenfeldt (2011:58) offers a paradigm of ‘productive war’ – based on 
force of arguments rather than force of arms as more relevant than traditional physical 
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warfare since, in his view it is ‘discursive clashes that determine political projects’ core 
values’. By this, it is conceived that in the process of developing a strategic narrative, a state 
demarcates the values and principles that inform its policy and dictate its strategic options; 
as Roenfeldt claims, this is possible by flipping the Clausewitzian dictum of war being ‘the 
continuation of politics by other means’ on its head (2011:53).  
Simpson’s War From the Ground Up (2012) takes this inversion of Clausewitzian 
strategy as his starting point of inquiry, and is perhaps the most ambitious and well-received 
attempt at promoting the role of strategic narrative in contemporary conflict. In a manner 
similar to Roenfeldt, he claims that politics is now an extension of war, or more precisely 
that the realms of politics and war are fusing so that the centre of gravity of conflict tends to 
be primarily ideational, thereby making the enemy and neutral parties’ acceptance of one’s 
strategic narrative the primary goal in irregular conflict (2012:75). As such, Simpson 
contends that successful strategy hinges upon convincing strategic narratives – essentially 
the articulation of policy, or ‘policy narratives’, which for liberal states involved in long 
counter-insurgency campaigns such as Afghanistan means relying upon advancing moral 
arguments to gain support. Such moral arguments, or ‘ethos’, are for Simpson informed by 
viewing ‘vision and confidence in one’s values’ as ‘the core of strategy’ (2012:221). In this 
way, Simpson argues that strategy in conflicts such as Afghanistan should be led or guided 
by a narrative that is centred upon the assertion of the ethical and moral rightness of the 
mission. This is challenging, however, since it is clear that a range of events and interests 
(the ‘fog of war’) militate against the coherent and consistent realisation of moral and 
ethical activity in pursuit of moral and ethical ends. This in turn produces the potential for 
contradiction within narrative. Simpson comes close on several occasions to identifying 
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disparities and conflicts of interest as the primary cause of disjointed policy and, therefore, 
of untenable strategy: 
‘[s]trategy requires an abstract starting point, an idea, which is typically 
understood as policy. Clausewitz stated that ‘policy is nothing in itself … we 
can only treat policy as representative of all the interests of the community’. 
In reality, to reconcile all the interests of the community in relation to a given 
conflict is often impossible. Even those constituencies who support a military 
action may well do so for different, and potentially contradictory motives. The 
further one moves away from wars fought for national survival, the more 
likely is one to detect such inconsistencies’ (Simpson 2012:117).  
This is an astute analysis that has been confirmed by the empirical chapters of this 
work. Policy is likely often representative of the interests of all involved in the policymaking 
process. This was how the CA was devised, and how it was conceived to function. Of course, 
the irony of this is that narratives for Afghanistan failed to coalesce because of this scenario, 
leading to the failure of the CA as a strategy and the eventual development of strategic 
communication. The issue for Simpson, however, is that he assumes that policy is ‘the 
starting point’ on a continuum that moves through strategy, operations and tactics 
(2012:118). This is strange given his admission in the quotation above that policies arise out 
of interests, a point that should lead one to examine in depth first the manner in which 
policies are shaped by interests and how those interests inform strategies, rather than 
simply positing policy as a theoretical starting point of analysis. Because he neglects this 
continuum, much of the potential for sociological and political examination of precisely the 
type of motives Simpson alluded to (those which this work has explored) is avoided, and as 
a result the analysis that remains – a largely abstract and hermetically sealed examination of 
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the potential uses of narrative to the strategic process – is largely devoid of any 
consideration of the detrimental aspects of strategic narratives to ideas of strategy, much 
less to ideas of a strategic process guided by narrative. He does not problematize narrative; 
he starts with an assumption of it being a solution to strategy rather than as a symptom of a 
lack of coherent strategy. Such a perspective is natural in circumstances where the wider 
intellectual, ideological, political and social milieus directing state interests and policies to 
conceive strategy in a certain way – for instance, in a way that argues strategy to be 
essentially synonymous with articulations of policy – are left unaccounted for or are simply 
assumed to be a certain way. Of course, such a position leads us back to the starting point of 
this work and the subject of the problematic state of British strategic thought, one which 
Hew Strachan identified as such because of a recurrent incapability of those concerned to 
distinguish between policy and strategy (2005:34,50). Strachan’s argument for improving 
this situation was similar to that which animated the MOD to undertake SC: it was based on 
a need for greater concord in the civil-military relationship (2006:76-77). What distinguishes 
my argument, however, is the idea that fractures within the strategic milieu of civil-military 
relations arise from a discrepancy of the location of interests between the two parties: 
policy and strategy are not iterative or collaborative in a sealed binary coupling; rather, 
national policy is infused by external considerations that shape and direct its interests, 
which then cause discrepancies between what is strategically possible and what is politically 
necessary. 
Of course, the sources of policy for any state, but particularly for the United Kingdom, 
are always multiple, taking in all the vicissitudes of inter- and intra-state compromise and 
negotiation as well as the personal or collective passions – be they ideologically or 
materially located – that animate policymakers in the decision-making process. Of primary 
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importance, however, is a recognition that policy for the United Kingdom is substantially 
dictated by the collective security framework in which it operates, because it is on this basis 
– and only on this basis – that the United Kingdom may secure its ‘national’ interests – the 
rational referent of policy. This point is simply not recognised by Simpson or other 
contributors to strategic communication literature, however; Simpson opts for a discussion 
of a Clausewitzian understanding of policy as ‘in the final analysis, dependent on passion’ 
(2012:238).  A possible result of neglecting this aspect of statecraft is that the majority of his 
analysis of the problems of contemporary strategy focuses on the misapplication of 
Clausewitzian paradigms of inter-state warfare in irregular conflicts; that is, he focuses on 
the root of strategic malaise as being located somewhere between policy and strategy, 
rather than as between the nodes of interest and policy. Ostensibly, this is because 
Simpson’s investigation is one that moves ‘from the ground up’, applying tactical and 
operational lessons from his experience as a military officer to the level of strategy and 
policy. He extrapolates lessons at those levels to the level of strategy because he equates 
the power of narrative at the operational level – for instance, providing local villagers of a 
culturally genial story of the presence of foreign troops as a means of pacifying the area for 
stabilisation operations – to a potential power for narrative at a strategic level where 
persuasion is the centre of gravity and the performance of stories aimed at securing popular 
consent can become a paradigm for contemporary warfare. This is unfortunate in that its 
equation of the operational level of war with the strategic is a common mistake of 
proponents of the ‘wars among the people’ thesis. This work, by contrast, takes the 
opposite approach of ‘policy from the top down’, and thereby imputes that the majority of 
Britain’s strategic shortcomings are not really strategic issues at all, but stem from 
intractable political issues at the transnational level which then exert themselves upon 
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social dynamics at the strategic level of states. Simpson’s is a common refrain from 
advocates of strategic communication and narrative, likely for similar reasons: they see the 
problem of strategy at the level of strategy and operations, rather than at the level of 
interests and policy. 
To further illustrate, according to Simpson, the West’s ‘fixation’ with ‘generic doctrinal 
categories’ such as ‘insurgent’ and ‘government’ produce the effect of ‘upscaling’ elements 
on the statecraft continuum: ‘when operational ideas, which demand a political context, are 
not adequately provided with one they move up to fill the vacuum [of strategy or policy]’ 
(2012:228). Ironically, although voiced as a warning against the encroachment of politics 
into the domain of war, this is precisely what Simpson advocates in the form of strategic 
communication and narrative: the elevation of an operational accompaniment (which is in 
fact merely an articulation of policy) to the level of strategy. This approach appears, time 
and again, to result in a lack of discussion about the way in which conflicting interests can 
distort strategy and produce incompatible narratives, or where the fixation on the 
production of coherent narratives actually distorts the work of strategy by equating it with 
articulations of policy. The danger here is that what Simpson refers to as ‘strategic 
narratives’ are actually little more than operationalised versions of the ‘policy narratives’ 
investigated in this work. Indeed, the lack of such analysis can also be found in the tendency 
to prognosticate on the options for improving British ‘national strategy’ without even 
contemplating whether British strategy is ‘national’ and whether, given the demands of 
collective security on Britain and the absence of a clearly defined and independent national 
interest, a national strategy – or even strategy itself, insofar as it pertains to being both the 
means to an end (alliance cohesion) and the means to the means of that end (stabilisation 
missions) – is possible.  
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Again, without a critical understanding of the nature of interest, from which all things 
policy and strategy descend, it is much easier to develop a theoretical construct that looks 
at strategic narratives as relatively unproblematic or even supportive of strategy (as 
opposed to being indicative of a lack of strategy). Indeed, as mentioned earlier in this work, 
nearly all academic contributions on the subject carry an a priori assumption that strategic 
communication and strategic narrative are naturally beneficial to strategy processes, as 
opposed to one that sees them as existing as a consequence of a lack of strategy. An 
appreciation of the lack of strategy or a confusion of policy and strategy in Afghanistan 
might explain why the idea of ‘strategic narratives’ has apparently gained so much currency 
in analyses of the conflict by Simpson, Roenfeldt and practitioners like Stanley McChrystal. 
Few scholars have investigated the potential for ‘narrative-led’ approaches to distort and 
even undermine the strategic process as a result of a muddled understanding of interest, 
policy and strategy, and how these elements inter-relate, much less the idea that strategic 
communication is the result of an already distorted strategic and political milieu. One 
exception is Dimitriu (2012:205), who notes how such a perspective could lead to unrealistic 
expectations on the power of narrative and communication to transform the state of 
contemporary strategy: 
‘There is the danger that too much value could be attached to Stratcom and 
that it could become seen as a corrective panacea against faulty policy or 
misconceived actions. Stratcom is in the end no substitute for an overall 
strategy, it is merely a supporting process. Not even the best communication 
and influence strategies are able to counter an unpopular policy or 
problematic actions’. 
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This is a point well worth making. Strategic narratives tend to be given a level of 
significance to the policy and strategy process that does not take account of empirical 
realities. The received wisdom evinced in Roenfeldt and Simpson’s work that posits a 
reversal of the relationship between politics and war as a reflection of changing contextual 
circumstances also assumes that the interests that underpin a traditional realist conception 
of power have been fundamentally altered. Moreover, the tendency of those advocating 
‘narrative-led’ approaches seem caught in a paradox in which narrative is necessary because 
of contemporary uncertainty and chaos in international relations, but also impossible 
because – obviously – events dictate strategy, not the other way around. The idea that 
events can adhere to a script seems to contradict one of the main lessons of the War in 
Afghanistan (and indeed of much of the ongoing fallout of the Arab Spring), that is, the 
speed at which events can overwhelm understanding. Warning against strategic 
communication and narratives as a panacea to problems of strategy is therefore crucial. One 
can do worse in this regard than to recall Clausewitz’s counsel on war as ‘the province of 
chance’: 
‘[from] this continual interposition of chance, the actor in War constantly finds 
things different from his expectations; and this cannot fail to have an 
influence on his plans, or at least on the presumptions connected with these 
plans. If this influence is so great as to render the predetermined plan 
completely nugatory, then, as a rule, a new one must be substituted in its 
place; but at the moment the necessary data are often wanting for this, 
because in the course of action circumstances press for immediate decision, 
and allow no time to look about for fresh data, often not enough for mature 
consideration’ (1982:140-141).  
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The fundamental paradox for strategic communication is this: in the pursuit of 
strategies of risk management, states have a natural tendency to try to mitigate risk – 
through the use of narratives that aim to support the pursuit of risk management by 
sustaining political support – but in doing so they actually produce the potential for creating 
greater risk to the political sustainability of risk management operations by attempting to 
predict, control and manage the course of those operations in defiance of a major 
philosophical tenet of strategy: that war is pervaded by elements of chance, contingency 
and uncertainty that defy attempts at prediction, control and management. In one sense it 
would appear that Simpson recognises this paradox by noting, in relation to the United 
Kingdom’s 2010 National Security Strategy, that 
‘To consider broad global trends is no doubt of value. However, any 
expectations situated so far into an abstract future should at least be 
tempered by today’s concerns…A distant-horizon gazing approach to strategy 
can leave one reacting to distant and fragile shadows that may vanish as soon 
as one approaches them’ (2012:242).  
On the other hand, however, Simpson appears to contradict his own argument by 
promoting the development of strategies based on ‘ethos’, or the advocacy of moral 
justifications for intervention in stating that ‘a strategic narrative which neglects ethos 
completely is in danger of finding itself illegitimate in the longer term’ (2012:213). Of 
course, this is an important point that has been borne out in the empirical chapters of this 
work: the production of the national security-centric counter-terrorism narrative at the 
expense of the normative interventionist strand that preceded it has likely come at the cost 
of nullifying much of the moral element in arguments for liberal intervention going forward. 
However, his view of the importance of ethos also stands in stark opposition to another 
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major conclusion derived from this work, that is, that an adherence to a high-mimetic 
ethical and moral dimension to British stabilisation efforts in Afghanistan was precisely the 
reason for the strategic and narrative drift that ultimately brought about a reconfiguration 
of narrative (via the institutionalisation of strategic communication processes) to one 
focused on narrow self-interest accompanied by the (often explicit) abrogation by public 
officials of the existence of moral or ethical elements to the strategic narrative. The point is 
that, just as strategic designs and policies vacillate in relation to events, so too does 
strategic narrative. Unlike in traditional narratives, strategic narratives are highly dynamic 
and unpredictable; they are not pre-destined stories waiting to be played out according to 
an already-written script. There is never one narrator, and the story being told is subject to 
forces beyond the narrator’s control, thereby producing the potential for the entire 
narrative to be subverted and actually become detrimental to the policies and strategies it is 
designed to support. 
A balance should therefore be struck in determining the utility of strategic 
communication and narratives. Discourse traps have been created by both the 
implementation of inappropriate strategic narratives and the attempt, through strategic 
communication practices, to rectify the gap between rhetoric and reality. If one accepts that 
discourse traps have indeed occurred, then one must also accept that discursive 
frameworks have considerable power in shaping and directing policy and strategy. In such a 
reading, then, one must concede, as many constructivists do, that discourse has a 
constitutive power: ‘[p]olicy statements should be “treated as actions…rather than policies,” 
because policies are instruments that result in action’ (Onuf 2001:79). This has been made 
clear throughout this work: with Blair in 2001 and 2002 and his placing of a high-mimetic 
framework of liberal peace theory onto the future course of the mission, with Reid and 
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Browne persisting in framing the mission in Helmand as one of ‘reconstruction’ despite all 
evidence to the contrary, with Hutton reconfiguring the rationale for the conflict from one 
of global security and for the sake of Afghanistan to one primarily concerned with national 
security and counter-terrorism, and with the Cameron Government’s reframing of 
Afghanistan within the context of a narrow conception of the national interest.  
In each case, the narrative pathway taken had ramifications that narrowed the 
rhetorical options available and contributed to the gradual altering of Britain’s strategic 
posture in Afghanistan. It is also important to recognise the limits of communication 
practices in strategic affairs, however; as Griffin (2011:331) has argued, ‘[d]octrine doesn’t 
shape policy and strategy: policy and strategy shape doctrine’. Treating policy statements as 
actions will not change the fact that words cannot substitute for action, just as rhetoric 
cannot meaningfully overcome a lack of autonomy in policymaking. Of course, the 
conclusion this work has arrived at is that the United Kingdom’s policy narratives for 
Afghanistan, directed by transnational processes and in response to the transnational 
dilemma, have sought to do precisely that. Communication on Afghanistan has effectively 
sidestepped the problems of British strategy and, in the process, has assumed a mantle of 
being ‘strategic’ in the absence of an easily defined continuum of interests, policies and 
strategies. The essential paradox here is that because strategic communication arose in 
spite of, and not in support of such a continuum, it cannot but obscure – and at worst 
further compound – the strategic shortcomings of the British state. This is how it should be 
analysed – empirically and then theoretically. Whilst interests do abide eternally (and 
therefore should be central to strategic studies), their substance and location, and our 
understanding of what they consist of and where they reside, remains uncertain as they are 
malleable to the processes of transnationalisation through which they are located and re-
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located. There is very little that is conceptually clear about ‘national interests’ under such 
circumstances (beyond its rhetorical ambiguity and therefore its political utility), and it is 
this confusion that gives rise to ideas of transnational dilemmas and, I have argued, has 
precipitated the need for strategic communication. Explaining the shortcomings of British 
strategy by reference to this dynamic has exposed this gap in strategic studies and the 
limitations of strategic communication. As long as war is considered a rational pursuit, there 
must be a clear conceptual link between policy and strategy. If the policy is unstatable, 
however, the possibility of strategies becoming decoupled from it is highly likely. If an 
unstatable policy is also fundamental and unavoidable, the potential for improving strategic 
thinking is diminished, not least since the protection of an unstated yet essential policy can 
(and apparently has) become a strategic aim in itself. This is a task for which strategic 
communication is well-suited, but also one that, by design, further obscures the strategic 
quandaries at the heart of British defence policy.  
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